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2Abstract
Communalism is the dominant factor in Peninsular Malaysia's 
plural society and influences every aspect of the electoral process.
This is the theme of the present work. The objective is not to 
attempt a study of the 197^ election per se but rather to observe how 
considerations of race influenced the electoral system, party 
organisation and appeal, and finally the electorate's response.
This approach necessarily demands an examination of the formal 
aspects of the electoral system, not merely to act as the backcloth 
for examining the election of 197^5 but also to determine how it 
influences and is influenced by considerations of race. The laws and 
regulations governing elections are studied and their implications to 
communal representation and organization examined. Particular 
emphasis is given to the apportionment of seats to the various states, 
and the delineation of constituencies. The implications of these for 
communal representation 3re established.
Political party evolution, organization and appeal are visualised 
as attempts to mobilise support from a divided society, and the operat- 
ion of three conflicting modes of party organization, i.e. communal 
parties, multi-communal parties and inter-communal coalitions, are 
examined. This in turn calls for an examination of the evolution of 
political parties to note the origin of the three modes of organisation. 
Aspects of communal discrimination by these parties are noted so as to 
establish the basis of their appeal and to present a theoretical 
rationale and empirical support for the identification of the several 
parties as having an appeal to and representing the interests of 
particular communities. In all, four aspects of discrimination are 
viewed - membership requirements, party branch establishment, candidate 
selection and candidate placement.
3The campaign itself is then seen as a logical outcome of the 
plural society, the electoral system utilised and the evolution and 
organization of political parties. The manner in which parties act 
and interact in the spotlighted arena of the campaign is studied and 
special attention is paid to the appeal to particular communities as 
the basis of electoral victory.
The results are then assessed as the response of the various 
communities to these appeals. Success and failure are seen to be
the consequences of two factors*. the biases introduced by the
system and the perception of members of society as to the communal 
disposition of the parties. Finally, the electoral results are 
examined to establish the regional variations in support, and to 
identify the implications for the several parties that contested the 
election.
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The Setting
The Malayan state which became independent on August 311 19575 
had seen significant changes in its internal political organization.
'I
By the end of the eighty-three years of only briefly interrupted
British colonial rule the independent petty riverine sultanates ;were
forged into a federation with a Westminster-style parliamentary
democracy. So successful did this system appear that within six
years of its gaining independence the young state became the senior
partner in an even larger federation encompassing Sabah, Sarawak and 
2
Singapore. Such developments were the evident outcome of British 
colonial rule.
Colonialism also transformed Peninsular Malaysia (as the former 
Federation of Malaya is now known) from an almost wholly homogeneous 
Malay society into a plural one, with no community having a numerical 
majority in the total population. At the time of the latest census 
in 1970 the population numbered 8 ,810,3^8 comprising thirty-two 
distinct communities. (Table 1) For purposes of political bargaining, 
however, these communities are reduced to three widely accepted major 
groupings: the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. Thus viewed the
Malays form 53-19%9 the Chinese 35-^% and the Indians 10.39% of the 
total population; all other groups not included in these broad 
categories comprise a mere 0.78%,
Statistical pluralism in itself may be regarded as insignificant 
were it not that the several ethnic groups in Malaya identify themselves, 
perceive interests, and define issues in a manner that tends towards 
conflict rather than consensus. Religious differences, linguistic
1 British control of Penang began in 1786 but it is the 187^ 
intervention in Perak that is generally regarded as the date of the 
beginning of British colonial rule of the Malay states.
2 This was in 1963- In 19&5 Singapore was forced out of the federation. 
The federation currently comprises the Federal Territory of Kuala 
Lumpur, the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. (Figure 1)
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Table 1
Population by Community Groups - Peninsular Malaysia, 1970
Community Group Number Percentage
Malay 4,392,203 93.73 49.85
Indonesian 222,698 4.75
Negrito 1 ,969 0.04
Jakun 7,639 0.16
Semai 13,312 0.33
Semalai 3,030 0.07
Temiar 10,769 0.23
Other Orang Asli 13,710 0.29
Other Malays 18,488 0.39
Total Malay 4 ,685,838 100 53.19
Hokhien 1 ,068,803 34.23
Cantonese 617,588 19.78
Khek (Hakka) 690,821 22,13
Teochew 387,048 12.40
Hainanese 145,758 4;67
Kwongsi 77,577 2.48
Hokchiu 57,095 1.83
Henghua 16,924 0.54
Hokchia 9,039 O .29
Other Chinese 31,697 , 1.66
Total Chinese 3,122,350
00 35 .44
Indian Tamil 75^,256 . 80.88
Telegu 29,531 3.17
Malayali 41,974 4.50
Punjabi 33,479 3.59
Other Indian 35,796 3.84
Pakistani 9,497 1.02
Ceylon Tamil 24,436 2.62
Other Ceylonese 3,660 0.39
Total Indian 932,629 . 100 10.59
Thai 27,114 39-00
Other Asian 6,106 8.78
European 13,918 20.02
Eurasian 14,007 ' 20.1-4
Others 8,386 12.06
Total Other 69,531 100 0,78
West Malaysian total 8,810,348 100
Source: Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing
Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, pp §2-§6.
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dissimilarities, social and kinship affinities, and economic special­
izations all reinforce the division of Peninsular Malaysian society into 
Malays, Chinese and Indians. Indeed the major process of acculturation 
has been the creation of common bonds and culture within these three 
primary groupings. The regional differences between the Malays of the 
various part of the peninsula as well as the distinctions between the 
local Malays and the recent immigrants from Indonesia and South Thailand 
are only secondary to the differences between Malays and non-Malays.
The diverse dialect and clan groups of the Chinese are similarly bonded 
together by the dictates of communal bargaining. Similarly, those from 
the Indian subcontinent - India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and Sri Lanka 
- may speak different languages and profess distinct religious faiths 
but for political purposes they view themselves, and are certainly 
regarded by the other Malaysians, as "Indians’1.
Most Peninsular Malaysian communities, including the vast majority 
of those classified as Malays, are migrants or the descendants of 
migrants to the country, but the Malays make a special claim to the land 
by virtue of their longer occupancy. This claim was reinforced by the
existence of political organizations in the Malay states in the form of
1sultanates with which the British colonialists entered into treaty 
agreements. Throughout British rule the special status of the Malays 
was acknowledged and the Malays appeared content with this arrangement. 
But when in 1946 the British Government proposed the Malayan Union 
which, it was argued, failed to preserve the special status of the 
Malay, Malay nationalism blossomed. The Malays rapidly came to 
dominate political life and successfully demanded the withdrawal of the
1 Gullick, J.M., Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 
1958 provides an authoritative account of the Malay political 
system prior to British rule.
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Malayan Union proposal. Malay special rights and privileges were 
written into the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 19^8, the 1957 
Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. The 
special rights and privileges accorded the Malay community were held 
as a condition for the granting of the ’legitimate interests of the 
non-Malays’. The words ’Malay special rights and privileges' and 
'legitimate interests of the non-Malays' are of'overwhelming importance, 
and form an essential part of the Malaysian political vocabulary. They 
are at one and the same time the basis of any claim advanced on the 
part of one community, and the basis for the rejection of that by 
others.
The provisions of the Constitution concerning Malay special 
privileges and rights involve, preferences in four different fields:
■ (i) reservation of land for Malays;
(ii) quotas for admission to the Public Service;
(iii) quotas in respect of the issuing of permits or 
licences for the operation of certain businesses; and
(iv) the granting of scholarships, bursaries, and other
1forms of aid for educational purposes.
No specific time limit was set for The duration of these provisions 
guaranteeing the special privileges for Malays. In the case of the 
'land reservations', the respective State Legislatures and both Houses 
of the Federal Parliament had to indicate the need for any changes by
a vote of the majority of their total membership and by a vote of at
least two-thirds of the members present and voting for such a change. 
The. provisions as regards the other rights and privileges are
1 A discussion of the compromise effected as regards the special 
position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the non- 
Malays is included in Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political 
Process in Malaya, 1965, pp 102-117.
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amendable only after the consent of the Yang di Pertuan Agong (the Head 
of State) is secured. In ’exchange* for these special privileges 
and rights, the non-Malays were granted rights of citizenship, freedom 
to pursue their own religious faiths and use of their languages for 
non-official purposes. As enacted, the provisions involving this 
compromise were weighted in favour of the status-quo.
The Malays thus regard themselves as Bumiputra, literally ’sons 
of the soil', with a natural right to political control. Non-Malays 
are regarded as aliens who are there by sufferance of the Malays; 
their rights to citizenship and a place in Malaysian society are 
grudgingly conceded only because the Malay special privileges are 
recognized. Even so, the Malays resent the perceived economic 
prosperity of the non-Malay, and most particularly, the Chinese. The 
popular belief that the Chinese ’control’ the economy is cast into 
doubt by data published in the Third Malaysia Plan. These reveal the 
ownership of share capital of limited companies and, ownership and 
participation in key sectors of the economy by community and nationality 
The statistics establish that there is a clear dominance of foreign 
interests in the ownership and control of the Malaysian economy.
(Table 2) Nonetheless, the statistics confirm the view that of all the 
Malaysian communities, the Chinese are the most privileged economically. 
Even if the Chinese community does not control the economy, and the 
Indian community also comprises an underprivileged group, most 
Malaysians accept that the Malay community is economically less 
privileged'than the other communities. Consequently, the Malay 
regards the fundamental and immediate function of his political 
strength as the instrument by which he can promote his own economic 
advancement. The non-Malay’s hope for political equality is not
1 Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, 1976, 
p. 183.
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Table 2 '
Ownership and Participation in Key Sectors of the Economy, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1972/73 (percentage share in each sector)
Sector Malay Chinese Indian
2
Others Foreign
X
Modern agriculture (planted 
acreage, 1973)
Rubber and oil palm 21.0 26.3 2.6 7.9 ^2.2
Coconut and tea 0 19-9 10.8 O .k 68.9
Industry'(value of fixed 
assets, 1972)
Mining 0.7 35.2 0.1 9.5 5^.5
Manufacturings ■ 6.9 32.5 0.8 1^.0 ^5.8
Construction 2.A- 85.6 - \ A 3.8 6.8
Trade (turnover value, 1972) 
Wholesale 0 .8 55.0 2.7 0.6 ^0 .9
Retail 3 .6 75.6 6.5 0.2 1*f.1
Transport (value of fixed 
assets, 1972)
Taxi ^0.6 ■39.7 18.0 1.7 0
Bus 18.0 5^.3 1.6 16.5 9-6
Haulage 15.3 70.6 5.2 5.8 3.1
Professional establishments 
(annual revenue, 1973) 5 .3 51.0 11 A 18-if* 13.9
1 In corporate and non-corporate sectors. Establishment's are 
categorized en the basis .of majority ownership. Government 
ownership is added to the Malay category as most of it is held in 
trust by public enterprises and agencies. In rubber and oil palm, 
Government ownership, excluding FELDA, is 0.9% and manufacturing, 
5.0%.
2 Includes other Malaysians as well as establishments where no 
particular group owns more than 50% of‘the assets.
3 Includes FELDA which had a planted acreage of 526,900 in 1973 of
which 96.2% was classified as Malay-owned and the balance as non- 
Malay, with Chinese holding 2.1% and Indians 1.6%. ■
k Private'establishments only. It includes doctors, dentists,
lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, surveyors and 
veterinary surgeons.
Source: Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1960?
1976, p. 183.
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considered negotiable until the Malay has at least reached economic 
parity.
Even if the first generation non-Malay Malaysians were willing to 
accept a secondary role in national politics, for those non-Malays who 
were born in Malaysia and know no other home, Malay special rights and 
privileges imply inferior status. Despite the majority of these 
conceding that some form of special assistance is necessary for the 
economic betterment of the Malay, their own frustrations and failures 
to advance satisfactorily in their careers are held to be the 
consequence of the Government’s pro-Malay policy. Inter-communal 
competition and conflict thus forms the motif of Malaysian politics, 
and political parties have tended to represent and exacerbate these 
primordial loyalities and conflicts.
The communal composition of the country, with no community com­
prising a clear majority, created problems for political parties wish­
ing to gain electoral majorities. The problems were overcome prior 
to independence by the formation of an intercommunal Alliance, a 
coalition of three communally based political parties - the United 
Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). For a while it appeared 
that this formula would suffice to counter the centrifugal forces that 
threatened to destroy the viability of the state itself. Election 
campaigns, however, provided a,'forum for the expression of the frust­
rations of the various ethnic groups, and the polls an opportunity to 
register their own claims and even challenge those of others. The 
euphoria of independence and the Alliance’s role in achieving it, 
retained for the Alliance Party, majority support in the first election 
held in independent Peninsular Malaysia. The artificial unity 
concommitant with the external threat posed by Indonesian
23
1
confrontation , even gained the Alliance increased support m  the
second parliamentary election in 196*f. Communal issues nonetheless
dominated the election campaigns. The 1969 parliamentary and state
elections, however, provided the first clear opportunity for the
Alliance formula to be challenged. The Malay opposition was united
under the PAS, and the only non-Malay opposition remained fragmented.
Immediately before the election the non-Malay based opposition
parties achieved an understanding amongst themselves, the consequence
of which was a series of straight contests between Alliance candidates
and opposition candidates. At the 1969 election the Alliance formula
of compromise was rejected by the majority of Peninsular Malaysians.
More significantly, the unrestrained airing of communal sentiments and
the uncertainty as to whether the Alliance or the non-Malay opposition
parties would form the governments of several states, particularly
Selangor, invoked increased communal tension.
On May 13, 1969 intercommunal violence erupted in the capital
city, Kuala Lumpur. Severe rioting and looting continued for almost
a week, more than two hundred people were killed, about five hundred
2
were wounded and almost nine thousand were arrested. At the height
of the rioting, two days after the outbreak of violence, the Yang di
Pertuan Agong proclaimed a state of emergency and suspended the
3
uncompleted parliamentary and state elections. Abdul Raz,ak bin Hussein,
1 The formation of Malaysia in 1963 resulted in Indonesian hostility.
The Alliance Government represented the principal issue of the 
election being one of unity in the face of external threat. This 
is discussed in some detail in Chapter III which deals with 
political party evolution.
2 Official estimates were 196 deaths, 180 injured by firearms, 239 
injured by other weapons, 9,1^3 arrested. These data are provided
in Malaysia, The National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy,
1969, pp 89 - 56.
Unofficial estimates place the figures considerably higher. ' See for 
instance Slimming, J., Malaysia: Death of a Democracy, 1969,
pp 29-^8.
3 For a discussion of the measures adopted' and the legal consequences 
of these see Mohamed Suffianbin Hashim, Tun, An Introduction to 
the Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, pp 228-232.
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Deputy Prime Minister in the Alliance Government, was made Director of
Operations and held solely responsible for exercising the executive
authority of the Federation. He was subject to only two restrictions
- he had to act on the Prime Minister's advice and was to be assisted
by a National Operations Council consisting of persons appointed by
himself. The functions of the federal cabinet were discharged by the
National Operations Council and those of the state cabinets by the
State Operations Committees whose members too were appointed by the
Director of Operations. The ethnic composition of the National
Operations Council comprised seven Malays, one Chinese and one Indian.
Parliamentary government, many believed, had come to an end, and one
commentator held that there had been:
" ... a breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Malaysia, a 
breakdown which may prove to be permanent in terms of any 
meaningful representation of non-Malay elements in Malaysia's 
political system".^
The events of May 19&9 shocked the nation and provoked bitter
communal animosity and paranoia. After the immediate task of
containing the violence had been completed, the National Operations
Council directed its efforts to seeking a strategy by which to curtail
the tensions generated. A Department of National Unity to study,
evaluate and implement economic and social programmes designed to
promote national integration, was established. The Department was,
under the leadership of Ghazalie Shafiee, charged with the task of
formulating a "national ideology" which would "serve as the nexus
2
uniting the people of Malaysia". A National Consultative Council, 
comprising sixty-five members, representing the National Operations
1 Snider, N.L., "Pace, Leitmotiv of the Malayan Election Drama", 
Asian Survey, December 1970, P- 1080.
2 The Straits Times, July 18, 1969-
25
Council, the State Governments, political parties, religious organ­
izations, professional associations, the Press, trade unions, teachers
organizations and representatives of minority communities was
1
established m  January 19?0.
The National Consultative Council met periodically over the next
year and a half and, to avoid any public disquiet on the sensitive
communa-l-issues-being discussed, held its meeting in camera. On
Independence day the following year, August 31? 1970? the Yang di Pertuan
Agong formally promulgated a statement of the national ideology of
Malaysia, entitled "Rukunegara",■ which was-to bind all Malaysians
together and form the basis for the government’s strategy for creating
communal understanding. The- introduction to the Rukunegara begins:-
"Malaysia is a land of many races. The diverse social, 
cultural and economic values which exist in our multiracial 
society are complicated by the identification of certain 
economic groups with particular racial communities and 
geographical locations ... Our nation-building efforts 
were marred by the activities- of destructive elements.
These elements are to be found in all communities. From 
time to time latent racialist attitudes and racial 
prejudices were exploited on various pretexts leading to 
racial incidents. The most serious racial incident was 
the riot of May "15) 1969s in the Federal capital ...
Activities in political, economic, educational, social and 
cultural fields must be geared towards- the objective of 
national unity ... In our endeavour to achieve these ends 
we shall be guided by certain principles which have evolved 
in the course of a common history, signifying a synthesis 
of thoughts and feelings, and which have-been enshrined in 
our Constitution. These ends and these principles, 
acceptable to all, will serve as the nexus which will bind 
us together. These ends to which our Nation is committed 
and the principles which will guide our actions,will 
together constitute our RUKUNEGARA.’^
The Declaration itself reads
OUR NATION, MALAYSIA, being dedicated
to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples; 
to maintaining a democratic way of life; 
to creating a just society in which the wealth 
of'the' nation shall be equitably shared;
1 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, pp ^13-^1^-.
2 Malaysia, Ministry of Information, Rukunegara, 1970? P* 1-
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to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich 
and diverse cultural traditions; 
to building a progressive society which shall 
be oriented to modern science and technology;
WE, her peoples pledge our united efforts to attain 
these ends guided by these principles:-
Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country 
Upholding the Constitution 
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality.^
The- Rukunegara was an indication of the developments to come.
The commentary on ’Beliefs* elucidates 'A Democratic Society* thus:-
We are dedicated to maintaining a democratic way of life 
in which ultimate power lies with the people acting through 
a constitutionally elected Parliament. All of us regard 
ourselves as Malaysians irrespective of race or creed.
In our system the national interests must prevail.
The interests of the whole must come before the interests 
of any sectional group, because otherwise the stability 
and security of the Nation will be jeopardised.
Fundamental liberties and freedom of political activity 
consistent with the laws of the country are guaranteed by 
our Constitution, but these rights shall not be abused, in 
the name of democracy, to promote racialism or to destroy 
democracy itself.
With the promulgation of the Rukunegara Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the Government's intentions to reconvene
3Parliament in February 1971* A White Paper was issued and proposed
a series of amendments to the Malaysian Constitution designed to
achieve two principal objectives:-
" ... to remove sensitive issues from the realm of public 
discussions so as to allow the smooth functioning of 
parliamentary democracy; and to redress the racial 
imbalance in certain sectors of the nation's life and 
thereby promote national unity.
1 Ibid., p. 6.
2 Ibid., pp 8-9-
3 The Straits Times, August 31, 1970.
Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony, 1971? P- 2.
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The Constitution (Amendment) Bill which proposed to make these amend­
ments was the first order of business for Parliament which was 
reconvened on February 21, 1971; indeed the adoption by Parliament
of the amendments was held to be the precondition for parliamentary
1 2 government. The provisions of the proposed Bill sought to:-
1 Amend Article 10 of the Constitution and give power 
to Parliament to pass any law prohibiting the 
questioning of any matter, right, status, position, 
privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or 
protected by the provisions of
a) Part III of the Constitution which contains 
provisions relating to citizenship, its acquisition 
and rights;
b) Article 192 relating to the National Language
(Malay) and the languages of the other communities;
c) Article 193 relating to the special position of the
Malays and the legitimate interests of the other 
communities; and
d) Article 181 relating to the sovereignty of the
Malay Rulers.
2 Modify Articles 63 and 72 of the Constitution with regard
to the privilege of the Members of Parliament and the
State Assemblies not being liable to any judicial 
proceedings in respect of anything said in any proceeding 
of Parliament and State Assemblies or in a Committee 
thereof. The defence of privilege was made no longer 
available.
3 Define the term ’official purpose" in Article 192 relating
to the National Language. The Constitution had hitherto
provided that Malay should be the National Language 
without preventing or prohibiting the' use of other 
languages except for official purposes. Official 
purpose was now defined to mean "any purpose of 
Government, whether Federal or State, including any 
purpose of a public authority".
Provide the Yang di Pertuan Agong powers to, in his 
exercise of the responsibility entrusted to him under 
Article 193 of the Constitution to ensure the reservation
1 Lim Kit Siang, DAP Member of Parliament for Bandar Melaka said in 
Parliament " ... we strongly deplore the Sword of Damocles which 
the Government has hung over the reconvening of Parliament with 
their oft-repeated threats that Parliament will be disbanded if 
it does not provide the necessary two-thirds majority vote to 
amend the Constitution". Government of Malaysia, Par1iamentary 
Debates on the~Constitution Amendment Bill 1971i ^972, p. 11.
2 Ibid., pp 8-9-
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for Malays and natives of the Borneo States of a 
reasonable proportion of places in universities, colleges 
and institutions providing post-secondary education 
where there are more qualified candidates than there are 
places.
5 Amend Article 159 (5) of the Constitution by providing
that these amendments be themselves not amended in future 
without the consent of the Council of Rulers.
The amendments were indeed far reaching and in proposing the Bill in
Parliament Tun Abdul Razak, who had taken over as Premier from Tunku
Abdul Rahman, held:
t!Our nation has gone through the most dangerous crisis in 
her history. Deep emotions of fear and bitterness, of anger 
and mistrust have been aroused ... Let us remember that 
the democratic system we are working has to bear the stresses 
and strains of a multi-racial society. ... shall we return 
simply to the ways of the past when, in the name of 
democracy and freedom of speech, irresponsible elements 
were at liberty to foment and exploit racial emotions until 
we were brought to the very brink of national integration?"^
The position of the non-Malays in the Government as regards the Bill
was reflected in the statement of the MCA President, Tun Tan Siew Sin,
who seconded the Bill:-
”1 readily concede'that, in theory, what we are advocating 
is not what one would regard as a model of parliamentary 
democracy ... /buty7 our multi-racial society is so unique that 
it is probably the most complex and complicated plural 
society in all history. Conditions are, therefore, anything 
but ideal for a full fledged democracy ... in the last 
analysis, it is better to have something less than one 
hundred per cent democracy than no democracy at all."^
The Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the People's Progressive
Party (PPP), two principally non-Malay based opposition parties,
rejected the contention that the May riots were caused by the discussion
and debate of the 'sensitive issues' during the parliamentary and state
elections. They considered that the scope of the amendments were so
vague that they could cover criticism of^ or,,") opposition to, government
policy and action, and that they were aimed at Opposition members and
critics. They argued that these constitutional changes represented a
1 Ibid., p. 7-
2 Ibid., p. 11.
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political move to bolster the fortunes of the ruling Alliance and its 
component parties which had suffered a loss of support at the 1969 
election. The Act was nonetheless passed by 126 votes to seventeen 
- all political parties represented in Parliament, except the 
Democratic Action Party and the Peoplevs Progressive Party, voted for 
the Bill.
With the sensitive issues removed from public discussion, the 
Government turned to the medium and long term corrective measures 
aimed at overcoming what it regarded as the principal causes of inter- 
communal strife - economic imbalance between the communities and the 
identification of race with economic function0 The New Economic 
Policy, as this was termed, became the guideline for the Second 
Malaysia Plan and was essentially two pronged in its aim:
1 to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising 
income levels and increasing employment opportunities 
for all Malaysians, irrespective of race; and
2 accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian 
society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the identification of race 
with economic function® This process involved the 
modernization of rural lives, rapid and balanced growth 
of urban activities and the creation of a Malay 
commercial and industrial community in all categories 
and at all levels of operation so that Malays and 
other indigenous people will become full partners in 
all aspects of the economic life of the nation.
The amendments to the Constitution pertaining to intercommunal 
arrangements, the national philosophy as contained in the Rukunegara, 
and the New Economic Policy were each introduced with an air of 
finality. It was not for society at large to discuss these issues 
and arrive*'&t* a consensus; whatever discussion there was of these 
issues was behind closed doors and the issues were presented as a
1 Speeches of Lim Kit Siang, DAP Secretary General and
S.P. Seenivasagam, PPP President, during the parliamentary 
debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971? Ibid., pp 13-20 
and pp 40-¥f.
2 Government of Malaysia, Sec’ond Malaysia Plan 1971-1973? 1971? p-1-
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fait accompli ,the minimum that all ’loyal’ Malaysians had to subscribe 
to. With this as the foundation of agreement the Alliance, 
principally its dominant partner UMNO, attempted to enlarge the 
coalition. In 1971 and 1972, a number of opposition parties, which 
had hitherto been amongst the principal adversaries in the political 
arena, agreed-to join the-UMNO, MCA and MIC in a larger coalition.
The entry of each of these opposition parties - the PAS, the Gerakan 
Rakyat Malaysia and the PPP - was certainly dictated by a number of 
different priorities, but the post-1969 political climate provided 
the nexus for such co-operation. The new style politics called 
'consensus politics’, and the enlarged coalition provided the structure 
for working out an-internal settlement to politically divisive issues. 
The future of parliamentary democracy as practised previously and the 
semblance-of a-multi-party system that had existed since independence, 
both appeared to be coming to an end.
The 197^ parliamentary election was thus of fundamental import­
ance to Malaysian society. It was the first opportunity that 
Peninsular Malaysians had to go to the polls since the debacle of 1969 
and the subsequent- developments. Malaysians, and the world at large, 
viewed it as of momentous importance and a mirror reflective of public 
opinion, particularly of the opinion of the various communities, on 
the fundamental changes that had been witnessed since 1969- At issue 
lay the crucial question - whether the communally divided Malaysian 
state could long endure.
Objectives-of the study
Th,e principal objective of this study of the 197^ parliamentary 
election is to examine , the role of the communal factor in the electoral 
process in Peninsular Malaysian society. Elections are infinitely 
complex events and thus it is necessary to limit the discussion to 
selected aspects of them. The approach utilized here is to regard
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the electoral process as comprising three primary interconnected 
components - the electoral system, the political parties, and the 
electorate. This allows for the electoral process to be viewed as 
involving an electoral structure or system which sets the bounds or 
stage within which the political parties as the actors appeal to the 
electorate. The electorate’s response itself may be likened to 
that of an audience reaction. The numerous aspects that comprise an 
election are all subsumed into these three broad components so as to 
allow for a structured approach in the treatment of the material in 
order to fulfil the primary aim of this study.
The electoral system, comprising the body of rules that define 
competition may unwittingly, or by conscious design, introduce biases 
favouring particular segments of society. The system is not 
indifferent to the groups whose interests are affected by it, and the 
enquiry therefore begins with an examination of the formal aspects of 
the electoral system and the administration of elections. Examined 
are the implications of plurality voting in single member territorial 
constituencies, the franchise rules, the machinery and procedure 
adopted for the administration of elections, the compiling of electoral 
registers, the nomination of candidates, the campaign, polling, the 
counting of the votes, the regulation of election expenses, election 
offences and lastly, petitions. The objective here is to ascertain 
whether the system itself is adequate for the conduct of an equitable 
election and to assess the discrimination if any introduced by the 
body of rules governing elections.
The thesis then examines the delimitation of constituencies with' 
reference to the principles laid down in the Constitution for this.
The apportionment and delineation principles, the changes effected to 
these, and the implications for representation of the principles and 
the changes effected are examined. Particular emphasis will be given 
to the 197^ apportionment and delineation of constituencies and the
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spatial biases these evoke. An attempt is made to represent in 
quantitative form the discrimination that is introduced for or against 
each community by the franchise rules and the delimitation of 
constituencies.
The section on political parties will, it is hoped, provide some 
light towards understanding the institutional, spatial and population 
bases of political parties so as to appreciate the manner in which 
these political parties attempt to mobilise support in Peninsular 
Malaysia’s plural society. This is done by first tracing the 
evolution of,party politics and establishing the dominance of communal 
considerations throughout. The state of the parties and their 
respective positions at the 197^ election is established by examining 
political developments since the "1969 election. The enquiry then 
seeks to examine aspects of communal discrimination by the political 
parties. The procedure adopted is to define political party openness 
as evidenced by the membership requirements stipulated in the respective 
constitutions of the parties, and then classify the parties according 
to these theoretical parameters for membership. The parties, having 
thus been differentiated the spatial distribution of party branches, 
candidate selection and candidate placement are examined for communal 
discrimination. Indices of dissimilarity between the parties are 
then presented in tabular form. Such an examination presents a 
theoretical rationale and some empirical support for the identification 
of political parties as having an appeal to and representing the 
interest of particular communities. Party organization for the 
election, election manifestos and the issues raised are then viewed as 
a concerted attempt to mobilise support of the various communities.
Hence the focus of the examination in the section on the 'Appeal for 
the Votes' is essentially to discern the manner in which each party 
attempts to mobilise support from an anticipated ethnocentric 
electorate.
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The final part of the thesis aims to examine the electorates' 
response to these appeals. The election results analysis is aimed 
at examining the implications of the voting for several aspects. More 
directly it examines the victory in terms of seats. Analysis at this 
level reflects more the nuances of the system utilized than the actual 
basis of support for the parties. Hence the rest of the analysis is 
in terms of the votes polled by the parties. The state-wise and 
rural-urban distribution of the votes, and the communal bases of 
support are examined. Turn-out and rejected votes are analysed for 
their implications.
Examination of the above aspects of the 197^ parliamentary 
election, and the electoral process at large, would serve not only to 
satisfy the principal objective but also to shed light on a broader 
issue. In the political wrangling, competition and consensus that 
is being evolved, will the electoral system truly allow for equitable 
representation, or would the minorities tend to suffer? Without 
explicitly formulating a hypothesis, it is still feasible that an 
election study of the kind attempted here will provide data for at 
least some preliminary conclusions on this question.
Methodology
Especially since the Second World War there has been no dearth 
of geographical studies of elections. So rapid has this development 
been that it has led some geographers to contend that electoral
1
geography is the very core and substance of political geography. 
Semantics aside, such contentions at least serve to establish that the 
geographer's contribution to the study and analysis of election data 
is*valuable, and has already been substantial. Indeed the geographer's
1 Cox, K.R., "A Spatial Interaction Model for Political Geography", 
East Lakes Geographer, Vol. f^, 1969? p* 38*
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interest in elections has seen no bounds and virtually every aspect of 
elections has been dealt with. Thus geographical studies of electoral 
systems, the spatial organization of electoral areas, the regional basis 
of party organization, appeal and support, and the analysis of election 
results have all been attempted; recently several excellent articles 
and books on the theory and practice in geographical studies of voting 
behaviour have appeared. It is not proposed here to attempt a survey 
of geographical works on elections - the present study covers too 
broad a spectrum of inquiry and makes any meaningful concentrated 
survey here impossible. In discussing the treatment of the data in 
the various chapters, however, appropriate reference is made to other 
works so as to aid in the classification of the material and in the 
choice of appropriate methodology. The dichotomy that has arisen in 
the approaches to the analysis of election results, however, makes it 
imperative for the approach adopted in this work to be explained.
Initial works in electoral geography assumed that people vote in
accordance with what they perceive to be in their best interests, and
therefore explored the characteristics of voters which might give a
clue to the nature of this self-interest. Hence areal variations in
social and economic class, religion, nationality and race were among
the prime factors considered. On the basis of these, geographers
)
explained the foundations of voting patterns, for whole countries or
1 Prescott, J.R.V., "The Functions and Methods of Electoral
Geography", Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
Vol. *f91 PP ?96-.3o4;
Prescott, J.R.V., "Electoral Studies in Political Geography" in 
Kasperson, R., and Minghi, J.V. (eds.), The Structure of 
Political Geography, 1970, pp 376-383;
McPhail, I.R., "Recent Trends in Electoral Geography",
Proceedings of the Sixth New Zealand Geography Conference, Vol. 1., 
pp 7-12, New Zealand Geographical Society Conference Series, No. 6 , 
1971.
Prescott, J.R.V., Political Geography, 1972, pp 75-91*
Busteed, M.A., Geography and Voting Behaviour, 1975-
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large sections of them. This approach has been criticised on the
grounds that by concentrating upon generalised voting patterns of
groups, geographers overlook individual behaviour, or even more
seriously, that on the basis of such aggregate data individual
'I
behaviour is falsely explained. The alternative approach suggested
is one which is essentially process oriented and examines the stages
whereby spatial patterns of voting are seen as the end result of a mass
2
of individual decisions and actions. The individual decisions and
actions are themselves viewed as the result of attitude formation after
an evaluation of the information that an individual receives from his
environment. Such an approach allows for a link to the voluminous
body of studies of perception. Examined for their significance to
individual decisions and actions are spatial processes such as contagion
and contextual influences. The polemical sting that has emanated from
the proponents of both these views appears to be conducted with a view
to regarding them as mutually exclusive alternatives. For instance,
in questioning the relevance and value of much of the earlier work in
electoral geography Muir contends that they have been
,r ... rather marginal, and if electoral geography is to be 
considered a part of political geography there is a definite 
need for approaches which will demonstrate the links between 
environment and voting behaviour; if such links do not 
emerge as being significant, the case for electoral studies 
outside the other social sciences is weak.'*
5
Prescott however criticises the new approach and states
nIf geographers follow the advice of Reynolds and Archer 
and Cox and concentrate on these spatial processes, they 
will be abandoning a road of proven reliability for a track 
which may lead into regions of sociology where they are ill- 
equipped to survive.’*^
1 Cox, K.R., op. cit., p. 58.
2 Cox, K.R., "The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context'*, in
Chorley, R.J., Hagget, P., and Stoddart, D.R., Progress in 
Geography, Vol. 1, 1969) PP 96-117*
3 Muir, R., Modern Political Geography, 1975) PP 207-208.
^ Prescott, J.R.V., Political Geography, 1972, p.87.
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Clearly each approach directs itself to different aspects of concern to
the geographer and hence they are best regarded as complementary
approaches within the wider field of concern of electoral geography.
The approach that is to be selected for any particular study will have
to depend on the aspect that is to be examined and, as importantly, on
the data that are available for study.
The data that presents itself as useful and appropriate for this
study of the 197^ parliamentary election is the one that attempts to
correlate aggregate data on ethnicity with voting patterns, at the
constituency level. The utilization of aggregate data offers a
number of advantages for reasons best articulated by Austin Ranney:
r,the availability and inexpensiveness of aggregate data 
invite replicative and comparative studies on a wide scale ... 
/""Aggregate election data_/ ... are the "hardest” data we can 
get, in the sense that their meaning and comparability vary
less from area to area, from time to time, and from study to
study than do most survey data ...
Whatever complex socio-psychological processes may underlie 
the votersdecisions to make particular allocations, the 
votes themselves constitute a basic medium of political 
exchange. Thus their relative "hardness” as much as their 
accessibility, makes election returns a significant body of 
data for political analysis.”^
Other factors also dictate the utilization of the aggregate 
approach, as distinct from the behavioural approach for this study. 
Operationalization of the behavioural approach ideally relies on 
survey material. Unfortunately survey analysis, involving the 
compilation of questionnaires and the interviewing of a sample of 
electors is - in the Peninsular Malaysian context - a highly in­
appropriate form of political analysis. Selection and training of 
interviewers and translation of questionnaires and replies into at 
least four languages - Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English - are, to say
1 Ranney, A., "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the 
Study of Electoral Behaviour" in Ranney, A., (ed.) Essays on the 
Behavioural Study of Politics, 1962, p. 96.
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the least, particularly formidable undertakings. More importantly,
formal enquiry into political attitudes and opinions will hardly bring
forth candid and honest answers. Ratnam and Milne, who made the
first authoritative and academic study of elections in Peninsular
Malaysia, commenting on an opinion poll on politics attempted in the
Kuala Lumpur area in March and April 1964 observet-
"Respondents were asked what they liked best, and least, 
about the government. ... Less than half the respondents 
answered the question of what they liked least ... The 
limitations of public opinion polls at elections, already 
indicated by the reluctance to criticize Alliance policy 
were confirmed by the answers to the question: 'If a general
election was held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?'
44 per cent refused to answer, 46 per cent said 'Alliance', 
only about 10 per cent named a party other than the Alliance.
Yet in the Kuala Lumpur area the opposition parties won 
about 60 per cent of the vote. In the absence of any 
evidence that there was a late swing of support away from the 
Alliance, it must be concluded that only about one in six of 
the opposition party voters was willing to state his 
preferences openly."^
This was in 1964 when the political climate was infinitely more relaxed.
The communally charged political atmosphere, the perceived fear of the
I
retributive wrath of those in power against those withholding support, 
and the 1971 .amendments to the Constitution barring discussion of 
'sensitive issues' all .make ■ a candid discussion of political issues 
difficult, if not impossible, via the medium of a questionnaire. The 
unwillingness of Malaysians in general to discuss what must remain the 
focal point in a questionnaire survey for this study, impedes the 
conduct of any such questionnaire and would make suppect, if not 
invalidate, any conclusions’ drawn on the basis of such a survey.
The other form of operationalization ,of the behavioural approach 
relies on aggregate data, but here the technique has been to relate 
aggregate electoral returns to census material over very small tracts
1 Ratnam, K.J., and Milne, R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election 
of 1964, 1969j PP 3-4.
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of the constituency. Such a technique compromises the benefits of
sample surveys because it generalises on individual acts on the basis
of the collective behaviour of very.small groups. In countries like
the United States■of America and France where the voting returns at
each polling district are made available and access to unpublished
census material is possible, this technique may be employed. In
Malaysia, the ballot papers from each of the polling districts that
comprise a constituency are all mixed before the votes are counted and
hence the voting data available are the aggregate for the whole
constituency. Unpublished census material, especially data pertaining
to communal composition and characteristics of particular areas, are
treated as classified and even material pertaining to the number of
persons of voting age by community for the respective communities was
2not made available to the writer.
The data utilized in this thesis are essentially aggregate data, 
thejr describe collective behaviour, not individual acts; the interest 
here is to discern and describe the collective behaviour of particular 
communities and not the individual acts of its” members. This remains 
the basis of analysis and discussion throughout this study of the 
197^ Parliamentary election in Peninsular Malaysia.
1 Reynolds and Archer utilized detailed analysis of "block
statistics" aggregated to the precinct level in their pioneering 
work and suggest that such analyses provided "within-precinct" 
homogeneity is-'assessed.1, should prove a valuable research 
contribution to electoral geography.
Reynolds, D.R. , and Archer, J.C.., An Inquiry into the Spatial Basis 
of Electoral Geography, 1969? P- 31-
2, Attempts to obtain data by community for each of the constituencies 
from the Statistics Department proved unsuccessful. The writer 
was referred to the Election Commission for this. The Election 
Commission, for its part, denied that it compiled any data by 
community.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
The Electoral System and the Administration of Elections
*K)
Manhood suffrage is not itself a sufficient condition but it is 
invariably regarded as an important condition of democracy. The 
physical act of voting occupies the voter for only a few minutes once 
every four or five years, and the role cannot be said to be a demanding 
one. But possession of the right to vote transforms the great mass of 
citizens from being a captive audience of the political drama to being 
at least occasional participants themselves* Audience they may be 
for the most part, but when their turn comes they have the power to re­
place the entire cast if the performance is found wanting, and the 
knowledge of this power is bound to make the full-time actors more
sensitive to audience reactions® Such a conception of the power of
the ballot assumes, however, that the electoral system performs the 
fundamental function of translating the wishes of the ordinary voter 
into an elected chamber of representatives and in the process provides 
for freedom of choice, avoids at least the grosser forms of corruption 
and secures general acceptance as a fair way of choosing between rival 
claimants to political office® Clearly, electoral forms may be
existent but the substance may be totally absent.
Writing in 1966, Dahl notes that of the 113 members of the United
Nations in 196^ -, only about thirty had, during the previous decade,
1
political systems in which legal party opposition had existed® The
New Encyclopaedia Britannica observes
"In a purely formal sense, the great majority of the approx­
imately 130 contemporary nations have what are called 
"elections", but probably only a third of these have more or 
less competitive elections; perhaps a fifth have one-party 
elections; and in some others the electoral situation is 
highly ambiguous." 2
Emphasising the importance of an appreciation of the mechanism of the
1 Dahl, R.A., (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, 
1966, p. x.
2 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 6 , 197^> P» 529®
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elections before geographers should venture into electoral studies,
Prescott suggests that there were 71 countries in which elections were
sufficiently open to repay detailed analysis and 57 where, due to
various constraints, it would be fruitless. Prescott did not oblige
by listing the states concerned. Malaysia, however, receives mention
in Weiner's essay on political participation and political development,
and Weiner considers that Malaysia numbered among the developing
nations that did not place major limitations on political participation.
In 1970, however, Blair, in his doctoral work on Caste, Politics and
Democracy in Bihar State ,India: The Elections of 19&7? in noting the
changes that had occurred since Weiner's work, holds:
"In May of 19&9? severe restrictions were placed upon 
political participation in Malaysia: so severe that it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that democracy has 
been extinguished there, at least for the time being."3
Blair in 1970 had been slightly more optimistic than the then Malaysian
Minister of Home Affairs had been in 19^9- Shocked by the communal
riots that ensued from the elections of 19^9? the Minister had declared
if
"Democracy is dead in Malaysia". In 1971? however, Malaysia made a 
comeback to parliamentary democracy but restrictions were placed on 
certain aspects of electioneering and party politics. An examination
of the formal aspects of the Malaysian electoral system thus becomes 
even more vital for this study of the 197^ election. , This chapter
aims to examine the formal aspects of the electoral system and the 
administration of elections in Malaysia so as to appreciate their
1 Prescott, J.R.V., "Electoral Studies in Political Geography", in
Kasperson, R.E., and Minghi, J.V., (eds.), The Structure of
Political Geography, 1970? P* 378.
2 Weiner, M., "Political Participation and Political Development",
in Weiner, M., (ed.), Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, 1966,
p. 206.
3 Blair, H., Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India:
The Elections of 19&7? 1970? P» 2.
k The Straits Times, May 1^ -, 1969°
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historical evolution and the extent to which they serve to influence the 
nature of representation of the Malaysian people. Such an examination 
will also serve as a backdrop against which the rest of the chapters may 
be usefully considered.
The Electoral System
The electoral system in use in Malaysia today is structured
largely along the lines recommended by the committee appointed on July
15th, 1953 to examine the question of elections to the hitherto wholly
nominated Federal Legislative Council. The committee's terms of
reference were wide and read:
”i) To examine the questions of elections to the Federal 
Legislative Council and constitutional changes in 
the Federal Government arising therefrom; and
ii) To make recommendations and submit a report at the
earliest possible date consistent with the importance 
of the task.” 1
In the absence of any previous elections at the federal level the
committee had no guidelines or precedents to adopt. Yet the task,
undertaken by a working party of twenty from amongst the fourty-six
member committee,' wasi completed in a third of the year. The
committee "mindful of-the* fact that constitutional development in the
Federation of. Malaya presents problems that in their entirety find
2
Titfle parallel in other countries11, regarded the uncritical applic­
ation of patterns which have been evolved elsewhere as’ not necessarily 
advantageous to this country. The system adopted, however, was 
wholly structured along the lines of the British electoral system.
Hence, the committee recommended that plurality-voting, more commonly 
known as the Anglo-American first-past-the-post system, based on
1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine 
the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 195^ 
p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as the Report of the Election 
Committee.)
2 Ibid., p. 2.
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single-member territorial constituencies and having a common roll, 
should form the basis of the country’s electoral model.
In accepting the first-past-the-post system, the committee con­
ceded that the system would tend to emphasize and in a measure 
exaggerate the advantage to large parties and thereby compromise the 
principle of fair representation. But it considered this dis­
advantage less consequential than the disadvantage that would accrue 
from a weak government that would emerge from a large number of small 
parties attempting to form a coalition government. Rather content- 
iously, the committee considered that proportional representation would 
result in a multiplicity of small -parties, and that the coalition 
governments Which result are ’’sometimes so unstable as to make difficult 
the application of long-term'policies or the introduction of radical 
but necessary measures which are unpopular with any part of the 
coalition”. What the committee could not foresee was that, despite 
their recommendations, from the very first election the government has 
been in the hands of coalitions.
Another important consideration of the committee was to establish
a form of election that would not make it difficult for the average
voter to grasp the precise significance of the electoral process and his
participation in it. For these reasons the committee did not recommend
2
the ’’limited vote” and ’’alternative vote” systems. The assumed 
qualities of strong government and simplicity determined the choice of 
the first-past-the-post system.
It is impossible to predict with precision the composition of the 
Malaysian House of Representatives should another electoral system be 
adopted. The truth is that any electoral system reflects a delicate 
balance of its undoubted mechanical effects, its more questionable
1 Ibid., p. 1^.
2. Ibid. , p. "l^f.
psychological effects, the nature of political conflict and the history 
of the evolution of party and voting systems. In Malaysia, as else­
where, the effect of utilizing the first-past-the-post system has been 
to exaggerate the relative strength of the ruling coalition, i.e. the 
Alliance Party and its successor the Barisan Nasional. Such is the 
mechanical effect of utilising the system. Table 3 lists the
percentage of votes won by the Alliance Party and the percentage of 
seats it obtained at each of the parliamentary elections held in 
Peninsular Malaysia. In no election, except the first held in 1933) 
did the Alliance share of the votes exceed two-thirds of that polled, 
and in the 19&9 election its share of the votes actually dropped to 
less than half that polled. Clearly the Alliance share of the votes 
being less than two-thirds since 1939) it would not have been able to 
alter the Constitution were it not for the exaggerated number of seats 
awarded it by the first-past-the-post system. This seems a 
particularly relevant consideration since the constitutional changes 
introduced by the Government to alter aspects of the electoral system 
were all done in the years when its share of the popular vote was less 
than two-thirds.
Presumably because it is the only system Malaysians are used to, 
and it is not envisaged that the ruling coalition would concede any 
electoral reform in this area, there has been no significant call for 
a change in the system. None of the political parties has dwelt on 
the issue with any sense of urgency; nor has any one of them included 
it as part of their election manifesto or party policy. But change 
being unlikely has not hindered opposition party leaders from referring 
to the “inbuilt inequity in our electoral system where vote percentages 
do not necessarily have to tally with seat percentages” in explaining
1 Fan Yew Teng, DAP National Organising Secretary, at the Great 
Economic Debate on ”The 197^ General Election: A Post-Mortem”,
organized by the University of Malaya Economics Society on 
September 20, 197^.
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Table 3
Votes and Seats won by Government Coalition in Peninsular Malaysian 
Parliamentary Elections 1955-197k *
Year % Votes Total No. 
of Seats
No. of Seats 
won
% Seats won
1955 79.6 52 51 98.1
1959 51.8 10^ 7k 71 .2
196^ 58.5 10^ 89 85.6
1969 ^8 .6 10^ 66 65.5
197^ 61.5 11^ 104- 91-5
Smith, T.E., op. eit., 1955, and 
* Source: Election Commission reports on parliamentary eleotions of
1959, 196^, 1969 and 197^.
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their poor performances in the elections. Dr. Tan Chee Koon, whose
Partai Keadilan Masyarakat gained only one parliamentary seat despite
winning 5«3% of the popular vote in Peninsular Malaysia in the 1974
election.,, specifically recommends the ’’German system where fifty per
cent of the seats are elected under the first-past-the-post system and
-1
fifty per cent by proportional representation”. What is clear is that 
with the increased domination of the political arena by the Government 
coalition, and in this aided greatly by the electoral system, 
opposition parties are likely to look for changes, and it is probable 
that the first-past-the-post system will be subjected to increased 
scrutiny and criticism.
Administering the system
The principal component in any electoral system is the body 
established to administer the elections, for few governments would, if 
left to administer the elections by themselves, resist the temptation 
of ’fixing' the outcome. Again, an election conducted by the govern­
ment, it being one of the contending parties, would serve to diminish 
the legitimacy conferred on it. The administration of elections 
inevitably devolves on three elements of society, namely the elected 
assembly itself, the civil service and the judiciary. It is from any 
one or a combination of these elements that a body to administer 
elections is usually evolved.
The first federal-level election in the country '.was- held on 
July 27, 1955, only eighteen months after the publication of the report 
of the committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the 
Federal Legislative Council. Prior to that, even state and settlement 
level elections had been held in Johore, Trengganu and Penang only,
1 Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas President, at the debate mentioned in the 
footnote above.
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though numerous municipal, town council and local council elections had
been held in different parts of the Federation. Indeed, the mass of
the electorate living in rural areas voted for the first time at the
election held for the Federal Legislative Council. Of the electorate
registered for this election only some twenty-five per cent had had the
2opportunity to vote on any previous occasion. There existed no 
machinery to conduct elections and as a temporary measure the respons­
ibility for the arrangements for the first federal level election was 
given to the Chief Secretary to the Federal Government. A Supervisor 
of Elections working under the Chief Secretary was appointed on June 23, 
195A. In December 195^ a committee, consisting of eight members of 
the wholly nominated Legislative Council, selected from the main 
political parties, two State Secretaries and one Settlement Secretary, 
and three other officials were appointed to advise the Chief Secretary. 
Election departments were created at headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and
in the several states and settlements. The 1933 election was
3
conducted with such arrangements.
Soon after the election, the Federation of Malaya Constitutional 
Commission was established to consider the constitution that independent 
Malaya should have and, as part of its recommendations, the Commission 
called for the establishment of an Election Commission of three members 
independent of the Government. Such election commissions had been 
established in virtually all the British colonies that had hitherto 
become independent. The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission
had envisaged that
,rIn appointing members of the Election Commission the Yang 
di Pertuan Besar shall have regard to the importance of 
securing an Election which enjoys the confidence of all
1 Smith, T.E., Report of the First Election of Members to the 
Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya, 1935? p- 1-
2 Ibid., p. 1.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
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democratic parties and of persons of all communities.”
The final draft of the Malayan Constitution of 19571 which was a result
of the Alliance Party’s influence, was less specific and merely read
that the Commission should enjoy ’’public confidence”.
To ensure that the Election Commission cannot be interfered with 
by the Government, Article '114(3) of the 1957 Malayan Constitution 
provided that:
”A member of the Election Commission shall cease to hold 
office on attaining the age of sixty-five years or on 
becoming disqualified under Clause (4) and may at any time 
resign his offioe by writing under his hand addressed to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, but shall not be removed from 
office except on the like grounds and in the like manner
as a judge of the Supreme Court.”
The said Clause (4) of Article 114 read
”A person is disqualified for appointment as a member of 
the Election Commission if he holds any other office of 
profit or is a member of either House of Parliament or of 
the Legislative Assembly of any State
Though obviously the Yang di Pertuan Agong was required to consult the
Government in appointing the Election Commission, once appointed the
Election Commission was guaranteed sufficient safeguards to operate as
an independent and impartial authority.
The Election Commission appointed under the provisions of Article
114 of the 1957 Constitution consisted of a Chairman and two other
members. The initial appointments were wholly in the spirit of the
1957 Constitution and even of the recommendations made by the
Constitutional Commission. A prominent and respected Malay, Haji
Mustapha Albakri, was appointed Chairman and a Chinese, Lee Ewe Boon, and
an Indian,Ditt Singh - both retired civil servants - were appointed as
the two other members. The new Chairman's standing in society was indeed
1 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission, 1957i Appendix II, Article 105(3T i p® 160.
2 The establishment and functioning of the Election Commission are 
governed by articles 113-120 of the Constitution of the Federation 
of Malaya.
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high and it was his efforts that went a long way to earn the Commission 
its early good reputation. He, though once a member of UMNO, the 
principal partner in the coalition Alliance, had resigned it to join 
Party Negara, which too he resigned from in disagreement with its shift 
towards an increasingly anti-non-Malay stand. He had served as acting- 
Chief Minister of Perak State, Keeper of Rulers Seal, Secretary of -the 
Conference of Rulers and as a member of the pre-independence cabinet.
The Alliance Government's appointment of him as Chairman was generally 
welcomed.
In i960 the Commission presented its report on the revised
delimitation of constituencies which the Alliance Government considered
unsatisfactory. An attempt was made by the Government to remove
Haji Mustapha Albakri as Chairman by amending Article 114(4-) the
Malayan Constitution to read:
"Notwithstanding anything in clause (9) the Yang di Pertuan
Agong may by order remove from office any member of the
Election Commission if such member
(a) is an undischarged bankrupt; or
(b) engages in any paid office or employment outside the
duties of his office; or
(c) is a member of either House of Parliament or the 
Legislative Assembly of a State."
The Chairman, Haji Mustapha Albakri, though not holding "any other
office of profit" as defined by the Constitution, held business interests
yielding remunerations. The attempt to remove him, however, failed
since the Chairman was able to fall back on Article 114(6) of the
Constitution which provides that "the remuneration and other terms of
office of a member of the Election Commission shall not be altered to
his disadvantage after his appointment." In the event he continued to
serve as Chairman till his retirement ih 196 7 at the age of sixty-five.
In 1964 the Chinese member, Lee Ewe Boon, retired and in 1969 'the
1 Morais, J.V. (ed.), Leaders of Malaya and Who's Who, 1937-98, 1998, 
p. 90.
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Indian member, Ditt Singh, retired - both on reaching sixty-five years. 
The new appointments, though also a Chinese and an Indian, were both 
Alliance Party members. Tan Cheng Leng was a Malayan Chinese 
Association stalwart and his appointment was objected to by the 
Election Commission, but the Commission's views were overruled. The 
new appointee on being appointed to the Commission resigned his member- 
ship in the Malayan Chinese Association. R. Sathiah, the replacement 
for Ditt Singh, was ex-president of the Klang branch of the Malayan 
Indian Congress. The fourth member of the Commission, appointed 
according to the Malaysia Constitution of 19&3 the Inter-Governmental 
Committee Report that preceded it, was also an active member of the 
Alliance Party. He is Abang Haji Marzuki, an ex-member of BARJASA, 
a component of the Sarawak Alliance and an unsuccessful Alliance Party 
candidate for the Kuching Rural District Council election of 1963-
The new Chairman, Dato Ahmad Perang, has no known party 
connections and, like his predecessor, served in high office in the 
civil service. Tan Cheng Leng was succeeded by Ong Beng Chye, a 
retired legal officer from the Attorney-Q-eneral's chambers, and in turn 
by Boey Kok Keat, a retired senior police officer„ The practice 
adopted in appointing members to the Commission has continued to be on 
the basis of nominations made by the three communal based component 
parties of the Alliance - UMNO, MCA and MIC.
The Election Commission's functions as envisaged by the 1957 
Constitution were to
(a) delimit constituencies;
(b) prepare and revise electoral rolls;
and (c) conduct elections to the House of Representatives, the 
Legislative Assemblies of the States, the Municipal 
Council of the capital city and any other elections 
that may be authorised by federal or state law.^
1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan 
Rakyat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 196^ 4- of the 
States of Malaya, 19^5, P» 2. (Hereinafter referred to as 19^4 
Elections Report.)
2 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 113 (1)»
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Also included was a provision which charged the Commission with the 
responsibility of organizing and conducting elections to the Senate 
when according to the provisions of the Constitution direct popular 
election of representatives of the States in the Senate are made.
This provision is also included in the Malaysian Constitution of 1963 
but has yet to become operative. In i960 Parliament enacted the 
Local Government Elections Act, entrusting the Commission with the 
conduct of the local government elections. In 1963$ however, local 
government elections were suspended and are yet to be resumed; 
consequently this power became inoperative.
The Commission’s power to delimit constituencies was withdrawn 
in 1962 after the Alliance Government, probably fearing its own 
electoral chances, found the Commission’s i960 delimitation exercise 
unsatisfactory. The Commission’s now curtailed powers m  this area
were to ’’recommend” changes and Parliament became the final arbiter of 
any delimitation proposals. In effect, of course, this meant the
government of the day.
As a means of ensuring the Commission’s independence and prevent­
ing any imperious intervention by Parliament, the remuneration of the 
members of the Election Commission is charged to the Consolidated Fund 
and thus not subject to annual scrutiny, debate and approval by 
Parliament. The Constitution also guarantees that the remuneration 
may not be altered to the disadvantage of the commissioners after 
their appointment.
The Commission is empowered to employ such number of persons, on 
such terms and subject to such conditions, as it may with the Yang di 
Pertuan Agung determine. Elections are, however, periodic events 
normally held every five years; thus to maintain a large and 
continuous staff is neither desirable nor even economically feasible.
1 A detailed discussion of this is included in Chapter Two which deals 
with constituency delimitation in Peninsular Malaysia.
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Accordingly the Commission employs a very small staff consisting of
five officers as secretary and assistant secretaries, fourteen super-
visors of elections, eleven deputy-supervisors and other secretarial,
'I
clerical and support staff. The secretary and assistant
secretaries of the Commission have always been drawn from the’general 
pool' of the Malaysian civil service and posted to their positions 
in the Commission. They are liable to be withdrawn from the service 
at any time as part of the routine civil service transfers. A case
in point is Hassan bin Ibrahim who served as secretary to the
Election Commission during the final stages of the 197^ constituency 
delimitation review and the period when the 197^ election was held.
He served in several capacities in the civil service, including being
a district officer, prior to being appointed secretary to the Election
Commission. Soon after the 197^ election he was transferred to the 
Prime Minister’s department. The supervisors, deputy supervisors and 
other secretarial, clerical and support staff are civil servants who 
are appointed by the Public Services Commission. Prior to 197^ these 
categories of staff were appointed specifically to the Election 
Commission and regarded as being in a "closed service” and thus not 
subject to transfers to posts outside the Election Commission. In 
197^ even these■categories of staff became part of the ’general pool* 
and thus liable to transfer to and from other government departments, 
though the Commission still retains control over them while they are 
with the Commission. This change from a ’closed service’ arrange­
ment to that of the ’general pool’ led some observers to suggest that 
it was yet another attempt by the Government to bring the Commission 
under government control, but such a criticism is certainly less fair.
The relative inability of the Election Commission staff to oblaxn
1 Information as regards staffing derived from a personal interview 
with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the Election Commission 
on August 21, 1975.
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promotions in their 'closed service' vis-a-vis their colleagues in the 
'general pool1 had led to considerable discontent in their ranks. In 
view of the fact that the secretary and assistant secretaries have 
always been part of the Malaysian civil service and the fact that 
major decisions, particularly policy decisions, are not made at the 
level of the junior ranks of the Election Commission's staff, this 
change in their status cannot be held to be sinister or even 
significant.
During periods of registration of electors, and, just prior to, 
during, and after elections, the need for extra staff is particularly 
acute. The Commission then utilizes the constitutional provision 
providing that all public authorities must, on the Commission's 
request, give the Commission such assistance in the discharge of its 
duties as may be practicable. Accordingly, federal and state 
government officials are recruited. When assisting the Commission, 
federal and" state officers are paid a small honorarium and are to 
take their orders from the Commission and not the Government, For 
the 1974 election a total of 32,276 temporary polling staff were 
appointed to carry out the election and most of these were employees 
of the federal and state governments or quasi-government 
organizations.1
An allocation of M/ 4.2 million was approved by the Government 
to conduct the 1974 parliamentary and state elections which were held 
simultaneously. However, only M/ 3*312,800 was utilized - a 
consequence of the large numbers of seats where candidates were 
returned unopposed. Peninsular Malaysian parliamentary and state 
elections incurred the major share of the expenses and this amounted
1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary
(Dewan Rakyat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 
1974 of the States of Malaya and Sarawak, p. 53^ (Hereinafter 
referred to as 1974 Elections report.)
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to M/ 2,673,600.1 
The Franchise
Whilst all parliamentary democracies function on the principle of 
rule by consent of the governed, they do differ as to whose consent 
amongst the governed the government should seek. Definitions, or at 
least applications of the concept of universal adult suffrage, even to­
day vary from country to country and are often the consequence of con­
ditions unique to the countries concerned. Citizenship is a generally 
accepted criterion, but nevertheless even here exceptions do exist.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, for historical reasons any citizen 
of any country in the Commonwealth can vote if present in the United 
Kingdom on registration day. Again for largely historical reasons, 
citizens of the Republic of Ireland, which country is no longer a member
of the Commonwealth, are given the franchise provided they are similarly
2resident m  the United Kingdom on registration day. Variations also 
exist as to the definition of 'adult'. In some countries the qualify­
ing age is 21 years, and in an increasing number of others it is 18 
years. The precise definitions adopted will necessarily affect differ­
ently the chances of victory of each of the parties concerned.
Adult suffrage for both men and women and a common register for 
all communities was instituted for even the first election conducted in 
Peninsular Malaysia. Article 119 of the Malaysian Constitution sets 
out the requirements of a would-be elector. All Malaysians who are 
citizens, are above twenty-one years of age and resident in that 
constituency on the qualifying date are, with a few exceptions,
1 Ibid., p. 38.
2 Wilson, G., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 1978, p. 99*
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entitled to register as electors. The exceptions include persons 
detained as of unsound mind or serving a sentence of imprisonment or 
who have before the qualifying date been convicted in any part of the 
Commonwealth for an offence and sentenced to death or imprisonment for 
a term exceeding twelve months, and persorewho remain liable on the 
qualifying date to suffer any punishment for such a proven offence. 
Also exempted are persons who may be disqualified under any law relat­
ing to offences committed in connection with elections. Read in 
conjunction with the Election Offences Act such persons remain barred
from participation in elections for five years from conviction or
'I
release from prison, whichever is the later.
The utilisation of the citizenship requirement has significant 
implications in the Malaysian context. The concept of federal 
citizenship itself was introduced by the British colonial government 
as part of the Malayan Union proposals after the second world war.
Till then, persons in the Malay States were subjects of the respective 
Malay rulers and those in the Straits Settlements were British 
subjects. The proposals aroused the fears of the Malays that they 
would be overwhelmed by the non-Malays and this led to the mobilis­
ation of the Malays in a massive show of strength against the Malayan 
Union proposal and the citizenship provisions. The proposal was 
abandonned and in its stead the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 19*+8
adopted. The citizenship regulations adopted in this later agree-
2
ment were more stringent for the non-Malays. These citizenship 
regulations were included with minor alterations in the 1957 Malayan 
Constitution and the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. Since the Malayan
1 Election Offences Act, 1959 (No. 9 of 195*0-
2 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, pp 51-67 deals in detail 
with the developments mentioned here.
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Union proposal, however, the citizenship question has remained a 
divisive issue in Malaysian politics - the Malays resenting the grant­
ing of citizenship to the non-Malays and the non-Malays seeking even 
more relaxed conditions for acquiring citizenship. Following the 
1969 communal riots, Parliament enacted the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance, No. 1970 amending the Sedition Act, 19^ +8, thus
making it seditious for any person to question the provisions of the 
Constitution pertaining to a number of issues including that of 
citizenship. The Constitution (Amendment) Act 197*1 even removed 
the privilege of parliamentarians to discuss these issues and it now 
became possible even to prosecute parliamentarians under the Sedition 
Act on the basis of their discussions in Parliament.
Basically, Malaysian citizenship may be gained by one of four
ways - by the operation of law, by incorporation of territory, by
2
registration or by naturalization. Citizenship by operation of law 
is principally for children of citizens or those born in Malaysia of 
parents who are permanently resident in Malaysia and are not citizens 
of any other country. In these cases citizenship is automatic. 
Citizenship by incorporation of territory occurs when Parliament by 
law determines what persons are to be citizens by reason of their 
connection with the incorporated territory. Persons who do not 
qualify by operation of law or by incorporation of territory may 
apply for citizenship by registration or by naturalization, it being 
easier to obtain citizenship by the former than the latter.
1 Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment 
Bill 1971, 1972, p- xii.
2 Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the 
Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, p. 255. The author is the 
Lord President of the Malaysian Judiciary and is regarded as the 
principal authority on Malaysian citizenship laws and deals in 
detail with the citizenship laws in Chapter 17 (pp 251-285) of 
his book.
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Citizenship by registration is open to wives and children of 
citizens, persons born in the Federation before independence day 
August 51 , 1957? ELncL persons resident in Sabah or Sarawak on 
Malaysia day. The provisions for naturalization are intended for 
all other categories of persons seeking Malaysian citizenship. 
Citizenship by registration and naturalization in all cases call for 
residential qualifications. This varies from two continuous years 
in the case of wives and children of citizens seeking citizenship by 
registration,to ten out of the twelve years, including the last twelve 
months,in the case of those seeking naturalization. In addition to 
the residential requirement is a language qualification for all persons 
seeking citizenship by registration or naturalization, excepting wives 
and children of citizens. Again, the proficiency required in the 
Malay language varies for each category of applicant - the gradations 
being 'elementary1, 'sufficient* and 'adequate' and assessed by 
language boards appointed by the Minister. Besides the residential 
and language qualifications the applicants are of course required to 
be of 'good character'. The law states that certain categories of 
these applicants are, on possession of the necessary requirements, 
'eligible' for citizenship, whilst others are 'entitled' to it. In 
the case of the former it is clearly a matter of executive discretion, 
but even in the case of those entitled to it, it is not clear what the 
position of the courts will be should they be denied citizenship.
No such pase has ever reached the courts but it is relevant to note 
that the Lord President of the Courts has observed "that as the court 
is reluctant to interfere with an executive discretion it is 
unlikely that it will compel the Federal Government to register a 
citizen about whose qualification it is not satisfied".
At the time of the 197^ election there were an estimated
1 Ibid., p. 259'.
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100,000 persons, mainly Chinese and Indians, who though permanently
resident in the country were ineligible for the franchise because they
1had not obtained citizenship. It is interesting to note that the
committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the
Federal Legislative Council on July 15) 1953, had considered the status
of these persons as regards the franchise and had decided that non-
2
federal citizens should not be entitled to the vote. The decision
had, however, not been unanimous, and fourteen of the forty-six
3
members of the committee, many of them later leaders of independent
Malaya, had argued that the following categories of persons other than
federal citizens should also be entitled to the franchise:
”1) any person born in any part of the territories now 
comprising the Federation of M&laya and ordinarily 
resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last 
five years immediately preceding the election; and
2) British subjects born in Singapore and ordinarily 
resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last 
seven years immediately preceding the election.” ^
A partial attempt to accommodate the minority view was made by way of
special arrangements for the first general election in 1955* Before
the beginning of the period of registration on October 18, 195^» a
considerable number of persons had submitted applications to be
naturalised as federal citizens or to be registered as subjects of a
ruler of any of the component states of the Federation (a subject of
a ruler became automatically a federal citizen). Many thousands of
these applications were still under consideration by the authorities
on October 17, 195^1 which was the date set for satisfying the
qualifications which electors had to possess. For the benefit of
1 Personal interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the 
Election Commission on August 21, 1975°
2 Report of the election committee, p. 18.
3 Ibid., p. k 8 m 
Ibid., p. 18.
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these persons, the Registration of Electors (Supplementary 
Registration) Regulations, 195^ + were approved by the High Commissioner 
in Council. A special supplementary period of registration lasting 
nine days was held in January 1955 for the benefit of those persons 
who had applied for naturalization or registration as federal citizens 
or as subjects of a ruler before October 171 195^ - sm-cL who satisfied 
the age and residential requirements for electoral registration on 
that date. No such accommodation was provided in the 1957 Malayan 
Constitution and its successor, the 19&3 Malaysian Constitution. 
Eligibility for citizenship and even application for citizenship are now 
not sufficient to procure the franchise; citizenship has first to be 
granted before the franchise is granted.
Literacy, possession of property or payment of taxes have never
served as criteria for exclusion from voting rights in the country -
the report of the election committee and both the 1957 Malayan
Constitution and the 19&3 Malaysia Constitution rejecting these.
A recommendation of the committee initially included in the 1957
Malayan Constitution was a condition requiring the voter to have
resided in a constituency for a period of six months immediately prior
to his registration as an elector. Electoral registers, which are
.prepared annually, are normally ready only six months after the actual
procedure of registering voters,and elections may be held up to a year
after these have been prepared. With the high degree of migration
within the pountry such a regulation would disenfranchise a large
number of persons;' the residential requirement is no longer called 
2
for.
The practice of the individual racial communities voting
1 Smith, T.E., op.cit., p. 10.
2 Federation of Malaya, Constitution Amendment Act, 1960, Section 1^.
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separately on communal rolls for communal candidates practised in some
countries, notably New Zealand, and Fiji, was considered and rejected 
j
by the- committee. Adoption of communal rolls would perhaps have 
been recognizing the obvious in the context of the country where 
'community' forms the overriding political consideration. The 
committee and the 1957 1965 Constitutions, however,' opted to be
optimistic rather than realistic and ruled that voting should be on 
the basis of territory rather than community. It was argued that 
communal elections strengthen communal feeling and would have serious­
ly impaired any possibility of working towards a cohesive and united 
2society. Elections in Malaysia are thus conducted on a common 
basis and candidates are elected by individual territorial 
constituencies and not by individual communities.
’ 'The- Electoral Register
Although all adults who are not disqualified are legally entit­
led to vote, they can only actually do so if their names appear on the 
Register of Electors. In Malaysia, registration is neither com­
pulsory nor automatic. Hence the machinery maintained and the ease
with which voters can register are of prime significance.
Each parliamentary constituency comprises a separate regist­
ration area and each polling district within a parliamentary 
constituency is a separate registration unit and has its own separate
3
portion of the- register. Polling districts are devised by the 
state election offices so as to give the-electors practicable distances 
to "travel to' vote. ‘The‘number'of electors pfer polling'district may 
vary from a handful in some rural hamlets to over five thousand in
1 Report of-the election committee, p. 12.
2 Ibid., p. 13*
3 Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations, 1959? Reg. 3(1)«
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densely populated urban areas. The growth of new housing projects in 
formerly sparsely populated areas and the building of high-rise flats 
present large changes in "the number of electors in some polling 
districts. Consequently the Election Commission is constantly review­
ing polling districts, in some cases subdividing and in others combining 
them to make them as practicable units as possible. At the time of 
the 197^ election there were some f^,900 polling districts and hence as 
many portions of the electoral register in Peninsular Malaysia.
Within each polling district's register, streets are listed in alpha­
betical order, and the electors1 names listed according to their 
identity card numbers. This practice replaced the system of names 
being listed according to house numbers and streets. The use of
identity card numbers, the Election Commission believes, makes dupli-
1
cation and double registration impossible.
The procedure for the registration of electors is contained in 
the Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 1959- These 
regulations stipulate that those eligible to apply for registration as 
an elector have to do so during the period allocated for this purpose. 
The regulations further stipulate that the registration period shall be 
not less than thirty days and not more than sixty days. The revision 
of the registers, which occurs every year, is required by regulation 
13(i) to be for a minimum of twenty-one days and a maximum of forty-two 
days. In practice the Election Commission opens the register for 
revision for the maximum forty-two days stipulated and this is normally 
from September 1st to October 12th. The practice of political 
parties registering electors, though never encouraged by the Election 
Commission, was allowed prior to 1972, but since then the Commission 
has, by denying the political parties the necessary forms, stopped this
1 Personal interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the 
Election Commission on August 21, 1979*
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practice. The-Election Commission now merely announces the date of 
registration by way of Gazette notification, the mass media and public 
posters, and, the public are intended to take the responsibility of 
registering. The publicity given the revision exercise has frequent­
ly been criticized as being inadequate, especially by the smaller 
political parties. Clearly, despite the Election Commission 
stopping the political'parties registering electors, the system of 
registering where the onus of responsibility for registration rests 
with the voters offers a premium to the larger and we11-organized 
parties which ensure that their supporters get on the register.
No legal provision is made to register those below the qualify­
ing age of twenty-one years, even where they would reach voting age 
during the period- the revised electoral roll is in effect. Such an 
omission inevitably disenfranchises new voters. Assume that an 
individual becomes twenty-one years of age on September 1 of a year 
and assume that the qualifying date for registration, which is the 
day before registration commences, is August 31 of that year. Such 
an individual will not be able to vote for approximately seventeen 
months after he has reached the qualifying age of twenty-one years 
- this includes the twelve months till the next revision and five 
months for that revised register to come into effect. With elections 
normally due every five years this could, though admittedly in few 
cases, result in a person not participating in the voting process 
till he is twenty-six years or so. Such disenfranchisement could be 
avoided by registering those whose twenty-first birthday falls later 
than the qualifying date for registration but still within the course 
of the prospective register. The date on which they become eligible 
to vote - that is their twenty-first birthday - could be entered on 
the register immediately next to their name.
The electoral register is compiled in three parts - List A is
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the register in force at the beginning of the period of revision,
List B contains the names of applicants for entry in the register and 
List C contains the names of persons who have died or have ceased to 
be qualified for inclusion in the electoral register of that 
constituency. At the end of the period of revision the revised 
register is prepared and open for inspection by the public to lodge 
claims or objections within a period of fourteen days from the date 
of publication of the draft registers. After the disposal of the 
claims and objections the rolls are certified and remain in force 
till the next revision in the following year. The regulations, it 
would appear, are adequate for the maintenance of an accurate 
register.
Table ^ lists the growth in the Peninsular Malaysian electorate
by states from 1967/68 to 1973/7^* Throughout, a steady growth in
electors is noticeable, except for the year 1973/7^? when there was
a drop in the number of electors; in all 330,86^- names were removed
from the electoral registers and this assuming that there were no new
electors registered! There was a decline in the number of electors
for each state. The decline was greatest in Selangor (including the
Federal Territory) where it was 92,466. Perak, Kelantan and Johore
also witnessed heavy declines in the number of electors. The
Chairman of the- Election Commission attributed this to
"the* removal from the rolls of the names of persons who
have died or migrated and cases of double registration.
The latter was detectable because the Commission is now 
utilizing computers and working on the basis of Identity 
Card numbers." 1
On election day, August 2^ f, T97^? however, thousands of electors 
were unable to find their names on the electoral register and thus
unable to exercise their vote. Omitted from the register were even
2
the names of a cabinet minister and his wife!
1 Ibid.
2 The Straits Times', August 28, 197^-
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Table h
Number of Electors by States, Peninsular Malaysia, 1967/68 - 1973/74^
State 1967/68 1968/69 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 Aug 19742
Perlis 52,971 56,060 59,808 61,420 58,244 58,721
Kedah 373,435 388,167 4 n  ,998 424,272 395,854 400,285
Kelantan 318,512 333,754 362,048 373,120 310,406 311,608
Trengganu 168,840 179,365 195,539 200,096 183,340 183,769
Penang 272,305 282,399 298,378 312,934 286,680 289,140
Perak 585,5^9 613,572 666,735 675,115 625,987 626,565
Pahang 162,041 176,768 202,484 207,337 196,057 199,478
Selangor
(including
Federal 473,564 516,984 592,558 601,911 509,445 511,299
Territory)
Negri
Sembilan 163,373 170,728 ,183,950 191,744 177,335 178,717
Malacca i4o, 125 1^7,765 163,770 160,807 151,535 151,699
Johore 414,140 436,620 480,695 511,909 494,918 495,380
Peninsular
Malaysia 3 ,123,855 3 ,302,182 3 ,617,963 3 ,720,665 3 ,389,801 3,406,661
1 No registration exercise was undertaken during 1969 and 1970.
2 As in the electoral registers utilised for the 1974 election.
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission.
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No official estimate of the number of electors unable to find
their names in the electoral register has been released, but the
number must indeed- be high. The registers utilized for the 1974-
election, the Commission claims, "were revised in 1973 and certified
on July 315 1974, after which they were rearranged according to new
constituencies", and there were for the "States of Malaysia 3,523,681:I 
1
electors. A count of all the electoral registers for the states of 
Malaya utilized for the 197^ election reveal that there were only 
3,406,661 names on the register. The latter figure is also that 
obtained when the total electorate for each of the 114 parliamentary 
constituencies in the states of Malaya listed in Appendix H of the 
Election Commission’s 1974 elections report are added. The 
difference between the two figures, both of which are from the same 
report of the Election Commission, it is believed represents the 
number of persons omitted from the electoral register. By this 
estimate a total of 117,020 electors were unable to vote in the 1974 
election because their names had been omitted from the electoral 
register.
The Election Commission understandably came under severe
criticism from both government ministers and members of the 
3opposition. Unsuccessful candidates found in it a convenient 
excuse. The inferred reasons for the omission are disturbing,
but given the communal nature of politics in the country not wholly 
unexpected. For instance, David Loh Kee Peng, the unsuccessful 
Barisan Nasiohal candidate for the Bandar Melaka parliamentary 
constituency, complained
1 1974 Elections report, p. 31 *
2 Ibid., pp 144-158.
3 Reports in The Straits Times, The Malay) Mail, and The Star, 
August 24 - September 10, 1974.
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"More than eight hundred of my Chinese supporters have 
lost their votes. The Election Commission people went 
around to the houses and asked where each voter was and 
when told they were not in they just cut-off their names." 1
Similarly, Bernard Sta Maria, State Assemblyman and the D.A.P.'s
campaign organiser in Malacca claimed
"A lot of my Chinese voters have been left out. The 
Election Office sent young Malay school children to the 
houses. The question asked was 'Mana ini orang' / y here is 
this person?/ and when the answer was 'taada' /'"Not in' or 
'Not herejT""their names were struck off the list." 2
These claims, in all fairness, have to be regarded as not proven, but
they are indicative of the fears harboured by candidates and electors
and serve to emphasize the necessity for the Commission to be not
only an unbiased and independent authority, but also to appear to be
so.
In the face of heavy criticism the Election Commission attempted
to vindicate itself and its secretary*Hassan bin Ibrahim, explained
that the electors names were missing from the register because voters
did not re-register after changing their addresses and that people had
incorrectly assumed that their names wpuld automatically be transferred
3to the register of the constituency they had moved to. It was
subsequently shown that this was not all there was to it, and that in
some instances persons who had not moved homes had also been deleted
from the register; in other instances the names of some members of
the family had been deleted while those of others remained on the 
iL}.
register. Even more alarming was the secretaryfs rather restricted 
conception of the role of the Election Commission in registering 
electors. The secretary held
1 Personal interview with David Loh Kee Peng on August 19, 1974.
2 Personal interview with Bernard Sta Maria on August 20, 1974.
3 The Straits Times, August 24, 1974.
4 Ibid., August 29, 1974.
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"The public should know that registration is an 
individual responsibility and should be done by all loyal 
citizens who believe in the principles of democracy.
It is incorrect to assume that the Commission is 
responsible for the registration of new voters.
The Commission is more concerned to see that those 
ineligible to vote are not registered in any constituency." 1
As a result of the complaints received as regards dis­
enfranchisement by omission of names from the electoral register, the 
Election Commission appointed a committee to investigate the matter.
Affected members of the public were asked to forward their complaints
2
to this investigating committee. Despite the obvious lack of 
enthusiasm and sense of urgency amongst the public after an election
- especially since they are appreciative that the next election is 
some five years away and thus at least four revision exercises hence
- about 2,000 persons wrote in. This involved the names of about
■z
-^,000 electors. Their names have since been reinstated on the 
electoral register. The report of the investigating committee was 
delivered to the Prime Minister but never made public and this served
to further arouse the fears of the public. It is, however, 
believed that one of the causes of so many names being omitted from 
the register was the removal of the names in certain states of all 
persons who had their old identity card numbers rather than the new 
ones listed on the electoral register. The omission of names on 
an electoral register, especially when it involves as many as it 
obviously did for the 197^ election,, is indeed a grievous error.
To a degree,at least', it encourages speculation about the validity 
of the election. It is encouraging to note that the Commission
holds that
1 Ibid., August 2 h , 197^.
2 Ibid.,. August 31) 197^*
3 197^ Elections report, p. ^0.
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"In order to avoid similar cases recurring in the 
future a new procedure relating to the register of 
electors and revision of rolls has been devised." 1
It is not, however, clear what this will entail.
The combined effect of the enfranchisement limitations
occasioned by the citizenship laws and the procedure adopted for the
registration of electors,has resulted in the communal composition of
the electorate being different from that of'the total population.
t
Table 5 indicates the communal composition of the Peninsular 
Malaysian electorate for each of the federal level elections held. 
Table 6 indicates the electoral advantage or disadvantage accruing 
from differential enfranchisement to each community at each of the 
elections. In 1953 the Malay community had a very significant 
advantage but over the years this has been reduced and the Chinese 
and Indian communities have obtained an increasingly proportionate 
share of the franchise. This development was brought about by 
increasing numbers of Chinese and Indians acquiring citizenship.
In 197^ however the trend towards parity in the share of the 
franchise was reversed, and the percentage of Malays in the elector­
ate increased. This increase cannot be accounted for in terms of 
any change in citizenship laws. Hence it has to be assumed that 
the differential in the rate of registration of electors amongst 
the various communities has become markedly in favour of the Malay
Community, or alternatively, that more non-Malays than Malays were 
omitted from the electoral register in 197^* ■^or Malay-based 
political parties this was certainly welcome but for the non-Malay- 
based parties this meant reduced chances of victory at the polls.
Nomination of Candidates
The Malaysian Constitution requires that whenever Parliament
1 Ibid.
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Table 3
Communal Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Electorate in 
Parliamentary Election Years
Year Malays
Wo. %
Chinese 
Wo. %
Indians
Wo.
I
%
Total
1955 1 ,077,562 84.2 142,9V 7 11.2 60,356 4.6 1 ,280,865
1959 1 ,244,827 57.1 732,846 3^.5 184,663 8.4 2 ,182,538
1964 1,503,836 34.4 1 ,039,264 37.5 223,431 8.1 2 ,706,531
1969 1,835,908 55.7 1,055,958 36.3 264.890 8 .0 3 ,296,256
1974 1,971,305 57-9 1,176,361 34-3 258,995 7-6 5 ,1106,661
1 Includes all communities except Malays and Chinese
Source: 1955)1959 and. 1964 data obtained from Barisan Nasional Office,
Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur.
1969 and 1974 figures based on data in Appendices 5 and 4.
Table 6
Discrepancies between Communal Composition of Electorate and Communal 
Composition of Total Population, Peninsular Malaysia, in Parliamentary 
Election Years.^
Year Malays Chinese 2Indians
1955 + 34.4 - 25.9 - 8.5
1959 + 7.1 - 2.5 - 4.6
196 -^ + 4.4 + 0.6 - 5.0
1969 + 2.8 + 0 .7 - 3.5
1974 + 4.7 - 1.0 - 3.7
1 Derived by percentage community in electorate minus percentage 
community in total population.
2 Includes all communities except Malays and Chinese.
Total Population data as estimated by Chief Statistician, 
Malaysia.
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is dissolved an election shall be held within sixty days in the States 
of Peninsular Malaysia and ninety days in the States of Sabah and 
Sarawak. In accordance with the provisions of Section 12 of the 
Election (Conduct of Elections) Regulations 1959, an election notice 
is made by the Election Commission in the Gazette and in one or more 
daily newspapers circulating in the states of Malaysia. The notice 
will specify the date, time and place for the nomination of 
candidates for election, the date being no less than seven days after 
-the publication of the notice. Also specified in the election 
notice will be the polling date which will be at least fourteen days 
after the specified nomination day.
The whole procedure for nomination, which is usually on a 
Saturday, takes some three and a half hours (9 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.) 
and is handled by the returnifig officer who is normally at least a 
division one officer of the Malaysian civil service. The first two 
hours are for the submission of nominations and the next one and one- 
half hours are reserved for any objections to the nomination. The 
nomination time itself is observed by reference to the 'Radio 
Malaysia time signal and a strict observance'of not accepting 
nominations after the appointed time has expired is made by the 
returning officers.'
The qualifications for election to Parliament are set out in 
Article 27 of the Malaysian Constitution and, except for a few 
differences, are substantially the same as those that apply for regist­
ration as electors. Malaysian citizens above the age of 21 years 
and"resident in the Federation on nomination day are, with"'a few 
exceptions, eligible to seek election. IJnlike electors who have to be 
resident in that constituency to be eligible to vote, there .is no 
requirement for candidates to be from the constituency in which they 
seek election to the House of Representatives. In the case of 
election to the State Assemblies, however, residence in the' state is
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required. Ability to read and write the Malay or English language 
with sufficient proficiency to participate in the proceedings of the 
House,had been required for election to the Federal Legislative 
Council prior to independence. The 1957 Malayan Constitution and 
the 1965 Malaysia Constitution dispensed with this requirement. 
Articles ^8 and -^9 of the Malaysia Constitution list the grounds for 
disqualification from membership of the House of Representatives.
By these articles, undischarged bankrupts, holders of public office 
and office of profit are excluded. By public office is meant the
armed forces, the judicial and legal services, the general public 
services of the Federation or any State, the police force, the rail­
way services and a number of named statutory authorities. By office 
of profit is meant the office of any judge of the Federal Court or 
of a High Court, the office of auditor-general and the office of a 
member of the Election Commission. Holders of public office and
office of profit may, however, seek election should they so choose, 
provided they resign from their office. Those convicted of 
,'.'fences are disqualified from seeking election'as long as they are 
earned from being electors,
The actual nomination procedure itself is governed by the 
detailed provisions of the Election (Conduct of Election) Regulations, 
1959- Nominations are made on specified forms and supported by one 
proposer, one seconder and four supporters, and the witness to the 
candidate's signature. The signature of the witness is required 
since candidates now need not personally present th'eir nomination 
papers. The amendment to the regulations to allow for this was the 
result of State Assembly elections and the House of Representatives 
elections being held simultaneously as from 196 -^. The amendment 
allows for candidates to present themselves for election to the State
1 Smith, T.E., op. cit., p. 18.
7 2
Assemblies of their own State,and yet seek election to the House of 
Representatives in a constituency in some other part of the 
Federation - there being no locality rule for election to the House 
of Representatives. In practice, a large number of candidates - 
almost exclusively from'the opposition - have taken benefit of this 
provision. Accompanying the nomination forms must be a statutory 
declaration signed in the presence of a commissioner for oaths or a 
magistrate establishing the eligibility of the candidate for the 
office he seeks. Also to be submitted is a letter from the 
candidate to the returning officer on the appointment of his 'agent1. 
This allows for an agent to deal on the candidate's behalf on all 
matters pertaining to the election. Like the candidate, the agent 
need not be a voter of the constituency but the -correspondence 
address for the purpose of the election is required to be within the 
constituency. The candidate may, however, act as his own agent. 
Candidates are also required to let the returning officer know how 
they wish their 'names to be written in the ballot papers should they 
want to utilise abbreviations and the like. Failure to provide 
any request in writing allows the returning officer to use the name 
as stated on the nomination forms.
All candidates seeking election are given a symbol which is 
printed next to their names in the ballot paper. Candidates of 
political parties which have already been officially registered with 
the Registrar of Societies and with the Election Commission are 
allowed to utilise their respective party symbols. The system is 
still largely one of requiring the" support of only six local, 
registered electors to be nominated. Cognisance is, however, given 
to the fact that parties do exist and therefore there is a need for 
resolution of conflicts between rival candidates, each of whom may 
claim to be the official candidate of the same party. Political
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party candidates wishing to utilise the approved party symbol have to 
present a letter of authorisation from the central committee of the 
political party concerned, to the returning officer at the time of 
nomination. All candidates not having such authorization letters 
are treated as independent candidates and are allocated a symbol from 
an approved list of 'independent' symbols for use during the election. 
These symbols are of neutral design and-are intended to be without 
religious, racial, political or sentimental significance and are 
distributed by lot to the candidates. (Plate 'I)
Regulation 5 of the Election (Conduct of Elections) Regulations, 
1959, calls for the payment of an election deposit payable in cash or 
by an official receipt-from'an approved treasury as an alternative by 
all candidates seeking election." The deposit is forfeited if the 
candidate obtains less than one-eighth of the total valid votes cast 
during the election- - The object of the deposit is to discourage 
frivolous candidates and those whose cause is unlikely to receive 
support, as "it is held that their inclusion would lengthen the ballot 
paper to no good purpose. It should be noted that the deposit is 
a successful deterrent only when there is lack of money in Malaysian 
politics. If politics were "big business" a small sum like 
1,000 would not deter potential candidates from seeking 
nomination. On the other hand, a large deposit would defeat its own 
ends by acting as a deterrent to candidates who are perfectly honest 
and serious,but poor. The election deposit itself has often been 
criticised as an odio.us regulation which serves to restrict candidates 
to the wealthier segments of society. In these circumstances some 
other kinds of deterrent might be thought appropriate, such as the 
petition signed by so many hundred electors. However, a deterrent 
of this kind is’administratively complicated since signatures cannot 
readily be verified; it is also open to political objections since
P o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  symbols 7^
£1
Barisan
Nasional
Pekemas
4i;u
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Rakyat IPPP
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P la te  1 P o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  symbols and symbols a l lo c a te d  to  
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it is a difficult hurdle to overcome, especially for new candidates.
By comparison the present system of requiring an election deposit is 
convenient and works exceptionally well.
What proved odious was' the manner in which the deposits were 
raised prior to the 197^ election. The Election Commission, in 
reviewing the regulations governing the conduct of elections, sought 
the Government’s permission to increase two-fold the election 
deposit for the state and parliamentary elections which till then
'i
were 250 and 500 respectively. The consultation is a
mat'ter-of practice since, though the Commission has the right to
change the regulations regarding the conduct of elections, the
changes would have to be tabled and approved by Parliament as soon 
2
after as possible'. -Any measure that the Commission adopted with­
out government sympathy would no doubt be denied passage through 
Parliament. The Government met the Election Commission's
suggestion by increasing the deposit three'fold to 750 for state
elections and M/ 1,500 for parliamentary elections. This
3decision was made on July 95 197^ but even the House of Represent­
atives' meeting from July 17 to July 26, 197^ was denied knowledge of 
this decision. Only after Parliament had been dissolved and the 
nomination and polling dates announced did the Chairman of the 
Election Commission announce the threefold increase in election 
deposits. The decision to raise the deposit came under severe
criticism from opposition parties and student unions which represented 
it as an attempt to prevent competition by the poor and the opposition
1 197^ Elections report, p. 28.
2 Elections Act, 1958, clause 17*
3 1974 Elections report, p. 28.
k The Star, July 30, 197^ and. The Malay Mail, August 1, 197^*
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parties. The DAP's Publicity Secretary, Lee Lam Thye, held 
that
"With the threefold increase in deposits, politics now 
becomes a business risk and money raising proposition and 
an investment to make bigger risks."^
The threefold increase would have stood had not the DAP challenged
the legality of the decision to raise the deposits. In a letter to
the Chairman of the Election Commission, the DAP Secretary General,
Lim Kit Siang, pointed out that clause 16 of the Elections Act,
1958 did not give the Commission the legal power to raise the deposit
2of any candidate beyond 1,000. The Government then rescinded
its decision and agreed to the Election Commission's earlier
suggestion to raise the deposit to M#f 500 for the state elections and
z
Mjpf 1,000 for the parliamentary elections.
At the end of the two hours for nomination one copy of the 
nomination paper and the candidate's agent's appointment letter are 
posted for public examination. Objections may be made to the 
nomination of any candidate by any person who is a registered elector 
in that constituency and by other competing candidates on any of the 
following grounds:
a) that the description of the candidate is insufficient 
to identify the candidate;
b) that the nomination paper does not comply with or was 
not delivered in accordance with the provisions of the 
regulations governing elections;
c) that it is apparent from the contents of the nomination 
papers that the candidate is not capable of being 
elected a member of parliament;
d) that the provisions pertaining to election deposits have 
not been observed; and
1 The Star, July 30, 197^-
2 The Star, August k , 197^®
3 197^ Elections report, p. 28.
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e) that the candi&ate is disqualified from being a member 
under the provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia. 1
No objection to a nomination paper is allowed unless it is made to
the returning officer within the one and one-half hours set aside for
this purpose, and all objections are required to be in writing. The
returning officer is required to decide as soon as possible but not
necessarily at once. This is to allow him opportunity to verify his
decisions by way of reference to the Election Commission itself or to
the Attorney General's chambers.
The returning officer may himself lodge an objection on any of
the grounds listed. The returning officer's decision is final and
conclusive for the purposes of -the election,in respect of which the
proceedings are being held, and cannot be called in question except by
way of an election petition on the grounds set out in paragraph (b)
of Section 32 of the Election Offences Act, 1959® The said section
merely declares the election of a candidate void on an election
petition on the grounds of
"non-compliance with the provisions of any written law 
relating to any election if it appears that the election 
was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid 
down in such written law and that such non-compliance 
affected the result of the election."
The powers of the returning officer at nomination are clearly
considerable. No irregularity in -the acceptance of nominations
for either the state or parliamentary elections held in Peninsular
Malaysia in 197^ is believed to have taken place. The DAP
candidate for the Johore State Assembly seat of Tiram was
disqualified following objections from Barisan Nasional supporters
that he was a hospital assistant and thus a holder of public office,
and that he had not resigned from his post as required by the law.
The candidate claimed that he had tendered a 24-hour resignation and
1 The Election '(Conduct of Elections) Regulations, 1959? Reg® 7 (i)®
78
paid a month's salary as required, before the close of nominations at 
11 a.m. on.nomination day. The DAP threatened court action but
'I
no election petition resulted.
The law governing nominations is precise and indeed the penalty 
for non-observance is high. Forging, fraudulently defacing or destroy­
ing any nomination papers, or even delivering to a returning officer any 
nomination paper knowing that it is forged makes the offender liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not 
exceeding M# 2,000, or to both.^ In addition, the offender may be 
debarred from being a candidate or an elector in any election for a
period of five years from the date of conviction or release from
3
imprisonment, whichever is the later. The nomination procedures are 
strictly observed and enjoy the general confidence of the public in 
Peninsular Malaysia.
The Campaign
flection campaigns, which in practice begin well before 
nomination day, officially end the day before polling day and no 
permits for public meetings and rallies are issued after this. An 
authorization letter' is required to be issued by the candidate or his 
agent to all persons canvassing on behalf of the candidate or address­
ing public rallies,and three copies of these authorization letters, 
referred to as "Form F" ,are required to.be lodged with the Election 
Commission within forty-eight hours of it being issued. All public 
rallies have further,*to have the approval of the officer in charge of
1 The Straits Times, August 10, 197^-
2 The Election Offences Act, 1959 (No. 9 of 195*0•
3 Ibid.
^ Ibid., Section 26.
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the local police district and are governed by all limitations govern­
ing all public meetings. The names, addresses and identity card 
numbers of all speakers at public meetings have to be submitted to the 
Election Commission and the local police before a permit can be 
obtained. As a matter of practice the police record in^full 
all speeches at public meetings to watch for any break of the law.
Personation, treating, undue influence and bribery are the four 
categories of corrupt practices identified under the Election Offences 
Act 1959® Each of these is a seizable offence within the meaning of 
the Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code and punishable by imprisonment 
for twelve months and to a fine of between M# 250 to M/ 1,000. It 
further involves suspension from being a candidate, counting agent or 
even an elector for five years after conviction or release from 
imprisonment, whichever is later. A recent addition to the section 
on undue influences is paragraph 2 of Section 9 of the Act, which 
reads:
"A person shall be deemed to interfere with the free 
exercise of the electoral rights of a person within the 
meaning of this section who induces or attempts to induce 
such person to believe that he, or any person in whom he 
is interested, will become or will be rendered an object 
of divine displeasure or spiritual censure."
The significance of the paragraph is more that there is official
recognition of the problem of such practices and the possible
deterrent value it affords, rather than the possibility of any actual
trials and conviction. As will become apparent in the discussion in
the-chapter on the 197*+ campaign, the offences are so committed that
they would make-conviction in an open court of law difficult and thus
unlikely.
Of special significance to the campaign in the 197*^  election, 
are the amendments to the Constitution effected by the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1971 which became effective from March 10, 1971*
The vigorous campaign that had taken place during the election of
8o
19^9 had witnessed the inflaming of communal tensions, and the sub­
sequent shock gains made by the opposition parties and the stalemate 
that resulted in the Selangor State Assembly ,in particular, led to 
communal rioting. Parliamentary government was suspended and
executive authority of the Federation was delegated to a Director of 
Operations whose power was virtually absolute except that he had to
act on the Prime Minister’s advice and be assisted by an Operations
2Council appointed by himself. Parliament was convened on
February 20, 1971 and amongst its first order of business was the 
adoption of the-Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1971• The amendment 
makes it seditious for any person to question the rights and 
privileges established or protected by tho,se provisions of the 
Constitution that relate to citizenship, to Malay as the national 
language, to the use of other languages for non-official purposes, 
to quotas for Malays and natives of Borneo and to protection of the 
'legitimate interests' of other communities, and to the sovereignty 
of the Rulers. There is, however, no restriction to any person
questioning the implementation of the said provisions of the 
Constitution. Though these amendments to the Constitution have 
been criticised in some quarters as stifling freedom of speech, it 
is generally accepted that they served in 197 +^* to an extent redhOb 
the crass appeal to communal sentiments that previous elections in 
Peninsular Malaysia had witnessed.
In an attempt to ensure that elections would be carried out in 
an orderly and peaceful manner, the Election Commission normally 
invites before each election all political parties and the police to 
a meeting to formulate an electoral code of conduct. The meeting
1 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 1, 1969*
2 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 2, 1969-
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for the 1974- election, was attended by members of the Barisan
Nasional, the DAP and Pekemas. Subsequently the Partai Rakyat
1
issued a statement assuring that it.would abide by the Code. The 
Code (refer Appendix 9) itself is merely obligatory and not legally 
binding,but it must be conceded-that much can be achieved by mutually 
agreed codes of conduct rather than by placing reliance on statutes 
and regulations. '
Election Expenses
The functions and mechanisms of political finance constitute 
inevitable links of influence between economic structures and 
- political processes. This is especially so where the governmental 
system involves popular elections. The problem is much broader 
■than just corruption in the narrow sense of 'bribery1, whether of 
public officials, or voters or party influence. ' The question 
broadly involves the relation between social' groups with vastly 
differing financial-resources, the' cost of getting candidates 
nominated and elected, and, very importantly, the obligations of 
parties and elected public officials to their source of financial 
support. An associated consideration involves the relation
between elected officials and their ability to exact financial 
support from various financial groups and organizations, especially 
if their chances of being returned are indeed' abundantly clear as 
has been the status of the Alliance Party, and its successor, the 
Barisan Nasional, since the.first national election was held in 
'independent' Peninsular Malaysia. Though, the transmutation of 
economic ipower into political power and the associated access of 
those in political power to financial support is of great * 
significance, in Malaysia, no effopts have been made to discern and
1 The Straits Times, August 13, 197^*
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interpret the political roles of those engaged in funding candidates 
and political-parties.
The Election Offences Act, 1959, prohibits and punishes with 
fines and imprisonment the personal bribery and intimidation of 
voters. It further -requires the candidate to appoint an election 
agent (the candidate himself could act on his own behalf) who is 
legally responsible for disbursing all funds and reporting all 
contributions and expenditures on the candidate's behalf. It 
imposes a legal maximum on amounts spent by the candidate, and 
establishes the methods and timing of the reports of candidates or 
their agents are to be submitted. The maximum limitation is a 
flat fixed amount and makes no allowance fob type or size of 
constituency. The specified amount has, however, been raised 
over the years. Prior- to the 196^ election, the expenditure per­
missible to candidates was increased from M$f 9?000 to 10,000 
in the case of parliamentary elections, and M#/ 2,500 to Mj^  7,500 in 
the case of state elections. Again, prior to the 19&9 elections 
the allowable expense was doubled to 20,000 for parliamentary
•Z
elections and M$f 15,000 for state elections. No further increase 
was made for the 197^ parliamentary and state elections.
On receipt of the declaration respecting election expenses 
within the stipulated thirty-one days after the publication of the 
result of. an election in the Gazette, the Elections Commission causes 
a notice of the date on which the return and statements in question
1 Milne, R.S.-, and Ratnam, K.J., 'Politics and Finance in Malaya',. 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 3 (1965) 
pp 182-198, is the only significant study of political finance in 
Peninsular Malaysia. Though based on the 196^ election, it 
provides a valuable insight to political finance in Peninsular 
Malaysia for even the 197^ election.
2 196^ Elections report, p. 15-
3 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary and 
State Legislative Assembly General Elections 19&9 of the States
of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, 1972, p. 32.
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must be received and the time and place at which they can be inspected, 
to be published in the Gazette. The returns are retained for six 
months after this date and then returned to the candidate or destroyed. 
No attempts are made by the Election Commission to analyze, tabulate 
or publish the returns of the candidates and interested persons have 
to analyze the separate reports themselves.
The adequacy and functioning of the Act leave much to be desired. 
The law makes no prohibition of certain organized groups, e.g. 
corporations, or persons engaged in gambling enterprises, etc. from 
contributing to party treasuries or political campaigns; nor does it 
impose limitations on amounts contributed by individuals or 
organizations for political purposes.
The amount stipulated as allowable expenditure by candidates is 
indeed small compared with election expenditure in many other countries, 
but Malaysian elections are usually short and simple by comparison.
In practice, most candidates spend somewhat less than they could. 
However,the machinery is not sufficient to exercise any control over 
those candidates-who spend more. Appendix 8 lists the actual 
expenditure incurred by two parliamentary candidates during the election 
campaign of 197^- The expenditure involved by the candidates them­
selves, excluding material and other support provided by the political 
party, amounted to, in one case, 19,830 and in the other to 
70,^92.30. The latter seat was regarded as marginal by the 
candidate concerned - hence the large amount spent. The candidate 
concerned won the seat. Another candidate claimed he spent between
M^ 73,000 and 80,000'in his constituency where he was the incumbent,
1
but lost his election to the opposing candidate. The large 
expenditure incurred, so it was explained, was because the
t
1 The actual expenditure incurred by all three candidates referred
to here were divulged in confidence to the writer by the respective 
candidates. For obvious reasons their identity cannot be 
disclosed.
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constituencies concerned were large. As noted above the allowable 
expenditure is a flat maximum. This insensitivity of the law to the 
size of the constituency can be remedied by making the maximum limit­
ation flexible by applying a fixed amount plus an amount per voter in 
the constituency. The amount per voter can again be varied accord­
ing to the type of constituency - rural or urban - should it be felt 
that the cost of campaigning varies depending on its type.
The contrpl of expenditure by candidates during the official 
campaign period is currently not paralleled by any control of expend­
iture by the political parties, regardless of whether this is linked 
to any particular candidate or constituency. For the control of 
expenses,the machinery is oblivious to the existence of, and expend­
iture made by, the political parties. Often,expenses that larger 
parties make have, in the case of independent candidates or 
candidates from financially weaker parties, to be borne by the 
candidates themselves and therefore to be declared in their state­
ments. It appears, therefore, that any control on the expenditure 
of candidates without a control on expenditure of the political 
parties totally defeats the purposes of the Act. If the system of 
the election expense control is to be made effective then some form 
of control of party expenditure is necessary.
The question of whether some general and continuous control of 
expenditure for political purposes should be made is indeed outside 
the scope of this study. However it is relevant to note that 
whilst it may generally be conceded that it is a democratic virtue 
for citizens to be well informed about politics,and recognized that 
exposure to conflicting views is an essential part of political life 
in a democratic country, the present rules are clearly in favour of 
large party organizations. The general complaint is that larger 
parties, and particularly the party in power, get a disproportionate 
share of publicity. With respect to this objective of providing
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equal access to publicity for all candidates, such devices as limited 
subsidies for advertising and publicity, equal access to radio and 
television, and use of mails might be explored. Government parties, 
especially in newly independent countries, are often guilty of abusing 
governmental authority over the mass media and do grab a dis­
proportionate share of the publicity. The Alliance party and the 
Barisan Nasional have in Malaysia shown similar tendencies. The 
distribution of radio time by the Ministry of Information between the 
parties contesting the 197^ election will serve to indicate this.
The Election Commission entered into discussions with the 
Ministry of Information for campaign time on the wholly state-owned 
radio and television networks in the country. On August 3, 197^ 
the Minister of Information promised that radio time to campaign would
be allotted in a "fair and responsible manner" but would not disclose
1
any further information. Eventually it was agreed to campaign time 
for the parties on the radio but not on television. The time allotted 
the parties was even more revealing. The Barisan Nasional got 1C& 
minutes, comprising eight 13 minute broadcasts. The series was 
begun and ended by the Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak himself. Each 
component party leader of the Barisan Nasional utilized the remaining
six broadcasts. In contrast, the DAP, - . Pekemas and Partai
2Sosialis Rakyat obtained one 13 minute broadcast each. The DAP 
decided to boycott the broadcast and the party1s Secretary General 
declared:
"This is a real farce. ' The National Front has about 
twice as many parliamentary candidates as the DAP, but 
it is given air time eight times over our allotted time.
This again does not take into account all the radio and 
television time the National Front leaders and candidates 
get on other programmes." 3
1 The Star, August 197^ + -
2 The Straits Times, August 13, 197^*
3 The Straits Times, August 14, 197^»
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Polling and Counting
The printing of the ballot papers is undertaken by the
Government Printing Department and all the ballot papers for the
parliamentary election, of 197^ in Peninsular Malaysia were printed
centrally in Kuala Lumpur. Those for the State Assembly elections
were, however, printed at the State printing departments in Alor Star,
1
Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur and Johore Bharu. This decentralization, though
increasing the number of persons dealing with the ballot papers and
thus theoretically increasing the possibility of irregularities, was
inevitable, given the short period of time between nomination day and
polling day. Moreover, postal ballot papers had to be distributed
to the returning officers sufficiently early for mailing. Again, a
very large number of ballot papers had to be printed, for,the 197^
parliamentary and state elections were held simultaneously making a
2total of seven million ballot papers.
The ballot papers contain the names of the candidates in an 
order determined by lot at nomination time, the candidates' symbols 
and a blank space for the voters to indicate their choice by marking 
an 'X'. To differentiate the ballot papers utilized for the 
parliamentary and state elections they were printed in different 
colours, the parliamentary ones in white and the state ones in yellow. 
Each ballot paper carries a serial number and is attached to a counter­
foil, carrying the same serial number; the voter's number is recorded 
on the counterfoil when he is given a ballot paper. It is the 
presence of these serial numbers that has been the subject of
criticism and accusations that"the’ ballot is not secret. It is 
suggested that the ruling party could trace through the serial number
1 197^ Elections report, p. 32.
2 Ibid.
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the choice of any voter and the fear of the retributive anger of the 
ruling party prevents voters from choosing opposition candidates.
The practice of having serial numbers is common in other countries, 
notably Singapore and the United Kingdom, and is a practice maintained 
to prevent any stuffing of the ballot boxes with forged papers and to 
allow for election petitions. The printing of serial numbers 
appears to be a necessity and the secretness of the ballot has to be 
ensured by regulations and procedures governing the safe keeping and 
eventual destruction of the ballot papers after the counting. In 
Malaysia between 39% and 5^% of the voters have in each election 
voted against the ruling party and this must serve as sufficient 
indication of the popular acceptance of the secrecy of the ballot.
Provisions exist for certain categories of voters who have 
registered as absent voters in their respective constituencies to be 
provided with postal votes. The categories that qualify to register 
as absent voters are:
a) a serving member of. any regular naval, military or 
air force of the Federation oh the Commonwealth;
b) a person in the federal or state public service or 
in the service of any local authority or statutory 
body exercising powers vested in it by federal or 
state law and who is on duty outside the Federation;
c) a person engaged in full time study at an educational 
establishment outside the Federation; and
d) the wife/husband of a person in any of the three above 
mentioned groups living with him/her at the date of 
application for registration, 1
Malaysians abroad for any other purpose, including those employed in
foreign countries, are not given postal ballots.
For the 197^ election a total "of 48,86*1 postal ballot papers 
for the parliamentary election and 46,528 for the state election were
1 Election (Postal Voting) Regulations, 1959• The regulations also 
empower the Election Commission to designate by Gazette 
notification any category of persons as postal voters.
88
1
issued. It has not been possible to verify the number who returned 
their ballot papers. Nomination day was on August 8, 1974 scid 
polling day on August 24, 197^» The ballot papers had to be printed, 
distributed to the returning officers, sent to the electors concerned 
and returned by them,in both cases by post,by polling day for them to 
be valid. Hence it is difficult to envisage that those residing 
outside the Federation did indeed have the opportunity to exercise 
their franchise - a sacrifice they were forced to make because the 
Election Commission found it expedient to set polling day so close to 
nomination day.
The procedure observed at polling stations is strictly governed 
2
by election ordinances, Polling stations, usually in public 
buildings or schools, are established in each polling district.
Outside the polling station is affixed prior to the commencement of 
the poll,a notice showing the name and symbol of each candidate.
No persons other than the polling station staff, the candidates, the 
election agent of the candidates and one polling agent for each 
candidate are allowed into the polling station. As each voter 
applies for a ballot paper, his identity is established by checking 
his identity card, and his number, name and description as stated in 
the electoral register is called out. As a practice each candidate's 
polling agent marks this off In his own copy of the electoral 
register. The number of the elector is written on the counterfoil 
of the ballot paper and the ballot paper is perforated and stamped or 
initialled by the presiding officer.
If a person representing to be a particular elector named in 
the electoral register applies for a ballot paper after another person
1 1974 Elections report, p . 35 •
2 The Election (Conduct of Election) Act 1959, (No. 9 of 1954) and 
The Polling Station, 1964.
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has been recorded as having voted as such elector, the applicant is 
made to take an oath of identity and vote on a "tendered ballot 
paper". The tendered ballot papers are of a different colour and 
a record of them is maintained. They are, however, not counted for 
the returns of a candidate at the counting of votes after polling. 
Their significance is only that they would be counted after 
adjudication by an election judge if an election petition arose.
Unlike the problem faced in many other countries in establishing the 
identity of voters,in Malaysia the existence of an identity card 
system greatly facilitates polling. The tendered ballot papers are 
thus rarely utilized.
On the closing of the poll the presiding officer is required 
to make up and seal in separate packets the unused and spoilt ballot 
papers placed together, the marked copy of electoral rolls and 
counterfoils of ballot papers, and the tendered votes list.
Candidates are invited to place their own seals as well. These are 
returned to the returning officer,who keeps them unopened for a 
period of six months and in the absence of any election petitions 
destroys them, also unopened, after giving notice of the place at 
which he is going to destroy them. As a matter of practice the 
candidates are invited to be present when the.se are destroyed.
These measures are regarded as an important means of ensuring public 
confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, as it has often been 
suggested that recording the elector's number on the counterfoil of 
the ballot paper destroys the secrecy of the ballot and may influence 
the vote of those who fear governmental reprisal.
The counting itself is done in the presence of the candidates
and their election and counting agents. The number of ballot 
papers from each polling station is counted to verify if the number 
of votes is correct, then mixed with that of the other polling 
districts, sorted for each candidate, and counted. A recount is
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allowed on request by the candidate or his agents if the number of 
votes for all candidates together with the rejected votes varies from 
the number of ballot papers found in the ballot boxes by one per cent 
or more, or if the number of votes cast for the leading candidate 
and the number of votes cast for the next leading candidate is two 
per cent or less of the total number of votes cast. The returning 
officer may, however, order a recount on his own discretion.
Rejected ballot papers are of importance and are held to 
indicate under various circumstances a number of different conditions. 
In some cases they may be an expression of protest or, especially in 
compulsory voting systems, spoilt votes may be an indication of the 
voter’s perceived lack of alternatives to choose from. In single 
party states they may even represent a negative vote against the 
candidate presented. Where voting is voluntary, however, spoilt 
votes are generally held to be due to voter ignorance of the voting 
procedure. In Malaysia the following category of ballot papers 
are rejected; namely any ballot paper
a) which is not stamped or perforated with the official 
mark, or initialled by the presiding officer except 
where it is deemed that such was due to an oversight 
by the polling staff;
b) on which more votes are given than there are candidates 
to be returned;
c) on which anything is written or marked by which the 
voter can be identified;
d) which is unmarked or marked other than in the place or 
manner provided, or,
e) which does not clearly indicate the intention of the 
voter;. 1
The discretion of the returning officer is held final except that 
aggrieved candidates may cause an election petition on the grounds 
that there were irregularities. On completion of the count the
1 The Election (Conduct of Election) Act 1959 (No. 9 of 1954).
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ballot papers are sealed and retained in safe custody by the returning 
officer for a period of six months, after which they are destroyed.
The election results become official when announced by the returning 
officer at the end of the counting. However, it is the date of 
publication in the Gazette that becomes the date by reference to 
which election petitions are made.
Election Offences and Election Petitions
Election offences are tried in the ordinary courts of the country
and in pursuance of the procedures laid down for criminal offences.
However, the election of any representative can be made invalid only by
way of an election petition to an election judge who is a judge of the
High Court. An election petition can be made on the grounds that
non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to any
election by any individual or group led to the election of a
candidate. Unlike normal court procedures, there is no appeal from
the decision of an election judge, this being held by the Federal
1
Court in the case of Tunku Abdullah v All Amberan. Only two
election petitions were filed after the 197^ election, one in Perak
2State and the other in Selangor. The petition m  Perak was based
on the claim that Daeng Ibrahim bin Othman, the successful opposition 
DAP candidate for the State Assembly seat of Pasir Puteh, was not a
resident of Perak and thus having not met the locality rule, was not
eligible to contest the state election. The petition in Selangor 
was on behalf of Goh Hock Guan the Barisan Nasional*s unsuccessful 
incumbent for the parliamentary seat of Petaling, on the grounds
that the counting of votes was incorrect. Both
1 /i"97_]7 Malayan Law Journal, p. 25.
2 197^ Elections report, p. 33.
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petitions were dismissed by the courts. This meant that the two 
opposition candidates whose election was questioned were held elected 
- a measure of the freedom of the courts from governmental pressure.
Conclusion
The system of elections utilised in Malaysia is structured
wholly along the lines of the British electoral system of plurality
voting in single member territorial constituencies. No steps were
taken by the framers of the Malaysian system and the'country*s
1
Constitution to allow for any guaranteed equitable representation of 
the various communities iri Malaysia. The assumed inherent 
characteristic of the system introduced - namely that it would 
provide for a stable government by way of advantaging the larger 
parties - held sway. No mention is-made in the relevant sections of 
the Constitution and the laws enacted as regards their implications 
to communal representation, and this omission appears to be based on 
the presumption that to accommodate communal representation would have 
the effect of perpetuating communal differences and would counter any 
efforts towards building a united Malaysian society.
The key element in the administration of. an equitable and free 
election in Malaysia is the existence of an independent Election 
Commission. It appears, however, that the hitherto largely 
independent Election Commission is coming under increasing pressure 
from the party in power which is able to utilise its power in 
Parliament to influence the Commission1s actions. The manner in 
-which the election deposits were increased for the 197^ election,
r /
the failure of the Commission to fix. a polling date sufficiently after 
nomination day so as to.allow for adequate time for the handling of 
postal votes: both are indications of a possible yielding to
governmental pressure. The Commission was again seriously 
compromised by the omission of several thousand names from the
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electoral register; the fact that the inquiry conducted into this was 
not made public only served further to arouse the fears of Malaysians.
Nevertheless the discussion in this chapter, which has been 
confined essentially to the formal and institutionalized aspects of 
the electoral system, indicates that, by-and-large, there is an 
adequate system of' ground rules on which to conduct a relatively fair 
and equitable election. However, no amount of statutory
stipulations, both primary and derived, could by themselves ensure a
fair and equitable election. It is on the formal aspects of the 
system that the informal aspects, like a tradition of fair-play by the 
administrators, candidates, voters and the judiciary, interact to 
result in a just or unjust election. One principal area where a
sense of fair-play is of particular importance in an electoral system
of plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies is, 
the delimitation of the constituencies itself. And it is to the 
implications of constituency delimitation in Peninsular Malaysia,that 
the next chapter addresses itself.
C H A  P T O  T W O
C o n s t i t u e n c y  Delimitation and, its Implications
for Communal Representation
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The ideal spatial organization of electoral areas, that is the 
subdivision of a state for purposes of representation, should be such 
that the common body of interests predominating in particular areas 
would be given representation. Inadvertently or by conscious
design, however, the common body of interests predominating in part­
icular areas could- be masked. Indeed the delimiting of electoral 
areas can be so tampered with as to result in partisan advantage.
This form of chicanery in political cartography is popularly termed 
’gerrymandering1, after Governor Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts, 
United States of America, who in I812 carved out an electoral district 
reminiscent of a salamander.
Gerrymandering may manifest itself in several forms and nearly 
two centuries of political ingenuity have contributed to a highly 
sophisticated art. Clearly, the manner in which constituencies are 
delimited can determine the result of elections, and those in power 
have not always been averse to changing the 'rules of the game' when 
their own performance has been found wanting. Hence decisions per­
taining to the apportionment and delineation of constituencies are 
primary determinants of the quality of representative government.
This chapter, therefore, aims to examine the delimitation of constit­
uencies in Peninsular Malaysia with reference to the principles laid 
down in the Constitution for such delimitation - and to assess the 
implications of these for communal representation in the political 
structure. Particular emphasis will be given to the 197^ deline­
ation review exercise which resulted in the number of parliamentary 
constituencies in-Peninsular Malaysia being increased from 10^ to 11^. 
It was on the basis of the 11^ f constituencies that the 197^ election 
was conducted.
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Forms of Gerrymandering
Classifications of the forms of gerrymandering abound. Orr, 
for instance, provided a five-fold classification based on the manner
in which the constituencies are delimited and the community
i
disadvantaged. Prescott, citing Glanville, differentiates two
types of spatial bias and this is on the basis of whether the gerry­
mander brings about an advantage to the gerrymandering party by
reducing the representation of the 'opposition1, or by increasing its
2own representation. In relative terms, of course, there is m  each
case an advantage to the party administering the gerrymander.
For the purposes of this- chapter a four-fold classification of 
spatial bias in constituency delimitation may be conveniently adopted. 
The basis for this classification is the manner in which the advantage 
accrues and is largely'based on Grr's classification. The four 
types- of spatial bias may be summarized as follows:
1 Excess Votes - This involves drawing the constituencies in
a manner so as to concentrate in as few constituencies as possible the 
votes of those whose representation it is sought to minimise. In 
these seats'the- 'opposition’ will gain impressive majorities; the 
number of seats won, however, remains small.
2 Wasted Votes - This occurs where the constituencies are so 
carved out as to dilute the, opposition vote by separating into several 
constituencies a concentrated area of opposition support. A prime 
■example of such a gerrymander is to split up urban areas and include 
parts of them with rural areas, ensuring that the urban vote is in 
each case less than the rural vote. The constituencies that
1 Orr, D.M., The Persistence of the Gerrymander in North Carolina 
Congressional Redistricting, Southeastern Geographer, Vol. IX, 
No. 2, 1969, p. 40. _
2 Prescott,'J.R.V;, Political Geography, 1972, p. .76 cites 
Glanville, T.G.,; Spatial Biases in Electoral Distributions, 
unpublished thesis, University of Melbourne, 1970-
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eventuate in such a gerrymandering are so drawn as to result in a 
large number of constituencies in which one's own candidates win by- 
small majorities.
3 Sinuous Constituency - Here “the aim is to concentrate one's 
own support and is achieved principally by gathering within a wander­
ing, sinuous constituency one's own scattered electors and thereby 
achieve a majority that would-have been otherwise sacrificed.
Governor Eldridge Gerry's Massachusetts gerrymander was of this form.
^ Weighted Constituencies - The first three forms may be 
utilized even where the constituencies delimited are not required to 
be of equal electorate size. In systems which impose no such restrict­
ions - constituencies may be drawn of any size and thus it becomes 
possible- to apportion a lesser number of seats to political sublimits 
which are opposition strongholds. Where no apportionment takes 
place it is still possible to delineate, a large number of seats with 
small electorates in one's own area of support, and a small number of 
seats with large electorates in areas of opposition strength. The 
resultant constituencies are invariably of greatly varying sizes, the 
net effect of which is to increase the value of the vote of one's own 
supporters vis-^-vls that of the opposition. Such weighted constit­
uencies may also arise by population movement^ rural-urban migration 
for instance, .causes the electorate size of rural constituencies to 
become progressively smaller by comparison to those of urban 
constituencies. The value of the rural vote increases relative to 
that of the urban vote.
Constituency Delimitation
The first national election in Peninsular Malaysia was conducted 
for the fifty-two Federal Legislative Council seats on July 27» 1953* 
No constituency delimitation had been attempted before, and the 
committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the
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Federal Legislative Council on July 15» 1953 held that the delimit­
ation of constituencies "will be a task of some difficulty calling for
1
careful study by an individual or body which is patently impartial".
The committee accordingly recommended that a constituency delineation
commission should be established consisting of three clearly
impartial persons, of whom the chairman should come from outside
Malaya, to make recommendations regarding the delimitation of 
2constituencies. The three-man commission under the chairmanship of
Lord Merthyr was obliged to have its recommendations ready in time for 
the 1955 election, and hence, the constituencies were delimited in 
considerable haste. The terms of reference of this commission
required that there should be a measure of weightage for area given to 
rural constituencies, and that the constituencies, whilst attempting 
to lie within whole administrative districts, should not in any case 
cross state boundaries. The terms of reference were silent as to 
whether the constituency delineation commission should pay any regard 
to the spatial distribution of the- various ethnic communities. The 
commission held this to be in accord with the then policy of disregard­
ing communal' considerations in the formulation of an electoral system
3
and thus "wholly ignored racial considerations". No effort was made 
to ensure equitable representation of the several ethnic communities.
The commission’s task was by all counts an unenviable one.
There had hitherto been no registration of voters and hence it was 
obliged to work with only total population statistics. The latest
census had been conducted as early as 19^ -7 und therefore was by 195^
1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to
• Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative
Council  ^ 195^ -, p. 13- (Hereinafter referred to as the Report of 
the Election CommitteeD)
2 Ibid.
3 Federation'of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation 
Commission, 195^1 p»
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to a measure inaccurate, this being largely brought about by the 
voluntary migration of peoples, particularly from the rural to 
urban areas, and by the forced regrouping in the early 1950s of rural 
dwellers into 'new villages' in an attempt to overcome the communist 
insurgency that had begun in 19^ +8. The constituencies that event­
uated were contained entirely!within the boundaries of individual 
states, and the range of population of the constituencies was such 
that the most populous contained as much as over two and one-half 
times the number of the least populouso Fifty of the fifty-two 
constituencies delimited had a Malay majority and two a Chinese 
majority; none had even as much as fifteen per cent Indian elector- 
ate. The enthusiasm for immediate elections prevailed and the
commission's, report was accepted in toto. Criticism was, however, 
not wanting and one critic referred to the report as "a rather 
pedestrian and unimaginative document1' and as evidence of the "ostrich
-like belief in Malaya that communalism can best be scotched by
2refusing to recognize its existence ..."
The 1957 Malayan Constitution emplaced the responsibility for 
the delimitation of constituencies and the conduct of elections on an 
independent election commission0 Article kG of the Constitution 
stipulated that there should be one hundred parliamentary constit­
uencies, and Article 116 and the thirteenth schedule of the 
Constitution included the principles by which the constituencies were 
to be delimited. For the purposes of the first election to the newly 
constituted House of Representatives however, Article 171 of the 
■ Constitution suspended these provisions and merely required that
1 Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 
1965, p* 185.
2 Carnell, F.G., 1 Constitutional'Reform and Elections in Malaya', 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 27, 195^ -, p. 230.
100
"the Federation shall be divided into constituencies by 
dividing into two constituencies each of the constituencies 
delimited for the purpose of the elections to the 
Legislative Council . ..M
This provision was obviously in recognition of the fact that the
delimitation attempted in 1951 required a thorough review which, it
was unlikely would be completed in time for the first post-independence
election. In pursuance of Article 1?1, therefore, the Election
Commission in 1958, merely divided into two the fifty-two constit-
1uencies delimited in 1951° The thus delimited 10l constituencies
were utilized for the 1959 election.
The constitutional intention of the 1958 delimitation was clearly
that the 10-1 parliamentary constituencies should be used for the 1959
election and the subsequent bye-elections only,1 and that a completely
fresh delimitation would be made in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution,, Immediately following on the election of 1959, the
Election Commission proceeded to apportion amongst the several states
the one hundred seats stipulated by Article 16 and to delineate these
constituencies. The Commission’s report was presented in 1960 and
the delimitation presented was to be effective for the next election
scheduled for 1961.
The Constitution bound the Government to accept the report, but
the Alliance Government took advantage of its more than two-thirds
majority in the House of Representatives to amend the Constitution
3in 1962, , and thus, made the delimitation inoperative. The
1 Federation of Malaya, Re-port of the Election Commission on the
Delimitation of Constituencies for-'the first Elections to the'
House of Representatives and the State Legislative Assemblies, 
1958, p. 1. ' —  '
2 Federation o'f Malaya, . , Report of the Election Commission on
the Delimitation of Parliamentary and State Constituencies under 
the provisions of the Constitution of the Perseketuan Tanah 
Melayu, 1960. (Hereinafter referred to as i960 Constituency 
Delimitation Report.)
3 Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1962, Section 31-
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reasons for the Government’s actions were not stated, though 
observers generally held that it was due to the Government's fear that 
the delimitation would be disadvantageous to its own electoral per-
"I
formances. The i960 delimitation, it will be noted, came soon after 
the 1959 election. The Alliance majority in terms of votes had been 
reduced from 79*6% in 1955 to 51°5% in the 1959 election; the 
percentage of seats won had dropped from 98*08% in 1955 to 71*15% in 
1959* The Commission's i960 apportionment of seats amongst the 
states was such that, by and large, it tended to increase or retain 
unaltered the apportionment to the states in which the Alliance had 
fared badly in 1959? but to decrease the number of seats apportioned 
to the states in which it had fared well (Table 7)*
The effect, among others, of the amendment to the Constitution
was:
1 Parliament assumed the powers of apportionment and 
delineation of constituencies. The Election Commission's 
powers were now restricted to merely recommending changes. 
The idea of an independent, non-partisan delimitation of 
constituencies was in one stroke removed and apportionment 
and delineation of constituencies became in effect the 
prerogative of the government of the day;
2 the rural weightage charge in the delineation of 
constituencies was further accentuated and rural 
constituencies could now be as little as half the urban 
constituencies. This contrasted with the requirements 
of the 1957 Constitution which required that there should 
be at most a fifteen per cent deviation from the average 
sized constituency; and
1 Smith, T.E., The Administration of the Election, in Ratnam, K.J., 
and Milne-,■ R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 19&A-,
1967, p* 65.
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Table 7
Seats Apportioned in 1958, and i960, and Percentage Votes Won by 
Alliance Party in 1959 Election, by States.
State
1
Seats Apportioned Difference 
in 1960
2
Alliance 
vote 1959
1958 1960 %
perlis 2 2 0 59-6
Kedah 12 12 0 65.3
Kelantan 10 10 0 31 A
Trengganu 6 5 _ 1 3 7 - k
Penang 8 9 + 1 ¥f.O
Perak 20 19 - 1 ^9.6
Pahang 6 5 - 1 66.9
Selangor 1*f 14 0 k k . 3
Negri Sembilan 6 5 ■ - 1 51.9
Malacca k 5 + 1 58.9
Johore 16 'Ik - 2 65.7
Total 10*f 100 - li­
1 Federation oi MuJ. aya, kenort of th e Election Commission on
the Delimitation of Constituencies, Kuala Lumpur, '1960, p. 3«
2 Compiled from: Election Commission, 19^9 Election Report, i960.
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3 the number of parliamentary constituencies was retained 
at 10A, making the Commission's i960 delimitation of one 
hundred seats inoperative,, Thus the 10^ f constituencies 
delimited in 1958, and intended for the 1959 election, 
could now be used for subsequent elections as well.
The new provisions occasioned by these 1962 amendments to the Malayan 
Constitution were incorporated into the 19&3 Malaysian Constitution, 
and the constituencies were utilized for the 196 -^ general election 
and subsequent by^-elections.
The apportionment of seats now being a government prerogative, 
the Election Commission in 1966 sought the Government's intentions as 
regards any changes it might wish to make. The Government, anxious 
to retain what was to it a highly favourable situation, was unwilling 
to make any'amendments. The inequitable apportionment of seats 
between the states continued. The Commission nonetheless undertook 
to prepare recommendations for the delineation of constituencies but 
was unable to rectify the malapportionment of seats between the 
states. The Commission failed to complete its review in time for 
the 1969 election and the review was postponed until after the 19&9 
election. In the event, the 19&9 election was also held on the
basis of the constituencies drawn in 1958® By now the constituencies 
were greatly disproportionate in total population or electorate size, 
and as the territorial basis of electoral representation, were grossly 
inadequate. The election results of 19&9 proved disastrous for the 
Alliance party and it gained less than fifty per cent of the valid
1 Malaysia, Lapuran Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia atas
Persempadan Bahagian - Bahagian-Pilihanraya Perseketuan dan Negeri 
bagi Negeri - Negeri Tanali Melayu (Semenan.jung Malaysia), 197^i 
p. 1 . (Hereinafter referred to as 197^ Constituency Delineation 
Report.)
10^
votes polled in Peninsular Malaysia but, aided greatly by the de­
limitation of constituencies that prevailed, the party was able to 
gain 63«3% of the seats. In the state elections held simultaneous­
ly, the shock to the Alliance was even greater. It had not only lost 
Kelantan but also Penang, and had difficulties in forming the state 
governments in Selangor and Perak, In Selangor the Alliance had
gained only fourteen of the twenty-eight seats and in Perak only nine-
1
teen of the forty seats,,
It has already been noted that communal rioting and clashes
followed the 1969 election and parliamentary government was suspended.
For this reason the Commission also suspended any constituency review.
With the restoration of parliamentary government on February 20, '197'!
the Commission resumed its review of constituencies and completed its
task in May 1973- In accordance with the provisions of section 9?
part II of the thirteenth schedule of the Constitution, the Commission
o
submitted its report to the Prime Minister.^ But even before the
Election Commission's 1973 report was tabled in the House of
Representatives, Parliament approved the creation of the Federal
Territory of Kuala Lumpur. The creation of the Federal Territory
required constitutional amendments for the transfer of Kuala Lumpur
from the State Government to the Federal Government. Along with the
amendments occasioned by this transfer, the Government increased the
number of seats in the House of Representatives from 10^ to 11^ f,
apportioned the additional seats between the States and the Federal
Territory, and again changed the principles governing the delineation 
3
of constituencies. The Election Commission was thus again obliged
1 Malaysia, Election Commission,' Report on the Parliamentary 
(Dewan Ra'ayat) and-State Legislative Assembly General Elections 
1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, 1972,
Appendix D, p. 113* (Hereinafter referred to as 1969 Elections 
Report.)
2 197^ Constituency Delineation Report, p. 2.
3 Malaysia, Act 206 of 1973* The Act came into force on 
February 1, 197^ f.
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to undertake a fresh review of constituencies and have it ready for 
the election due before 1976. It was obvious to observers, however, 
that political developments indicated that the Government was aiming 
for an early election, though the House of Representatives could 
continue to serve till 1976.
The new review exercise begun in June 1973 was carried through 
in tremendous haste. Whilst 'the Commission in the past has been 
unable to complete delimitation exercises in even two years, it now 
managed to complete its task in thirteen monthsD The recommendations
were presented on1July 20, 1974 and- adopted by Parliament after two 
days of discussion, on July 24, 1974. A report completed in such a 
hurry could hardly be expected to be adequate and, as it turned out, 
was subjected to considerable criticism by members of the opposition. 
It was saved from any further criticism only because of the lack of 
time given members of parliament to both examine and discuss the 
report.
The report was remarkable for its failings'. No individual
constituency maps were available, these being presented only when the
electoral registers were being revised in late 1975 and early 1976.
Indeed more detailed maps showing the electoral districts within
parliamentary constituencies were in some case's still in the process
2
of being drafted as late as August 1977® At the time of the 
adoption of the report, the only maps available to Parliament merely 
indicated the constituency boundaries on otherwise blank state maps
1 Malaysia, His Majesty*s Government Gazette,1 February 19? 1976,
p.u. (b) 87 - p.uTTb) 101. “
2 Attempts were made to obt-ain these maps for Negri Sembilan State
in August 1977® Ihe Survey Department, Negri Sembilan, which was 
responsible for preparing the maps, was able to provide only some 
of them, because, some maps had not been completed and yet others 
had bqen completed but not yet gazetted.
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of the scale of five miles to an inch. The report, however, listed 
all the polling districts that comprised a constituency, and interest­
ed persons could, by obtaining the old constituency maps, piece 
together a detailed map of each constituency.
The electoral register used for the purpose of the delineation 
according to the Commission'1 s report was
"the electoral roll of 1972/73 which was updated, that is 
after the deletion, of recurring names, of names cf persons 
who have died, relinquished or Tost their citizenship and  ^
so forth, as completed and reaffirmed in February of 1974".
The procedure for the registration of electors is governed by the
Election (Registration of Electors) Regulations ,19599and was discussed
in chapter one. Gazette notifications are made of the qualifying
date by which the revision is made, the dates for registration and of
the certification of the electoral registers. Any electoral register
prepared without regard to these provisions as required by the
Election (Registration of Electors) Regulation, 1959? would be deemed
unconstitutional. Table 8 lists the figures derived after the
procedure for the registration had been observed for the registration
exercises of 1972/73 and. 1973/74, and, the figure utilized by the
Election Commission for its 1974 review exercise. A search of the
gazette publications did not reveal, any additional exercise having
been undertaken between that of 1972/73 and 1973/74. As such, it has
not been possible to verify where the figures utilized by the
Election Commission for its 1974 delineation were derived from.
Compared to the figures of 1972/73 it would appear that the Election
Commission disregarded more than a quarter of a million electors in
its delineation exercise. Compared to the 1973/74 figures, it would
appear that the Commission had delineated the constituencies with
regard to 80,003 non-existent electors£
1 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 4.
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Table 8
Electorate by States as in the 1972/73 and 1973/74 Revised Rolls, and 
the 1974 Constituency Delineation Report.
State
197^
Delineation
Report
1972/732
Difference
1973/A2 Difference 
with 1974 
Report
Perlis 37,883 6 1,420 3,535 58,244 + 359
Kedah 397,320 424,272 26,952 395,854 » 1,466
Kelantan 336,843 373,120 36,277 310,406 - 26,437
Trengganu 183,723 200,096 16,371 183,340 - 385
Penang 293,973 312,934 18,961 286,680 - 7,293
Perak 630,893 675,115 44 ,222 625,987 - 4,906
Pahang 207,792 207,337 - 455 196,057 - 11,735
Selangor
Federal Territory
341,238  
210,835
601,911 49,818 509,445 - 42,648
Negri Sembilan 181,009 119,744 10,735 177,335 - 3,674
Malacca 153,011 160,807 7,796 151,535 - 1,476
Johore 475,260 511,909 36,649 494,918 + 19,658^
Total 3,469,804 3,720,665 250,861 3 ,389,801 - 80,003
Source: ■ 1 Election Commission, 1974 Constituency Delineation
Report, 1974, P° 82 =
2 Data obtained from Election Commission.
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The report prepared by the Election Commission and dated
July 20, 197^1 and that presented for approval by Parliament, were the
same for all states except Johore. Members of Parliament themselves
1
were unaware of the extent of the changes introduced, the changes
were merely marked on a blank map of the State of Johore on the scale
of one inch to five miles and included as an appendix to the report by
the Commission,, No indication of even the polling districts that
comprised the newly amended constituencies of Johore were presented,
though such information was included for all other states. This was,
however, subsequently provided in the gazette notification which
2announced the holding of electionso
Opposition politicians were unable to do more than voice their 
indignation at what appeared to be a shoddy and inadequate delineation 
of constituencies. The government's majority in Parliament, however, 
assured the safe passage of the amended report of the Commission.
The government-controlled radio and television, and the newspapers 
were silent on the implications of the changes introduced by the 
Commission's initial report and the amendments made to it - the news 
was focussed on the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of 
elections. What was already a fait accompli received scant
attention. After sixteen years, and/ two elections more than that
intended by the 1958 delineation exercise, Parliament adopted a new 
set of constituencieso The delineation adopted was of momentous 
implication to the representation of the several communities in 
Peninsular Malaysia’s plural society, and was to alter greatly the 
fortunes of the several parties at the 197^ election*
1 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Member of Parliament 
for Kampar on August 10, 1-97^ ? and, V. Veerapan, Pekemas Member 
of Parliament for Nibong Tebal on August 11, 197^-
2 Malaysia, His Majesty’s Government Gazette, August 15, 197^,
P.U. (B) 572 - PcU. (B) 58^.
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Apportionment
A problem particularly associated with federal structures, 
though not wholly exclusive to them, is the question of apportion­
ment which is ordinarily defined as the allocation of seats to 
subordinate units of government. In apportioning seats to the 
several component units of a state, factors other than just population 
numbers may be taken into consideration. Hence, when viewed in 
terms of representation of people, the apportionment may appear to 
disadvantage certain units. This form of malapportionment, referred 
to as constitutional malapportionment, was occasioned by the 
Constitution adopted in 1963 when the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, 
Sabah and Sarawak, together formed the larger Federation of Malaysia. 
Sabah and Sarawak were afforded forty seats - sixteen for Sabah and 
twenty-four for Sarawak. This placed Sabah and Sarawak at a con­
siderable advantage, a compromise that the other states were willing 
to make to allay the fears of these new states that they may be join­
ing the Federation as junior partners. Singapore, on the other hand, 
conceded an even greater electoral disadvantage than the Federation of 
Malaya, in exchange for greater self-government. (Table 9) When 
Singapore separated from the Malaysian Federation the number of seats 
in the Malaysian Parliament was reduced from 159 to 1AA. The advant­
age accruing to Sabah and Sarawak was now solely at the expense of 
Peninsular Malaysia, thereby further accentuating the disadvantage to 
the Peninsular Malaysian states. This was to an extent rectified when 
Parliament in 1973 increased the number of Peninsular Malaysian seats 
from 10A to 11A, but left unchanged at a total of forty the seats for 
Sabah and Sarawak. (Table 10) For the apportionment of seats between 
the Peninsular Malaysian states no explicit constitutional guarantees 
exist and Parliament reserves the exclusive right to apportion seats, 
such powers having been assumed from the Election Commission by the 
constitutional amendment of 1962.
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Table 9
Discrepancies between Total Population of Component Units of the 
Malaysian Federation and Apportionment of Seats, 1964,
Peninsular g^ngap0re Sabah Sarawak 
Malaysia & *
Malaysia
Population 7,919,0.55 1,844,200 506,628 819? 808 11,089,691
Population as 
percentage of 
Malaysian total
71=4 16.6 4=6 7,4 100
Seats 104 15 16 24 159
Seats as 
percentage of 
Malaysian total
65-4 9 A  10*1 15-1 100
Discrepancy - 6 o0 - 7=2. + 5 = 5 +- 7-7 -
S our c e: Malays i a, Official Year Book, 1970, 
Table 10
Discrepancies between Total Population of Component Units 
Malaysian Federation and Apportionment of Seats, 1974,
of the
Peninsular _ , , , ^ . Sabah. Sarawak 
Malaysia
Malaysia
-1
Population 8,819,928 654,943 977,438 10,452,309
Population as 
percentage of 
Malaysian total
84=4 6*2 9-4 100
Seats : 114 16 24 154
Seats as 
percentage of 
Malaysian total
74=0 10,4 15=6 100
Discrepancy - 10=4 + 4=2 + 6=2 -
1 Population statistics are those for 1970=
S our c e: Malaysi a, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia,
Community Groups, 1972, pp 45-46=
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Most crucial in apportionment is the decision as to the
principles of representation. If population, the most frequently-
mentioned. principle, is to be adopted, then several population
measurements are available* Total population, permanent residents,
'citizens, eligible electors, or simply the registered electors can
each separately, or in varying combinations, serve as the basis of
apportionment * The choice of the exact population criteria utilised
can have a considerable effect on the final pattern of representation*
In the absence of any accurate figures as regards the number of
citizens, and in the absence of any previous registration of electors,
the Merthyr Commission of 1954 had, been obliged to utilise the total
1
population measure® The 1957 Malayan Constitution had, however,
altered the principle utilized and stipulated two criteria to be
jointly utilised - the total population and the total electorate
(iDe® registered electors) of the component states* The relevant
clause in the Constitution reads
"Constituencies shall be allocated to the several States 
in such manner that the electoral quota of each State is 
as nearly equal to the electoral quota of the Federation 
as it can be without causing undue disparity between the 
population quota of that State and the population quota 
of the Federation*"
It should be noted that ''electoral quota’ means the number, 
obtained by dividing the number of electors in the Federation by the 
total number of seats; and ’population quota’ means the number, 
obtained by dividing the total population of the Federation by the 
total number of seats® The phrase "without causing undue disparity 
between the population quota of that State and the population quota 
of the Federation" contained in the above-cited clause of the
1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation 
Commission, 1954, p® 2®
2 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 116 (3)«
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Constitution, however, is not sufficiently precise. It thus made it 
incumbent upon the Election Commission to attempt an interpretation.
The emphasis clearly had to be on electorate size, but total population
was not to be entirely discounted - but what was to be the extent of
the weightage given the former? For its 1960 delimitation review, 
the Election Commission decided to place a double emphasis on the 
figures based on the electoral quota, and, a single emphasis on the
figures based on the population quota. The formula used by the
Commission was as followsi the exact number (i.e. to three places 
of decimals) of constituencies which each state should receive was 
calculated firstly on a population basis, and secondly on an electorate 
basis. The- result of this calculation was multiplied by two in the 
case of that by electorate basis, and., added to that by population 
basis. This figure was then, divided by three and the result of the 
division, calculated to the nearest whole number, gave the number of
"I
seats to be apportioned to each state. In 1962 the Government 
amended the Constitution, and the apportionment of seats now became 
solely on the basis of the number of electors in each state.
In a state with a relatively homogeneous population such a step 
would leave little cause for concern, for it may be assumed that the 
total electorate would be a fair representation of the total popul­
ation and be almost all of the total adult population. Indeed, in a 
homogeneous state a constant relation is more likely to exist between 
the different population classifications, and hence, a change in the 
population principle utilized may not be of great significance. In 
the context of Malaysia1s plural society, however, the omission of the 
total population consideration has significant ramifications on the 
relative electoral strength of the various communities. This problem
1 1960 Constituency Delimitation Report, p. 2.
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had been envisaged by the Election Commission in its i960 delimitation
report, and the report reads:
"The allocation of Parliamentary seats in a country which 
has ... somewhat complicated provisions with respect to 
citizenship constitutes a problem that is by no means 
simple."^
The combined effect of the citizenship regulations and the regist­
ration of electors was seen to advantage the Malay community at the
2expense of the Chinese and Indian communities. The utilization of
the total electorate principle rather than the total population
principle therefore tends to translate the Malay community’s advantage
into a similar advantage in the apportionment of seats.
Regardless of the population principle, the apportionment of
seats to component units prior to the delineation of constituencies
inevitably introduces a degree of deviation from absolute parity in
numbers. This is occasioned by the Constitution requiring a whole
number of seats to be apportioned to each state, thus precluding the
3possibility of constituencies lying athwart state boundaries. Such 
discrepancies become marked in the case of small states, since the 
fractional increase or decrease in apportionment in proportion to 
their population is more significant than in the case of large states. 
Such a deviation, being an inherent feature of apportionment itself, 
would therefore result regardless of which population principle is 
utilized. Table 11 indicates the extent of deviation from absolute 
parity that apportionment would cause each Peninsular Malaysian State. 
Three different population criteria have been utilized to illustrate 
the point:
1 Ibid., p. 1.
2 Refer Chapter 1, p. 6 9 ®
3 Schedule 13 of the Malaysian Constitution sets out the principles 
by which the constituencies are to be delimited.
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1 the total population;
2 the total electorate; and
3 a single emphasis for total population and a double 
emphasis for total electorate.
Table 11 illustrates that, regardless of the population 
principle, absolute parity will be sacrificed by apportionment, but
what is significant is that the amount of deviation from absolute
parity varies depending on which population principle is adopted.
Some states have an electoral advantage regardless of the criteria 
utilized, though the extent of the advantage itself varies. Perlis 
and Pahang are examples of thisQ Other states have an electoral dis­
advantage regardless of the criteria utilised but again the extent of 
the disadvantage is dependent on the criteria used. Johore and 
Malacca belong to this category. In the case of all other states 
the choice of any particular critericnwould determine whether the 
state has an advantage or disadvantage. Undoubtedly the population 
criteria employed is of immense significance to representation.
In 1973 Parliament increased the number of seats for Peninsular 
Malaysia from 10^ - to 11^ -, and apportioned these seats to the eleven 
states and the Federal Territory. This apportionment formed the 
basis for the delineation exercise of 197^® In apportioning the 
seats, however, Parliament made no indication of the exact population 
criteria utilized. Table 12 indicates, the apportionment made by 
Parliament and the apportionment that would have resulted had the 
criterion utilized been any of the three population criteria discussed 
ahove - i;e. total population, total electorate, and a combination of 
both total population and total electorate. Kelantan, Trengganu and 
Pahang are seen to have been apportioned more seats than that warranted 
by any of the three population criteria. Conversely, the Federal
1 197^ Constituency Delineation Report, p. 2.
117
Table 12
Parliament's Apportionment of Seats 1973i and, Apportionment that 
would have resulted by various population criteria.^
State
Parliament By Total 
Population
By Total 
Electorate
By Total 
Population 
and Total ^ 
Electorate
Perlis 2 2 2 2
Kedah 13 12 13 13
Kelantan 12 9 10 9
Trengganu 7 5 6 6
Penang 9 10 10 10
Perak 21 20 21 21
Pahang 8 7 7 7
Selangor 11 13 11 12
Federal Territory 5 8 6 7
Negri Sembilan 6 6 6 6
Malacca 3 3 3
Johore 16 17 17 16
Total 114 114 114 114
1 Refer Table 11 for basis of calculation.
2 Single emphasis for total population and a double emphasis 
for total electorate.
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Territory, Penang and Malacca are seen to have been apportioned less 
seats than.they would have gained had any of the three population 
criteria been used. A measure of the actual advantage or disadvant­
age accruing to each state by Parliament's malapportionment of the 
seats is exemplified when adjustments are made for the deviations 
inherent in apportionment itself, i.e. the deviation that was seen to 
result because of the necessity of apportioning a whole number of 
seats to each state. The method adopted here is to note the 
percentage deviation from the absolute parity principle that the 
apportionment introduced by Parliament occasioned, and to deduct from 
this the deviation that was seen to result because of the necessity of 
apportioning a whole' number of seats to each state. (Table 13)
The implications of Parliament's apportionment to communal 
representation becomes apparent when the communal composition of the 
electorate of the several states and the Federal Territory at the time
if
of the 19?4 election is noted. (Table 14) The states that were 
seen to be advantaged by Parliament's malapportionment of the seats 
- Trengganu, Kelantan and Pahang - are predominantly Malay. The 
states that are disadvantaged are predominantly Chinese and non-Malay. 
Consequently, Parliament's apportionment of seats results in an 
electoral advantage for the Malay community. The correlation 
apparent from a comparison of Tables 13 and 14 may not, in itself, be 
sufficient evidence that the apportionment was deliberately introduced. 
Suffice it to note that the apportionment does in fact result in a 
relative advantage to the Malay community, and that significant 
principles of representation can easily escape a Parliament which can 
indulge in the luxury of a sufficient majority to alter the 
Constitution.
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Table 13
1975 Apportionment of Seats to Peninsular Malaysian States and 
Percentage Deviation from various population criteria.^
State
1973 
Apport i onment
2Percentage Deviation
By Population By Electorate 
Quota Quota
By Population 
and Electorate 
Quota
Perils 2 0 0 0
Kedah 13 + 7-9 0 0
Kelantan 12 + 24.7 + 17.4 + 26.6
Trengganu 7 + 30.0 4- 14.6 4- 13.4
Penang 9 - 11.2 - 10.7
0•I
Perak 21 + 4.8 0 0
Pahang 8 4- 11 06 + 12.0 - 11.8
Selangor 11 - 17„8 , 0 - 9.2
Federal
Territory 3 - 62.9 - 19.4 - 41.6
Negri
Sembilan 6 0 0 0
Malacca 4 - 26.2 - 23.3 - 23.8
Johore 16 - 6.1 - 9 .3 0
1 Percentage Deviation from various population criteria introduced 
by 1973 apportionment after disallowing for deviation that would 
have been introduced by the need to apportion whole number of 
seats to states (Refer Table 11). Basis of calculation here 
is:
Deviation introduced by 1973 Apportionment minus deviation 
introduced by need to apportion whole number of seats to 
states.
2 Plus signs indicate advantage introduced, and minus signs 
indicate disadvantage introduced.
Source: Based on calculations shown on Table 11.
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Table 1A
Ethnic Composition of the Electorate of Peninsular Malaysian States, 
197^ -9 by Percentage®
State Total State Population Malay % Chinese %
Indian %
Perlis 58,721 83.87% 14.15% 1,98%
Kedah AOO,285 75°95% 17°4o% 6065%
Kelantan 311,608 9^-19% 5°19% 0,62%
Trengganu 183,769 9^°12% 5-30% 0«58%
Penang 289,1^0 3^.17% 56,11% 9-72%
Perak 626,565 A 5 *0A% 44.75% 10.21%
Pahang 199,^78 63-57% 31°51% 4*92%
Selangor 337,353 46.^7% 38088% 14.65%
Federal
Territory 173,9^6 27°79% 60o22% 11.99%
Negri Sembilan 178,717 47.56% 40.32% 12.12%
Malacca 151,699 54.78% 38o?5% 6.47%
Johore ^95,390 54.58% 40.46% 4.96%
Source t Compiled from data in Appendix
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Delineation
Malaysian constituencies are currently delineated in accordance 
with the principles set out in the thirteenth schedule to the 
Constitution which reads as follows;
a) While having regard to the desirability of giving all
electors reasonably convenient opportunities of going
to the polls, constituencies ought to be delimited so 
that they do not cross state boundaries and regard 
ought to be had to the inconveniences of state 
constituencies crossing the boundaries of federal 
constituencies;
b) Regard ought to be had to the administrative facilities 
within the constituency for the establishment of the 
necessary registration and polling machines;
c) The number of electors within each constituency in
State and the Federal Territory ought to be approximately 
equal except that, having regard to the difficulty of 
reaching electors in country districts and the other 
disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of 
weightage for area ought to be given to such 
constituencies; and
d) Regard ought to be had to the inconveniences attendant 
on alteration of constituencies, and to the maintenance 
of local ties.
These principles are largely based on the recommendations of the 
committee appointed by the pre-independence Federal Legislative 
Council to examine the question of elections to that council in their 
report dated January 21, 195^* Two clauses have, however, undergone 
significant changes.
Omitted from clause (a) as it currently appears are the words 
”... endeavour to define constituencies so that they would embody
'I
complete administrative districts o.o" Clause (b), however, has
been retained substantially as in the earlier requirement and calls 
for regard to be paid to the availability of- administrative facilities 
for registration of electors and polling. The Election Commission,
1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative 
Council, 195*t-, 13«
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it was noted in chapter one, has neither the staff nor the required 
financial resources to maintain full time officers to register electors 
and conduct elections. Hence, it is the district officers and their 
supporting staff who are frequently relied upon to assist in the 
registration of electors and the conduct of elections. In interpret­
ing clause (b) of the thirteenth schedule, the Election Commission in 
its 1974- delineation report observes:
"Registration, the conduct of elections and the voting 
machinery should be under the control of the chief 
administrative officer. However due to the unequal 
distribution of the electorate a constituency may include 
more than one administrative district ..." ^
Clearly, the Election Commission itself believes that constituencies 
are ideally situated within one administrative district. The 
hazards of gerrymandering are reduced if there is preservation, of 
such common delineation rules as maximum preservation of political 
subdivision lines, for instance, district"'boundaries, in delineation. 
Although such rules are not necessarily anti-gerrymandering rules, 
their general thrust is in the directiop of channelling the work of 
the delineating body against possible gerrymanders. They also serve 
to act against the creation of artificial constituency boundaries, and 
thus, serve to preserve local ties as required in clause (d) of the 
thirteenth schedule of the Malaysian Constitution. The preservation 
of such ties, and the representation of such interests, are after all 
amongst the more persuasive reasons for territorial representation.
As such the removal of the provision requiring constituencies to 
embody complete administrative districts is surely regrettable.
Clause (c) of the thirteenth schedule presents the most content­
ious and tampered-with principle in the Malaysian context. The 
clause provides a measure of weightage for area to rural
1 197^ Constituency Delineation Report, p. 5*
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constituencies, and this involves allocating to rural areas greater 
representation than they would acquire by a strict application of the 
population parity principle. Weightage for rural areas is almost 
invariably questioned but nevertheless grudgingly conceded in most 
countries where the electoral system involves the utilisation of
I
territorially based constituencies. Thus in the United Kingdom,
Australia and New Zealand a measure of weightage for rural areas is
provided. In the United States of America, however, the courts,
after initial hesitation to enter the thicket of political squabbles
about "rotten boroughism", have, since the famous Baker v Carr decision
of 1962, forced the legislatures to delimit constituencies with a
2strict emphasis on the population parity principle.
! 3
Rural weightage is defended principally on two grounds. The
first is that, this sort of weightage is a traditional and necessary
part of representative government because, not only people, but also
places have to be represented in a legislature. This is regarded as
especially important, - since t-he relative voting strength of the
industrial city areas have tended to outvote agricultural and small
i
town interests which play a significant role in - the nation's economy. 
The second ground for defending rural weightage is that, the sparse 
distribution of population in the rural constituencies calls for candi- 
idates and representatives in these rural constituencies to spend more 
time and effort, than those in urban areas do,- in campaigning and in 
representing their constituents. It is worth examining the validity
■1 See for instance- Finer ,- (Ed.O*, '•’Adversary Politics and
Electoral Reform, 1973? p® 10; Rogaly, J ., Parliament for the 
People, 1975? pp 13-15? and, Pulzer, P.G.J., Political 
Representation and Elections in Britain, (3rd edition), 1975?
pp 33-35*
2 McKay, R.B., Reapportionmentt The Law and Politics of Equal 
Representation, 1965, p» 6 . '
3 See for instance Perrin, N., 'In Defense of Country Votes',
The Yale Review, Volume 32, Fall 1962, pp 16-2^ -.
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of these contentions in the Peninsular Malaysian context.
The Malaysian Constitution, though showing a marked tendency to 
encourage the concentration of power in the Federal Government, does 
offer significant guarantees to the State Governments. Hence the 
legislature of each state has exclusive powers to make laws with 
respect to land, including land tenure, colonization, improvement and 
soil conservation, permits and licences for prospecting for mines, 
compulsory acquisition of land, agriculture and forestry, local 
government and a number of other matters;^ It is to be expected 
that the interests of the rural areas would need to be specially 
defended in the State Legislatures rather than in the Federal 
parliament. Furthermore, the Federal Parliament itself consists of
two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The 
Senate comprises twenty-six elected members and thirty-two members 
appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agung. The twenty-six elected 
members, provisions for whose election by direct vote exists in the 
Constitution, are currently elected by the legislative assemblies of 
each state. Each state, irrespective of size and population, elects
two senators. This is intended to give equal representation to 
state interests in Parliament. The thirty-two senators appointed by 
the Yang di Pertuan AgQ.ng on the government's advice, are required to 
be persons who have rendered distinguished public service or achieved 
distinction in the professions, commerce, industry, agriculture, 
cultural activities or social service, or are representatives of 
racial minorities or are capable of representing the interest of 
aborigines. The Senate is thus structured so as to allow for
1 Tun Mohomed Suffian bin Haship, An Introduction to the
Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, Chapters 12 and 13? pp 159-202, 
deal with relations between the Federation and the States, and, 
the financial provisions made for each by the Constitution of 
Malaysia.
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representation of interests other than population numbers. In view 
of these accommodations in the Constitution, it would appear that 
there is no cause to depart from the population parity principle when 
delineating constituencies for representation in the House of 
Representatives. This contention is especially cogent in the 
Peninsular Malaysian context where it is the rural population, by 
virtue of its greater numbers, that commands a greater voting strength 
- the percentage of the population living in urban centres of larger 
than 10,000 inhabitants was, at the time of the latest Census in 
1970, only 28. 1
The second reason for providing rural weightage, and indeed the 
one given by the framers of the Constitution is that of population 
distribution and the increased time and effort called for in campaign­
ing and representing the rural constituencies as compared with urban 
constituencieso Impressions gained by looking at the size of 
constituencies on a constituency map not depicting the distribution of 
population are often deceptive. In most cases the areal size of the 
constituencies is not a consequence of the distribution of population, 
but rather, of the inclusion within the constituency of mountainous 
terrain, forested areas, and even, national parks which are not 
populated at- all. Add to this the Impact of rural-urban migrationo 
Of the constituencies delineated in 1958, the increase in electorate 
over the years has been greater in the- urban constituencies with large 
electorates than in the rural constituencies .with small electorates.
1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perankaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census 
of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 30.
Of the total Peninsular Malaysian population of 8,810,3^-8 in 1970, 
16.8% lived in Metropolitan areas with populations in excess of 
751000 persons, 11.9% in large towns between 10,000 and 7 k , 999 
persons, and 11.9% in small towns with between 1,000 and 9?999 
, persons. The remaining ^-8.1% lived in settlements of less than 
999 persons.
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However, much of this increase was due to an increasing percentage of 
the non-Malays gaining the franchise - there being a larger number of 
non-Malays living in the larger urban constituencies than in the rural 
constituencies,, The bulk of the non-Malays have, however, already 
■gained the franchise and any significant increase in the electorate 
from further of their numbers gaining the franchise is no longer 
possibleo Due to the non-availability of data to distinguish the 
increase in electorate brought about by rural-urban migration and by 
enfranchisement of the non-Malays, the growth in the electorate size 
of the constituencies of differing sizes cannot be utilized to 
establish that population movements alorie result in the larger 
constituencies recording larger increases in electorate than the 
smalleb constituencies. Instead census data have been used, though
I
the utilisation of these also presents problems® Due to urban
boundary changes between the census periods, the data presented in the
19^7, 1957 and 1970 census reports, are not strictly comparable®
However, even given these limitations, they indicate in broad terms
the extent to which there have been changes in the numbers living in
areas termed urban and rural® (Table 15) The peninsular
Malaysian population .living in urban areas, i.e® centres having more
than 10,000 persons, rose from 15°9% in 19^7 to 2 6.5% in 1957 to
28.7% in 1970. The population growth of Kuala Lumpur, the federal
capital, has been estimated to be currently in excess of ten per cent 
1per annum.
1 Saw. Swee Hock, 'Patterns of Urbanization in West Malaysia, 1911- 
1970', The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2., October 
1 9 7 2 , pp 114— 120.
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Table 15
Degree of Urbanization, Peninsular Malaysia.
Year No.
1
Urban Rural
19^7 A-, 908,000 15*9 % 84.1 %
1957 6)278,758 26.5% 7 3 .5 %
1970 8 ,819,928 28.7% 71.3%
1 Urban-centres with more than 10,000 persons□
Source: Malay sia,v Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing
Census of .Malaysia,' Ccrrmmeity Groups, 1972, p* 33°
Since the Constitution requires the review of constituencies at 
intervals of between eight and ten years only, and indeed the 
Malaysian experience hitherto has been for the reviews to be adopted 
only much later than that required by the Constitution, regard must 
logically be paid to population movements*, This the Election 
Commission claims to have observed in the delineation exercise
■I
presented In 197^° The rural weiglitage principle necessarily runs
counter.to this consideration»
An eve'n more cogent consideration is that it is in rural areas 
which have smaller constituencies that electoral registration is 
higher. Table 16 lists the smallest ten and the largest ten constit­
uencies delineated in the 197^ delineation exercise, and, calculates 
the registered electors of 197^ as a percentage of the population of 
voting age. 'In the rural constituencies the percentage is in some 
cases well in:excess of 95% whilst in the larger urban constituencies 
the percentage drops as- low -as 63'°2^ -%.' For the ten largest
1 197^ Constituency Delineation Report, p. 9°
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Table 16
Percentage of those above 20 years of age who have registered as 
electors in the ten largest and ten smallest constituencies,
1974 election,,
Largest 10 Constituencies'* Total above 
20 years
Total
Number
Registered
%
Menglembu 57 5 735 49,038 84.94
Ip oh 66„272 48 ,062 72® 52
Petaling 75,792 47 ? 929 63 ®24
Kinta 52,734 46,663 88®49
Kota Melaka 55,439 44,370 80.03
Jelutong 63,075 42,8o4 67-86
Tanjong 63.300 41,409 65 okZ
Shah Alam 58,716 41,231 70.22
Bukit Bendera 51,782 40,895 78.98
Selayang 48,420 40,863 84® 39
Total 593,565 443,264 74.68
Smallest 10 Constituencies
Grik 21,226 17,280 81.41
Kuala Kerai 18,596 17,332 93-20
Tenggaroh 20,507 17,379 84.75
Ulu Kelantan ■ 20,409 17,959 88® 00
Tanah Merah 21,894 20,002 
21,014
91® 36
Larut 21,379 98®29
Kuala Kangsar 22,421 21,456 95-70
Pekan 28,463 2 1,970 77-19
Rantau Panjang 22,429 22,014 98.15-
Sabak Bernam 25,088 22,343 89.06
Total 222,412 198,749 89-36
* Data for Population above twenty years of age for Johore Bharu, 
the largest constituency, and Muar, the eighth largest constit­
uency were not available® Hence Bukit Bendera and Selayang have 
been included®
Sources: 1 Data (unpublished) for population above twenty years
obtained from Statistics Department, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia®
2 Election Commission, 197^ + Election report, 1975? 
Appendix 11, pp 144-157-
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constituencies as a whole only 74.68% of those above twenty years were 
registered as electors as compared with 89-36% in the ten smallest 
constituencies. Hence Parliament, in rejecting the total population 
criterionand in using exclusively the total electorate criterion in the 
apportionment and delineation of constituencies, has thereby already 
built in a system of rural weightage. If the member of parliament's 
task is viewed as one of representing the interests of, and serving the 
whole of the population residing in the constituency, rather than only 
those who have been registered .as electors, then to Impute a further 
rural weightage would certainly be to err in the direction of excess 
weightage.
The principle of rural weightage is contentious, but what is not
contentious and is conceded by even the most ardent supporters of the
principle of rural weightage, is the need for some form of restriction
on the amount of such weightage conceded. In Malaysia, however,
clause (c) of the Constitution's delineation guide lines, which allows
for the rural weightage, has been amended frequently and at each
juncture a greater and greater weightage has been introduced. The
Merthyr Commission’s guidelines had included that:
"the number of inhabitants within each constituency should 
be approximately equal except that ... the Committee would 
not regard such ’weightage’ as unreasonable if in some 
instances a rural constituency should contain as little as 
one-half of the constituents in the more populous urban 
areas.
The 1957 Malayan Constitution, a document very much reflecting the 
’bargain1 entered into between the Alliance leaders of the various 
communities in their quest for independence, restricted and specified 
the weightage. ' Article 116 (4) of the Constitution thus read:
1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative
Council, 1954,~p. 13-
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"Each State shall be divided into constituencies in such 
manner that each constituency contains a number of electors 
as nearly equal to the electoral quota of the State as may 
be after making allowance for the distribution of the 
different communities and for differences in density of 
population and the means of communication; but the 
allowance so made shall not increase or reduce the number 
of electors in 'any constituency to a number differing from 
the electoral quota by more than fifteen per cento"
The 1962 Constitution Amendment Act reinstated the guidelines used by
the Merthyr'Commission of 195^ and the relevant clause of the
Constitution was made to read:
"The number of electors within each constituency in a State 
ought to be approximately equal, except that, having regard 
to the difficulty of reaching electors in country districts 
and the other disadvantages facing rural-constituencies, a 
measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such 
constituencies to the extent that in some cases a rural 
constituency may contain even as little as one half of the 
electors of any urban~constituency,." /Emphasis mine/
This amendment was included in the 19^3 Malaysian Constitution. No 
constituency delimitation was adopted whilst this amended clause 
remained in force. In 1973 the Government, whilst ushering through 
Parliament Act 206, which created the Federal Territory, made further 
changes to this clause and repealed the words underlined in the above 
citation. It now became possible for rural constituencies to have 
even less than half the electors of any urban constituency. It was 
with this new guideline that the Election Commission delineated the 
constituencies in 197^° Table 17 sets out the seats with the largest 
and smallest electorate in each state as at the 197^ election. The 
amount of rural weightage provided is so marked that in many states 
the value of the rural vote is seen to be more than twice that of the 
urban vote. ' In Johore it is even more marked and reaches 2.97 times 
the value of the urban vote.
- Rural weightage in constituency delimitation is traditionally 
opposed on the grounds that it defeats 'the all-important principle in 
democracy of one man one vote, by imputing different values to each 
vote. In Peninsular Malaysia the implication of rural weightage goes
131
Table 17
Constituencies with the smallest and largest electorate, 
Peninsular Malaysian States, 197^ + Election.
State
Smallest Constituency Largest Constituency Ratio
largest
to
smallest
Name Electors Name Electors
Perlis Kangar 29,256 Arau 29,^65 1.01
Kedah Padang Serai 2*t. 256 Alor Set.ar 37,178 1.33
Kelantan Kuala Kerai 17,332 Kota Bharu 35,93^ 2.07
Trengganu Dungun 25,202 Kuala
Trengganu
32,391 1.29
Penang Permatang Panh 22,663 J elutong k2 ,80A 1.89
Perak Grik 17,280 Menglembu A9,038 2 .8A
Pahang Pekan 21,970 Kuantan 27,800 1.27
Selangor Sabak Bernam 22,3^3 Petaling ^7,929 2.15
Federal
Territory Kepong 32,282 Sungai Besi Ao ,A89 1.25
Negri
Sembilan Jelebu 25,512 Seremban ■ ^0,731 1.60
Malacca Jasin 33,727 Kota Melaka AA,370 1.32
Johore Tenggaroh 17,379 Johore Bharu 51,53A 2o97
Peninsular
Malaysia Grik 17,280 Johore Bharu 51,33^- 2.98
Source: Election Commission, 197^ Election report, 1975?
Appendix H, pp 1TA-157°
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beyond that, and has significant ramifications for the comparative 
electoral strength of the different communal groups. This is due to 
the differences in the degree ’of urbanisation of the various 
communities - the Chinese and Indian communities are more urbanised 
than the Malay. In 1970, of the 28.7% of Peninsular Malaysia’s 
population that lived in urban, centres witli more than 10,000 persons, 
38.3% were Chinese and 12.8% were Indians; only 27»6% were Malays. 
(Table 18) On the other hand, of the 71= 3% of the population that 
lived in the rural areas - that is centres with less than 10,000 
persons - only 26.2% were Chinese and 9 = 7% were Indians; but here the 
Malays formed 63=3%° Expressed In. another way, only 52 = 6% of the 
Chinese and 65=3% of the Indians lived in the rural areas as compared
'I
with 83o1% of the Malays. The manner in which the electoral
advantage manifests itself is apparent when it is noted that, during
the 197^ election, of the sixty-nine seats smaller than the Peninsular
Malaysian electoral quota of 29,883, there were fifty-seven seats with
a Malay majority; of the forty-five seats larger than the electoral
2quota only twenty-two had a Malay majority. The advantage to the
Malay community becomes even more apparent when expressed in a 
different form - of the seventy-nine seats with a Malay majority only
t
twenty-two (27085%) were larger than the electoral quota, whereas of 
the thirty-five seats with a non-Malay majority twenty-three (63=71%) 
were larger than the electoral quota. (Table 19) Rural weightage 
in the Peninsular Malaysian context thus means a weightage for Malay 
electoral strength, and Parliament, by progressively increasing the 
amount of rural weightage, has provided for a corresponding increase 
in the Malay's electoral dominance.
1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan,'1970 Population and Housing Census 
of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 33= Of the category 
'others' only 39=2% live in the rural areas.
2 Refer Appendix A.
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Table 18
Ethnic Composition of Urban and Rural Population of 
Peninsular Malaysia by Percentage, 1970°
Type of Area Malays Chinese Indians
Urban (more than 10,000 persons) 27*6 58o5 12.8
N = 2,330,433 (28*7#)
Rural (less than 10,000 persons) 63°5 26<>2 9°7
N - 6,279,915 (71.390
Source: Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing
Census of Malaysia, Community .Groups, 1972, p. 30®
Table 19
Ethnic Composition of Constituencies by size categories,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1974 election,,
Category Number Malay Malay Chinese Chinese Non-Malay
Majority Plurality Majority Plurality Majority
Less than 20,000 4 4
20,001 - 25,000 24 21 A) 1 1 3
25,001 - 30,000 41 32 2 3 4 9
30,001 - 35,000 21 13 1 6 1 8
35,001 - 40,000 10 7 0 3 3
40,001 - 45,000 9 1 1 6 1 8
More than 45,000 5 1 4 4
Total 114 79 5 23 7 35
Source: Compiled from data Included in Appendix 4.
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The above discussion established the significance of the 
principles utilized in apportionment and delineation to communal 
representation It also examined the effects brought about by the 
changes to the principles utilized; each change, it was noted, 
resulted in an increased advantage to the Malay community at the 
expense of the Chinese and Indian communities® Further disadvantage 
to non-Malay electoral representation was brought about by Parliament 
when, first, it created the Federal Territory In 1973? and, secondly, 
when it adopted the Government8 s amendmentis to the constituency 
delineation report submitted by the Election Commission®
l
The Creation of the Federal Territory
By Act 206 of 1973? which, came into effect-on February 1, 1974, 
Parliament declared the creation of a Federal Territory of ninety-four 
square miles of land In Selangor State® This included the whole of 
the thirty-six square miles of the former municipality of Kuala Lumpur 
and parts adjoining it® As a result of this, 173,946 electors of 
the Federal Territory who otherwise would have been able to participate 
in the voting for the Legislative Assembly seats in Selangor State, 
were at the 1974 election unable to do so® This disenfranchisement- 
had not been recompensated by the creation of any elective body for the 
Federal Territory® Act 206 of 1973, had also reapportioned the House 
of Representative seats to the various states and the newly created 
Federal Territory, and in this the Federal Territory was noted to have 
been the most disadvantaged® (Table 13, page 119) Ihe communal 
composition of the 173,94-6 electors of the Federal Territory at the 
time of the 197^ election was 27*79% Malay, 60*22% Chinese and 11=99% 
Indian. The disenfranchisement and the electoral
1 Refer Appendix 4®
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disadvantage to the Federal Territory clearly affects the various 
communities differently, the non-Malay communities being more dis­
advantaged than the Malay community*
At the time of the 1969 election the communal composition of the
electors in Selangor State had been 35® ^9% Malay, 50*38% Chinese, and 
11A*13% Indian* This had resulted in a Malay absolute majority in
only five of the total of fourteen parliamentary constituencies, and 
eight of the total of twenty-eight, state assembly constituencies0 
(Figure 2) Principally due to the exclusion of the 173? 9^ -6 electors 
from Selangor State by the creation of the Federal Territory, the 
composition of the electors in Selangor State at the time of the 197^ 
election became 4-6<A7% Malay, 38088% Chinese, and 1 A®65% Indian.* The 
thirty-three Selangor State Assembly constituencies delineated in 197^ 
thus had a Malay absolute majority in twenty-one seats and a non-Malay 
absolute majority in twelve seats* The increase in the percentage of 
Malay majority seats in the Legislative Assembly of Selangor was from 
35*71% in 1969 to 63o6A% in 197^° The percentage of parliamentary 
seats, in which the Malay community comprised an absolute majority in 
Selangor and the present Federal Territory together, increased from 
35®7'1 % in 1969 to 37®50% in 197^® (Figure 3) Tbe implications of 
this to communal representation are emphasised when it is'noted that in 
the 1969 election the DAP and the Gerakan, principally non-Malay based 
parties, and an independent, had together obtained fourteen of the 
twenty-eight Selangor State seats„ The uncertainty thus created as 
regards which party would form the State Government in Selangor, had 
been one of the principal factors that had resulted in communal 
violence and the suspension of parliamentary government till 1971°
The creation of the Federal Territory and the resultant disenfranchise­
ment of 3^°02% of the electors, 72*21% of whom were non-Malay, who
1 Refer Appendix 3
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would otherwise have voted in the Selangor State Assembly election 
meant that no non-Malay based party could hope to form the State
Government in Selangor unless it was able to win a sizeable number of
Malay votes» However, the creation of the Federal Territory ensured 
that a Malay-based party with the support of the Malay community alone 
could obtain a majority of seats in the Selangor State Assembly,,
Amendments- to the Election Ccmmissionls Report
The constituency delineation report dated July 20, 197^ wa-S 
presented to Parliament without changes in the case of all constituen­
cies save those in JohoreE The amendments made were done in extreme 
haste" and, as noted earlier, the boundary changes were merely recorded
on an otherwise blank map of the scale of one inch to five mileso
Even'the polling districts within the bounds of the amended constit­
uencies were not indicated in the report presented to Parliament, 
though such information was provided in the case of all other 
constituencies0 Also lacking was any explanation as to why this 
hasty amendment had been necessitated; but though the reason for the 
changes made may be lacking, the effects of the changes are clearw
The communal composition of the electorate in Johore at the time 
of the 1989 election was Malay, V3°63% Chinese and +^q81% Indian!
In the constituencies utilized for the 1969 parliamentary election the 
Malay electors formed an absolute majority in eight of the sixteen 
constituencies; the thirty-two state assembly seats had a Malay 
majority in nineteen (Figure k)o Since 19&9 there has been no
appreciable change in'the communal composition of the Johore electorate, 
there being at the 197^ election 3^ =>38% Malays, -^Ch^ -6% Chinese and 
ko96% Indians*^ Yet-, the constituencies recommended by the Election
1 Refer Appendix 3°
2 Refer Appendix
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Commission in its 197^ - delineation"'report greatly increased the
number of Malay majority seats in Johore for both. Parliament and the
State Assembly<» Had these constituencies been used for the 197^
election there would have been a Malay majority in twelve of the
sixteen parliamentary seats and twenty of the thirty-two state seats®
(Figure 5) Changes had been made to virtually all the constituencies
utilised for the 1969 election and the constituencies thus delineated
varied even more in size than those utilized in 1969 - the Dauer-Kelsay 
2
Index for the sixteen parliamentary seats of 19&9 i-s 50o09 as compared 
with ^+8.35 for those presented in the Commission's report (Table 20)« 
The Election Commission's changes cannot for these reasons be held to 
be an improvement over those of 1969°
Changes were, however, made to the Commission’s report before 
they were presented to Parliament for approval - the effect was not to 
redress the imbalances introduced but rather, to further accentuate 
them (Figure 6)«
The- delineation approved by Parliament paid little regard to the 
existing constituency boundaries and the new constituencies drawn i te 
in some cases athwart more than two constituencies« The case of the 
Sri Gading parliamentary constituency is most remarkable® This
1 Refer Appendix 3°
2 Dauer,'M®J. and Kelsay, R„G0, 'Unrepresentative States', National 
Municipal Review, Vol® AA, 1955j pp 371-573 and p® 587® The index 
is defined as 'the smallest percentage of a state's population 
which could theoretically elect1 a majority of the lower house’ 
(ibid,, p. 571 )«• The index is calculated in the following 
manner: The electorates-are arranged in ascending order of
■ 'numbers of voters; then st-arting -wrth'the -smallest electorate, 
the votes in successive electorates are'totalled until a majority 
of the electorates is achieved® That total is expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of electors in all the 
constituencies® ’ The figure so obtained is the 'Index of 
Representatives', here referred to as the Dauer-Kelsay Index®
Table ‘20 presents the index for Johore State®
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constituency with its long and sinuous boundary was carved out of parts 
of four parliamentary constituencies as they had been at the time of 
the 1969 election and of five parliamentary constituencies as they had 
been delineated by the Election Commission in its 197^ report 
(Figure 7)® The Sri Gading constituency at the time of the 197^ 
election had the highest percentage of Malay electors of the sixteen 
parliamentary constituencies in Johore, there being ^8^28% Malay 
electors® By comparison with the 19&9 constituencies and with those 
prepared by the Election Commission, that approved by Parliament was 
even more marked in terms of variation's in electorate size, the 
Dauer-Kelsay Index for these sixteen parliamentary seats now being 
^6.08 (Table 20), The size of the Johore Bharu parliamentary 
constituency was increased from. +^9 = 392 electors as it would have been 
by the Election Commission's initial delineation to 51953^ electors 
by that approved by Parliament® This made Johore Bharu the largest 
parliamentary constituency in Peninsular Malaysia, The smallest 
parliamentary constituency in Johore was, however, left unchanged and 
the electorate here at the time of the 197^ election was '17?379° By
no objective measure can the amendments made to the Election 
Commission's delineation report be held to be an improvement, but they 
had one significant effect: they increased the Malay electoral
■strength and conversely reduced non-Malay electoral strength® The 
number of parliamentary constituencies, of the total of sixteen in 
Johore State, in which Malay electors formed a majority increased from 
eight in 1969 twelve in the Election Commission's report of July 20, 
197%, to thirt-’een' in the delineation approved by Parliament® In the 
case of the thirty-two State Assembly seats the increase was even more 
dramatic - there were nineteen in 19^9? twenty in the Election 
Commission's report of truly 20, 197^ -j ^ d  twenty-six in the delineation 
approved by Parliament® (Figure 6)
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Table 20
Electorate Size of.Parliamentary Constituencies in Johore State, 1969, 
1974 Delineation Report and 1974 election.
1969 1974 Delineation Report 1974 Election
*1
Constituency Electorate
2
Constituency Electorate Constituency Electorate
Johore
Tenggara 13,821 Tenggaroh 17,379 Tenggaroh 17,379
Johore Timor 18,319 Panti 23,561 Panti 23,561
Segamat Utara 21,893 Segamat 23,597 Pagoh 24,280
Kluang Utara 25,334 Semerah 25,326 Labis 25,469
Batu, Pahat 26,999 Yong Peng 28,810 Ledang 25,850
Johore Bharu 
Barat 27,169 Pag oh 28,839 Ayer Hitarn 26,040
Pontian
Selatan 27,920 Ledang 30,362 Sri Gading 26,645
Muar Dalam 28,529 Pontian 30,496 Semerah 28.871
Johore Bharu 
Timor 28,754 Pulai 31,153 Segamat 30,152
Segamat
Selatan 29,742 Benut 31,889 Batu Pahat 33,714
Pontian Utara 29,663 Kluang 32,163 Pulai 34,344
Kluang
Selatan 30,254 Labis 32,658 Kluang 34,755
Muar Utara 30,269 Kulai 33,893 Rengam 35,599
Muar Pantai 30,338 Batu Pahat 36,218 Pontian 35,665
Batu Pahat 
Dalan 32,661 Muar 39,644 Muar 41 ,522
Muar Selatan 34,964 Johore Bharu 49,392 Johore Bharu 51,534
Smallest Nine 218,738 239,523 228,247
Total 436, 649 495,380 495,380
Dauer-Kelsay
Index 50.09 48.35 46.08
Malay
Majority
Non-Malay
Majority
8
8
12
4
-
13
3
1 Election Commission. 1969 Election Report, 1972, Appendix H, 
pp 122-134.
2 Refer Appendix 5°
3, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1973, Appendix H, 
pp 144-157. —
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Cumulative Effect of Delimitation Principles and Practices on
Communal Representation
Electoral studies have seen the development of a number of
measures to assess the adequacy of delimitation exercises. Each
measure is based on a value assumption and the deviation from this
assumed ’ideal’ is noted for comparisons. Hence, measurements of
compactness work on the assumption that constituencies are ideally
compact in form. The introduction of shape criteria in any
delimitation problem has sprung from both positive and negative
motives. The positive aspect is that compact constituencies allow
for easier contact and hence foster a sense of community and identity
within the constituency by both party organizations and electors.
The negative aspect of compactness is that it acts as a means of
hindering gerrymandering. Compactness is a question of shape. Thus
measures of compactness are essentially shape measures. Several
shape measures have been utilized to determine the compactness of
constituencies. One of the basic approaches of political scientists
has been to compare areal shapes to geometric shapes whose properties
are known, and thus make- shape measures at a ratio level. Reock,
for instance, suggests a shape measure that relates a shape’s area to
2
that of a specified circle. Schwartzberg presents a measure which
relates a shape’s perimeter to a specified circle’s circumference as
3
a measure of compactness. More general measures of shape based on
1 Taylor, P.J., A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral 
District Patterns, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
LXVII, No. 3, September 1973, pp 948- —  ■
2 Reock, E.G., Jr., ’Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of 
Legislative Apportionment', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 5? February 19S1, pp 70-74. ~
3 Schwartzberg, J.E., 'Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion 
of Compactness', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 50, January 1966,
pp 443-452.
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aggregate diverseness from a centre of gravity have also been utilised
-1
to determine the quality of any delineation. The advantage of
these measures of compactness is that they direct themselves to the 
principal reason for territorial representation, which is ensuring 
representation of the common body of interest predominating in part­
icular areas of a polity.
An alternative set of measures has been directed to the assump­
tion that constituencies are ideally equal in electorate size. The 
usefulness of this second set of measures is that they direct them­
selves to the majoritarian principle in democracy and seek to high­
light the compromise effected to this principle by territorial 
representation. Two prominent measures developed on the basis of 
this are the Dauer-Kelsay Index and the Kaiser Index. The Dauer- 
Kelsay Index seeks to measure the minimum number of electors who could 
elect sufficient representatives to bring about a ’majority decision’
2
in a parliament elected on the basis of single member constituencies. 
The main limitation of the Dauer-Kelsay Index is that it can only be
used as a basis of comparison for legislatures with an equal number
3
of constituencies. The Kaiser Index overcomes this latter limit­
ation but in the words of Kaiser himself:
”It must be admitted that the calculation ... by hand, is 
troublesome and tricky, requiring the informed use of 
logarithms.”^
1 Kaiser, H.F., ’An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative 
Districts’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10,
May 1966, pp 200-223.
2 Dauer, M.J., and Kelsay, E.G., ’Unrepresentative States’, 
National Municipal Review, Vol. 44, 1955» PP 571-575-
3 Kaiser, H.F.,A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative 
Apportionment, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, 
No. 1, March 1958, pp 208-215*
4 Ibid., p. 212.
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He, however, obligingly offers those using the index the use of his 
Fortran version of a programme to calculate it and indeed assistance 
in any computational problem involving the measure for any particular 
set of data.
Both the above sets of measures - those determining compactness 
and those measuring the unequal sizes of constituencies - are, however 
inadequate when it is attempted to assess the implication of any 
delimitation exercise of the representation it affords particular 
segments of society. For instance, their applicability to plural 
societies where the advantage or disadvantage accruing to particular 
communities is to be measured is limited. The measures discussed 
above do not specifically direct themselves to this latter problem. 
Hence, for the purposes of this chapter,which principally aims to 
measure the effect of the delimitation of constituencies on communal 
representation, these measures have not been utilized. Instead, 
the communal predominance in each of the constituencies is determined 
and then the percentage of constituencies in which each community 
predominates is noted and compared with the percentage that community 
comprises of the total population. The assumption in such a measure 
is that constituencies are ideally so delimited that the percentage of 
constituencies in which a particular community predominates is equal 
to the percentage that the community comprises of the total population 
The deviation from this assumed ideal provides a measure of the 
advantage or disadvantage accruing to each community.
In utilising this measure in the Peninsular Malaysian context, 
however, it must be noted that there is a difference between the 
percentage that each community comprises of the total population, and. 
the percentage it comprises of the total electorate. The rules and 
procedure governing enfranchisement were noticed to have already 
resulted in a degree of electoral advantage or disadvantage to the
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different communities (Refer Tables 5 and 6). This is here referred 
to as enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage. Thus, in 
the Peninsular Malaysian context, the difference in the percentage 
that each community comprises of the total population and the percent­
age of constituencies in which the community comprises a majority is, 
in effect, the cumulative advantage or disadvantage that accrues to 
that community - the cumulative of the enfranchisement induced 
advantage or disadvantage, and the delimitation induced advantage or 
disadvantage. Hence, to assess the delimitation induced advantage 
or disadvantage, it is necessary to deduct the percentage the 
community comprises of the total electorate from the percentage of 
the constituencies the community comprises a majority. Alternatively, 
the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage may be calculated 
by deducting from the cumulative advantage or disadvantage the 
enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage.
Table 21 sets out the communal predominance amongst the elector­
ate of the parliamentary constituencies for each of the parliamentary 
elections held in Peninsular Malaysia, including that for the pre­
independence Legislative Assembly election of 1955° The Indian 
community though comprising 10.53% of the total population at the 
latest census in 1970, and 7-6% of the electorate - at the time of the 
1974 election: had,due to its spatial distribution,been in no constit­
uency in excess of twenty-six. per cent of the electorate. Hence the 
community does not form an absolute majority or even a relative 
majority (here referred to as plurality) in any of the constituencies, 
a predicament it has found itself in. since the introduction of 
elections and along with it the plurality system of voting (Figures 8 
and 9)* Such was also the case at the time of the 1974 election.
The communal predominance in Peninsular Malaysian constituencies has 
therefore to be viewed in terms of Malay predominance and Chinese
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Table 21
Communal Predominance in the Electorate of Parliamentary Constituencies, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1955-197^
Year No. of 
Seats
Malay
Majority
Chinese
Majority
Indian
Majority
Non-Malay 
Majority
No. % No. % No. % No. %
1955 52 50 96.2 2 3*8 0 0 2 3 .8
1959 10^ 60 57 0 7 25 2^.0 0 0 bb 12.3
1964- 10^ 58 55-8 31 29-8 0 0 be Vf.2
1969 10^ 58 55-8 28 26.9 0 0 be bb a 2.
197^ 11^ 79 69-3 23 20.2 0 0 35 30.7
Source: 1 Data for 1955? 1959, and 196A- obtained from Barisan
Nasional Office, Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
2 Data for 19^9 compiled from Appendix 3-
3 Data for 197^ - compiled from Appendix A.
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predominance, or alternatively, as the predominance of any one of the 
two as against that of all other communities combined,
Malay predominance in the electorate during the 1955 election 
led to ninety-six per cent of the constituencies having a Malay 
absolute majority. Independence and the increased franchise of the 
non-Malay communities,however, saw Malay dominance being progressively 
whittled down and in 1969 the community had an absolute majority in 
fifty-six per cent of the constituencies and a plurality in a further 
5*6 per cent. (Refer Figure 10 for the percentage of Malays in the 
electorate of the parliamentary constituencies in 1969.) The Chinese 
community saw a concomitant increase in its electoral strength and 
from an absolute majority in just four per cent of the seats in 1955 
it, by 1969? had an absolute majority in twenty-seven per cent of the 
seats and a relative majority in a further 11. b per cent. Viewed in 
terms of Malay and non-Malay predominance it meant that the seats 
where the Malays had a majority declined from ninety-six per cent to 
fifty-six per cent and that of the non-Malay communities increased 
from four per cent to fourty-four per cent. This was the situation 
till the 1969 election.
The 1973 apportionment of seats by Parliament and the delineat­
ion of constituencies on the basis of this approved by Parliament in 
July 197^ -j however, saw a reversal of the above trend. The number of 
constituencies in which Malays formed an absolute majority increased 
to sixty-nine per cent and in a further four per cent of the seats the 
community had a plurality. The Chinese community’s electoral 
strength declined, it now having an absolute majority in twenty per 
cent of the seats and a plurality in six per *b'ent. .* Ih' termsydf-Malay 
predominance as opposed to non-Malay predominance it meant that the 
Malay community had a majority in sixty-nine per cent of the seats and 
the non-Malays a majority in thirty-one per cent of the seats. The
15^
effect of the 197^ delimitation exercise was to increase the number of 
Malay majority seats from fifty-eight out of a total of 10A in 1969 to 
seventy-nine out of a total of 11 A- in 197^- The non-Malay majority 
seats declined from forty-six to thirty?-five, and this, despite there 
being an increase of ten seats in Parliament. (Figures 1A and 15)
Table 22 sets out the ethnic composition of,the constituencies 
utilized for the 19&9 election by groupings of ten per cent for the 
Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, and the non-Malay communities 
as a whole. Table 23 sets out the similar distribution for the 
constituencies used for the 197^ election. A comparison of both 
tables provides a valuable indication of how the increase in Malay 
majority seats was achieved. The seats in each category where 
Malays formed more than fifty per cent increased in 197^1 but in each 
category where Malays formed less than fifty per cent of the electorate 
there was a decline. (Also compare Figures 10 and 11). The trend 
is reversed for the Chinese and Indian communities, there being a 
decline in the category of seats where the Chinese formed more than 
fifty per cent of the electorate, and an increase in the category of 
seats where the Chinese or the Indians formed less than fifty per cent 
of the electorate. (Also compare Figures 12 and 13) A similar 
trend is apparent when the distribution of the non-Malay electorate as 
a whole is studied - there is a decrease in the number of seats in the 
categories where non-Malay electors form more than fifty per cent and 
an increase in the categories where they form less than fifty per cent. 
Most marked is the increase in the seats where Malays comprised 50%
- '59-9%' of the electors - the increase being from 10%- 58%  of the 
seats in 19&9 to 18.^2% of the seats in 197^- The category of seats 
where non-Malays formed 40% - ^-9-9% increased from 10.58% to 18.^2%. 
(Also compare Figures 'lb and 1 5) Clearly the constituencies utilized 
for the 197^ election had been so delimited as to result in a dilution
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Table 22
Ethnic Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Constituencies, 1969
Percentage 
Community in 
Electorate
Malays 
No. %
Chinese 
No. %
Indians 
No. %
Non-Malays 
No. %
90 - 100 15 14.42 0 0 1 O .96
80 - 89.9 13 12.5 1 0.96 0 7 6.73
70 - 79.9 11 10.58 6 5.77 0 9 8.65
60 - 69.9 10 9.62 6 5-77 0 16 15.38
. 50 - 59.9 11 10.58 14 13-46 0 11 10.58
4o — 49-9 11 10.58 17 16.35 0 11 10.58
30 - 39.9 16 15.38 14 13-46 0 10 9.62
20 - 29.9 9 8.65 13 12.5 3 2.88 11 10.58
10 - 19.9 7 6.73 14 13-46 35 33.65 13 12.5
0 - 9.9 1 0.96 19 18.27 66 63.46 15 14.4-2
Total 104 100 104 100 104 100 104 100
Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 3»
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Table 25
Ethnic Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Constituencies, 1974.
Percentage 
Community in 
Electorate
Malays 
No. %
Chinese 
No. . %
Indians 
No. %
Non-Malays 
No. %
90 - 100 18 15.79 0 0 3 2,63
80 - 89.9 15 13.16 2 1.75 0 6 5.26
70 - 79*9 12 10.53 6 5.26 0 7 6 * 14
60 - 69.9 13 11.40 7 6.14 0 9 7.89
50 - 59.9 21 18.42 8 7.02 0 10 8.77
4o - 49-9 10 8.77 16 14.04 0 21 18.42
30 - 39.9 9 7.89 21 18.42 0 13 11.40
20 - 29.9 7 6.14 15 13.16 3 2.63 12 10.53
10 - 19-9 6 5.26 18 15.79 34 29.82 15 13.16
0 - 9.9 3 2.63 21 18.42 77 67.54 18 15.79
Total 114 100 114 . 100 114 100 114 100
Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix V.
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of non-Malay electoral strength, the non-Malay electors being distrib­
uted amongst a large number of constituencies, in each of which they 
form a minority.
Table 2k sets out the enfranchisement.induced advantage or 
disadvantage, the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage, and, 
the cumulative advantage or disadvantage accruing to the Malay, Chinese 
and Indian communities at each-of,the parliamentary elections held in 
Peninsular Malaysia, including that for the Legislative Assembly in 
1953. The Malay community is noted to have been advantaged by the 
enfranchisement rules and procedures and the delimitation principles- 
and practices at each of the elections held. Consequently there is 
a cumulative advantage accruing to the Malay community at the expense 
of the Chinese, and particularly the Indian, communities. The 
increased enfranchisement of especially the Chinese community resulted 
in this electoral advantage being progressively diminished till the 
1969 election. However at the time of the 197^ - election the Malay 
community is seen to have again improved upon its advantage in terms 
of enfranchisement and delimitation at the expense of the Chinese and 
Indian communities. Clearly this improved electoral status of the
Malay community is the result, as indicated in the discussion earlier 
in this chapter, of the deliberate and systematic amendments brought 
about to the 1937 Malayan Constitution's provisions for constituency 
apportionment and delineation, the creation of the Federal Territory, 
and, the amendments made to the Election Commission's delineation 
report of 197^*
Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter raises a pumber of fundamental 
issues. Reapportionment and delineation invite fresh analysis of 
bioameralism, the single-member constituency system, the possible role
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Table 24
Electoral Advantage/Disadvantage Accruing to various Communal Groups 
from Enfranchisement and Delineation of Constituencies, 1955-1974
Malays Chinese Indians Non-Malays
Year _ - 1 _ 2 Enf. Del. Cum.^ Enf. Dell. Gum. Enf.,Del. Cum. Enf. Del. Cum.
1955 +34.4 ’+12.2 +46.4 -25.-9 - 7*4 -33-3 -8.5 -4.6 -13*1 -34.4 -12.2 -46.4
1959 + 7*1 + 0.6 + 7 .7 - 2.5 -10.5 -13*0 -4.6 -8.4 -13*0 - 7*1 - 0.6 - 7-7
1964 + 4.4 +1.4 + 5-8 + 0.6 - 6.5 - 7-1 -5*0 -8.1 -13*1 - 4.4 - 1.4 - 5 .8
1969 + 2 .8 + 0.1 + 2 .9 + 0.7 - 8 .0 - 8.7 -3.5 -8 .0 -11.5 - 2 .8 - 0.1 - 2 .9
1974 + 4 .7 +11.4 +16.1 + 1.0 -14.3 -15*3 -3.7 -7*6 -11.3 - 4.7 -11.4 -16.1
1 Enfranchisement induced advantage - Percentage Community in electorate
minus percentage community in total population (Refer Table 6).
2 Delimitation induced advantage - Percentage of Constituencies in which
community has an absolute majority minus percentage community in 
electorate. (Table 21 lists the communal predominance in the 
electorate of parliamentary constituencies 1955-1974)
5 Cumulative advantage - i.e. Enfranchisement induced advantage plus
Delineation induced advantage.
Source: Compiled from data in Tables 6 and .21.
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of such devices as cumulative voting, limited voting, and modifiedl
forms of proportional representation which may allow for minority 
groups to obtain adequate representation. It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to attempt answers to these difficult questions. However, 
the discussion also raises basic questions concerning conditions of 
allegiance and modes of expression of public will and opinion in the 
Peninsular Malaysian political arena. It calls for an analysis of the 
institutional, spatial and population bases of political parties and 
the manner in which political parties attempt to mobilise support to 
obtain electoral successes. The subsequent three chapters address 
themselves to these questions.
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
The Evolution of Communal Party Politics
167
Party politics in Peninsular Malaysia, at least successful party 
politics, remains largely a matter of mobilising communal support.
Such has been the pattern since the early attempts at party formation 
in the post World War II days. However,, the introduction of popular 
elections in 1952 emphasised the all-important consideration of winning 
parliamentary majorities. This presented the political parties with 
the dilemma of retaining communal support and gaining parliamentary 
majorities - a task which appeared impossible because of the peculiar 
communal composition of the Malayan population,, where no community has 
a clear majority. Two alternatives presented themselves - either to 
attempt party formation along non-communallines, or to form inter- 
communal coalitions. Both alternatives have been tried with the
latter having more success. Indeed, the country has,/since the first
r
election been dominated by the Alliance and its. successor the Barisan 
Nasional - both essentially inter-communal coalitions.
Given the communal composition of the country, however, it is to 
be expected that the success of the smaller parties who are content, or 
the circumstances under which they are forced to -be communally based, 
would, by highlighting communal issues, present serious opposition to 
non-communal parties or inter-communal coalitions. This has been the 
trend since the first election in 1952, but in 1969 their challenge 
was sufficient for the first time to reduce the popular support of the 
inter-communal Alliance to less than 50%- The ensuing communal 
clashes resulted in the suspension of parliamentary democracy and the 
introduction of the Emergency Government by a National Operations 
Council.' The Council made the removal from public discussion of a 
number of politically sensitive communal issues, the condition for 
reconvening Parliament. A number of' Opposition parties capitulated 
and party politics and .parliamentary government resumed. The 197^ 
election, was thus the first to be held under the as it were newly 
defined ’limits of the game'.
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Party politics in Malaysia- can- therefore be divided into three 
phases: phase one comprising -the period prior to the introduction of
elections in 1952; phase two from 1952 to the suspension of 
parliamentary government in 1969; and--phase three comprising the 
period since then. By an examination*of each of these three phases 
the present chapter attempts to trace the evolution of party politics 
in Peninsular Malaysia with the aim of establishing the dominance that 
communal considerations had throughout. It also seeks to explain the 
state of the parties and their respective- positions at the 197^ 
election..
The Pre-1952 .period
Party polities as witnessed today in Peninsular Malaysia 
originate from -the response in general of the Malayan population, and 
in particular the Malay community, to the British Government's 19^6 
proposal for a Malayan Union scheme in the Malay peninsula. The 
proposed scheme 'sought to create a more unified and centralized 
government in the Unibn'by including all the Malay states plus the 
former settlements of Penang and Malacca - leading as a consequence to 
a severe reduction in the power of the Malay rulers. Political 
rights for the non-Malays were to be enhanced, for the relevant White 
Paper stated " ... all those who have made the country their homeland 
should have the opportunity of a due share in the country's political
-I
and cultural institutions". This in effect meant the termination 
of the privileged status enjoyed by the Malay community. Citizenship 
proposals were particularly favourable to the non-Malay communities 
for it called for the inclusion as citizens of all persons born in 
Malaya or Singapore or residing therein for ten out of the preceding 
fifteen years-with the occupation period disregarded. More
1 United Kingdom Government, Malayan Union and Singapore, 
Cmnd. 672^, 19^6, p. 1.
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significantly, ■naturalized citizenship1 could be acquired after a
residence of five years in Malaya and Singapore.
These provisions struck at the very basis of Malay communal
feelings and proved the occasion for the rude awakening of the Malays
from their political lethargy. Malay nationalist organizations
were formed in nearly every state by the end of 199-5 “ the strongest
of these being Onn bin Jaafar's Johore based National Movement of
Peninsular Malays which soon gained a 100,000 strong membership.
Qnn's subsequent call for the uniting of Malay organizations to fight
the Union led to the-All-Malay Congress-in Kuala Lumpur on March 1,
199-8, with representatives of 9-0 Malay organizations attending.
Here was formed the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) with
Onn as President, and with the specific task of fighting the
communal battle that the Malayan Union implied for the Malays.
Within a year UMNO had organized itself into a mass party with
extensive grass-roots support. Kampong (village) branches, mukim ( ! \
branches and state divisions were formed within each state. Where
there was more than one division in a state, State Liaison Committees
were set up to co-ordinate their activity. This careful organization
together with the united front presented by UMNO and the Malay Rulers
gave it a supremacy over any existing organization."'
Due almost wholly to the efforts of UMNO, the British Government
agreed to review the Constitution and announced the formation of a
2committee to seek an acceptable agreement. This Working Committee
consisted of six Government members, four Malay Rulers and two UMNO -■ 
representatives. . Clearly the drafting of the Constitution "waS"'in' 
the hands of the‘Malay elite. This caused alarm amongst the
1 Silcock; T.H. and Ungku Aziz, ’Nationalism in Malaya' in 
Holland, W.L.-(ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, 1953, p* 277*
2 The Straits Times,'July 26, 199-6, quoted in Means, G.P.,
Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 55*
170
non-Malay communities who feared a return to the openly pro-Malay 
policies of pre-War Malaya. Non-Malay organisations like the 
Chinese Associations and Guilds and the-Malayan Indian' Congress sub-
• I
mitted their views on citizenship, immigration and the political 
rights of the non-Malays.• No strong united front existed. Due to 
this, lack- of organization non-Malays were unable "to exert any signi­
ficant degree of influence. In December of 19^6, however,- under -the 
leadership of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) a Council of Joint 
Action (eventually coming to be known as the All-Malaya Council of
•'j
Joint Action or AMCJA) was formed. It was through this Council 
that non-Malay opposition to the UMNO-backed Federation of Malaya 
Agreement was channelled. The AMCJA, being an uneasy coalition of 
too varied a composition ranging from communist organizations to 
purely commtmai'groups, 'could hardly challenge the highly cohesive 
UMNO which for^added strength enjoyed a common front with the Malay 
Rulers. The "AMCJA1 s efforts were to; little avail and the procedure 
adopted by "the"British 1Government in securing an agreement with the 
various-groups was first to negotiate-a formula which the Malay 
Rulers and UMN0 would be willing to supporty' and then to give the 
domiciled non-Malay populations an opportunity to- criticize and 
support changes, provided'they'did not seriously alienate Malay 
opinion. The tenor of communal bargaining was established and was 
to form the- basis of-political relations among the different Malay 
communities.
The- Federation of Malaya Agreement meant political competition
t
between the various ethnic communities in Malaya. The significance 
of this was- not lost on Onn bin Jaafar who now aimed at a multi­
racial approach to- Malayan politics. Onn had been greatly
1 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 55•
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influenced by the- deliberations- carried- out at the Communities Liaison
Committee■(CLC). - The CLC, which began as a Malay-Chinese Goodwill
Committee on the initiative of the British Commissioner General, had
developed into a body-with six Malays, six Chinese, one Eurasian, one
Indian, one Ceylonese and one European; and reached a consensus on
a number of divisive issues. Convinced of the CLC's formula for
citizenship Onn attempted to force it on UMNO. He resigned as
UMNO's President; UMNO capitulated and re-elected him as President.
The following year Onn again attempted by a similar step to get UMNO
to open its doors to non-Malay membership. UMNO's decision was
unequivocal.- It was prepared to lose Onn rather than have its
membership 'adulterated' by non-Malays. Onn left to form the
Independence of;Malaya Party (IMP) and UMNO chose Tunku Abdul Rahman 
2
as its leader.
Onn's newly formed non-communal IMP seemed to appear at an 
opportune moment, for the AMCJA had disintegrated with the beginning 
of the communist-insurgency in 19^8. The AMCJA's constituent 
associations returned to their spate of communal politics. Even 
Tan Cheng Lock, the AMCJA's President , -had on February'27, 19^9 in 
conjunction with a number of other Chinese leaders formed the Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA). The formation of the IMP presented an
apparently' viable alternative to the communal politics of UMNO.
1 It has been claimed that the CLC was the- result of a meeting of 
twenty-one leaders from various communities held at the 
initiative of Onn bin Jaafar at his-home on December 31» 19^8. 
See Ishak bin Tadin, 'Datb Onn and Malay-Nationalism, 19^6-31'?
'' -Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1960,
2 Moore, D.E., The UMNO and-the 1939 Elections: A study of a
Political Party in Action in a Newly'Independent'plural'Society,
1960, p. 7 . -
3 Soh Eng Lim, 'Tan Cheng Lock, His Leadership of the Malayan' 
Chinese'-,- Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1, 
March 19^0, pp 29-33-
1?2
The initial support given the IMP by all the members of the CLC, 
leaders of all the major communal organizations (excepting UMNO) and 
the Trades Union Congress seemed to suggest that the new party would
'I
certainly dominate Malayan politics. The support of the non-Malay 
communities at least seemed certain, for the IMP's objectives were to 
provide and maintain an efficient non-communal national organization. 
Then in 1952 was held the Municipal Council election for Kuala 
Lumpur. The organization of political parties to act merely as 
pressure groups was no longer sufficient^and parties and their leaders 
had to gain sufficient electoral support if they were to gain credence 
The announcement of the forthcoming election brought about a flurry 
of activity, manoeuvering and bargaining and properly marks the 
beginning of the second phase of Malayan political party formation and 
development.
The 1952-1969 phase
The Kuala Lumpur Municipal election of February 1952 was not
the first election in the Federation. Election for the Municipal
Council of George Town on Penang Island had been held in December 1951
However it was the capital city's election that was regarded as most
significant - here the IMP would be able to test its non-communal
approach to Malayan politics and do so on grounds that were most
favourable to it. Kuala Lumpur's Malay, Chinese and Indian
populations had lived together in harmony and were probably more
liberal in their attitudes. Also, significantly, it was in Kuala
Lumpur less than five months earlier that the IMP had been founded,
attended by great pomp and ceremony. Decisive victory for the IMP
and non-communal politics seemed imminent.
1 Vasil, ,R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, A study of non- 
communal 7political parties in West Malaysia,. 1971? P» 50.
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On January 9» 1932 a shock announcement appeared in the local
press - the UMNO had entered into an electoral -understanding with the
MCA hy which both parties would not contest each other but instead
would field joint UMNO-MCA candidates - UMNO in the Malay-dominated
j
constituencies and the MCA in the Chinese-dominated ones. - The
agreement seemed particularly surprising since MCA President
Tan Cheng Lock had been the Chairman of the inaugural meeting of the
IMP and a member of its Organizing Committee. Further, several MCA
leaders were also leaders of the IMP. The reasons for the UMNO-MCA
agreement were, however, to be seen from the immediate aims of the two
organizations. The MCA had-been formed by conservative Chinese
leaders- with the backing of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the
behind-th-e-scenes-support of the British Government, essentially to
serve as an alternative to the communist influence over the Chinese 
2
community. All sixteen of the Chinese members of the Federal
Legislative and Executive Council were members of the formative 
committee of the MCA and, despite the Chinese community’s initial 
opposition to the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Tan Cheng Lock had 
been President of the AMCJA), the MCA accepted the Agreement and ' 
pledged full support for the Government; in return the British 
Government gave it unofficial recognition as the principal represent­
ative of the Chinese community. Its continued status as such called 
for a measure of electoral support. The IMP had however been 
unwilling to enter into an electoral understanding with the MCA, 
though it was willing to accommodate MCA candidates within the IMP 
ticket. For UMNO the alliance meant” the opportunity of beating its 
immediate rival, the IMP, both by gaining financial support from the 
MCA for election expenses and by gaining Chinese support at the polls.
1 The Malay Mail, January 9i 1932.
2 Means, G.P., op. cit., p. 120.
17^
The UMNO-MGA agreement was, however, not the consequence of
deliberations at the national level, and had been entered into by the
President of the Selangor State branch of the MCA, and the Chairman of
the UMNO election sub-committee for the Kuala Lumpur branch - not even
'I
the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO had been consulted. So successful 
was this arrangement that MCA won six seats, UMNO three and IMP only 
two of the twelve seats contested. The success in Kuala Lumpur led 
to similar arrangements elsewhere and liaison committees between UMNO 
and MCA branches were set up at all levels throughout Malaya to 
exploit the advantages of this compromise. In December of 1952 
thirty-seven municipal council seats were contested in six cities - 
UMNO and MCA captured twenty-six and the IMP only one.
This workable arrangement and apparent united front of the 
Malay, and Chinese communities paved the way for discussions for 
Federal Legislative Council elections and eventually for independence. 
The only disagreements arose over details and these essentially, 
because the- IMP, which lacked popular support, had a greater influence 
in the hitherto wholly nominated Legislative Council. Having 
received a great setback in the local council elections, the IMP 
hoped to delay Legislative Council elections so as to gain time to 
recoup and consolidate its support. The UMNO and MCA were, however, 
eager to press for speedy elections in an attempt to capitalize on
I
their victories. The delaying tactics of the IMP served only to make
4 % f ;
it appear less intent on gaining independence and thus lose even more 
support.
Unable to gain support for the non-communal IMP Onn bin Jaafar 
announced the formation of the Party Negara - and in February 195^ the 
new party was launched. The membership qualifications of the new
1 Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, p. 11.
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party,however, severely restricted non-Malay participation and the 
party began to adopt an increasingly Malayu.,oriented position. Thus 
had failed the first serious attempt at non-communal party formation.
The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), which had withdrawn from the 
AMCJA, now viewed the UMNO-MGA combination with interest and on 
October 171 195^ the Executive Committee of the MIC decided to link
itself with the UMNO-MCA alliance.^ The MIC itself had been
f. v'1 d t: >■
established- in August 19^6 after!the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Nehru,!
f/
—Vrisit; to "Malaya and his urging Indians in Malaya to strengthen their
organization so- as to play -an active role in Malayan politics. The
party's constitution was patterned - along the lines of the Congress
Party of India and in its early years the party showed a great concern
for the- status of Indians overseas and their relations with India.
Despite its links with the AMCJA and opposition to the Federation
Agreement, the party never received any significant support from the
Indian community and even as late as March 1950 the Assistant Registrar
of Societies, Selangor/Negri Sembilan, wrote:
"Even though the Congress claims to represent the Indians 
in this country, I do not think even a fraction of Indians 
will follow /they7 ideology. Indians who are members of the
Federal and State Councils are not members of the Congress." 3
In 1950 the Congress claimed 10,015 members but the Assistant Registrar
noted "I don't think even 10% of the people are paying subscription
regularly". The MIC's importance derives essentially from its
membership 'in the Alliance. For the Alliance, too, the MIC's liaison
has been of little electoral significance, for in no constituency do
1 Ibid., p. 82.
2 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 108.
3 Assistant Registrar of Societies, Selangor/Negri Sembilan,
Inspection Report on the MIC, March'23, 1950. Document included
in Registrar of Societies, Malaysia, File No. ^56/^9-
k Ibid.
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the Indians represent more than 25% of the electorate. The MIC’s 
inclusion, however, gave the Alliance a more Malayan appearance and 
thus increased legitimacy, for it now had the facade of representing 
all three major communities in Malaya.
By the time of the holding of the 1955 Federal Legislative 
Council election, . the Alliance was the only party capable of contest­
ing all fifty-two seats. The Party Negara, after its failure to stop 
the Alliance from winning all ^6 of the seats it contested in the 195^ 
State Legislative Council elections, was in no position to offer
serious competition. It nevertheless fielded thirty candidates for
1the 1955 election..- The Alliance's other challenge came from more
extreme Malay-based organizations like the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, 
National Association of Perak, and the Perak Malay League. Also in 
the contest were two' hitherto non-c^ommunal organisations, the Labour 
Party and the Perak Progressive \Party, but these were too small and 
disorganized*to present any effective challenge. (Table'25 lists 
the classification of candidates by party and by community and the 
party performances for the 1955 election.,) In the event, the 
Alliance made a virtual 'clean sweep at the polls. The only seat it 
lost, was not won by the Party Negara, but rather by the Pan- 
Malayan Islamic Party in a constituency which comprised <x more than 
90% Malay electorate. . The inter-communal Alliance and its pattern 
of polities had received an overwhelming endorsement and the Alliance 
was established as the dominant party in the Malayan political arena.
The 1 equal-partnership Alliance' of the- 1955 election!*, however, 
progressively gave way over the years and UMNO began to assert a 
dominant position.- The MCA and MIC found-themselves in an 
increasingly difficult dilemma. During the constitution-drafting
1 Vasil, R.TEC., Politics in a Plural Society ..., p. 86.
Table 25
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1955 Legislative Assembly Election:
Candidates by Party and Community and Party Performances.
Candidates Seats Votes won
P a r t y
Malay Chinese Indian Total No. %
Alliance 35 15 2 52 51 818,013 79.6
Party Negara 29 1 - 30 - 78,909 7.6
PAS 11 - - 11 1 ^0,667 3-9
Labour Party - 2 2 k - 20,996 2 .0
National Association 
of Perak 8 1 - 9 - 5A33 0.5
Perak Malay League 3 - - 3 - A-,786 O A
PPP 1 - 1 2 - 1,081 0.1
Independents . 
candidates 16 1 1 18 - 31,6^ +2 3-0
Total 103 20 6 129 52. 973,52? 100
Source: Ratnam; K. J.; Communalism and the Political Process in 
Malaya, 1965 , pp 191 aud 196.
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years of 1956 and early 1957, in particular, the MCA and MIC were 
forced to make substantial concessions to UMNO and away from the 
positions that*the bulk of their respective'communities clearly wanted 
them to adopt. The option that presented itself to the MCA and MIC 
leaders then and since has been "if we insist ... we may well have 
to part company from UMNO. - This /we/7 cannot afford to do."
In 1959 the-Alliance faced its major crisis. The MCA had in 
1958 been taken over by a younger group which deposed Tan Cheng Lock 
and replaced him-with Lim Chong Eu- as President. The new group 
aimed at a more-equal partnership of the MCA with UMNO and the 
Chinese community with the Malay community. The issue finally boiled 
down to the sharing of seats-for the 1959 election,. ^ The MCA asked 
for an increased--share of seats to be contested, and based its claim 
on the increased percentage of the Chinese electorate as from, 1955- 
UMNO flatly refused the MCA request for "about forty of the 10^ - seats" 
and allotted-the MCA only thirty-one seats. The new leaders, 
frustrated by their inability-to.seek an equal partnership quit the 
party, and the-MCA again fell under the leadership of the old guard, 
now led by Tan Cheng Lock’s son, Tan Siew Sin. The party, however, 
was severely weakened and its membership dropped from 299,250 in 1957 
to 59,500 in 1961. Never again was the party, at least in
membership, to reach its 1957 stature.
The Alliance as a'political organisation was integrated only at the 
summit and even that only via the-principal leaders." The rank and 
file remained apart and agitated for the interests of their respective 
raeeS‘. • - No attempt' was" made'to' integrate'or eveh allow a modicum of 
interaction between the lower level leaders. Thus the MIC resolutions 
urging the Alliance leadership ".to, hold an annual or biennial -
1 Tan Siew Sin’s now famous comment to the MCA Central Working 
Committee meeting of April 7, 1957 included in the minutes of the 
same meeting.
2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. IOA7/5 0.
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conference of delegates of all the organizations forming the Alliance
with the aim of their knowing each other better and facilitating the
1
eventual formation of a single party" were never acted upon. Given
this state of affairs, the Alliance came under challenge from two
fronts - the more communal parties in "the form of the Muslim-Malay
PAS and the non-Malay PPP,and the left-wing Socialist Front.
The Partai Islam Semenanjung. Malaysia (PAS) had evolved from the
ineffective Malayan Muslim Party of 19^8. It initially operated as
the All-Malaya Islamic Association. But in 1955) at the insistence
of the Registrar of Societies, it changed its name to the Pan-Malayan 
2
Islamic Party. The PAS campaigned for -a Muslim theocratic state
with a'Malay nationality, more stringent citizenship laws, and more 
restrictive immigration laws for the non-Malays.Its initial success 
at the 1955 election, when it won the only seat lost "by the Alliance, 
had been largely due to the support given it by Malay organizations 
and Islamic groups disenchanted with the UMNO’s co-operation with the 
MCA and MIC and-with UMNO's alleged selling-out of Malay interests. 
With the election of Dr. Burhanuddin as its new President, PAS entered 
a more dynamic phase and campaigned for the creation of Malay states 
in the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca and the 
selection of Sultans there to ensure the special privileges of the 
Malays, the immediate enforcement of Malay as the sole official 
language, the expansion of the Malay educational■system, and, the 
eventual establishment of a Melayu Raya encompassing all the Malay 
people of Southeast Asia. The strength' of such an extreme Malay 
communaliidt appeal amongst the Malay electorate, particularly in the
1 . Resolution adopted unanimously at the Seventeenth Annual
Delegates Conference of the MIC, November 30, 19&3 and December 1, 
1963- Similar resolutions•were also adopted in previous years.
2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 26/52.
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predominantly Malay and isolated states of Kelantan and Trengganu, was 
not to be underestimated.
At the other end of the political continuum,.representing 
communal appeal, was the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), initially
'I
known as the Perak Progressive Party. It had been formed in Ipoh
in January 1953 by D.R. Seenivasagam and'"a number of eminent non- 
2
Malays. In December of 1953 the party entered into co-operation
with the UMNO-MGA alliance and in the 195^ Town Council election for
Ipoh , D.R. Seenivasagam was elected on a joint UMNO-MCA-PPP ticket.
In mid-1955 the PPP quit the Alliance, primarily because it was unable
to influence the choice of candidates for the 1955 election.. . It
fielded two candidates for the 1955 election and campaigned on a
moderate non-communal platform. Indeed its policy position was
identical to the Alliance and the party was willing to accept Malay as
the national language with multi-lingualism for a limited period of
ten years; the party even promised special assistance for the Malays.
However, both its- candidates lost their■deposits. Disenchanted with
the lack of support for its basically moderate and non-communal
approach, the party swung to a more non-Malay communal appeal. In
March 195& the party changed its name to the Peoples Progressive Party
and demanded for the principle of jus soli in citizenship provisions
for non-Malays-. It further capitalized'on Chinese discontent over
the Razak education report of 1956.and-the attendant legislation of 
3
1957* With the support of the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce,
1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 21/53*
2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 21/53-
3 .Federation of Malaya, Report’of the Education Committee, 1956 
(Dato Abdul Razak, Chairman), No. 21 of 1956.
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D.R. Seenivasagam won the 1957 bye-•election for the Federal Legislative 
Council in the predominantly Chinese, Ipoh-Menglembu seat - the same 
seat for which he had-lost his -deposit two years previously campaign­
ing on a non-communal platform. The party’s instant success on 
adopting a communal approach encouraged it to formulate a more 
blatantly Chinese chauvinist stand. Early in December 1958 the party 
succeeded in capturing all the four seats it contested in the Town 
Council election in Ipoh. It used the control it thus gained of 
the Council^ to secure approval for multi-lingualism in the Council’s 
deliberations. The PPP’s 1959 election manifesto was termed ’’Blue 
print for equality and progress” and represented the shift the party
'I
had made from its 1955 policy positions. The party campaigned for 
Chinese and Tamil as official languages, citizenship laws based on the 
full application of jus soli, equal privileges for all Malayans and 
the amendment- of the immigration and education provisions so as to 
favour non-Malay communities rather more - positions in direct conflict 
with the PAS on each of the major issues on which Malayan society is 
divided.
In marked contrast to the other parties in policy orientation 
and approach, was the Socialist Front (SF) - an ideological alliance 
of the Labour Party (LP) and the PartaiRakyat (PR). The Labour Party 
had begun as essentially independent regional parties in Penang, 
Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Perak in 1951- The early 
initiators were-the English-educated and leaders of the colonial 
government-sponsored Malayan Trade- Union Congress. In June '1952 
these regional parties formed a'Pan-Malayan Labour Party and adopted‘ 
an anti-communist democratic socialist stand. Even at the end of 
1955 the party was "as yet little more than a discussion club .of
1 Vasij., R.K., Polities in a Plural Society ..., Chapter VI,
pp 221-251 provides an excellent and detailed analysis of the 
development .of the PPP.
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social democratic in-t-elTectuaTs deriving- scant support from the trade 
union movement”. At the -second annual- conference in June 195^ the
party was renamed the Labour Party of Malaya, adopted a new con­
stitution and a more radical position. It called for immediate self- 
government, union of Malaya and Singapore, a measure of public owner­
ship of the means of production, and collective farming. At the 1955 
election the party lost all the four seats it contested. The party, 
however, continued to adhere to its socialist demands and presented to 
the Reid Constitutional Commission a report, calling for a republican 
government with an elected President as head of state. Perhaps most 
radical was its position as regards the Sultans whom it proposed to 
phase out in time. The party objected to special Malay privileges 
but accepted Malay as the national language. It also called for the 
continued use of English, Chinese and the Indian languages in the 
Federal and State Legislative Councils and the teaching of these 
languages in schools. In December 1956 all the party's five 
candidates won the George Town Municipal Council election ,and from 
then till 1966, the party controlled-the said council.
In the meantime, Ahmad Boesterman, the colourful leader of the
Malay leftist organizations of the immediate post-war years, fresh
2from his release from detention, launched the Part a x R a kyat. From 
its commencement , ■ however, the Pariai tvaKyat was an essentially pro- 
Indonesian Malay-based organisation distinctly more radical than the 
Labour Party. The Part&iRakyat adopted Marhenism, a political 
philosophy initiated by President Sukarno of Indonesia as its
1 Carnell, F«G., 'Communalism and Communism in•Malaya', Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1953, p. 108.
2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 326/55 includes 
numerous documents prepared by the party ip the early years which 
provide valuable insight into the party's initial ideology and 
organisation.
183
ideology and -subscribed to the concept- of Melayu Raya - a Malay 
homeland comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei 
with close links with Indonesia. The Labour Party, unable to gain 
Malay support, joined the Partai Rakyat to form an Alliance-like and 
ideologically-oriented Socialist Front in July 1937- As strategy, 
the Labour Party and Partai Rakyat undertook to cultivate different 
constituents - the Labour Party the'largely urban-based non-Malay 
workers, and the Partai Rakyat the predominantly rural-based Malay 
peasants. It is a measure of the communal nature of Malayan politics 
that essentially non-communal ideological parties should be forced to 
operate along communal lines. For the 1939 election the ranks of the 
Socialist Front had been swollen-by the influx of MCA dissidents and 
the party posed a serious threat to the Alliance.
The election campaign 'manifested itself as a campaign on 
essentially communally divisive issues and the results indicated a 
severe erosion of political support for the inter-communal Alliance.
Table 26
1939 Parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community and Party. Performances
P a r t y
Candidates Seats Votes won
Malay Chinese Indian Total
won
No. %
Alliance 69 31 10^ 7^ 800, 51.8
Party Negara 10 - - 10 ' 1 32,578 2.1
PAS 58 - 58 13 329,070 21.3
Socialist Front 11 20 7 38 8 199,688 12.9
PPP 1 9 9 19 k 97,391 
13 ,^ ok
6 .2
Malayan Party - 1 1 2 1 0.9
Independent-
candidates
7 17 2 26 '3 7*f, 19^ 9
Total 157 79 23 259 - 1Qif 1 ,5^7 ,269 100
Source: Ratnam; K.J-., Communalism and the Political Process in
Malaya, 1963? pp 202 and 20^.
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The main challenge came from the PAS, which had absorbed almost half 
the Malay electoral strength. Non-Malay support still remained 
largely intact, though the Socialist Front and the PPP were making 
inroads.
. In May 19&1 the Malayan Prime Minister proposed a closer under­
standing between Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. 
This Malaysia'proposal, and the opposition to it by both the 
Indonesian and Philippines governments, dominated Malayan politics 
for the next few years and created particular problems for the 
opposition parties.
The Socialist Front, now enlarged to include the National 
Convention Party of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, opposed the formation of 
Malaysia and represented it as a neo-colonial plot, criticizing in 
particular,the manner in which it had been formed. The Malaysian 
Government was held responsible for alienating Indonesia and thereby 
causing.Indonesian opposition. The Front's peace plan - calling 
for a Borneo ceasefire, the withdrawal of British and Indonesian 
troops, the release of all political prisoners and a referendum in 
Borneo to ascertain the wishes of the people there - was presented 
as anti-national and aiding the interests of Malaysia's enemies.
The PAS's position was less ideologically motivated and indeed rested 
on the party's fear of a dilution of Malay society ,by the incor­
poration within Malaysia of the Chinese population of Singapore.
The earlier sympathies--. oflJPAS leaders for a Melayu Raya encompassing 
the Malay world in Southeast Asia once again appeared feasible in the 
current political situation. The Socialist Front and the .PAS were 
singled out by the Alliance Government and the Peoplds Action Party 
Government in Singapore, as having direct links with Indonesia and 
were accused of supporting Indonesia's aggression towards Malaysia.
Of singular embarrassment to the Socialist Front and PAS was the
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support given them in the Indonesian radio broadcasts beamed to 
Malaysia, and the Alliance Government's accusations that they had re­
ceived financial support for their activities from the Indonesian 
Government. ^
The United Democratic Party (UDP), formed by the MCA dissidents 
who left the MCA with Lim Chong Eu in 1958, and the PPP, also 
initially opposed the Malaysia proposal. However, they accepted 
Malaysia as a fait accompli and supported the Government in condemn­
ing Indonesian confrontation. Of all the opposition parties it
was the PPP which took the most militant position in its denunciation 
of Indonesia and conducted virulent attacks on the Socialist Front and the 
PAS‘VdP'dusijjgtftem of selling out to the Indonesians. The party 
thereby hoped to capitalize on the Chinese fears of a Melayu Raya 
whilst at the same time not losing out by the "support Malaysia vote" 
that the Alliance was calling for.
Of-greater significance to subsequent developments was the role 
played by the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, whose entry 
into Malayan politics was announced just prior to the 1964 election...
The PAP's aim was clearly to replace the MCA in the Alliance. 
Concentrating its attention on the non-Malay majority urban areas, it 
directly challenged the MCA and SF but carefully stayed away from 
challenging UMNO. Indeed, when on nomination day the PAP discovered
it was contesting two UMNO candidates it withdrew its candidates in
2these two constituencies.
Despite the 1964 election, being dominated by the "Malaysia 
■ issue", the perennial communal issues received their share 'of 
prominence. Thus the positions adopted as regards the special
1 Federation of Malaysia Government, A Plot Exposed, Cmnd. 12 of 
1965, pp 4-5.
2 Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, 1972,
PP 7 - 8 .
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privileges of the Malays, the citizenship privileges of the non-Malays 
and the status of the Chinese and Tamil languages by the respective 
parties in the 1959 election, continued to be emphasised. But 
clearly the 1964 election results are least reliable as an indicator 
of the divisions in Peninsular Malaysian society deriving from 
"communal issues". . More accurately it represented a "support 
Malaysia vote" and in the event the Alliance was returned with a 
decisive victory, greatly improving on its 1959 record. All
opposition parties lost seats to the Alliance, and the PAP and the 
newly formed UDP only won one seat each. (Refer Table 27.)
Table 2?
195/4. parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community, and, Party Performances
P a r t y
Candidates Seats
won
Votes won
Malay Chinese Indian Total No. %
Alliance 68 33 3 104 89 1,204,340 58.5
Party Negara 4 - - 4 0 7,319 0.4
PAS . 53 - - 53 9 301,187 14.6
Socialist Front • 30 28 5 63 2 330,898 16.1
PPP 1 4 4 9 2 69,898 3.4
UDP 8 18 1 27 1 88,233
42,130
4.3
PAP 1 8 2 11 1 2 .0
Independent
candidates
3 3 2 8 0 13,509 0 .7
Total 198 94 17 279 104 2,057,514 100
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission The 1964 Elections Report,
1965.
The PAP entry into Peninsular Malaysia politics and its 
particular brand of politics greatly affected the political climate 
and the conduct of the other political parties. The PAP’s attempts 
to woo the UMNO and displace the MCA in the Alliance had received a 
strong rebuff from UMNO■leaders. The Tengku had declared in no
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uncertain terms the position of the UMNO:
"I have said before that the MCA have served the Chinese 
and the country so' well'that even if there are only five 
members of the MCA left, I will still support this 
organisation because of its achievements and its 
commendable objectives." 1
Clearly,the UMNO was unwilling to take on new partners and it was this
unwillingness to have a realignment that was the cause of many of the
developments following the 1964 election.. In February and March
1985 1the PAP leader ,Lee Kuan Yew,formulated the idea of a Malaysian
Malaysia. The fundamental principles on which this was founded were:
a) Malaysia should be a democratic society where legitimate 
differences of views provided they accept undivided 
loyalty to the Malaysian nation should be permitted and 
where individuals and political parties should have full ' 
freedom to persuade its citizens, by constitutional means, 
to their particular point of view.
b) Malaysia being a multi-racial and multi-cultural society 
must show respect and tolerance for legitimate diversity 
provided they do not weaken Malaysian unity or hamper 
loyalty to Malaysia.
c) Malaysia was conceived as belonging to Malaysians as a 
whole and not to any particular community or race. 2
This apparently innocuous idea of a Malaysian Malaysia at once became
a rallying point for the non-Malays and roused the fears of the Malays.
The PAP's subsequent attempt to organize and unite the pro-Malaysian
Malaysia parties into the Malaysian Solidarity National Conference
further aggravated the situation and the Alliance leaders forced
Singapore out of Malaysia on August 9, 1965- The PAP's brief period
in Malaysian politics served once again to highlight the issues of the
political role of the non-Malays and the position of the Chinese and
Indian cultures and languages in Malaysian society, thereby bringing
to the fore communal tension. On Singapore's exit the remnants of
the PAP in Malaysia'attempted to continue functioning under the name
1 The Straits Times, April 24, 1964.
2 Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, 1972, p. 13-
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of the People's Action Party; on failing to receive registration they
continued the vanguard action for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' under the
name of the Democratic Action Party (DAP). Uninhibited by any
immediate plans for a coalition with any Malay-based party ,the DAP's
concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' went significantly further from that
adopted by the PAP. As defined in The Setapak Declaration it
represented a frontal attack on Malay special privileges and political 
1
dominance. It particularly rejected the division of Malaysian
society into bumiputra (son of the soil) and non-bumiputra.
Communal tension was further aroused by the passage through
Parliament of the 19&7 National Language Bill. The 1957 Malayan
Constitution, whilst recognizing Malay as the national language, had
allowed for the continued use of English in both Houses of Parliament
and the Legislative Assemblies of each State and for all other
official purposes for a period of ten years after independence, and
2
thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides. UMNO ultras, led 
by Syed Nasir bin Ismail, had set up the National Language Action 
Front (Barisan Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan) in early 19&5 with the 
primary aim of implementing Malay as the official language by 19&7- 
In response' to this, MCA branches insisted on the continued liberal 
use of Chinese. The Alliance set up an action committee to resolve 
the issue. The National Language Bill of 1967 was hence a 
compromise in the Alliance style. The Bill allowed the Federal 
Government or any State Government to use any translation of official 
documents or communications in the English language as may be deemed 
fit in the public interest. It further allowed the Yang' di Pertuan 
Agong to permit -the use of English for such official purposes as he" 
deemed fit, and for the continued use of English in the Courts,
1 Democratic Action Party, The Setapak Declaration, July 19^7-
2 Federation of Malaysia Constitution, Article 152.
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Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies and in the texts of laws.
Malay reaction, particularly in the PAS and large sections of 
UMNO, considered this a betrayal, and demonstrations, including the 
burning of the Prime Minister’s effigy, occurred. . Despite the 
concessions won for the non-Malays by the MCA, the opposition PPP 
and DAP, deemed the formula as inadequate seizing the opportunity to 
present themselves as the champions of the non-Malay communities.
The Labour Party in the meantime was facing particular 
problems. Since the MCA split in 1959 the Chinese-educated had 
swollen the ranks of the Labour Party and gained increased prom­
inence and power though willing to retain the more moderate English 
educated leaders. However, 'differences between the Labour-Party 
and the Partai Rakyat - principally over their differing positions on 
communal issues, but also over party organization and selection of 
candidates for-elections - led to the Partai Rakyat unilaterally 
withdrawing from the-Socialist Front in late 1965- Unrestrained 
by the need lor a-compromise with the predominantly Malay Partai 
Rakyat the Labour Party adopted a more extreme position on the 
issues of interest to non-Malays, particularly the Chinese. This 
shift to a more extreme position on communal issues was paralleled 
by a shift to an increased left-wing'position. Indeed,as early as 
1959 communist infiltration of the Labour Party rank and file had 
begun. Tli© formation of Malaysia and the influence of the extreme 
left wing Barisan Socialis of Singapore amongst the Chinese-educated 
in the Labour Party,made the position of'the English-educated 
moderate’s "increasingly'uhtenabre. the‘extreme anti-Malaysia stand
brought things to a head. By 19&7 the1 Chinese-educated felt 
strong.enough fto abandon■operating' within the- constitutional .
1 Vasil, R.K., Politict 'in a Plural Society ..., Chapter V,
pp 183-221.
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framework and ■ called for’mass struggle’ as the avenue to political
power. The-- moderates were finally alienated.
These moderates, together'with the UDP, -which in itself was
making no headway in gaining mass - support, together with some
intellectuals from- the University of Malaya, attempted to seek
co-operation with the DAP. The DAP' was, -however-, hesitant to lose
its own identity. Though prepared to accommodate a number of
senior ‘leaders-"of this group into the Central, Committee, it was
unwilling-to--accept the rank and file members en bloc. It proposed
to consider each application for membership on its own-merits.
After several 'months of unsuccessful‘negotiations the-.group' f Or me d
its.own party - the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) - in March
1968. The new party attempted to-present a worker-oriented and
non-communal'approach to Malaysian -politics and included several
2senior trade- union leaders amongst its leadership. The Chairman
of the party was1 a respected, Malay, Professor Syed -Hussein Alatas, 
and its sixteen-member pro tern Committee included “five Malays.
De-spite'-the -failure' to--achieve- a single united opposition 
party, several "-of- the -oppositipn parties -were able to work out an 
electoral understanding for the 1969 election. The-rationale for 
this was essentially twofold. Aware that there was not even the 
remotest-possibility of gaining power, -they were willing to ignore 
differences-in their--poTitical ideologies so as to best" capitalize 
on the -anti-Alliance “vote's by not splitting-these votes. This 
"considerabion-was given added. emphasis, as-the Gerakan began to 
acquire sufficient momentum and support to rival the DAP in its
1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 226/68.
2 Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Workers’ Charter (mimeographed),
November 3, 1968.
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appeal in the-' urban areas. The second' consideration that was given 
added public emphasis' and'proved effective at the election hustings 
was to prevent the Alliance from securing its two thirds majority in 
Parliament i and thereby denying it the- power to make constitutional 
changes. The electoral pact entered into, by bilateral arrangements 
between each of the three parties' - the Gerakan, DAP and PPP - was to 
allocate both parliamentary and state constituencies to each of the 
three parties. - Though no formal agreement existed between these 
parties and the PAS, it is believed that some measure- of understanding 
was present,at least in some constituencies.
The picture of electoral competition was thus greatly simplified 
The Alliance-UMNC candidates were challenged, in predominantly Malay 
areas by"the PAS. -In areas with predominantly non-Malay constituents 
the challenge was from one of the three parties in the Gerakan-DAP-PPP 
group. in areas with a plurality electorate the competition came 
from both the'PAS and the Gerakan-DAP-PPP group. In these'con­
stituencies "the Alliance fielded candidates’from any of its three 
constituent parties - the UMNO, MCA and MIC.
The e-1-eebion results came as a surprise to even. opposition 
party leaders. Though all observers had considered it probable that 
the opposition would improve~its performance over that of 1964, few 
expected" it to be of■ the magnitude that-it turned out to be. For 
the first time -since elections were ■introduced the Alliance actually 
polled less- than 5®% of the votes, -and gained less than two-thirds of 
the seats in Peninsular Malaysia. Several senior Ministers and 
Alliance stalwarts lost their seats. Most severely dealt with were 
the MCA candidates. (fable 28.)
1 A copy of these agreements with .this writer.
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Table 28 
1969 Parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community, and, Party Performances.
P a r t y
Candidates Seats Votes won
' won
Malay Chinese Indian Total No. %
Alliance 68 33 3 10A 67 1,0 2 5 ,1^ A8.6
PAS 62 - • 6-2 12 5 0 1 ,1 2 3 23^7
Party Rakyat 6 - - ■6 . 0 2 7 ,1 1 0 1.3
PPP 0 3 ' 3 6 A 8 0 ,7 5 6 3.8
Gerakan 3 7 h . 1t 8 178,97-1 8.5
DAP 1 20 3 . 2A 13 2 8 6 ,6 0 6 13.6
United M^ldysian z 0 1 ,8 0 8 0.1Chinese Organisation
Independent
candidates 3 1 - h 0 9,76^ Q.t
Total 1t3 67 13 223 10t 2,111,282 100
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission,,The 1969 Election; Report,
1972.
The post-1969 period
Since'independence there has undoubtedly been increased 
politicization in Peninsular Malaysia, and, the political-parties have 
ventured to involve larger" and larger numbers' of the people. However, 
the consequent politicization has been integrative within ethnic 
communities but wholly-disintegrative within-the larger multi-ethnic 
Malaysian society. Paradoxical -as it may -seem, this has been largely 
due to the existence of the Alliance. Since its inception the 
Alliance has remained a coalition of inter-communal parties. - Each 
of these component parties operated for all purposes, save that of 
elections, as a separate party. Their membership was communal -and
1 4
their success was measured in terms of their ability to achieve the 
essentially parochial demands that their constituents made. In
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itself this-was a-difficult task, for almost without exception, the 
demands- -made were conflicting. This- was made possible only by the 
senior leader’s'being willing to work out in private- a compromise, and 
then convincing their-respective- junior leaders and constituents to 
accept these-'•as- the-'-maximum" attainable. In - large measure, the 
personal popularity and'appeal that"the"senior leaders'had, made this 
workable, but in time a number of developments occurred which made 
this situation increasingly untenable.
UMNO had- succeeded"in converting the Malays of the component 
states of Malaya from thinking ofthemselves as subjects of the 
individual Sultans' into viewing'themselves as members of the Malay 
race living in the land of the Malays. This increased politic- 
izationlcreated-strong and■effective ties'based upon well defined and 
shared--''poir'tical'interests. It linked the grass-roots members with 
their state and-national leaders. The resultant Malay political 
loyalty and Commitment are essentially-restricted to the Malays as a 
distinct ethnic,-social* cultural,- and, importantly, religious’group 
rather than t©- a'multi-ethftic''Malaysian--state. The effectiveness
of UMNO-- and- its - continued popular support""from- the' Malays was possible 
only by-UMN0-not only succeeding but,also being seen to succeed in 
championing'Malay political supremacy, the preservation of Malay 
special rights-' and privileges and the- favouritism shown them in the 
formulation and execution of government policies. " Yet UMNO, by its ■ 
appeal to- Malay cohesiveness and by being-the" vanguard of the"Malay 
in his attempts to retain his dominant political status, whilst at the 
•‘-same 'timeabhievinjg' economic ahd'- eduOdtlonal' parity with" hon-Malay, 
had created the conditions in which its own supremacy could be
challenged. Moderate UMNO officials could be challenged by more
’ s '
extreme ones , -and'indeed, •UMNO- itself could-be threatened by more 
extreme parties - the Malay electorate-had'built an appetite for the
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very thing it- had-been fed with. Thus as long as loyalties tended to 
be primordial and not to the nation as a whole, more extreme leaders 
and more extreme parties- could,‘-and did, pose as viable alternatives.
The dilemma that UMNO- and its moderate leaders faced was felt to 
a greater degree-by the other--component‘parties’of--the Alliance and 
their leaders. Increasingly, as UMNO-became -the'-dominant’member'of 
the coalition Alliance, the -MCA-and-MIC began-losing their support to 
other more communal parties, thus indicating to the non-Malays1 a path 
of increased primordial loyalties. Perhaps the most tragic aspect 
of these developments has been that many-of these in effect extreme 
communal parties began as genuinely "non-communal parties. Yet the 
Alliance pattern” of ■'politics-1, with the--dominance of UMNO and the 
relegation of the MCA and MIC to a state of relative ineffectiveness, 
meant that the opposition-parties could seek their support only 
amongst those- who were- disenchanted-with-the MCA and MIC. Electoral 
support for' these-opposition parties -was-guaranteed if they would 
succumb to the temptation of representing- increasing primordial 
loyalties. Political realism demanded it, the willing succumbed, 
and the unwilling lost their support or opted out of politics 
altogether.
■ >The election results of'May “10, -1969 depicted precisely the
above-mentioned'state of affairs. . UMN0-,had .been successfully
challenged by -the -PAS, the MCA- and MIC were virtually devastated by
the DAP, Gerakan' and PPP. What remained.of the Alliance following
the 1969 elections-was clearly a coalition that was unable to muster
majority support amongst the Malaysian electorate. The communal riots 
! * 1 
following the- elections, the suspension of parliamentary government and
the price-- called for by the Alliance to resume-parliamentary government
served, however to-greatly alter the- modus operandi' of the respective
parties. The Alliance was willing toi'resume parliamentary government
only if the' other ’parties were willing to abstain from discussing the 
communally -sensitlve~issues, and thereby, not increase communal 
tensions nor pose as effective alternatives to it. The new political 
climate was.conducive and indeed1called for modification of policies 
and. strategies.
On the*1 part- of- the Alliance, in-particular UMNO, it provided an
opportunity* to seek-new partners and enter a new-coalition,. ---Under
the leadershdp-of Tunlcu Abdul Rahman the -preservation -of the- Alliance
in its original form, that -is as an inter-communal coalition of UMNO,
MCA and MIC had- been- a c-ardinal policy. Indeed -the expulsion of
Singapore -from the Malaysian Federation and the 1969 election debacle
was a consequence-of UMNO being unwilling to accept' new partners in
its coalition. In- '\ty69 the opposition-’parties had succeeded in
demonstrating that* it was they and not the MGA and MIC that could
muster non-Malay support. MCA i-ts-elf had been so alarmed-by this
1
that it- initially-considered withdrawing from the Government and the 
new leadership of UMNO was willing to acknowledge what had been denied 
earlier. The legitimacy of the Government itself depended on
including at least a semblance of non-Malay participation. Under 
the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak,UMNO was thus willing to attempt- 
more 'expedient-partnerships, than that offered by MCA and MIC.
The- willingness of UMNO to accept new partners came at a""time 
when the opposition parties, themselves had-grave doubts as to the 
effectiveness with- which they could operate. In an attempt to 
arrest the- rioting that followed the 19&9 elections and .establish a 
return ■'t’o' a 1 s’tath^'df "ie"iat'ivie'‘‘'calmthe1'‘Ndtiorial" Operations Council" " 
had issued an emergency decree amending the Sedition Ordinance.
The amendments restricted freedom of speech and press by making it a
1 The Straits Times, May ih, 1.^ 69.
196
"seditious- tendency" to question any matter, right, status, position,
privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protested-by the
provisions of-Part III, and Articles 152,1:53, or'l8l 'bf the Federal 
1
Constitution. In effect it became sedition to question the rights
and privileges established or protected by those provisions ~of~the
constitution relating to citizenship, to the use of the,Malay
language -as--the national language and the' use of other languages for
non-official purposes, to guaranteed1 quotas for the Malays and
natives of Borneo, to the'protectioh-of- the'"legitimate’ interests
of the other- -communities-, - and-, the sovereignty of-the Malay Rulers,
/
This- meant -the exclusion from'debate of all communally sensitive
matters which-hitherto had proved particularly effective at the
election hustings. Any question of such matters was deemed to be
seditious, • even if-an-attempt was made "to procure by lawful means
the alteration of any- /such7‘matter ..." or if the act, speech or
publication-had a -"tendency to produce feelings of i H :-will and-
2enmity between different races". By-the Constitution
(Amendment)"Act' 1971j Parliament had made these provisions an
integral part of the Constitution. The*provisions were also extended
to Members of Parliament. Most importantly, Parliament abrogated
its own powers to amend the new provisions and any laws passed under
Article 10 -of the Constitution, for any amendments to these now
3
required' the consent of the Conference of Rulers. These amendments 
and the new Sedition Ordinance empowered the. Government to greatly 
curb opposition political activity. It was. in this milieu that a
1 Federation of Malaysia, Ordinance-No. 15 of 1970.
2 Ibid.
3 Ahmad Ibrahim 1 Introduction’, in Malaysia-, Parliamentary Debates 
on the Constitution Amendment Bill, 1971  ^ 1972, p. xv.
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number of opposition parties agreed to-* join the Alliance in a greater 
coalition.
The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia which had captured the Penang State
Government had run into troubled waters. The party had had a clash
of personalities, leading to an acrimonious attempt by each faction
to oust the other - the outcome being that Lim Chong Eu and his
supporters retained' control of the Gerakan. The ousted group,
largely led by the former English-educated-moderate leaders of the
Labour Party, initiated the Partai Keadilan Masyarakat(Pekemas)
which moved into the opposition in the State-Assembly. Lim Chong
Eufs continuance as Chief Minister seemed extremely nebulous. In
the twenty-four member Penang State Assembly, Lim Chong Eu's
Gerakan had thirteen seats, whilst the Alliance had four, the DAP
three, Pekemas two and Partai Rakyat one. The remaining member
was an independent. After a series of secret negotiations between
Prime Minister Abdul Razak- and Lim phong Eu, it- was announced that
the Gerakan--would join-the Alliance in a coalition government at the
federa-1— level, while the Alliance would be admitted as a partner in
the Gerakan controlled State Government in Penang. To placate MCA
fears and rumblings,MCA President Tun Tan Siew Sin was included,
along with Tun Razak and Lim Chong Eu, in the three-member
2Co-ordinating Council. This Council was established in order to 
formulate policies for Penang and to facilitate co-operation between 
the State and Federal Governments.
Two months later t-he Alliance succeeded in attracting the PPP 
into a coalition. 'Non-Malay representation' in the State Government" 
in Perak was minimal and the image of the Perak State Assembly was 
essentially one of a Malay-govepnment and a non-Malay opposition.
1 The -‘Straits Times, -February 1 -^, 1971 •
2 The Straits Times, February 16 , 1971*
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The forty-member Assembly had twenty-two Alliance members, whilst
there were ten PPP, five DAP, one Gerakan, one PAS and one independent
member. To the Alliance which hitherto was accustomed to large
comfortable majorities this seemed inadequate and to absorb one of the
opposition parties appeared advantageous. The principal consideration
that faced the PPP leaders was the fear;-that-failing to enter-into a
coalition could result in the Alliance using' its powers to have the
State Government suspend the PPP controlled-Municipal Council and
assume its functions. The PPP leaders, aware that it was their
control of the Municipal Council that gave them a continued political
base in the Ipoh area, were faced with Hobson’s choice. In April
2
1972 the PPP, too, entered into a coalition with the Alliance.
The coalition involved PPP participation in.the Alliance State
Government in Perak, and, Alliance participation in the PPP controlled
Ipoh Municipality. In time the PPP extended its participation in the
coalition to the federal level.
The absorption process was not restricted to the non-Malay
parties, and in time was extended to the PAS as well* In September
1972 the berms-of agreement were concluded by Prime Minister Abdul
Razak with Asri bin Mohammad, the PAS leader. The Gerakan and PPP,
being at this stage largely parties of personage, had little
difficulty in Convincing their membership of the coalition idea. In
the PAS?however,there was considerable opposition and the terms of
the coalition agreement were approved at the PAS annual congress by
3
a vote of 190 to ninety-four with nineteen abstentions. The terms
1 Personal interview with Datuk S.P. Seenivasagam, President of 
the Peeples Progressive Party on August 8, 197^-
2 The Straijs Times, April 17? 1972-
3 The Straits Times, December 22, 1972.
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of the agreement were substantially more favourable to the PAS than 
had been the earlier agreements to the Gerakan and PPP. The PAS 
leader Asri bin Mohammed was made Minister of Land Development, in the 
federal cabinet, a number of other PAS leaders were appointed to
i
lesser federal posts, and the•PAS gained•representation on a wide 
variety of government boards and councils. ’ Coalition governments 
by the two parties were established in Alliance controlled Trengganu 
State ?and PAS controlled Kelantan State.
On June 1, 197^ a new coalition comprising of UMNO, MCA, MIC,
PAS, Gerakan and PPP in Peninsular Malaysiaj-and the Sabah Alliance, 
Sarawak Alliance and the Sarawak United Peoples Party was registered
"I
as a new party, the Barisan Nasional.
What the Alliance had failed to gain in the 19&9 elections had 
thus been achieved by absorption. Despite the obvious 'carrot and 
stick’ techniques utilised to bring the Gerakan, PPP and PAS into a 
coalition with the Alliance, the appeal of such- an agreement appeared 
compelling. Each of the political party leaders concerned 
explained their stance by defining the situation that created the 
riots of May 13, 1969 - communalism. The- indignation aroused by 
such definitions provided the people with a powerful stimulus for 
co-operative activity.- The Barisan Nasional was presented as an 
antidote against communal sectarianism, but above all as the outcome 
of the recognition that practical' politicking calls for the body 
politic to be taken as it is and not as the avowedly non-communal 
parties would like it to be. The situation is thus paradoxical.
The'Barisan Nasional, as the Alliance before it, provided a powerful 
motive to unite in one organisation and under 6ne leadership,elites 
and masses who would otherwise have spent their energies in conflict.
1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No.. 320/7^.
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The formation of the Barisan Nasional greatly diminished the 
significance of the identifiable opposition. In Parliament there was 
the DAP whose own ranks had been depleted by defections to the govern­
ment. Whereas at the end of the 1969 election the party had won 
thirteen seats, it had on the eve of the 1974 election only nine.
Part of its membership and support had been alienated by leadership 
conflicts and the expulsion of two of its Vice Presidents - Goh Hock 
Guan and Soorian. The DAP was further embarrassed by the 
revelation of the secret MCA-DAP merger talks of 1971* This 
seriously damaged any pretence the party had of being a genuinely 
non-communal party and created a credibility gap among its non-Chinese 
supporters. The Pekemas as a newly established party lacked the 
organization and support that even the DAP had. Its conscious
efforts to appear non-communal in leadership and appeal, forfeited it 
a following. Not represented in Parliament was the essentially Malay 
based Partai Rakyat dedicated to a socialist solution to Malaysian 
problems. The party continued to organize itself in the 
predominantly urban areas. Also amongst the Malay opposition were 
the PAS dissidents who had disagreed with the party^s decision to 
join the Barisan Nasional.
The changed political climate spurred on a number of opposition 
parties to endeavour some form of co-operation. An initial meeting
was sponsored by the Pekemas and attended by representatives of 
Pekemas and DAP in Peninsular Malaysia and the Sarawak National Party 
(SNAP) together with the United Sabah Action Party (USAP) to discuss
the formation of a United Opposition Front on January 24, 1973- From
1the inception the Partai Rakyat spurned the idea of any such co-operation. 
The meeting agreed to the submission of a minimum programme of
1 The Straits Times, January 25, 1973*
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objectives for agreement by each of the parties concerned for their
consideration. For immediate effect, they agreed to the appointment
of the DAP Secretary General Lim Kit Siang, as Leader of the
Opposition in Parliament,with the tacit understanding that James
Wong of the Sarawak National Party would succeed him for the latter
half of the remaining term of Parliament. The programmes submitted
by the parties indicated the very divergent interests and approaches
of this heterogeneous group. The SNAP and USAP's programmes stressed
issues relating specifically to their respective states, in large part
dealing with state and federal government relations. The USAP
programme bluntly concluded:
"it is a known fact- in Sabah that the Opposition i§ 
protruded by the ruling party as an enemy of the Nation.
Hence ours is more concerned on State level in view of its 
unique p e c u l i a r i t y 1
The Pekemas -presented a comprehensive document covering such topics
as parliamentary democracy and human rights, language and culture,
finance and economy, education, morality, labour, wages and social
security, defence, racial unity, and foreign affairs. As a party
whose Constitution accepted the new code Eukunegara as its guideline,
its position on race relations was tame. Its section on racial
unity merely read:
"We are determined to direct all our efforts towards 
achieving racial unity which is vital for peace and harmony 
in multi-racial Malaysia. We shall oppose any action or 
policy that will lead to racial tension and conflict." 2
1 United Sabah Action Party,Minimum Programme of tjhe United Sabah 
Action Party for consideration of-other-parties-Jas agreed during 
a round"'table" conference- he±d. en"January 24," T97~3. ~ ('Undated,
m i m e o gr aphed) Gopy with this writer.' " Also ‘'similar ’'d'O'cUment'of 
the Sarawak National Party (undated, mimeographed) Copy with this 
writer.
2 Partai Keadilan Masyarakat, Minimum Programme for consideration 
of Opposition Parties, (undated, mimeographed). Copy with this 
writer.
202
Much of the Pekemas programme was based along the policy lines
adopted by the Labour Party in the late 1950s, the section on
education being virtually lifted out of a document entitled "Our
Education Policy" submitted by the Labour Party for consideration by
the Socialist Front in 196 1. This is not surprising,, for many of
the current leaders in Pekemas were from the Labour Party and
V. Veerapan was the principal author of the Labour Party document
as well as the Pekemas minimum programme.
The DAP's submission was entitled •DAP's programme for
Malaysia - the democratic socialist approach1 and was subdivided
into three parts - Political Democracy, Socio-Economic and
Industrial Democracy, and Cultural Democracy. In tenor it was more
daring than the Pekemas document, and especially so on the issue of
race relations:
"The campaign against poverty and backwardness must 
accordingly be a national campaign, based on the criteria , 
of need and not 'on that of race. Unfortunately, the 
Alliance government have managed to give a racial twist 
and bias to all their social, economic and educational 
programmes. Socio-economic and industrial democracy 
means, among other things: (1) The abandonment' of the
racial and dangerous fallacy that there is a so-called 
•racial economic imbalance* in Malaysia, ... An equal 
multi-racial society presupposes that no one race exercises 
political, social and cultural hegemony over the others ...
The DAP will strive for ... Development of a Malaysian 
culture from the free interplay and interaction of the 
diverse cultural elements in Malaysia and not proceeding 
from the hegemony of any one culture." 2
To those familiar with the Malaysian political arena this could
represent nothing but a tacit attack on the special rights and
privileges of the Malays.
1 Personal interview with V. Veerapan, August 11, 197^*
2 Democratic Action Party, DAP's Programme for Malaysia - the 
democratic socialist approach. (Undated, mimeographed.) 
Copy with this writer.
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The difference in policy approach however did not hinder 
progress and for a time a United Opposition Front seemed a 
probability. But the DAP and the Pekamas soon fell out with each 
other. In February 197^ the DAP issued a press-statement calling off 
talks with Pekemas for a United Opposition Front and gave as its 
reasons, not any differences in policy orientation, but., rather,an
'I
alleged breach of good faith on the part of Pekemas. The party 
cited three reasons for this:
1 Pekemas leader V. Veerapan’s alleged issuing of a press 
statement purporting Pekemas willingness ’to fight it out 
with the DAP'.
2 The acceptance into Pekemas of Soorian and Samuel Raj, two 
expelled members of the DAP, in contravention of an 
agreement between SNAP, DAP and Pekemas leaders that no 
party would adopt any person expelled by another party, 
including putting him forward as a candidate in the next 
election; and
3 The alleged malicious rumours and smear campaign conducted
by the Pekemas against the DAP. In a statement issued a 
2
week later the DAP accused Pekemas President Tan Chee Koon
3
of delivering a statement to a Malay daily alleging a 
leadership crisis in the DAP.
Pekemas leaders, aware of their failure to make any impact in the two 
years since their party's formation, made strenuous efforts to placate
1 Press sta'tement'‘'by"'Daing-"Tbr'ahTm 'bin ©thman, Vice-Chairman, DAP 
Malaysia on February 5 ? ,197^- Mimeographed copy of the text of 
the statement issued by the DAP with this writer.
2 Press statement by Daing Ibrahim on February 11, 197^ + - Similar 
copy as in footnote above with this writer.
3 Berita Harian, February 7i 197^ + -
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the DAP and seized the opportunity to point out that the report in
the press was erroneous. As evidence, the Pekemas sent the DAP the
actual text of the press release and VeerapanTs letter to the
Straits Times Press calling for a correction of its report. As
regards the taking in of expelled members, the Pekemas claimed that
there had not been
"any categorical or tacit agreement either oral or written 
ever made ... The matter was stated in the Coffee House 
of Parliament by, I think, Fan Yew Teng /DAP Organising 
Secretary^ and that was all". 1
The DAP, however, had by then lost all interest in any
co-operation with the Pekemas and the principal reason for this
appears to be the inclusion of Soorian and Samuel Raj into the
Pekemas. The expulsion of Soorian from the Vice-Presidency and
membership of the DAP had been after much personal antagonism .between
him and the Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, it being generally
acknowledged that there was no love lost between the two. Soorian*s
anti-DAP, and in particular anti-Kit Siang comments, prior to and
immediately following his admission to the Pekemas, further aggravated
the situation. Kit Siang*s ire was raised and his hold on DAP policy
is regarded as virtually complete - that Kit Siang held sway in the
decision of the DAP not to co-operate with the Pekemas is certain.
It has also been suggested that the DAP having obtained what it
desired from an understanding with the other opposition parties,
namely, the appointment of its Secretary-General as Opposition Leader
in Parliament, was now keen on contesting the Pekemas at the 
2
election. The DAP, according to this view, worked on the pre­
sumption that Pekemas being a new party with insufficient grass-root 
support could not pose a threat to the DAP's appeal for the
1 Copies of V. Veerapan's letter to the DAP dated February 11, 1974, 
and Lim Kit Siang*s reply dated February 18, 19?4 are with this 
writer.
2 Personal interview with V. Veerapan, on August 11, 197^*
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opposition vote. However, entering into an electoral understanding
with the Pekemas and thereby gaining a few additional seats would
serve to strengthen the Pekemas which was by all indications a
potential foe. The choices open to the DAP were essentially two
- either to gain a few extra seats by an electoral pact with the
Pekemas and in the process help the Pekemas to also gain seats, or,
to saorifice the marginal seats but emerge from the election as the
principal opposition party. The DAPjit was suggested,chose the 
1
latter. It is likely that such considerations also played their
part in the DAP's decision.
The Pekemas nonetheless, continued pursuing the possibility of
an agreement, and in April 197^ ' urged James Wong, then Leader of the
2Opposition m  Parliament, to arrange for a meeting with the DAP.
Having had no response,the party tried again on the eve of the
election ■ to come to some form of an agreement with the DAP and was
willing at this stage to, "as far as Soorian is concerned we can
3’request1 him not to stand for any parliamentary seat". The
attempts failed and the opposition parties entered the election as 
much to take on each other as to challenge the Barisan Nasional.
Conclusion
Malaysian party politics had come a full circle. With the 
avowedly leftist parties banned or seriously handicapped by govern­
ment measures, the effective parties and political groups were again 
grouped along the same communallines as they had been in the early
1 Ibid..
2. . Letter to James Wong from V. Veerapan dated April 25, 'I97it- 
Copy of letter with this waiter.
3 Letter to James Wong from 'V. Veerapan dated July 8 , 197^ -* 
Copy of letter with this writer.
206
years of independence. The inter-communal government coalition was 
represented by the Barisan Nasional. Also occupying a centrist
position was the opposition Pekemas. Extreme Malay opinion was
expressed by the dissidents from the PMIP who had banded together to 
form a loose group known as the B.ebas- Ber^atu. Non-Malay extremism 
was symbolised by the DAP.
Whether the Barisan Nasional could hold together during the 
197^ + election: and the' years after would depend on q. number of 
variables, not least of which' was whether t'he respective party 
leaders and their members were able to work out amongst the larger 
number of parties representing a broader extent-of the political 
continuum, compromises on conflicting■interests. Most importantly, 
however, it was essential for each of the Malaysian communities to 
feel that their vital interests were not being severely jeopardised; 
otherwise the parties in the coalition would' sacrifice a larger and 
larger number ©P'their -supporters to those parties occupying the 
extreme fringes of the continuum,and therebyjlead to a possible 
replay of those tragic events that followed the "T969 election.
The task was formidable, yet vital.
C H A P T E R  F O U R
Communal Discrimination by Political Parties
208
Communal discrimination is a key aspect of political party 
organization in Peninsular Malaysia. It is not only a manifestation 
of political party structure but, as a form of discrimination itself, 
directly affects the nature of-political interaction and exchange. 
Communal discrimination by political parties is properly conceived as 
being multi-dimensional - parties which are not discriminatory in one 
characteristic may be so in others, and indeed, may generate different 
degrees of discrimination in each of these characteristics. 
Consequently, no one, or unique combination of characteristics can 
sufficiently depict the complexity of the communal discrimination 
exercised. It is, however, not the purpose of this chapter to 
examine the dynamics of discrimination. This chapter attempts 
first, to define political party openness as evidenced by the member­
ship requirements stipulated in their respective constitutions, and 
then to classify the parties according to these theoretical parameters 
for membership. Having so differentiated the parties, the chapter 
attempts to discern the discrimination employed by the different 
classes of political parties in their attempts to carve out electoral 
support. In all, four aspects of communal discrimination are 
examined:
1 The membership qualifications of the parties in order to 
examine the extent to which all communities are allowed to 
become members;
2 The distribution of party branches so as to assess the 
preference shown for areas in which particular communities 
predominate;
3 Party candidate selection by which to determine the extent 
to which the party’s selection of candidates reflects the 
communal composition of the country; and
^ ' Party candidate placement, in order to assess the extent to
which the party’s candidates are placed in constituencies
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in which the candidate’s community predominates.
The first three aspects examined will also serve to present a 
theoretical rationale and some empirical support for the identification 
of political parties as having an appeal to, and representing the 
interest of particular communities. It will also aid in high­
lighting the-nature of the appeals made by, and the electoral perform­
ances of, the respective parties - aspects to be considered in the two 
subsequent chapters.
Indices of dissimilarity between the parties for each of the 
aspects examined are presented in tabular form. The distinction is 
determined on' the basis of their dissimilarity from a previously selected 
standard - the standard in each case being the representativeness of 
the total population. The applicability of the standard for each of 
.the aspects examined is discussed in the relevant sections of the 
chapter.
For the purposes of this chapter, only the political parties that 
contested the 197^ election; ^ are being considered. Two definitional 
problems have, however, to be dealt with at the onset. The first is, 
whether the component parties of the coalition Barisan Nasional are to 
be regarded as individual parties ,or whether the coalition itself is to 
be- treated as the real party and the component parties as mere pressure
i '.
groups within it. Several'criteria may normally be utilised to 
distinguish between real parties and pressure groups, for example, 
party identification by members, distintiveness of party policy and 
exertion of it, distinctiveness of party organization and branches,
■and, 'distinctiveness of party candidates. Given the Malaysian 
coalitions, however, such an attempt leads to no conclusive identifi­
cation. Each of the component parties and the coalition subscribe 
to all the characteristics of a real party. Hence for the purposes 
of this analysis both,the component parties and the coalition, have 
been included separately. This treatment seems especially warranted
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because, the wider coalition (Barisan-Nasional) does not, as in the 
case of the Alliance, confine itself to component parties which main­
tain mutually exclusive communal membership, but also contains open 
parties. Hence, a distinction between these component parties with 
disparate organizational f orris would prove useful.
The second problem is raised by the Bebas Bersatu (United
Independents), an association of independent candidates who had
defected from PAS in disagreement over PAS' participation in a
coalition government with the Alliance and eventual membership in the
Barisan Nasional. Is the Bebas Bersatu to be considered a political
party .and included in the analysis that follows? Duverger ,
distinguishes between political parties and pressure groups on the
basis of their participation in political conflicts and their member- 
-1
ship base. Political parties, it is held, have as their primary
goal the conquest of power or a share in its exerbise - they try to 
win seats at elections and take control of the government. Pressure 
groups, on the contrary, do not seek to win power themselves. Again, 
political parties draw support from a broad base whereas pressure 
groups represent a limited number with a particular or private 
interest.
If the criteria provided by Duverger are utilised the Bebas 
Bersatu qualifies to be considered a political party. At the time 
of the election, and particularly in its campaign, it indicated all 
signs of being a cohesive political force that would attain the formal 
status of a political party aimed at displacing PAS - its candidates 
had a common symbol, presented a manifesto and campaigned as.members 
of a political organisation. However, at the time of the election 
it neither had a formal organizational structure, nor, party branches; 
neither had it been registered, nor,' had it even sought registration
1 Duverger, M., Party Politics and Pressure Groups; A Comparative 
Introduction, 1972, pp 1-2.
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as an official political party. For the purposes of this chapter, 
therefore, the Bebas Bersatu has Leen regarded as merely a pressure 
group. This is requisite because the absence of a constitution 
defining membership requirements, and the absence of party branches, 
makes its inclusion for analysis here incongruous.
Membership Qualifications
The qualifications stipulated by the political parties for
membership provides an expedient method of classifying them. By
using such a criterion,parties may be classified into open,
restricted and closed parties, thus facilitating the measurement of
the discrimination employed by them against particular communities.
Closed parties are here defined as parties confining their membership
exclusively to one particular community. Restrictive parties are
parties that extend membership rights to more than one community,
but nevertheless, exclude members of at least one community from
membership. Open parties are classified as those which are open to
all-Malaysians regardless of race, colour, creed or sex.
The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), formed in 19^8,
from the outset confined its membership- to the Malay community. So
marked is this insistence that an attempt to have its membership
extended to the other communities by the founder President led to
his resignation from UMNO. In the years following independence
the constitutional definition of a Malay - that is a Muslim who speaks
1
the Malay language and habitually observes Malay custom and practice
- served to define- the” party’s memberfship. ' The existence of 
• 2 '(f5,900 aboriginal peoples in Malaya ;who spoke little or no Malay, 
had their own language, and whose religious practices were other than
1 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 153*
2 Based on the Orahg vAsliuCensus, Estimate for 1965 provided by 
Jabatan Orang Asli, Malaysia,
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Islam, had posed little problem for UMNO. Indeed, the treatment of 
these aboriginal peoples as a distinct group would have greatly 
embarrassed the Malay claim as 'native peoples' and hence UMNO under­
took to ignore their separate identity and chose instead, to pretend 
that the government policy of ultimately absorbing them within the 
Malay community was already completeo This was facilitated by the 
absence of any cohesiveness or political organization amongst the 
Malayan aboriginal groupSo Hence, they were conveniently ignored.
The 1963 Federation of Malaysia Agreement, however, posed definitional 
problems that could not be disregarded. The native populations of 
Sabah and Sarawak not only differed from the Malays but also asserted 
their essential distinctiveness. More importantly, they had not 
forgotten their subjugation by the Malays in the days of the Brunei 
Sultanate’s hegemony. They spoke different languages and were for
the most part, non-Muslims. Yet the need to include them as natives
1and to acknowledge their status was imperative. To overcome this, 
the term 'Bumiputra1 (literally 'son of the soil'1) was coined and gained 
wide political currency. After September UMNO granted full member­
ship privileges and status to all Bumiputra i0e0 all native populations 
including non-Muslim groups. The party's constitution currently lists
its qualifications for membership as being confined to Malays and
2
Bumiputras of the age of sixteen or more. In the Peninsular Malaysia 
context, however, the party in effect remains a closed party. The Malayan 
Chinese Association (MCA) formed on February 27, 19^9, and the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC) - the other two components of the Alliance -
1 Racial arithmetic played a very important role in the formation of 
Malaysia. Were the native peoples to be linked with the non-Malay 
groups the Malay community would have been relegated to a minority 
status. Hence a definition that would allow for them to be counted 
with the Malays had to be sought.
2 United Malay National Organisation, Constitution approved at the 
25th UMNO General Assembly, June 29 and 30, '197^ +, Articles k 
and 5®
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are also closed parties. The MCA confines its membership to members 
of the Chinese community and the MIC to members of the Indian 
community.
The term 'Indian', however, raises definitional problems. Are 
Indians to be regarded as those who came from, or whose forefathers 
came from India as it exists today, a national state, or India as it 
existed as a geographical and political entity at the time when the 
bulk of the Indian population or their forefathers migrated to 
Malaysia? Again, in some usage the term 'Indian' has been utilized 
as an essentially cultural term to include even those who trace their
i ' 1
origins to Sri Lanka - the 1970 Census of Malaysia being an example. 
The MIC's constitution itself provides no guidelines as to the
I
definition of the term 'Indian'. Those who trace their origins to 
the territories now classified as Pakistan, Bangla Lesh and Sri Lanka, 
have often felt alienated. from the mainstream of MIC politics. The 
predominance of the Tamil,' Telugu and Malayali peoples amongst the 
Malaysian 'Indian* population (however defined) has led to their 
prominence in MIC politics. There is, however, no known instance
where members of any of the afore-mentioned groups, i.e. Pakistani, 
Bangla Deshi or Sri Lankian, have applied and were denied membership 
on grounds of their origin. The existence of the Peoples Republic 
of China and Taiwan has not created similar problems for the MCA and 
the local Chinese population.
The UMNO, MCA and MIC confine their discrimination to ordinary 
membership only and allow associate membership to all Malaysians 
irrespective of race. However, tfyis is a mere window-dressing 
device, carrying extremely limited rights of participation in party 
organization and function. Associate membership in 'each of these 
parties has involved a handfql ,of people and is not taken seriously
1 Refer Table 1.
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by party officials - it is to be doubted if the associate members 
themselves regard their role as anything other than insignificant.
The UMNO, MCA and MIC therefore commenced and remain today as 
essentially closed parties, each confining their membership to only 
one communal group.
The Alliance Party, which began as an electoral arrangement 
between UMNO and MCA in' 1952, had by 195^ - also included the MIC and 
was registered in 1937 as a-political party. Its membership then 
was restricted to the three oomponent parties; individual membership 
at this stage was possible only via one of its closed party 
components. Despite frequent calls-on the component parties to 
surrender their separate identities and merge into a unitary Alliance 
Party, the possibility of such a move has, over the years, become 
increasingly remote. The major objection has come from UMNO, but, 
the- apprehensions of some MCA and MIC leaders and members that they 
would be -swamped'by'UMNO in any unitary party, has also served as an 
impedimenti In so far as the Alliance- was confined to the -Malays, 
Chinese and Indians, it remained a party with restricted membership. 
Excluded, from its ranks were Eurasians,'Thais and a number of small 
minority groups who together form 0 .78% --of the Penirisular Malaysian 
population."'
From December 1965 the Alliance, in an attempt to accommodate 
minority participation, created the qualifications for a new category
of membership - membership via. the Alliance Direct'Membership
2 ■'
Organisation (ADMO). ADMO branches "Were established in most
I
1 The figure of'0.78% is from the'1970 census. The 19^ +7 an& 1957 
census, included those of Sri Lankian origin in the''others' 
category. The 1970 census included them with the '’'Indians'.
2 Alliance Party of West Malaysia, 'Constitution and Rules, October 
28, 1966. Article 6 (e) reads "Direct individual membership is 
open to any Malaysian citizen who is over,the age of twenty-one 
and whose application for membership has been approved by the 
Membership Committee appointed by the National Council".
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states, usually as an adjunct to the Alliance state branches. The
number of Malays, Ghinese-and Indians who have preferred to seek
direct membership instead of membership via UMNO, MCA and MIC has been
insignificant. Nor have senior UMNO and MCA leaders genuinely
encouraged membership in ADMO; some have even been hostile - one
UMNO State Chief Minister, it is claimed, unkindly referred to ADMO as
j
being the vehicle for Eurasians, Ceylonese and social climbers.
ADMO remained extremely small in membership and was never allotted a
single-seat in the 1969 election. By 197^ - the Alliance gave way to
the Barisan Nasional and ADMO lost even the little significance it had.
The Partai Islam Semenanjung Malaysia (PAS) originating in the
Malayan Muslim Party and registered in 1955? from its inception
2maintained exclusive membership to-Muslims only - in theory, including 
all Malays, Indian Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangla Deshis and those 
amongst the other communities who had been converted to the Islamic 
faith.- The other two Peninsular Malaysian component parties of the 
Barisan Nasional are by their membership qualifications essentially 
open parties. The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), formed in 197'!, 
specifically undertakes to dispel any restrictions to membership on 
sectarian grounds and the relevant clause in its constitution reads 
that "Membership of the party shall be open to all persons who are
Federal Citizens;and over the age of eighteen irrespective of race,
3 . .
colour, creed or sex". Similarly the People's Progressive Party
(PPP) defines its membership as being open to any person, of either
k
sex, who is a Federal citizen not less than eighteen years of age.
1 David Loh Kee Peng in a personal interview on August 19, 197^.
2 Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), Constitution, approved February 27, 
1973, Article 9.
3 Partai Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Constitution (undated), Clause 
IV W .
k People's Progressive Party of Malaya, Rules, September 1, 1966; 
Rule 3*
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The Barisan Nasional,defined in its constitution as basically
"a confederation of political parties which subscribe to the objects
'I
of the Barisan Nasional", confines its membership only to political 
2
parties. There is no allowance for direct individual membership
as had been allowed in the Alliance - the inclusion of the Gerakan 
and PPP removed the need for such an apparatus. The- inclusion of 
the Gerckkau and the PPP allows the Barisan NaibdbonaH to be classified 
as ..an open party.
With PAS joining the UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan and PPP in the 
Barisan Nasional the opposition was made up of essentially 1 open 
party’ organizations. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), the 
Partai Keadilan Masyarakat (pekemas) and the Partai Sosialis Rakyat 
Malaya (PSRM) - the three larger opposition parties - all extend 
membership to all Malaysians. The Kesatnan Insaf Tanah Air (KITA) 
and the Independent People’s Progressive Party - the other two parties 
which fielded candidates in the 197^ + election - are also open to all 
Malaysians irrespective of race or creed.
The above discussion allows for a computation which can serve as 
a measure of the discrimination exercised by each political party. 
Table 29 sets out the potential membership - here defined as the 
population that can seek membership - of each of'the parties 
considered. For purposes of the table, however, the age qualific­
ations for membership required by the respective parties have been 
ignored.
Analysis of party membership requirement and restrictiveness, 
however, -establishes- only the theoretical bounds of party openness 
and closeness and communalism may be practiced in a number of other 
aspects. The other three criteria will attempt to reflect these..
1 Barisan Nasional of Malaysia, Constitution and Rules, 197^ +5 
Clause 2.
2 Ibid; Clause 6.
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Table 29
Potential Membership of Political Parties, Pensinsular Malaysia, 
1970. 1
Party Membership Number
As Percentage 
of total
UMNO Malays 4, 6 8 5 ,8 3 8 53.19
MCA Chinese 3 ,1 2 2 ,3 5 0 35,44
MIC Indians 932,629 10,59
2
Alliance All 8,810,348 100
PAS'5 Muslims 4,685,838 53-19
PPP All 8,810,348 100
Gerakan ’ All ’ tt tt
Barisan Nasional All 11 tt
DAP All
1
t» tt
Pekemas All Tl tt
Partai Rakyat All It tt
KITA All It tt
IPPP All IT It
1 Age qualifications disregarded,,
2 Assuming membership for Malaysians other than Malays, Chinese 
and Indians via ADMO - this category total 69?531 and comprise 
0.78% of the total population,
3 Excluding non-Malay musliins0
Source % Based on 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 
Community'Groups, 1972,' pp 28-29*
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Distribution of Party Branches
A political party1s; strength at the political centre is 
determined by the number of seats it wins and thus ultimately the 
territorial base under its control. It therefore implies that 
parties in their attempt to gain this territorial base and to hold it, 
must establish the groundwork for the capture of the territorial 
units, i.e. the constituencies® A major step towards establishing 
such a groundwork is the establishment of new branches so as to 
challenge the supremacy of other parties in future elections - the 
geographical tactic is the gradual attrition of the existing parties' 
control over specific portions of thd state itself® The geographic 
aspect of location and spread of political party branches thus 
provides a useful criteria for classifying parties as either national 
parties or essentially regional parties. Such a classification is 
based on the premise that the distinction between national parties and 
regional parties is not in their objectives, but rather in their 
involvement of the population®
The location and spread of political party branches also serves 
as a useful method for assessing the communal discrimination employed 
by parties. This is because despite the political parties being 
anxious to extend their territorial base to encompass the whole state, 
they are in the immediate term restricted by practical considerations 
- essentially on their own perceived political cost-benefit analysis. 
Hence party branches are established in areas where the party is most 
likely to succeed in the short term. It is this discrimination in 
■the selection of areas for location- of party branches that allows for 
an analysis of the communal bias of political parties.
Appendix 6 sets out the number of branches each party has in 
each of the 114 constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia and Table 30 
sets out the branches by state® On the strength of this it will be 
clear that only UMNO, PAS, MCA and to a lesser degree MIC can claim
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Table 30
Political-Party.Branches by State, 1974
State
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Perlis 93 142 11 5 0 1 0 252 0 0 8 0 0
Kedah 336 469 67 21 6 8 0 927 1 1 4 0 0
Kelantan 647 497 26 5 10 1 0 1186 0 0 5 0 0
Trengganu 164 328 27 2 3 0 0 524 0 0 8 0 0
Penang 33 117 90 34 11 56 0 343 13 19 15 2 0
Perak 336 616 173 126 25 45 30 ^371 56 6 8 0 0
Pahang 108 280 72 23 23 2 0 508 6 1 12 0 0
Selangor 82 258 114 80 14 24 0 372 16 20 7 1 0
Federal
Territory 6 65 41 30 3 8
✓tI 156 11 9 4 1 0
Negri Sembilan 47 180 82 69 8 10 2 398 19 2 4 0 2
Malacca 77 216 36 25 8 8 0 390 13 18 6 0 0
Johore 57 340 136 69 17 11 0 850 30 8 11 0 0
Total 2028 3708 915 489 130 174 33 7477 165 84 82 4 2
Source: Compiled from data obtained from Registrar of Societies,
Malaysia.
Refer Appendix 6.
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to be truly national, parties. Each of them has branches in almost 
all the 114 constituencies - UMNO in all 114, PAS in 109, MCA in 111 
and the MIC in ninety-seven. However, all these parties, as 
stated earlier, restricted their membership to only one community each, 
thereby seeking to mobilize only 53-19%, 53-19%, 35-44%, and 10.59% 
respectively of the total population.
UMNO with a total of 3708 branches, ranks as the party with the 
largest number of branches. This superiority is maintained even when 
the number of branches the several parties have is related to their 
potential membership. Hence for Peninsular Malaysia as a whole 
UMNO has one branch per 458 Malay electors as comparedto one branch 
per 972 Malay-electors in the case of PAS; the MIC has one branch for 
every 530 Indian electors and the MCA one 'branch per 1,286 Chinese 
electors (Table 31)- UMNO's superior organizational network is 
perceived in every state except Kelantan where PAS has a larger number 
of branches. The extensive network UMNO retains throughout the 
countryside and urban areas has its origin in the days when UMNO 
leaders and party-workers conducted a nationwide campaign against the 
Malayan Union proposal. Since independence the prestige of UMNO 
as the party in government has provided an added impetus for grass­
roots support. The keenness to become UMNO branch officials and 
thereby attain a measure of power and influence is indeed great.
UMNO's numerous branches are co-ordinated at the constituency level by 
a 'division headquarters' and each parliamentary constituency is 
regarded as a division. The activities of the several divisions in 
each state are co-ordinated by the State Liaison Committees, but as 
the name- implies, the function of these state bodies, is merely to 
co-ordinate and liaise between the branches. It is the division that 
is the important unit of organization and which sends representatives
1 Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership, 1975, p- 134.
221
Table 31
Number of Electors from Communities Represented by Closed Parties 
per Party Branch} by State, 1974®'
State
Malay 
electorate 
per PAS 
branch
Malay 
electorate 
per UMNO 
branch
Chinese 
electorate 
per MCA 
branch
Indian 
electorate 
per MIC 
branch
Perlis 550 347 755 232
Kedah 854 648 1040 1268
Kelantan 601 ' 624 386
Trengganu 1055 527, 361 535
Penang 2823 845 1803 827
Perak 793 458 1621 508
Pahang 1174 453 873 427
Selangor 1912 608 1150 618
Federal
Territory 8057 744 2555 695
Negri Sembilan 1809 472 8788 314
Malacca 1079 385 1050 393
Johore 4744 501 1285 356
Peninsular Malaysia 972 458 1286 530
Source: Party branch data compiled from data obtained from
Registrar of Societies, Malaysia®
Refer Appendix 6 0
' Communal Composition of the'electorate compiled from
electoral registers®
Refer Appendix 4®
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to the national body* The establishment of a large number of 
branches, averaging fifty members each, is also due to the attempts of 
the respective divisions to thereby increase their membership - this is 
regarded as important since representation at the National Congress is, 
subject to a maximum, determined by the number of members each UMNO 
division can enrol®
It is not to be assumed however, that UMNO’s branches are evenly 
distributed® In reality the branches vary greatly in number from 
constituency to constituency ~ from two in Lumut., Perak, to one hundred 
in Pasir Puteh, Kelantan® These variations are due largely to the 
size of the potential membership of UMNO in each constituency® In 
establishing branches UMNO appears to have not favoured constituencies 
where Malay electorates are sufficiently large to yield at least a 
relative majority in votes at the elections® This is due, in part, 
to UMNO’s coalition with the MCA and MIC, and more recently the Gerakan, 
PPP and PAS, which calls for the mobilization of the Malay electorate 
even in constituencies where UMNO itself does not field candidates®
Like UMNO, the MCA and MIC place great emphasis on organization 
along constituency lines - hence the proliferation of branches within 
each constituency® The branches are linked to the division level and 
ultimately to the national headquarters® The MIC has a larger number 
of branches in relation to the Indian electorate than the MCA does to the 
Chinese electorate - the national average being 530 Indian electors per 
branch for the MIC and 1,286 Chinese electors per branch for the MCA 
(Table 31) • Both have'far fewer branches in relation to their potential 
membership than does UMNO, and this, despite these two parties enjoying 
the same position as UMNO in being members of the ruling coalitons® The 
number of branches again differs greatly from division to division, but as 
in the case of UMNO, the percentage that the potential membership 
of these parties comprise of the total
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electorate in these constituencies does not appe-ar to influence the 
location of branches® This Is also due largely to their membership 
in the coalition and hence the need to mobilize support even, in 
constituencies where they do not field candidates®
UMNO, ..MCA and MIC branches operate at the constituency level as 
purely 'closed parties' cultivating their mutually exclusive potential 
memberships® A degree of co-ordination of their activities is 
sought by the Alliance constituency and State level branches, but, 
excepting the election period the influence of the Alliance, branches 
is but little, and the respective parties are left much to their own 
discretion.
PAS's organisation, number of branches, and its claim to have a 
comprehensive network of these branches throughout the country, are 
second only to UMNO - PAS has a total of 2,028 branches spread over 
all but five of the 114 constituencies in the country® However, 
despite PAS having branches in 109 constituencies its strength lies 
clearly in the states and constituencies- where the Malay electorate 
predominates (Table 30). Hence it is In Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis 
and Trengganu that PAS branches abound; in Kelantan State it has a 
larger number of branches than even UMNO. It is PAS emphasis on 
these states that made PAS pose serious threats to UMNO, and, 
control the Kelantan State Assembly from 1959 to the present, and 
the Trengganu State Assembly from 1959 to 1964® When analyzed in 
terms of branches per electorate in constituencies according to their 
communal composition, PAS is seen to clearly emphasize areas where 
Malays again have a clear majority (Table,31)°, This, is the 'con-
I
t
sequence of PAS being a closed party and till late '1973 not being in 
coalition with any other party - its policies would have definitely 
led to its rejection by non-Malays; heh.ce establishing branches 
amongst Malay constituents in.non-Malay predominant constituencies, 
would result in no electoral returns®
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All other political parties, in spite of their claims to being 
national parties and their open membership, have emerged as regional 
parties - the Gerakan has branches in fifty-six constituencies, the 
DAP in sixty-one, the PPP in sixteen, the Pekemas in thirty-eight and 
the Partai .Rakyat ih;..fQ,rty-hine. . Only ■ the. Partai Rakyat "has-..branches in 
every state, the Gerakan having none in Trengganu and the DAP"'none in 
Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu. The PPP’s branches are confined 
-mainly to Perak, 'the-^Federal' Territory, and Negri■ Sembilan.':(Table 30)
The Gerakan had at the time of the 1974 election a total of 
174 branches. The party's mixed fortunes since its inception are 
borne out by the growth of its.branches. Its initial popularity 
and 1969 electoral victories following its formation in 19^7 ? led to 
■the party establishing a total of 95 branches by 1971- The internal 
rivalry and split in the party in mid-1971 led to fourteen of these 
branches being deregistered. Following the 1973 coalition with the 
Alliance and its subsequent membership in the Barisan Nasional, the 
party established another ninety-three branches and these were dist­
ributed in all the states except .Trengganu - for the first time the 
party established 'branches in Perlis and Kelantan® The attempt was 
clearly aimed at establishing the Gerakan as a national party so as to
I
claim an increased share when it came to sharing seats with its 
coalition partners. Analysis of the distribution of Gerakan branch­
es however shojw that the party remains an essentially regional party 
with its core area in Penang. (Table 30). Despite its emphasis on 
open membership and its attempt to incorporate Malays in its leader­
ship, the-■‘party after the' 1969 election, and its membership in the 
Barisan Nasional has become identified-as primarily a non-Malay 
political party. The distribution of branches shows a marked 
correlation with areas of non-Malay dominance. (Tables 32 and 33)
In constituencies with more than eighty per cent non-Malay electorate 
it has an average of 3»33 branches per constituency. The average
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Table 32
Party Branches in Constituencies of Differing Communal Composition,
197^ -
Constituencies 
with non-Malay 
electorate 
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0% -  20% 33 6 3 16 0 2
20% -  4o% 25 24 4 12 31 21
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45 11 31 54 16
60% - 80% 16 61 7 17 46 21
80% -100% 9 30 13 8 37 15
Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6.
Table 33
Party Branches per Constituency 
Communal Composition, 1974®
in Constituencies of Differing
Constituencies 
with non-Malay
Brandies per Constituency
electorate
comprising . Gerakan PPP Partai
Rakyat
DAP Pekemas
0OJ1o 0.18 0.09 0.4-9 0 0.06
o
 
-1 
.
1oCM 0.96 0 .16 ■ 0.44 1.24 0.84
4o% - 6o% 1.45 0.35 1.00 T.74 O .52
60% - 80% 3-81 0,44 1.06 2.88 1.31
8o% -100% 3-33 1 .44 0.89
1
4.11
.1
1.67
Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6 .
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drops significantly till it reaches only 0.18 branch in constituencies 
with less than twenty per cent non-Malay electorate.
The other ’open party* in the Barisan Nasional coalition, the PPP, 
has its branches primarily in the state of Perak - Table 30. Only 
three of its branches were outside Perak - two in Negri Sembilan and 
one in the Federal Territory. The two in Negri Sembilan were due to 
the efforts of J. Nadchatiram, the brother-in-law of the PPP founder 
member and President, S.P. Seenivasagam. At the onset of the 197^ 
election these two branches had become non-functional as a result of the 
formation of the Independent People*s Progressive Party (IPPP) by 
J. Nadchatiram. The PPP branches were located in constituencies where 
there was a heavy dominance of the Chinese electorate - twenty-four of 
the party's thirty branches being established in the Chinese New Villages 
of Perak.
Of the parties that remained in opposition after the formation of 
the Barisan Nasional, the DAP had the largest number of branches. Till 
the 1969 election the party had only seventy-one branches and it was not 
until the resumption of parliamentary government and active party 
politics in 1971 that the party sought to increase the number of its 
branches. The party began in 1966 essentially as the remnant of the 
People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, which in its brief interlude in 
Malaysian politics, had won the Bungsar constituency which comprised a 
portion of the largely middle-class suburb of Petaling Jaya and part of
Kuala Lumpur town. The constituency was overwhelmingly non-Malay and the
V  * ■' ■
attraction of the PAP had been its virulent and effective electioneering 
style backed by the image of the effective government that it provided for 
Singapore. With the expulsion of Singapore and the PAP from Malaysia,and 
the DAP’s registration, the former's caucus of support in Selangor, Penang, 
Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore Bharu was inherited by the latter. 
Lacking the organizational and financial strength the PAP was able to 
bring to Malaysian politics, the DAP was slow in establishing
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branches. Only twenty-eight were established in 19^7 and. twenty-six 
in 1968. Almost all the branches established were in the urban
areas and in the >■ Chinese New Villages of the West coast states of
Peninsular Malaysia - Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan,
Malacca and Johore..
The strategy employed by the DAP was to drive home the advantage 
of its image which carried the Malaysian Malaysia banner. If the 
'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan and the DAP's association with the PAP 
provided an immediate advantage, it was also to serve to circumscribe 
the DAP's ultimate membership potential. In so far as the Malaysian 
Malaysia concept was a challenge to Malay supremacy, and thus an 
affront to the Malay community at large, the DAP was restricted to 
being an essentially non-Malay organization. Its branches accord­
ingly were established in non-Malay dominated areas. The initial
problem of the DAP was the existence of the Gerakan.and the PPP, which
had carved out their own areas of support" - the former principally in 
Penang, and the latter, in the Kinta district of Perak. The DAP 
accordingly'chose to establish itself in the other states with 
substantial non-Malay populations - Selangor,, Negri Sembilan, Malacca 
and Johorej The decision of the Labour Party to quit electoral
politics had created a vacuum in these states which the DAP attempted 
to fill. With the', death of D.R. Seenivasagam, founder member and 
principal organiser- of the PPP, prior to the 1969 election;,■. the DAP 
was presented with an opportunity to eventually expand into Perak 
£tate. By 1969 the, party was a. significant force in the non-Malay 
dominated urban constituencies-, nevertheless it was not yet .sufficient­
ly confident (to challenge the Gerakan and the PPP and therefore for 
the 1969 election entered into electoral arrangements with the two.
The Gerakan's unwillingness to co-operate with the DAP in the 
State Assemblies of Selangor and Perak after the 1969 ©lection poised 
the two parties on collision course. The Gerakan's subsequent
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coalition with the Alliance and membership in the Barisan Nasional 
meant that there now existed a vacuum for an opposition party in 
Penang. The already debilitated PPP*s entry into a coalition with 
the'Alliance-"created a- similar situation in Perak.. The DAP lost no 
time in opening branches in areas where the Gerakan and the PPP had 
held sway. -At the time of the 197^ election'the party'-s branches 
were established principally in the .predominantly non-Malay states of 
Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and the Federal 
Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Even in these states the emphasis was 
clearly on areas with substantial numbers of non-Malays. Though
constituency boundary changes make detailed analysis of the distrib­
ution of party, branches difficult, the general trend becomes obvious 
when the number of branches the DAP has in the several constituencies 
is correlated to the communal composition of the electorate. In 
August 197^,the party had an average of more than four branches in 
constituencies with more than eighty per cent non-Malays, descending 
rapidly to no branches in constituencies with less than twenty per 
cent non-Malays. (Table 33)
The Pekemas, formed by the Gerakan dissidents in 1972, began by 
establishing its branches initially in the areas where the dissident 
Gerakan State Assemblymen and members of Parliament were. By 197^ 
the party had had only two years to make its impact. The great 
insistence placed by Tan Chee Koon, President and prima donna of the 
party^ on a communally balanced executive and moderate policy made the 
establishing of branches more difficult. Nevertheless, the national 
level leaders worked hard at party organization and:at,approach of the 
197^ election, the party already had eighty-two branches. The party 
presented itself as the group still conforming to the ideals of the 
Gerakan and regarded the post-1969 election conduct of Lim Chong Eu 
and his supporters as betraying these principles - the Gerakan*s entry 
into a coalition with the Alliance was held as testimony to this.
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The rationale for party branch establishment was thus simple - at the 
197*f election the Pekemas was going to challenge the Gerakan in each 
of the constituencies the latter was contesting, and accordingly, 
branches were established in constituencies where the Gerakan had its 
branches. A further consideration in the choice of constituencies 
for establishing branches was the attempt to tap the residue of 
support the Pekemas leaders, a larger number of whom were former 
Labour Party members and leaders, had in the areas where the Labour 
Party had been particularly effective. This included the non-Malay 
dominated urban areas of Penang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and 
Johore.
Analysis of the Pekemas branches as at the 197^ election shows 
a marked concentration in the states of Penang, Selangor and Malacca 
and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. (Table 30) Even in 
these states its emphasis was more on constituencies with non-Malay 
majorities than on those which had a Malay majority. This is 
however not as marked as in the case of the DAP, Gerakan and PPP.
(Tables 32 and 33)
The Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (Partai Rakyat) had- from its 
inception in 1965 till December 1967 established 15^ branches in all the 
states of Peninsular Malaysia - five of these had however not been 
approved by the Federal Governmenta During 1970 and 1971 a total of 
seventy-five branches were deregistered because they no longer maintained 
effective organizations. With the handful of new branches that were 
established in 1973? the party had a.total of eighty-two branches at 
election time 197^* An analysis of the distribution of these 
branches shows that the Partai Rakyat maintains its branches in each 
of the states of Peninsular Malaysia, and the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur - the only truly open party to do so. The party, in 
establishing its branches distinguishes in favour of the states of Perlis, 
Pahang, Penang and Trengganu where it has one branch per 7 j3^ -0,
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16,623, 19,276 and 23,971 electors respectively - the national 
average being only one branch per i2 ,.7.63 electors. (Table j h ) The 
party also does not appear to appreciably discriminate in favour of 
establishing branches in constituencies where any particular community 
predominates - there appear, to be as many branches in constituencies 
with large Malay electorates as where there are large non-Malay 
electorates.
The only two other parties that contested the election were KITA 
and the IPPP. ' KITA had four branches - three in constituencies with 
a non-Malay majority (Bukit Bendera, Nibong Tebal, Kepong) and one in 
a Malay majority constituency (Sepang). The IPPP's two branches 
were both in areas with a non-Malay majority - Seremban and Telok 
Kemang.
The analysis above establishes that only the coalition Barisan 
Nasional can be considered to be a national party by virtue of its 
component party branches being established in all the constituencies. 
UMNO, PAS, MCA and MIC,though they have branches in almost all 
constituencies,by confining their membership to particular communities, 
seek to involve only portions of the total electorate and cannot 
therefore be classified as national parties. None of the open 
parties have branches in more than half the total number of constit­
uencies and, except for the Partai Rakyat and to a lesser degree the 
Pekemas, discriminate in favour of constituencies with non-Malay 
majorities.
Party Candidate Selection
Closed parties by being so^face no problems in their selection 
of candidates; understandably their candidates are from the commun­
ity to which their membership is limited. Restrictive and open 
parties are not similarly confined and can select candidates from the 
various communities. This analysis therefore assumes that political
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Table 3k
Partai Rakyat Branches, and.,
Malay Electorate and Total Electorate per Branch, by State, 197^*
State Branches Malay Electorate Total Electorate per Branch per Branch
Perlis 8 6,15? 7,3^0
Kedah k 75,998 100,071
Kelantan 5 58,699 62,322
Trengganu 8 21,619 23,971
Penang 15 6,587 19,276
Perak 8 35,280 78,321
Pahang 12 • --10,567 16,623
Selangor 7 22,396 ^8,193
Federal Territory k 12,086 V5,^87
Negri Sembilan k 21,250 ¥f,679
Malacca 6 13,850 25,283
Johore 11 2 k ,580 ^5,035
Total 82 24,0^0 ^2,763
Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6.
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parties not practising- any communal discrimination would, in their 
selection of candidates reflect the communal composition of Peninsular 
Malaysian society - referred to in this analysis as the 'perfect 
slate'. In practice, however, political parties do not present this 
perfect slate and d’o discriminate for or against particular communit­
ies. It is here attempted to measure the deviation from the perfect 
slate and thus the discrimination against each community so exercised. 
The measure adopted here is similar to that utilised in chapter two 
where the communal advantage or disadvantage produced by the 
enfranchisement rules and constituency delimitation were examined. In 
this analysis, the percentage that the number of a party's candidates 
from a particular community comprise of the total number of candidates, 
is subtracted from, the percentage that community represents of the 
total population of Peninsular Malaysia. This will present an 
indication of the extent to which a party discriminates against any 
particular community. The aggregate of the discrimination for, or 
against, each community, will present an indication of the amount of 
discrimination that the party exercises in its selection of 
candidates. Tables 35 and 36 set out the above tabulations for 
each of the political parties that contested the 197^ + parliamentary 
election.
The above tabulations indicate that each of the political 
parties deviates significantly from the perfect slate. As expected^
„ ■ L i
each of the closed parties - UMNO, MCA, MIC and PAS - were by far most 
discriminatory, confining their candidates to their respective 
communities. It will be noted that ,despite each of the closed -
parties allowing membership of individuals from only one community
1 F o r example, to assess the discrimination against the Malay 
community, the percentage Malays comprise of the total 
population (i.e. 53*20%) minus, the percentage Malay candidates 
comprise of the party's total number of candidates.
Table 35
Party ALlocation of Seats by Community, 1974.
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Party
Total 
No. of 
Candidates
Malay
Candidates
Chinese
Candidates
Indian
Candidates
No. % No. % No. %
UMNO 61 61 100 0 0 0 0
MCA 23 0 0 23 100 0 0
MIC 4 0 0 0 0 4 100
Alliance 88 61 69.31 23 26.14 4 4 .55
PAS 14 100 0 0 0 0
Gerakan 8 0 0 7 87.50 1 12.50
PPP 4 0 0 2 50.00 2 50.00
Barisan
Nasional 114 73 63.79 32 28.07 7 6.14
DAP 46 9 19.56 29 63.04 8 17.40
Pekemas 33 12 34.29 18 51.43 5 14.28
Partai
Rakyat 22 13 68.1 8' 6 27.27 1 4 .55
KITA 2 50.00 2 50.00 0 0
IPPP 1 0 0 0 0 1 100
Source: Compiled from Election Commission, 1974 Election Report,
1975. Appendix H., pp 144-157•
1
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Table 36
Communal Discrimination in Party Allocation of Seats , 1974.
Party Malay
Community
Chinese
Community
Indian
Community
Aggregate^
Di s c r i minati on
UMNO - 46 .80 + 35-40 + 10.60 92.80
MCA + 53-20 - 64.60 + 10.60 128.44
MIC + 33-20 + 35.40 - 89.40 178.00’
Alliance - 16.11 + 9 .26 + 6.05 31.42
PAS - 46 .80 + 35.40 + 10.60 92.80
Gerakan + 33-20 - 52.10 - 1.90 107-20
PPP + 53.20 - 14.60 - 39-40 107-20
Barisan Nasional - 12.59 + 7.33 + 4.46 24.38
DAP + 33.64 - 27-64 - 6 .8 0 68.08
Pekemas + 18.91 - 16.03 - 3.68 38.62
Partai Rakyat - 14.98 + 8 .13 + 6 .0 5 29.16
KITA + 3.20 - 15.40 + 10.60 2 9.20'
IPPP + 53.20 + 35.40 - 89.40 178.00
1 Percentage community represents of the total population of the 
country minus percentage community represents of party*s 
candidates.
2 Sum of the discrimination for or against each community. In 
the table this is represented by adding the discrimination 
figures for each community after disregarding the minus and plus 
signs.
Malays comprise 33-20%, Chinese 35*40% and Indians 10.60% of the total 
population of Peninsular Malaysia. Other communities represent 
0.p0%. (to one decimal point).
Source: 197Q Population and Housing Census, Community Groups, 1972-
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each.,the tabulations record different aggregate discrimination 
figures - the MIC having the largest 178.00, . , the MCA with 128.44
and lastly UMNO and PAS with 92.80 each. The measure here adopted, 
is to assess the amount of the Peninsular Malaysian population 
discriminated against, and it follows that a party confining itself 
to candidates from a smaller community exclusively ji is thereby 
discriminating against a larger proportion of the total population. It 
will therefore aggregate a larger discrimination figure. Consequent­
ly the MIC confining its candidates to Indians, who comprise only 
10.6% of the total population has a greater discrimination aggregate 
than the MCA (Chinese 35-4%) or UMNO and PAS (Malays 55-2%).
The coalition party slates also show discrimination - albeit to 
a lesser degree. The Alliance (comprising the UMNO, MCA and MIC) 
has only a 31-42 discrimination aggregate. The Barisan Nasional 
(comprising the Alliance partners, and PAS, Gerakan and PPP) has an 
even lower discrimination aggregate of 24.38 - the lowest recorded by 
any political party. The discrimination of both the coalitions has 
been in favour of the Malay community at the expense of the Chinese 
and Indian communities - the Barisan NasionalTs relatively lower dis­
crimination against the Chinese and Indian communities having been 
made possible by more than off-setting the fourteen seats allocated 
the Malay community via PAS,by the nine seats allocated the Chinese, 
and three seats allocated the Indians via the Gerakan and the PPP.
The remarkable f.eature of the coalition Barisan Nasional is that 
although it comprises the six political parties that are most dis­
criminatory in their selection of candidates, it still manages toL 
record the lowest discrimination aggregate.
Of the open parties it is the Partai Rakyat that presented the 
least discriminatory slate (discrimination aggregate 29-16) - a slate 
even less discriminatory than the Alliance slate and only marginally 
more discriminatory than that of the Barisan Nasional. The party's
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slight discrimination was, like that of the coalitions, in favour of 
the Malay community. All other open parties of significance dis­
criminated in favour of the Chinese and Indian communities, particular­
ly the former,at the expense of the Malay community. The open 
parties, the Gerakan and PPP, both members of the coalition Barisan 
Nasional, had particularly large discrimination aggregates - the 
largest amongst the open parties. It must be noted,however, that 
this was as much imposed on them as their own choice, their membership 
in the Barisan Nasional being principally to win the Chinese support 
the MCA had lost in the 1969 election,-.. The DAP and Pekemas, the 
two largest parties in the opposition in terms of the number of seats 
contested, both discriminated in favour of the Chinese and Indians.
In this the DAP was more so, having a discrimination aggregate (68.08) 
almost twice that of the Pekemas (38.62).
The analysis above establishes that closed parties are wholly 
discriminatory in their selection of candidates, each restricting 
themselves to a particular community but in coalition with each otjher, 
they field a mix of candidates as close to the perfect slate as 
possible. In contrast, the open parties, are less discriminatory 
than the closed parties but, as it turns out, are without exception 
more discriminatory than the Barisan Nasional. All the open parties,
with the exception of the Partai Rakyat, discriminate in favour of the
non-Malay communities, and in this the DAP is particularly 
discriminatory. The analysis bears out the contention that the 
open parties hold a greater attraction for non-Malay participation 
than Malay participation.
Party Placement of Candidates
An aspect of the communal discrimination exercised by the elect­
orate is to vote for candidates of one's own community. Political 
parties therefore, in an attempt to maximize their opportunities of
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winning a seat, take cognizance of this perceived discrimination by 
the electorate. It is attempted in this section to assess the extent 
to which political parties match their candidates with constituencies 
where the candidates1 respective communities predominate and thus 
assess another aspect of communal discrimination by the political 
parties.
The analysis proposed here-is open to objection on four princi­
pal counts. Firstly, it may be argued that the membership of a 
party,especially when it is a representative cross-section of the 
electorate in a constituency,will show a dominance of a particular 
community if that particular community also forms a majority in the 
electorate of the constituency. Hence even where no communal 
considerations are present in the selection of candidates from the 
party’s local branch membership, the party is more likely to select a 
candidate of the majority community. Secondly, it may be also 
plausibly argued that local community leaders,who would be preferable 
as candidates,will also be more likely to be from the predominant 
community and their selection as candidates cannot be a measure of a 
party’s attempts to place candidates on communal grounds. Thirdly, 
political parties, especially open parties, in their attempt to 
present an image of a non-communal approach to politics may field 
candidates not belonging to the majority community especially in the 
constituencies that they expect to lose. Finally, political parties 
anticipating voting along communal lines will tend to place their 
party-leaders in "safe constituencies" even when the predominant 
community of the electorate is different from that of the candidate 
fielded. This will be in constituencies where the party expects 
that its image as a party championing the cause of the predominant 
community of the electorate will tend to balance out any tendency of 
the electorate to vote for candidates of their own community but from 
a different party.
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In theory, the above four objections are indeed significant.
It is felt, however, that in practice they do not serve to sufficient-
/ ■Hi
ly challenge the validity of the analysis to be undertaken. The 
foregoing analysis in this chapter has already shown that political 
parties do gauge the predominance of particular communities in 
establishing branches and have a marked tendency to select candidates 
of those particular communities - this being the pattern for closed, 
restrictive and open parties. Matching candidates to the 
constituency’s predominant community is a natural extension of the 
above considerations. Furthermore, the Malaysian electoral regulat­
ions do not impose a ’locality rule' and in practice a large number of 
candidates do indeed come from outside the constituency. Finally, 
the attempt of political parties to field candidates for purposes 'of 
creating a favourable image, and the fielding of party leaders in 
"safe constituencies" where they are from different communities than 
that of the predominant community in the electorate can be noted.
These anomalies are indeed exceptions, exceptions employed by the 
respective parties to overcome the dilemma presented by the Malaysian 
polity, that is, to win seats for which the party has to take cogniz­
ance of the electorate's tendency to vote along communal grounds, and 
at the same time, maintain a non-communal image so as to not ..tod 
seriously circumscribe the party’s support to particular communities. 
The anomalies are considered not sufficiently significant to obviate 
the analysis to be undertaken, and especially when this analysis is 
read along with the other three criteria already utilized, it will be 
a valuable indicator of party communal discrimination.
The Barisan Nasional's seventy-five Malay candidates were from 
two Malay based closed parties - fourteen from PAS and sixty-one from 
UMNO (Figure 16). Each of the PAS candidates were placed in con­
stituencies with a predominantly Malay electorate - all but one of 
these constituencies had less than eighty-five per cent Malay
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electorates; the only exception being the Bagan Da.tok constituency 
with a 6 k A 2 %  Malay electorate. UMNO's sixty-one candidates were 
also placed in constituencies with Malay majorities. Sixty of these 
had absolute Malay majorities, the only exception being the constit­
uency of Batang Padang and even here the Malay electorate had a rel­
ative majority - the electorate composition being V?»35% Malays,
Chinese and ten per cent Indians and others. Clearly then, 
the Malay candidates of UMNO and PAS all contested in constituencies 
with a Malay majority. (Tables 37 and 38)
The Barisan Nasional's thirty-nine non-Malay candidates came 
from two closed parties, (the Chinese based MCA and the Indian based 
MIC) and two open parties (the predominantly non-Malay based Gerakan 
and the PPP). The allocation of seats between these parties was 
twenty-three for MCA, four for MIC, eight for Gerakan and four for the 
PPP. In analyzing the placement of these candidates an important 
consideration must be borne in mind. The MCA as the only Chinese 
based party in the Alliance had been afforded all constituencies with 
a Chinese majority in the 19&9 election. The MCA had however been
trounced by the opposition parties in that election and it is this 
that led to the inclusion of the Gerakan and the PPP in the Barisan 
Nasional. In the 1969 election the MCA, Gerakan and PPP had inI
total contested fifty-three parliamentary seats - the MCA thirty-five,
■n
the Gerakan fourteen and the PPP six. Most significantly, these
parties had contested against each other, the MCA being challenged in
five constituencies by the Gerakan, in another five by the PPP and in
2
one by both the PPP and the Gerakan. ■ The incumbents from these 
parties were thus allocated the seats they already held. The only
1 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1969 Election Report, 1972.
2 Ibid.
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Table 37
'I
Matched Placement of Candidates in Constituencies , 1974
Party Malay
Candidates
Chinese
Candidates
Indian^"
Candidates
Mean
Aggregate
UMNO 61/61 - - 61/61
MCA 15/23 - 15/23
MIC - - 4/4 (4/4) 4/4
Alliance 61/61 15/23 4/4 (4/4) 80/88
PAS' 14/14 - - 14/14
Gerakan - 7/7 1/1 (0/1) 8 /8
PPP - 2 /2 1 /2 (0/2) 3/4
Barisan Nasional 75/75 24/32 6/7 (4/7) 105/114
DAP 6/9 23/29 6 /8 (5/8) 35/46
Pekemas 12/12 17/18 5/5 (4/5) 34/35
Partai Rakyat 14/15 5/6 0/1 (0/1) 19/22
KITA 1/2 1 /2 - 2/4
IPPP - _ 1/1 (1/1) 1/1
1 Party's candidates placed in constituencies where the candidate's 
community predominates. Denominator indicates number contesting 
and nominator indicates number matched.
2 Two criteria utilised - (a) where candidate is placed in
constituency with non-Malay majority and Indians form more than 
10.56%; (b) where candidate is placed in constituency with
plurality constituency and Indians'form'mone'than'10.56%. Latter 
results are entered within brackets. For 'mean aggregate', only 
first criteria utilized.
Source: Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975-
2kZ
Table 38
']
Matched Placement of Candidates in Constituencies , by Percentage, 197^.
Malay Chinese Indian Mean
Candidates Candidates Candidates Aggregate
UMNO 100 - - 100
MCA- - 65.22 - 65.22
MIC - - 100 (100) 100
Alliance 100 65.22 100 (100) 90.90
PAS 100 - - 100
Gerakan - 100 100 (0 ) 100
PPP - 100 100 (0 ) 75.00
Barisan Nasional 100 75.00 85.71 (66.67) 92.11
DAP 66.67 79.31 66.67 (6 2.50) 76.09
Pekemas 100 9*+.*+*+ 100 (80) 97.1*+
Partai Rakyat 93.33 83.33 0 (0) 86.36
KITA 30 30 - 50.00
IPPP - - 100 (100) 100
1 Percentage of party's candidates placed in constituencies where 
the candidate's community predominates.
2 As in Table 37-
3 As in Table 37*
Source: Election Commission, 197*+ Election Report, 1975*
2*+3
seats that were available for re-allocation were seats held by the 
opposition DAP and Pekemas members of Parliament and whatever addition­
al non-Malay majority seats that may have been created by the 197*+ 
delineation exercise which increased the total number of seats from 
10*+ to 11*+. However, as noted in chapter two, the delineation exer­
cise actually reduced non-Malay majority seats from forty-five to 
thirty-five. Hence there was an increased number of parties and 
potential candidates amongst whom,! an actually reduced number of seats 
had to be allocated. The Barisan Nasional partially overcame this by 
conceding to the non-Malay based parties five Malay majority seats.
The Barisan Nasional?s thirty-nine non-Malay candidates were therefore 
placed in thirty-four constituencies with non-Malay majorities and in 
five constituencies with Malay majorities. The mismatched placement 
of some of the Chinese candidates of the MCA, the Gerakan and the PPP 
(Tables 37 and 38) is due principally to there being insufficient 
Chinese majority seats available - there being only twenty-three 
constituencies with absolute Chinese majorities and seven with 
relative Chinese majorities, and, there being thirty-two Chinese 
candidates and seven Indian candidates to share them.
An analysis of the placement of the seven Indian candidates 
further emphasizes the communal discrimination employed. Six out of 
the seven candidates were allotted constituencies in which the Indians 
formed more than 10.6% of the electorate, i.e. where the Indians are 
more numerous than they are in the total population of Peninsular 
Malaysia. Especially the MIC’s four candidates were placed in 
constituencies with relatively large Indian electorates - Sungei Siput 
(13°6*+%), Pelabohan Kelang (15*59%)? Telok Kemang (19*3*+%) and 
Damansara (20.20%). The first three of these seats have for each of 
the elections held in independent Peninsular Malaysia been allocated by 
the Alliance to the MIC candidates. As a result of the 197*+ delineation, 
a further ten seats were created and the MIC's claim for an increased
2*+*+
share of seats had to be met. Consequently the choice revolved 
around the three seats with the largest Indian electorates by the new 
delineation exercise - Shah Alam (25-*+3% Indians), Kuala Selangor 
(23.*+7%) and Damansara (20.20%). The creation of the Federal 
Territory meant that Kuala Lumpur was no longer included for represent­
ation in the State Assembly of Selangor. Five parliamentary
constituencies were created within the Federal Territory and the 
communal composition of the electorate at the time of the 197*+ elect­
ion was 66.22% Chinese, 27-79% Malays and 11.99% Indians. The 
Barisan Nasional, anxious to have representation of all three commun­
ities, distributed three seats to Chinese candidates, one to a Malay 
candidate and one to an Indian candidate. The choice of Damansara
for the MIC therefore met both requirements admirably, that is, of
allocating the MIC a seat with a large Indian electorate and allowing
-1
Indian representation in the Federal Territory. Another charact­
eristic perceived in the placement of Indian candidates is, they are 
more often than-not placed in constituencies where no community has an 
absolute majority - i.e. in constituencies with a plurality electorate 
- and where Indians form a substantial minority. This is true of 
all the four candidates of the MIC. This practice, it will be 
observed, is also adopted by the opposition parties in fielding their 
Indian candidates.
Figure 17 shows the ethnic origin of the 11*+ candidates of the 
Barisan Nasional at the 197*+ parliamentary election. A comparison 
of this map with Figure 13 which shows the ethnic dominance in the 
parliament'aty constituencies at the time of the 197*+ elections is 
instructive. For convenience of comparison Figure 15 has been 
again included in this chapter and placed adjacent to Figure 17-
1 Personal interview with S. Subramanian, MIC Secretary General and 
candidate for Damansara, January 8, 1977*
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Clearly there is a marked, correlation between the ethnic predominance 
in the constituency and the ethnic origin of the candidate fielded.
The anomalies are' only in the-case of a number of non-Malay 
candidates. The reasons for this have already been suggested in the 
preceding discussion.
The- BAP fielded its forty-six: candidates - twenty-nine Chinese, 
nine Malays and eight Indians - in each of the thirty-five constituen­
cies with non-Malay majorities and in eleven Malay majority constit­
uencies. The discrimination employed by the DAP,in theory an open 
party, in seeking constituencies with non-Malay majorities becomes 
even more clear by a comparison o.f Figure 18 and Figure 15. Figure 
18 shows the ethnic origin of the DAP’s candidates for the 197^ 
parliamentary election and Figure 15 shows the ethnic predominance in 
the constituencies at the time of the election. To facilitate 
comparison Figure 15 has been presented again and placed adjacent to 
Figure 18 .
The party1, s’ candidates in the twenty-three constituencies 
having an absolute Chinese majority comprised twenty-one Chinese 
candidates and only one Malay and one Indian candidate. The Malay 
candidate was Encik Daing Ibrahim, the Party’s National Vice-President, 
and the Indian candidate was the National Assistant Secretary, Peter 
Paul Dason. The election of Encik Daing Ibrahim was considered 
vital to dispel the party’s image as an essentially non-Malay party.
In the event the party felt that fielding him in Beruas (52.88$ 
Chinese, 11.15$ Indians, and 55-99$ Malay) would be advantageous - - 
^-not only would the party’-s non-Malay! image gain him'the -bulk of the 
non-Malay vote, but also, being a Malay he would be able to obtain a
'I
portion of the Malay vote as well and thus ensure his victory.
1 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Organising Secretary, 
August 1^, 197A. I
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The Indian candidate, Peter Paul Dason, was the party's Penang State 
Secretary and member of the National Executive Committee. Dason , 
as a Penang leader, had to be allocated a seat in Penang. During the 
1969 election, as a result of the electoral understanding that existed 
with the Gerakan, Dason was placed in the Penang Utara seat. Having 
won the election in 1969, and having nursed it in the subsequent five 
years, his claim to be placed again in the same constituency (renamed 
Bukit Bendara in 197*0 was naturally strong."'
The party’s eight' other Malay candidates were all placed in 
constituencies with a Malay majority electorate or with a plurality 
electorate. The rationale for this was basically the same as that 
employed in placing Daing Ibrahim in Beruas - the Malay candidates 
would be able to retain the bulk of the non-Malay vote on the basis 
of the party’s non-Malay image whilst hopefully gaining a number of 
Malay votes on the strength of their being Malay. The DAP never 
seriously believed that any of these candidates would stand any chance 
of being elected. Their inclusion in the. party slate was primarily 
for creating a non-communal image.
The DAP’s eight Indian candidates were placed intone constit­
uency with a Chinese absolute majority, two with Malay absolute major­
ities, and, five with plurality electorates® The case of the 
candidate in the Chinese majority constituency, has already been con­
sidered above. The two candidates in Malay absolute majority constit 
uencies were Karpal Singh in Alor Star (37*2.3%' Chinese, 6.^0% Indians 
and 56.37% Malays) and Ms. Ganga Nayar in Setapak (6^.18% Malays, 
26.9*1*% Chinese and 8.88% Indians). Karpal Singh is a prominent 
lawyer from Alor Star and particularly sought to contest his home
1 Personal interview with Peter Paul Dason, DAP National Committee 
Member, August 10, 197**--
2 Ibid.
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1
constituency. The DAP Organising Secretary explained Ms*Ganga Nayar's 
placement in Setapak as being unavoidable, since the DAP was contesting
all five constituencies in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and . ,
/ 2 
that at least one non-Chinese candidate had to be included. Ganga Nayar
herself explained it as the efforts of the DAP Secretary-General,
Lim Kit Siang, to ensure her defeat in the election and rejected the
Organising Secretary’s explanation as spurious. She pointed out that
Damansara, also within Kuala Lumpur with a non-Malay majority and
*Z
20.20% Indians, would have been a better seat for her. If nothing 
else, the above underlines the importance candidates and parties place 
on matching candidates to constituencies where their own community 
predominates. All the other five Indian candidates were placed in 
constituencies with non-Malay majorities, but where no community had 
an absolute majority (i.e. plurality electorate) and where Indians 
formed a substantial minority - Shah Alam (45*84% Chinese, 28.73%
Malays, and 25*43% Indians), Nibong Tebal (41.58% Malays, 43*68%
Chinese, 14.74% Indians), Sungai Siput (37-23% Malays, 49*13% Chinese, 
13-64% Indians), Ulu Selangor (40.74% Malays, 40.06% Chinese, and 
19*20% Indians) and Mantin (47*28% Malays, 36,10% Chinese and 16.62% 
Indians)„
Clearly the DAP discriminates along communal lines in its place­
ment of candidates^. The discrimination employed has been bp, as 
far as possible, place candidates in areas with non-Malay majorities. 
Chinese candidates were placed in constituencies with absolute 
Chinese majorities, Malay candidates "in Malay absolute majority con­
stituencies or seats with plurality electorates with Malay relative
1 Personal interview with Karpal Singh, August 135 1974.
2 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Organising Secretary,
August 14, 1974.
3 Personal interview with Ms. Ganga Nayar, August 20, 1974*
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majorities, and Indian candidates in constituencies with plurality 
electorates and substantial Indian minorities»
Figure 19 shows the ethnic origin of the Pekemas candidates.
Figure 15? which shows the ethnic dominance in the constituencies has 
again been presented and placed adjacent to Figure 19» A comparison 
of these, highlights the discrimination employed, by the Pekemas in the 
placement of' candidates. The party fielded thirty-five candidates 
- twelve Malays, eighteen Chinese and five Indians, Ten of the 
twelve Malay candidates were placed in constituencies with Malay 
majorities, the other two were placed in constituencies with a plurality 
electorate but relative Malay majorities. The party's twenty-three 
non-Malay candidates were placed in twenty-two seats with a non-Malay 
majority and only one seat with a Malay majority. The exact placement 
of these twenty-three candidates further evidences the communal 
discrimination employed. The party's eighteen Chinese candidates 
were placed in thirteen seats with absolute Chinese majorities (the 
party contesting only fourteen such seats), four seats with relative 
Chinese majorities and one seat with an absolute Malay majority. The 
five Indian candidates were all placed in constituencies with non-Malay 
majorities and substantial Indian minorities - Nibong Tebal (58.42% 
non-Malays, 14,74% Indians), Shah Alam (71-27% non-Malays, 25-43% 
Indians), Telok Kemang (60.46% non-Malay, 19-34% Indians), Port Kelang 
(52% non-Malay, 15-39% Indians) and Jelutong (79-02% non-Malay, and 
11.48% Indians). All except the last are also constituencies with 
plurality electorates.
The Partai Rakyat fielded twenty-two candidates, comprising 
fifteen Malays, six Chinese and one Indian. Fourteen of the fifteen 
Malay candidates were placed in constituencies with an absolute Malay 
majority - the exception being placed in a Chinese majority 
constituency. Five of the six Chinese candidates were fielded in 
constituencies with absolute Chinese majorities and the sixth placed
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in a constituency with a plurality electorate. The sole Indian 
candidate was placed in his home constituency Kuantan, a constituency 
with an absolute Malay majority. (Compare Figures 15 and 20)
The KITA fielded four candidates - two Chinese and two Malays. 
There appeared no discrimination in the placement of these candidates 
one Chinese and one Malay candidate were placed in constituencies 
with absolute Malay majorities, and the other two in constituencies 
with Chinese majorities. The IPPP’s sole candidate, an Indian, 
contested in Telok Kemang - a constituency with a plurality electorate 
and a substantial Indian minority (39*55% Malays, 4-1.12% Chinese and 
19*34% Indians’).'
The analysis above shows‘the importance placed by the respective 
parties in the placement of candidates, and, the care taken to match 
the candidates with constituencies where their community predominated. 
This is seen to be'the rule rather than the exception with all parties 
including those which in their selection of candidates attempted to 
allocate seats as close to the "perfect slate" as possible. The hard 
facts of Malaysian politics demand such considerations.
Conclusion
Political parties in Peninsular Malaysia may be classified as 
open parties or closed parties on the basis of their membership 
requirements, i.e. the discrimination, if any, employed towards 
restricting membership to particular communities in the Malaysian 
population. Hence UMNO‘confining its membership to Malays, PAS 
'■limiting its membership to Muslims (in effect Malays), the MCA to 
Chinese and the MIC to Indians, are all essentially closed parties. 
Each of the closed parties is, however, a member of the coalition 
Barisan Nasional, which by the inclusion of these and two open parties 
- the PPP and the Gerakan - achieves an ropen party: status. All 
other political parties are - at least in theory - open parties.
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It would, nevertheless be artificial to separate categorically 
considerations as to ’theory' and ’practice’. Many striking 
ambiguities are readily identifiable between the theoretical bounds of 
membership and the actual practice of mobilising support, whether this 
be viewed primarily as a determinant of practice or merely as its 
reflection and rationalisation. The 'open parties’ excepting the 
coalition are thus seen to actually cater more to the interest of 
particular communities than to others. This is borne out by the com­
posite picture that emerges from the analysis of the communal 
discrimination exercised by the open parties in party branch location, 
candidate selection and candidate placement in constituencies. Thus 
the DAP, theoretically an open party, discriminates in each of the 
other aspects examined in favour of the non-Malay communities in 
general, and in particular, the Chinese community. Such is also the 
case with the Pekemas, though less so than with the DAP. The Partai 
Rakyat: presents a lesser degree of discrimination, whatever dis­
crimination it employs favouring the Malays. In contrast to the 
opposition parties, the wholly discriminatory UMNO, PAS., MCA, MIC, and, 
the Gerakan and PPP which are the more discriminatory of the open 
parties, are able, by way of a coalition, to present a less dis­
criminatory image. The process is best seen as one in which the 
discrimination exercised by the component parties is without exception 
in excess of any that is practised by the open parties, but where, due 
to a coalition with each other a 'balance in discrimination1 is 
attained - a balance achieved by the discrimination in favour of one 
■ community*by one component party 'off-setting the discrimination in 
favour of another community by another component. In comparison to 
this balance, the discrimination of the open parties appears indeed 
high. The differential in discrimination between the various 
parties in Peninsular Malaysia serves in part to determine their 
appeal and their performances at the polls.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
The Appeal for the Votes
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The raison d'etre of political parties is essentially the 
assumption of power. In electoral democracies, therefore, there is 
an element of campaign for electoral support in virtually all activit­
ies undertaken by political parties. However, prior to each 
election there is an intensification in campaigning, and the momentum 
so gathered peaks at a feverish pitch on polling day. Campaigns may 
often be confined to the formal campaign period - i.e. from the 
dissolution of parliament to polling day - but/ the expectation of an 
election may give an electoral atmosphere to much longer periods. The 
latter was the case in Peninsular Malaysia for the election of 197^-
Dissolution of Parliament
Though Members for the third Malaysian Parliament had been 
elected on May 10, 19&9? nearly two years elapsed before the third 
Parliament was convened, due to the declaration of emergency and 
suspension of parliamentary democracy following the May 13? 1969 
communal clashes. The third Parliament having been convened only on 
February 20, 1971» it could function till February 19? 197&, ton the 
Constitution provides Parliament with a maximum five-year life span 
from the date of its first meeting. The formation of coalition 
governments between the Alliance and the Gerakan, the PPP and the PAS 
in the states of Penang, Perak and Kelantan respectively, and the 
eventual inclusion of these opposition parties into the Bari'san 
Nasional, created great enthusiasm amongst Malaysians. With the 
initiative clearly in the hands of the Government, it was apparent 
that an election well before the date of prorogation of Parliament was 
likely.
But this was not going to be a routine election for the Govern­
ment - at issue being the Government's handling of the communal 
violence, the subsequent rule of the National Operations Council, the
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constitutional amendments and the concept of the Barisan Nasional •
itself. Every effort and preparation was made, every detail attended
to, and every opportunity utilized to ensure victory. By the time
Parliament was dissolved the Prime Minister himself had toured the
country twice - once, beginning on April 21, 197^j to explain the con-
cept of the Barisan Nasional; and again, after his return from his 
2visit to China. - on each occasion addressing mass rallies in
principal towns. On both occasions the state governments and the
component parties of the Barisan Nasional made tremendous efforts to
3
ensure a massive turn-oht. In addition, maximum mass media coverage 
was given by the government-owned Radio, Television and Department of 
Information and the wholly sympathetic press. By early 197^ an 
election in that year was apparent and speculation was rife as to the 
possible date.
Intending to retain the initiative it had gained, the Government
continued to deny the possibility of an early election. On April 20,
197^,the Prime Minister declared:
"Wherever we go today people are talking about the issue 
and the election fever is fast spreading throughout the 
country ... rumours saying that the elections would be ^ 
held in July, August, September or October are not true."
An important factor seemed to lend weight to the Prime Minister’s
contention. The constituency delineation exercise was incomplete
1 The Straits Times, April 22, 197^-
2 The Prime Minister's visit to China was from May 28 to June 2, 
197^* The timing of the visit was clearly of benefit in improv­
ing the Government’s image among Chinese electors in Malaysia.
3 In Alor Star, Kedah, for instance, the State Government arranged 
for bus companies to run extra services and charge half-price 
fares for those attending the rally. Special bus services were 
also arranged for from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m. after the rally to take 
home villagers from the outlying areas. The. Straits Times,
May 1, 197*f.
^ The Sunday Mail, April 21, 197^.
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and not expected to be ready for a while. Experienced observers, 
however, discounted this as insignificant, arguing that if need be the 
Barisan Nasional would hold parliamentary elections on the basis of 
the constituency delimitation that was currently in use. As late as 
June 29, 197^j the Prime Minister, even in urging UMNO to prepare for 
the election;-,:, still kept the nation guessing. All he would concede
was "The election is not as far away as some say, and not as near as
'I
many expect". On July 30, 197^, a proclamation dissolving
Parliament was signed by the Yang di Pertuan Agong and a statement from
the Prime Minister’s office stated that the dates for nomination and
2
polling would be announced by the Election Commission. The
regulations provide that elections for Peninsular Malaysia should be
held within sixty days after the dissolution of Parliament and that
nomination day can be seven days after the dissolution at the earliest,
3
and polling day two weeks after nomination day at the earliest. On 
August 1, 197^,the Election Commission declared nomination day to be 
August 8 , 197^1 and. polling day to be August 1^ +, 197^« Opposition 
parties immediately protested that the haste with which nominations 
and polling were to take place were clearly to the advantage of the 
Barisan Nasional. They further pointed out that as late as July 13, 
197^)the electoral rolls were not ready and that detailed maps of the
newly delimited constituencies approved by Parliament only on July 23,
1 b1974*?were as yet unavailable. Nevertheless, the ending of the
prevailing uncertainty was generally welcomed.
' I
1 The Straits Times, June 30, '197^ *
2 The Straits Times, July 31, 197^-
3 Malaysia, Constitution, Article 5^-
^ The Straits Times, August 1, 197^-
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The Government’s efforts to pretend that the election was not to
be held as soon as it was, were not regarded by the opposition political
parties seriously, for they had been anticipating and preparing for a
considerable time. Beginning in March 197^ +? the Partai Rakyat had
j
commenced its public rallies, as had the DAP and the Pekemas. On
April 21, 197^5 the DAP Secretary General had declared that
nthe DAP would not be caught napping in the coming general 
elections. We have gone into top gear in preparation for 
the coming elections'especially in Perak ... I believe that 
although, technically, Tun Razak has not yet taken a decision 
to advise the Yang di Pertuan Agung to dissolve Parliament 
there is no doubt that the Alliance have made advanced 
preparations for the general election to be held shortly.”
The Barisan Nasional’s Advantage
As noted in Chapter the Barisan Nasional's component parties, 
especially UMNO, PAS, MCA and MIC, had party branches in almost every 
constituency; just prior to the 197^ election even the Gerakan had 
undertaken the opening of branches in several constituencies. Thus, 
of the Barisan Nasional's component parties, only the PPP had a poor 
ground-level organization. The Barisan Nasional conducted its
electoral campaign by setting up liaison bodies between its component
parties at state and constituency levels. The election organization 
was under the supervision of Encik Ghafar Baba as Director of 
Elections, and an Election Committee with an Operations Room at UMNO 
headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. This Operations Room, the highest in a 
hierarchical network stretching to the constituency level, served as 
the nerve centre of campaign planning and execution. Several 
-secretaries were-appointed, each in,charge of a separate function -
1 Utusan Malaysia, March 6 , 197^ -.
2 The Straits Times, April 22, 197t.
3 Mingguan Malaysia, March 17} 197^ +»
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transport, rallies, publicity, legal affairs, police liaison, etc.
It was at the national level operations room that the printing and 
distribution of posters, banners, badges, transport vehicles, public 
address system equipment and all the other paraphernalia requisite 
for an effective campaign were made. Here also were carefully 
planned the speaking tours of national leaders. Charts and graphs 
were continually drawn, the progress in each state and constituency 
constantly updated. The national level operations room was linked to 
the state level operations room by a hot-line telephone. As at the 
national level, the State operations rooms, too, had their own 
secretaries, handling separate campaign functions. Next in the 
hierarchy was the constituency level operations room which was linked 
by hot-line telephone to the State level.• All operations rooms were 
manned round the clock and the daily assessments of the village and 
polling district level campaigners were, regularly passed up the 
hierarchy and formed the basis of decisions for the deployment of 
resources to the various constituencies and the planning of strategy. 
Behind edch Barisan Nasional candidate was the assistance of this 
powerful election machinery.
\ 1
The Barisan Nasional, with enormous financial resources at its 
command, was able to provide its candidates with the kind of cash and 
material support that none of the other parties could hope to compete 
with. Each candidate was able to receive from the National
Operations Room alone vast amounts"of posters of party symbols in
' 1 • ■ various sizes , party badges, party manifestos, several files on
speaking points, and; three' publie-address sys,terns. Also distributed
1 One million copies of posters of party symbols in various sizes 
were despatched to Perak State alone (626,563 electors)1.
The Straits Echo, August 13, 197^«
265
freely were posters*of various sizes with the words "Together we 
support the leadership of our Prime Minister Tun Haji Abdul Razak". 
These posters appeared in three languages. - Malay (in the Rumi and 
Jawi scripts), Chinese and Tamil (Plate 2). Further support for the 
Barisan Nasional's candidates came from their own respective parties 
but this varied greatly from party to party, UMNO, MCA and MIC 
candidates on the ‘whole being better served than their counterparts 
from Gerakan, PPP and PAS. The PPP, for instance, supplied its 
candidates with their deposit and M#f 5,000., ; besides paying for the 
electors cards and the first thousand personal posters. The party 
also printed 160,000 posters with party symbols. Further resources 
depended on the financial standing and influence of individual cand­
idates - the total election expenditure of a large number of Barisan 
Nasional candidates is thought to be in many cases well in excess of 
the stipulated maximum of M/ 20,000.
The Barisan Nasional, as the government party, was also able to 
bring to bear on the election its control of the Radio and Television 
and the services of the Department of Information both at the federal 
and state levels. The Prime Minister's visit to China before the 
election, provided the opportunity for a wholly pro-government 
propaganda campaign to be meted out by the Radio, Television and the 
Department of Information, lauding the efforts of the Prime Minister 
and the Barisan Nasional. Prior to. and duripg, the campaign period,
1 Personal interview with Dato Sri S.P. Seenivasagam, President of 
the PPP on August 8, 197^.
2 Appendix 8 sets out the breakdown of the actual expenditure 
incurred by two Barisan Nasional candidates totalling in one case 
M/ 19,850 and in another M£f 70,^92-30. Another candidate, though 
unable to provide a breakdown of the expenses incurred,, estimated 
his actual total expenditure*to be between M ^  75,000 and
M$f 80,000. These expenditures were over and above expenses 
incurred on behalf of ;the candidate by 'the party like providing 
party posters, public address equipment, landroverh, etc.
KAMI
flJMNO GERAKAN PPP PESAKA PAS PERIKATAN
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D itrrb itkan  oleh Ibu Pcjabat Barisan Nasional Kuala Lumpur, dan dicetak olch Perchelakan Mas Sendinan Berbad Kuala Lumpur.
Plate 2 Barisan Nasional election poster
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the Department of Information displayed throughout the country 20"*. by 
26" posters with the Prime Minister's photograph and just the words 
"Together we support the leadership of Tun Abdul Kazak". (Plate 3)
The similarity in wording of this poster and that issued by the 
Barisan Nasional (Plate 2) could hardly be missed. The Barisan 
Nasional also distributed to its candidates via its National 
Operations Room hundreds of copies of the Department of Information, 
Malaysia publication entitled Masyarakat Baru and its English
'j
translation The New Society. The publication, obviously intended to 
serve as election campaign material, explained in rather glossy 
fashion the "two prongs of the New Economic Policy, namely, eradicat­
ing poverty irrespective of race and accelerating the process of 
restructuring society so as to eliminate the identification of race with 
vocation". Also distributed to candidates and speakers was another 
Department of Information, Malaysia effort - fact sheets entitled 
"Talking Points". Each of these fact sheets presented background 
information and statistics that candidates could utilize during their 
campaign speeches, there being fact sheets on Foreign Policy, Labour 
and Manpower, Progress of the New Economic Policy, Towards Self- 
sufficiency in Rice, Education, Domestic and Foreign Loans, RISDA 
(Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority) and Industrial 
Development. All were neatly placed in two pockets - one for those 
in the Malay language and the other for those in English - in a con­
venient white folder. The assistance from the Department of Inform­
ation did not terminate there. In at least one state, official
departmental vehicles were utilized to convey Barisan Nasional State
2
Operations Room workers and Barisan Nasional posters. In Tumpat, Kelantan,
1 Malaysia, Ministry of Information, The New Society, 197^-
2 This was in Alor Star, Kedah and was witnessed by the writer.
BERSAMA
KITA MENYOKONG
PtMPINAN 
TUN ABDUL RAZAK
Plate 3 Department of Information, Malaysia, poster.
Translation: Together we support the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak,
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a Department of Veterinary Services landrover was used to distribute 
money to campaign workers. It is not here suggested that the 
Barisan Nasional made systematic use of government vehicles during the 
election campaign, and in all probability such misuse was the result 
of the over-enthusiasm of particular party officials and government 
servants. However, as the government party and the party that was 
certain to be returned to power, the Barisan Nasional was the chief, 
if not sole, beneficiary of such excesses. Perhaps the saddest 
aspect of this blatant abuse of governmental authority is that it was 
accepted, though grudgingly, by the opposition as a normal feature of 
elections.
The sharing of radio time for political party broadcasts during
the campaign period, it has already been noted, was to the advantage
of the Barisan Nasional - it obtained*eight 13-minute broadcasts as
compared to one 13-minute broadcast each for the DAP, Pekemas and 
1
Partai Rakyat. None of the political parties was given television
2time, but broadcasts over Radio and Television Malaysia were obviously 
slanted to advantage the Barisan Nasional. During the campaign . 
period, for instance, Radio and Television Malaysia continually broad­
cast in between regular programmes excerpts from Tun Abdul Razak's 
speeches under the heading Kata-Kata Perdana. The DAP protested
1 Chapter One, page 83.
2 All mass media activities are co-ordinated by the Ministry of 
Information. The Ministry has two main divisions - Radio 
Television Malaysia, and the Department of Information.
Adhikarya, R., et. al., Broadcasting in Peninsular Malaysia, 1977> 
pp 5-10 provide an up-to-date outline of the guidelines for 
government communicators and broadcasters and the functions of the 
two divisions of the Ministry of Information.
3 Kata-Kata in Malay means 'Sayings' and 'Perdana' means 'chief', 
'principal', or 'important'. 'Perdana' is also used in the 
term Prime Minister (Perdana Menteri).
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pro-Barisan Nasional bias on the part of the Election Commission in 
programmes purportedly put out over Radio and Television Malaysia by 
the Election Commission to encourage voters to exercise their franch­
ise in the election. As an example of this, the DAP pointed out that
"the television appeal headed 'Pilehanraya Nasional1 /national 
election/ is slanted to promote the name 'nasional' used by the 
National Front /Barisan Nasional/. The correct form should 
be 'Pilehanraya Umum' meaning general election - a term used 
throughout the years''.^
2 -
Newspapers in Peninsular Malaysia have been generally sympath­
etic to the government and this, it is believed, is due to two princi­
pal reasons - ownership patterns and legislative control. The Printing 
Presses Act (19^8) was amended in January 197^ to ensure that Malaysian 
investments■in newspapers exceeded those of non-Malaysians and gave the 
Home Affairs Minister power to refuse, suspend,or revoke the annual 
licence where necessary.^ The Internal Security Act (19^0) and the 
Sedition Act (19^8) as amended by the Constitution Amendment Act (1971) 
impose further limitations on the Press - the general effect of these
Acts is to ensure*that the-Press does not bring into hatred or contempt,
i
or excite disaffection against/any Ruler,or against the government. .
As a result, the newspapers have generally played safe and tended to
. . 4 1be non-critical of government policy. During the 197t election,
1 The Straits Times, August 13, 197^-
2 There were in 197^ - thirty-two newspapers in Peninsular Malaysia
publishing in five different languages - English (eight), Malay
(six), Chinese (ten), Tamil (seven) and Punjabi (one). The 
largest circulations in 1973 were recorded by The Straits Times 
(1^0,800) and The Sunday Times (17^,000) - both English language 
newspapers. Leader, Malaysian Journalism Review, Vol. 3 , No. 1, 
197^ , p. 22.
3 Malaysia, Printing Presses (Amendment) Act, 197^*
i
4 Lent, J.A., until December 1973 Head of the Communications
Programme at the Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, observed in 
197^ "Mass media are controlled ... it is difficult to determine 
where government interference stops and media self-restraint 
commences." Lent, J.A., 'Malaysia's Guided Media', INDEX 
(London) Vol. 3 , No. k , Winter 197^*
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politicians interviewed generally conceded that the Malaysian Press
was especially more partisan and pro-Barisan Nasional than it had ever
been in previous elections. One Opposition leader bluntly declared:
"When one translates news stories in the mass media into 
advertising,the Barisan runs a billion-dollar campaign."^
One feature of the election preparations, however, served as a
disadvantage to many Barisan Nasional candidates. Though the party
itself was extremely well organised, its candidates were not in many
cases as well prepared for the election as candidates from the
opposing parties. The final selection of candidates was left to the
2Prime Minister himself and not the component parties. This measure, 
was in accordance with the procedure adopted by Tengku Abdul Rahman in
the previous elections. But in the 197^ * election/the rivalry between
/
the component parties, and the numerous potential candidates/ meant
• /
that an early announcement could result in defections and opposition 
by the unsuccessful aspirants. Consequently, many Barisan Nasional 
candidates only knew of their selection and the constituency they were 
contesting,the day before nominations for the election. Even then, 
numerous Barisan members entered the Contest as Independents challeng­
ing the official Barisan Nasional candidates. But the party still 
had a tremendous advantage over the other parties. There never was 
any doubt that the Barisan Nasional would form the national government 
even before the nominations closed - at issue only was the size of 
the majority.
The Barisan Nasional1s relative strength became apparent at the
1 Fan Yew Teng, at a public rally in Menglembu on August 9? 197^*
2 The Sunday Times, May 12, 197^*
3 Goh Cheng Teik, the Barisan Nasional candidate for Nibong Tebal
constituency claimed he was certain of his nomination only the
' day before nomination day. ' Personal interview with
Goh Cheng Teik on August 10, 197^*
272
close of nomination - it was returned unopposed in thirty-two 
parliamentary constituencies out of a total of M k  in Peninsular 
Malaysia. In Sabah and Sarawak,the Barisan Nasional gained fifteen 
of the total of forty seats without contest. It needed a mere thirty- 
one of the eighty-two Peninsular Malaysian and twenty-two Sabah and 
Sarawak seats for which polling was to be held,to form a majority in 
Parliament. DAP, Pekemas and Partai Rakyat leaders were not sur­
prised; but they were certainly disheartened. The DAP Secretary 
General, Lim Kit Siang, expressed the Opposition's hopes when he held 
"The k? unopposed parliamentary seats do not spoil our strategy as we
'I
merely want to deny them a two-thirds majority". Pekemas President,
Tan Chee Koon, voiced the Opposition's fears - "It is a sad commentary
that the seats are unopposed and God help the people of this country
2if it becomes a one-party State".
The Issues and the Campaign
A general election elicits a great flood of propaganda for the 
parties - the manifestos and major speeches of the national party 
leaders, the addresses and speeches of the candidates, broadcasts and 
articles, leaflets, cartoons and posters. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to encompass this mass of material easily in formal 
analysis. What is attempted here is merely to present the main 
trends of the campaign and thus the general impression obtained by 
reading the vast literature poured out, by attending political rallies 
and house-to-house campaigns, by talking to candidates and their 
campaigners - in short, by having experienced the general election 
alive.
1 The Barisan Nasional gained forty-seven seats without contest - 
thirty-two seats in'Peninsular Malaysia and fifteen in Sabah.
The Star, August 11, 197^-
2 Ibid.
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The Party Manifestos
Much of the significant electioneering went on at the national 
level. Each party produced a manifesto which presented its outlook 
and policies in vague but attractive language. These documents re­
presented as firm a commitment to a programme as may reasonably be 
expected, while going beyond the interests and understanding of most 
electorsI Though the manifestos themselves clearly had little 
direct impact, they provided an agenda for the rest of the campaign 
and to a large measure reflected the issues that were to be emphasized 
by the respective parties.
The Barisan Nasional’s manifesto, itself a compromise document 
between its nine component parties, was entitled 'The People's Front 
for Happier Malaysia'. The manifesto was marked by three important 
characteristics. Firstly, the emphasis on the personality and image 
of Tun Abdul Razak as Prime Minister. The previous five years had 
seen him take over the running of the country as Director of the 
National Operations Council, and then, with the forced retirement of 
Tengku Abdul Rahman, as Prime Minister. Initially, the non-Malay 
community had apprehensions about his pro-Malay Image, but his efforts 
at forming the new Barisan Nasional and thereby including non-Malay 
representation in the Government, and his visit to Communist China as 
the first Southeast Asian leader to do so, had all gone towards remedy­
ing this. UMNO, and the other Barisan Nasional leaders, helped by 
the state-controlled Radio and Television and a wholly sympathetic 
press, had*helped develop a massive personality cult. The party's 
manifesto accordingly, carried not the party's symbol on its cover?but 
an approximately by coloured photograph of Tun Razak. The
1 The Barisan Nasional,Manifesto 197^, The People's Front for 
Happier Malaysia, 197^»
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manifesto also began with a personal letter from Tun Razak signed as 
"Prime Minister of Malaysia and Barisan Nasional Chairman" calling for 
support for the Barisan Nasional and himself, and expressing his 
willingness "to shoulder the responsibility of continuing our efforts 
to:
(i) maintain peace and security in the country and to 
protect the lives, property and rights of our people
(ii) strengthen and consolidate social and political 
stability
(iii) ensure the highly respected position of our nation 
in international, relations by pursuing a free, 
neutral and active foreign'policy
(iv) implement fully the New Economic Policy, and
(v) establish a just, united and prosperous society in
accordance with the Rukunegara."^
Secondly,.the manifesto aimed at presenting the Barisan Nasional
as attempting to include a broader participation in government and
thus, by avoiding politicking and communal politics, achieving-1
political stability. In this respect the manifesto read:
"The Barisan Nasional is a logical consequence of the growth 
and development of Malaysian political life. It is yet 
another milestone in our serious approach to consolidation 
in national politics. There is no place for the politics of 
racism and communal polarisation in this country ...
The Barisan Nasional is a single, effective political party 
which reflects a complete spectrum of views on Malaysian 
politics - enables a greater popular representation and 
greater participation in' the Government ... enables the 
national interest and national unity to be placed above party 
and sectarian interests. We recognise that political 
stability is of utmost importance for our survival.
/The7 Barisan Nasional - the confederation of nine political 
parties ... is the successful culmination of the people's 
efforts towards political unity which has no precedent in 
the history of our national struggle."
The third characteristic was the emphasis on the government's 
economic progress. The manifesto claimed that since the launching of
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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the Second Malaysia Plan in 1971 there had been tremendous progress, 
and this certainly made impressive reading. ,There had been a rise 
in Gross National Product from A- billion in 1957 to Mjjf 16.8 billion 
in 1973 and there was a forecast of a seven per cent increase in real 
terms for 197^ over that of 1973* ^50^000 jobs had been created
under the plan, amounting to fifty-eight per cent of the five year 
target, with the prospect of another 1^0,000 new jobs to be created in 
197^. 670,000 acres of uncultivated land had been developed and a
further 200,000 acres of new land would be developed during the year. 
The manifesto then listed several major economic projects completed or 
underway, and then dedicated itself to a national programme, stressing 
in the process Agriculture, Industries, Timber, Petroleum, Roads and 
Communication, Electricity and Water,and Education. Also given 
mention were the strength of the Malaysian dollar, the need to beat 
inflation and encourage foreign investment, and the need to emphasize 
education. For good measure, and to allow for the expansion of 
appropriate themes at the appropriate constituencies, the manifesto 
included pledges to
a) "improve the lot of Fishermen and Farmers by way of 
co-operatives and modern techniques" and
b) "not neglect Hawkers and Petty Traders as they perform 
a useful role in our Society. A proper scheme will be 
introduced to assist them to improve their livelihood."^
The last was, in particular, due to the efforts of the Gerakan, which
along with the MCA and PPP, was contesting the essentially urban
constituencies where Chinese hawkers have hitherto complained of
. . . 2victimisation by Local Government and police authorities.
1 Ibid.
2 Personal interview with Goh Hock Guan, Barisan Nasional (Gerakan) 
candidate for Bungsar, January 15, 1975»
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The DAP's manifesto was again marked by three principal 
characteristics,, Firstly, the party placed great emphasis on reject­
ing the concept of coalition governments and the Barisan Nasional.
The manifesto itself was entitled "Expose the National Fraud of the 
National Front". In a lengthy introduction, the DAP presented the 
Barisan Nasional as an attempt by the Alliance Party to defraud the 
Malaysian public with a new name and symbol but no change in policies, 
and held that the Gerakan, PPP and PAS had surrendered their political 
beliefs and principles for position, office and profit. This, the 
party viewed, had been made possible only because it, itself, had by 
way of an electoral understanding helped the Gerakan and the PPP win 
seats in the 1969 elections0 It claimed to be the only party that 
had stood true to its 1969 pledges.
The period, 1969 to 197^, the party argued, had been "A season of
2political opportunism and knavery" and cleverly dismissed outstanding 
issues which It feared would represent liabilities in its image to the 
public - its unwillingness to form a United Opposition Front with the 
Pekemas, the internal conflicts, the rivalries, and the expulsion of a 
number of senior leaders from its ranks. The manifesto explained its 
unwillingness to join the United Opposition Front as being due to the 
Pekemas leader's betrayal of the people by voting for the 1971 
Constitution Amendment Act, thereby curtailing the freedom of speech and 
political activity of Malaysians. This, the party held, was done 
despite Pekemas leaders having in 1969 "campaigned with the clarion 
call to the people to reduce the Alliance majority in Parliament in 
order to DENY THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY they need to abrogate car
1 Democratic Action Party, The 197^ General Election Manifesto of 
the DAP, Expose the National Fraud of the National Front 1, 197^»
2 Ibid.
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1constitutional rights and guarantees’*. It further, accused the 
Pekemas of holding talks with Barisan Nasional leaders in connection 
with some form of understanding in the general elections even while 
the United Opposition Front talks were in progress. The manifesto 
also skilfully explained away the DAP’s own negotiations with the MCA 
for joining the Barisan Nasional, as being, ’’the efforts of arch­
opportunist Goh Hock Guan” and justified its ’’great party purges of 
Goh Hock Guan, Walter Loh and Richard Ho”, as efforts which returned 
the DAP to its original wholesomeness and integrity, thereby, enabling 
it to forge ahead in its struggle to create a democratic socialist 
Malaysia, where there is no exploitation of man by man, class by class, 
or race by race.
A second characteristic of the manifesto, was the effort made 
towards presenting an image of the DAP as a party championing the cause
of the non-Malays in the country. Though//not as blatant in this as
/
it had been in its 19&9 manifesto, the message could hardly be missed.
The innuendo was made by first challenging the Government's New Economic
Policy, which is based on the assumption that there is a disparity in
incomes between the Malays and the non-Malays. The DAP argued that
"The New Economic Policy planners talk about the myth of economic
imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays, but ignore the reality of
3
the economic imbalance between Malaysians and foreigners”. Its 
proposal was for economic reform based on a redistribution of income 
favouring the have-nots. Such reform was not to be on the basis of
community, but rather on a class basis, by way of:
a) A Cheap Food Policy and a Fair Prices Tribunal as part
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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of a National Anti-Inflationary Policy,
b) general wage increases and statutory minimum wages;
c) overhauling the anti-labour laws;
d) a review of Employees, Provident Fund policies;
e) Reformation of taxation policies by increasing the 
relief for individuals in the lower income group and 
raising the tax for the higher income groups;
f) establishing a Ministry of Housing;
g) a full employment policy; and
h) a new deal for hawkers.
The manifesto then claimed that government policies had produced
educational inequality and undermined national unity, and objected
that "every year, tens of thousands of Malaysians fail the MCE
^alaysian Certificate of Education/ because of failure in Bahasa
Malaysia /Malay language/ althbugh they get a string of distinctions
1in other subjects". The party called for
i) the expansion of Higher School Certificate and 
University places $o that all those with requisite 
qualifications and ability can get opportunities 
for higher education;
permit the establishment of private Universities 3nd 
Colleges;
government financial subsidy to Independent Chinese 
Secondary Schools;
constitutional guarantees that Chinese-and Tamil 
primary schools be not converted; 
compulsory teaching of the mother tongue of every 
student in every school; and
1 Ibid.
ii)
iii)
iv).
v)
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vi) recognition of foreign degrees of international 
repute including those from Nantah, Taiwan,
Indian and Indonesian Universities.
The above demands all held special appeal to the non-Malay communities. 
The appeal was, by 1969 standards, certainly restrained but nonetheless 
clear. For the bulk of Malaysians, disposed to viewing policies as 
being either pro-Malay or anti-Malay,'the message was obvious.
The third characteristic' of the manifesto, was its cam^pign for 
human rights andJcivil liberties. It called, for the repealing of a 
numberof- measures -that the Government had" imposed on the grounds of 
internal Seedri-ty. Thus the manifesto advocated, the repealing of 
the Constitution Amendment Act qf 1971 which /served to curtail 
freedom of speech in a number of specified areas and had curtailed the 
parliamentary privilege of immunity of ••■Members of Parliament and State 
Assemblymen; abolition of the Internal Security Act which allowed for 
detention without trial; abolition of--'the Universities and University 
Colleges Act which prevented university students from participating in 
politics; and an end to the annual licencing system imposed on the 
Malaysian press.
Perhaps of all the manifestos produced for the 197^ * election, 
that of the Pekemas was most comprehensive in its coverage. There was 
hardly an aspect of Malaysian society and politics that the manifesto, 
entitled "Pekemas as Your Watch Dog", did not take a stand on. The 
position adopted was,generally,in keeping with the moderate socialist 
policies advocated by the Labour Party in the years immediately 
following Malaya’s independence.' ~ Such1 a"stand "was'hardly'surprising, 
since many of the Pekemas leaders had then led the Labour Party, and 
ever since the formation of the Pekemas, had consciously attempted to 
cultivate the residue of support they 'had in the former strongholds of
1 Parti Keadilan Masyarakat Malaysia, Platform for 197^ - General 
Elections, Pekemas as Your Watch Dog, 197^»
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the Labour Party. ■ The manifesto thus called for the reduction of the 
wide imbalance bet,ween foreign and local ownership of assets in the 
country, restriction of the outflow of capital, nationalisation of 
selected enterprises such as the petroleum industry, mines and other 
vital industries, prevention of monopolies, and the strengthening of 
the co-operative'system. The party’s land reform policies, too, were 
reminiscent of the Labour Party’s stance - the manifesto called for a 
ceiling on the ownership of land, eradication of absentee landlordism, 
control of landownership by foreigners, foreign corporations and 
firms, and the re-introduction of the right of adverse possession.
A number of the Pekemas founder members and top office.bearers, 
notably Yeoh Teck Chye and V. David, are prominent Trade Union leaders. 
The party, even at its formation, had greatly emphasized its Labour and 
trade union sympathies. The manifesto therefore claimed that ’’the 
Alliance, supported-by the SUPP, Gerakan, PMIP and the PPP has put 
LABOUR IN CHAINS, while still allowing Capital freedom to exploit our 
workers and giving every incentive to exploit the nation’s wealth."
It undertook to strive for the right of every worker to join a trade 
union, the revision of anti-Labour laws and the automatic recognition 
of trade unions, establishment of a State Social Security system, 
public housing for workers close-'to' industries, a basic living wage, 
introduction of a National Health Service, and, the ratification of the 
International Labour Organisation's Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 per­
taining to freedom of association and right to. collective bargaining.
On issues pertaining to Culture and Education,the manifesto was 
in-agreement'"'with :the DAP as regards its position on Chinese and Tamil 
schools, private universities and the recognition of Nanyang, Taiwan 
and Indian degrees. There was, however, a determined attempt to make 
its appeal appear non-communal. Unlike the DAP manifesto, that of the 
Pekemas committed the party to strive "to preserve and sustain the
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growth and achievement of BAHASA MALAYSIA as the SOLE official 
language", and the acceptance of "the special privileges for the
1
Bumiputras as laid down in Article 153 of the-Federal Constitution".
The Partai■Rakyat’s manifesto entitled Program dan Manifesto
2Pilihanraya (Election Programme- and Manifesto) was reflective of the
Party's non-communal socialist approach to Peninsular Malaysian
politics. The lengthy introductory statement began with a call for
action and an indictment of the Government:
"This country is currently at an important historical
crossroad and the moment has arrived for all progressive
groups and action-oriented people to pool their resources
to determine the future of our people and nation. The group
that was given power by the British in 1955 3  reference to
the Alliance/1' has- destroyed faith and become corrupt. It
represents the interests of the foreign monopolists who
control two-thirds of the economy, and the rich families
from all races, who grab the wealth of this country for
themselves and their minions.".,
5
It alleged- that the Government had used its authority and police power 
to harass the poor - prices had risen, homes of the poor were destroyed 
in the name of ’development' and their land confiscated and given to 
the foreign monopolists for the construction.of hotels, casinos, 
business complexes and factories. The manifesto held that the 
country was drained of about M/ 1,000 million yearly by foreign 
monopolists, and that government policy had resulted in a national 
debt in excess of M/ 8,000 million.
The party regarded the May 13, 19&9 communal riots, as a direct 
consequence of the Alliance policy, and held that the formation of the 
Barisan Nasional itself was merely an attempt to present the 
discredited Alliance under a new name and symbol. It accused the
1 Ibid.
2 Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya, Progam dan Manifesto pilihanraya, 
Julai 197^.
3 Ibid.
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Barisan Nasional of utilising government property for party purposes.
The principal objective of the party's efforts, the manifesto 
presented, as:
1. the creation of a genuine and fully independent state 
that has control over its political and economic life;
2 . the forging of national unity by measures aimed at 
helping the masses, especially labour, farmers and 
fishermen, and the removal of poverty, corruption and 
nepotism,;
I
3- the establishment of a modern nation and new society 
that is high in morals, has a scientific approach, new 
technology, and which maintains friendly relations and 
is sympathetic to the peoples of the world who are 
struggling to overcome imperialism; and the creation of 
a socialist nation._
This general statement of the party's philosophy, ideology and 
strategy,; was supported by forty-three specific proposals of reform. 
The measures suggested were grouped under six headings:
(i) politics and administration;
(ii) economics and finance;
(iii) economic and social welfare;
(iv) education and culture;
(v) defence and foreign affairs;, and
(vi) religion and morals.
The specific proposals,like the general statement, were void of any 
communal appeal and again emphasized the party's socialist approach. 
It may be held tbiat the most striking aspect of the Partai Rakyat's 
manifesto-was its attempts to ignore the communal divisions in 
Peninsular Malaysian society', and indeed, attempt to take society more 
as it would like to visualize it. Hence,there was no reference to
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Malay special privileges and rights, to citizenship, to language, to 
culture and to religion - these divisive issues of Peninsular 
Malaysian politics were totally ignored. This approach is indeed 
the antithesis of that adopted by the other parties. Regardless of 
the rewards that such an approach would provide on polling day, the 
party, as it will become apparent in the discussion that follows, 
was steadfast. Its electoral performance would indeed serve to 
indicate, to at least an extent, how much Peninsular Malaysians are 
able to divorce the concept of 'race' and accept the paradigm of 
’class' as the basis of their problems.
The Electoral Centest •
The contest may be conveniently viewed as two separate battles. 
The first, principally between the Barisan Nasional, DAP and Pekemas, 
was a contest for the non-Malay vote. In places the Partai Rakyat 
and a few independents also participated. Spatially this contest was 
confined to the non-Malay majority constituencies in the states of 
Penang, Perak, Selangor, the Federal Territory, Negri Sembilan,
Malacca and parts of Johore. Here the battle quickly boiled down to
being one of the DAP and the Pekemas, while not reducing their 
own invective at each other, challenging the essentially non-Malay 
based parties of the Barisan Nasional, i.e. the MCA, the MIC, the 
Gerakan and the PPP.^ (Tables 39 and ^0)
1 The second battle - the battle for the Malay votes - was in 
constituencies with Malay majority electorates and thus confined 
principally to the states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu,
Pahang and parts of Johore. For the Barisan Nasional, this involved
1 Appendix 7 sets out the contest in each parliamentary 
constituency in the 197^ election.
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Table 39
Parliamentary Seats Contested by Political Parties by State, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1974.
Total 
No. of 
Seats
Barisan
Nasional
(a)
DAP PEK Partai Independents Rakyat Malay Non-Malay
Others
Perlis 2 2 2
Kedah 13 13 (8) 1 1 \b) 1 (KITA)
Kelantan 12 12 (4) 1 8
Trengganu 7 7 (1) 3
Penang 9 9 (1) 7 8 6 1 (KITA)
Perak 21 21 (3) 1if 11 6 5 6 2 (KITA)
Pahang 8 8 (3) 2 1
Selangor 11 11 (2 ) 6 5 4 2 1
Federal
Territory 5 5 5 6 1
Negri
Sembilan 6 6 (2 ) 4 2 1 2 1 (IPPP)
Malacca 4 4 1 3 2 1
Johore 16 16 (8) 6 1 2
Total 114 114(32) 46 35 29 9
4 (KITA) 
1 (IPPP)
(a) Figures within brackets indicate seats won without being contested
(b) Seats contested by ' Beb,as Bersatu* (United Independents)
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, ,197^  Election Report, 1975)
, Appendix B, pp 144-158.
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Table 4-0
Number of Malay and non-Malay Majority* seats contested by 
Political Parties, Parliamentary Election, 1974.
Party Malay Majority 
(Total 79)
Non-Malay Majority 
(Total 35)
Barisan Nasional 79 35
- UMNO - 60 1
- PAS 14 0
- MCA 5 18
- MIC 0 4
- Gerakan 0 8
- PPP 0 4
DAP 11 35
Pekemas 11 24
Partai Rakyat 15 7
IPPP 0 1
KITA 2 2
Independents
- Malay 26 5
- Non-Malay 1 8
* Absolute majority - i.e. where community comprises more than 50% 
of the electorate.
Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 4, and,
Malaysia, Election Commission, 19?4■Election Report, 19751 
Appendix H, pp 144-158.
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two separate engagements, one with the UMNO and PAS dissidents and the 
other with the Partai Rakyat, the challenge in the latter being 
confined mainly to Trengganu and parts of Johore. (Tables 39 and 40)
The Battle for the non-Malay vote
Although the Barisan Nasional gave serious consideration to its
battle for the Malay votes, it was clear from the preparations that
led to the election and concentration of effort by the principal
leaders, that the party viewed its battle for the non-Malay votes as
the more difficult. A measure of the challenge was indicated by the
fact,that of the thirty-two parliamentary seats in‘which the party was
returned unopposed,none was a non-Malay majority seat. To win a
mandate’ for the Barisan Nasional from the non-Malay population meant
that the shift of the Gerakan and the PPP from the opposition to the
Government be witnessed by a corresponding shift of their respective
members-and electoral support. For the Gerakan and the PPP the
election was of special importance, for the outcome would decide the
continued existence of these parties. The campaign for them was
largely one of defending their decision to join the Barisan Nasional.
Lim Chong Eu put his message- across plainly. Referring to his own
resignation from the Presidency and membership of the MCA over the
status of the MCA vis a vis UMNO, he explained:
"In 1939 I broke- away-from-the Government'and Tun Razak.
For ten years we went on separate paths. However the 
tragic events of 1969 brought us together again to work 
for a peaceful and united Malaysia. Tun Razak phoned
me. And from there on we began to sit together once
more to discuss ways to se-ttle the national crisis.1*^
He denied claims that the Gerakan had, by joining the Barisan Nasional,
sold out the Chinese interests; he dismissed these as malicious
1 The Straits Times, August 10, 19?^.
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allegations by the opposition. The Barisan Nasional, he claimed, had
in fact provided a broader base for the Ghinese-based parties like the
Gerakan, the PPP, the SUPP and the MCA to safeguard Chinese rights.
In Penang, the Gerakan stressed that "A State Government in the hands
of an opposition party will never progress without support from the
Central Government"-. As proof of the development brought to Penang
by Federal Government assistance, the greatly publicised and much
vaunted Penang Urban Centre, a 200 million project, and the proposed
bridge replacing the ferry service and linking Penang Island with
2
the mainland,were pointed out. Lim Chong Eu and the Gerakan in
Penang,were to a degree on safe grounds, for in Penang the Pekemas and
the DAP appeared equally strong and it was thought that the opposition
vote would be split between them. What was needed for the Gerakan
candidates there was thus,merely to retain a portion of their electoral
support- from the 1969 election,and, with the help of the pro-
Government vote, win the seats. With the help of its reasonably
sound organization and network of branches, the Gerakan hoped to pull
it off; besides, Lim Chong Eu had a moderately impressive record as
Chief Minister in Penang.
In Perak, the PPP faced a far greater problem. Since the death
of D.R. Seenivasagam, the PPP founder and prima donna, the six-rpointed 
3star had lost much of its lustre. The party had few members and 
poor ground-level organization. There was little that the party 
could prove as being advantages gained by entering into a coalition 
with the Barisan Nasional; certainly nothing that' could mitigate its 
alleged-betrayal *of’ its electorate; who had for long been cultivated
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 The People's Progressive Party symbol is a six:-:pointed red star on 
a white background.
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with an extreme anti-Alliance stand. Moreover, the change in 
political stance by the PPP, occurred at a time when the image of good 
administration in the PPP-controlled Ipoh municipality was itself 
being questioned. Nonetheless, the PPP campaigned very much along 
the lines of the Gerakan in Penang. The new political climate follow­
ing the communal clashes of 1969* it was claimed, needed co-operation
between the various communities. The coalition, it was held, had 
brought federal government finances for important projects for the 
people of Ipoh, namely, the M^ million twenty-storey Kinta Heights 
which could house 300 families, a M^ 1 million public library, the 
sewerage scheme,and the repossession and subdivision of mining land 
by the State Government for availability to the public. The PPP
regarded the election as a referendum on one issue - that of winning
2an endorsement for its decision to join the Barisan Nasional.
The Gerakan and the PPP were to an extent handicapped by the 
lack of support, and in places definite obstruction, rendered their 
candidates by some divisions of the MCA. The reason for this stems 
from the MCA's apprehensions, and in some states, notably Penang and 
Perak, open hostility to the idea of coalitions with the Gerakan and
the PPP. The admission of these parties meant that many MCA hopefuls
were denied a party ticket for the election, and were instead asked to 
support candidates who in the past had been their arch-rivals. In 
Perak, the Barisan Nasional*s election co-ordinator urged the compon­
ent parties to bury the hatchet:
"There were tussles over the selection of candidates 
before the nominations were finished. Now that these 
have been settled I hope the leaders and supporters of 
the various parties will pool their resources to win 
the elections."
3
1 The Straits Times, August 10, 197^« Also Utusan Malaysia,
August 20, 197^.
2 The Straits Echo, August 12, 197^ +.
3 The Straits Times, August 10, 197^.
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Many did. not, and in places even sought election as Independents 
against official Barisan Nasional candidates. MCA Leader and 
Secretary-General of the Barisan Nasional, Michael Chen, even found it 
necessary to deny that he was supporting a number of these 
Independents.
The MCA was contesting seats that comprised a high proportion of 
2
Malay electors, whose support for the Barisan Nasional was regarded as
relatively certain. The MCA reasoned that with their support and a
portion of the Chinese votes, many of its candidates would be returned.
What the MCA was seeking was a mandate from the Chinese. Addressing
Chinese guilds, clubs and associations in Segamat, Johore Acting MCA
President Lee San Choon urged
"We will win, but we want to win with the full support of 
the Chinese. It is not so good for Tun Razak to say we 
had won mainly because of the Malay voters. All the 
Chinese must come out to show full support."^
The MGA leaders continually stressed the need for Chinese participat­
ion in government and urged the Chinese to ensure this by electing 
Chinese candidates from the Barisan Nasional.
The call by the" Barisan Nasional's non-Malay based parties, the 
MCA, the Gerakan, the PPP and the MIC, urging the non-Malay voters to 
ensure non-Malay participation in the Government, was backed by UMNO 
leaders, especially the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's style
here was simply to present an ultimatum to the non-Malay population,
A
particularly the Chinese - "Front or Nothing". Repeatedly through­
out the campaign he
"urged all Malaysian Chinese to give their full suport to 
National Front candidates like those from MCA, PPP and 
Gerakan. If they wanted representatives in the
1 , The Straits Times, August 16, 197^*
2 Refer the section on 'Party' Placement of Candidates' in Chapter f^.
3 The Straits Times, August 18, 197^»
^ Star, August 5? 197^ -*
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Government, Tun Razak added, then they would have to 
vote for those who represented the Front, because the 
Government would not take people from other parties 
like the DAP and Pekemas".^
The message was simple and stressed each day in his campaign speeches
- "We do not accept Chinese from the DAP or Pekemas. We will only
2
accept the Chinese in the National Front." - The Straits Times
editorial of August 12, 197^ entitled "Time to Choose" presented the
case succinctly:
"The choice Tun Razak has placed before the non-Malay 
voter is clear: do you want a Malay Government or a
national, multi-racial government? Massive Malay 
representation in government is guaranteed. All but two 
of the A-7 MPs elected unopposed are drawn from UMNO and 
PAS, indisputable proof of their strength on the ground.
With only Independents standing against them in Kelantan, 
a clean sweep can be expected. In fact the Front’s Malay 
candidates in the rural constituencies in Peninsular 
Malaysia are unlikely to lo^se except in one or two areas.
The Prime Minister has made’clear he wants a national 
multi-racial government, not a Malay government.
He will not get it and the non-Malay will not get the 
balanced representation he wants if the National Front’s 
non-Malay candidates are not returned.
Tun Razak has stated again and again that he will not be 
prepared to take the DAP, Pekemas or Partai Rakyat into 
the .'National Front Government. UMNO and PAS on their 
own will have enough elected MPs to enable him to form a 
Malay Government. Every seat won by the Opposition 
parties from the Government’s non-Malay candidates will 
be one seat less for the non-Malays in government.”
This message was continually drummed home. The Press, Radio and
television assured that it would be.
To emphasize its challenge to the Gerakan and the PPP, the DAP
fielded its Penang State Chairman,Yeap Ghim Guan, against the Gerakan
President, Lim Chong Eu, in Tanjong, and its Organising Secretary,
Fan Yew Teptg, against the PPP President, S.P. Seenivasagam, in Ipoh.
The tenor of the campaign was set by the DAP Secretary-General,
Lim Kit Siang, when, on the eve of nomination day, he "challenged
1 Ibid.
2 The Straits Times, August 17, 197^- Also The Sunday Times,
August 11, 1974.
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Dr Tan. Ghee Koon, Dr Lim Chong Eu and Dato Sri Seenivasagam to stand
against him for the Bandar Kuala Lumpur parliamentary seat". He
further added "For good measure, let Dato Lee San Choon and Tun Abdul
Razak also come along so that the people can have a good choice of 
2
party leaders". The choice of Kuala Lumpur Bandar is significant,
it was a constituency with a sitting Pekemas Member of Parliament,
Yeoh Teck Chye, but the Chinese comprised 82,65% of the electorate.
Throughout the campaign the DAP adopted an aggressive campaign
style, thus appearing the more militant and domineering when compared
with the Pekemas. It took the initiative by freely distributing at
its meetings and rallies copies of its,, publication entitled "Coalition
3politics in Malaysia". (Plate A) The arguments presented in the 
document were continually developed. It presented the Barisan 
Nasional as an expedient for principle-lacking, power-hungry politic­
ians to get a share of the spoils, and pointed to the potential grave 
consequences. ■ The Front', the DAP argued, far from representing a 
broader base and thus xion-Malay participation, was' a grand strategy 
by the Alliance, and in particular UMNO, to impose total Malay 
hegemony in the country. Onoe in the Front, the Gerakan and the PPP 
were bound by the terms of their agreement not to voice any opposition 
to policies and could' be disciplined as 'wreckers' of unity if the 
need arose. The effects of such developments was, to suppress 
opposition by absorption, and in the final analysis form the basis for 
the establishment of a one-party- dictatorship. Another fear, the DAP 
submitted, was in the admission of the PAS,tp the. coalition. The DAP
1 The Malay Mail, August 7? 197^*
2 Ibid.
3 Democratic Action Party, Coalition Politics in Malaysia (undated).
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Plate k Cover of DAP publication 'Coalition Politics in Malaysia1.
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speakers pointed out that PAS, long committed to a theocratic Islamic
state and hitherto indifferent to the vicissitudes of opposing a
Federal Government under the Alliance, would see little attraction in a
coalition except for the possibilities that such a coalition would
grant towards the ultimate attainment of their objectives. Already
PAS, it was claimed, had bargained for, and obtained, control of key
government positions and ministries. By contrast, the PPP and the
Gerakan were said to have little to show as achievements for the
■people in joining the Barisan Nasional.
The DAP backed up its campaign with an extensive circulation of
a large amount of printed handouts, back issues of its monthly
publication 'The Rocket' and political cartoons at its rallies, house-
to-house campaigns and street corner hustings. The street corner
hustings involved DAP campaigners posting themselves at vantage points
along principal streets and engaging groups of three or four people at
1
a time,m discussions. This in itself represented a novel and
totally new style of campaigning in Malaysia. These stepsfthe party
deemed necessary,in the face of what the party considered "hostile
2
coverage by the Malaysian Press". Also distributed were mimeo­
graphed copies of its daily press releases, little of which got into 
the Press. In Penang, a cartoon portraying Lim Chong Eu as hiding 
within the 'sarong' of the UMNO gained wide distribution. (Plate 5)
In Perak, similar cartoons, and in particular one of S.P. Seenivasagam
betraying the cause of Justice and Equality as represented by his 
brother, the late D.R. Seenivasagam, was also freely distributed. 
Similarly■distributed in Perak were photographs of D.R. Seenivasagam 
with the words "Remember D.R., Vote for the DAP". In Selangor the
1 The Straits Times, August 12, 197^-
2 Personal interview with DAP Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng,
on August 8, 197A.
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DAP published a four-page document entitled Can You Trust this Chap 
*1
Any More? with a photograph of expelled DAP Vice President, Goh Hock
Guan, who was contesting the 197^ election on a Gerakan ticket. The
document carried contradictory statements passed by Goh Hock Guan, on
Lim Chong Eu and the Gerakan, the Rukunegara, the coalition Government
and Lim Keng Yaik - in each case, statements that Goh Hock Guan had
issued when he was a DAP member, and statements he. had made after he
had joined the Gerakan. While the document was directed essentially
at discrediting Goh Hock Guan, it did not miss the opportunity to drive
home the point on political opportunism by the Gerakan and the PPP in
joining the Barisan Nasional. By way of introduction and
exemplifying the DAP's vituperative style, the document begins:
"The period between 19&9 197^ saw many politicians
indulging in opportunistic double-think and double-talk.
They sold their political principles, pawned their 
political beliefs and mortgaged their political souls.
In short, they literally turned 3&0 degrees roundabout 
to betray the interests and aspirations of the people in 
order to protect and promote their own selfish 
interests.
Like the DAP, the Pekemas questioned the validity of coalition
governments, and the Barisan Nasional claim that it was an attempt to
accommodate non-Malay participation. Dr Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas
President, reflected the Pekemas campaign approach when he said:
"It is gratifying to note that Tun Razak has at long last 
realized that he must have the support of the Chinese in 
the Government. Hence he has called on the voters to 
return National Front Chinese candidates. But does 
Tun Razak really and sincerely want the support of 
Chinese? Or does he want Chinese puppets whom he can 
manipulate at will? ...
prove by DEEDS and not WORDS that the non-bumiputras in 
this country have a place under the Malaysian sun.
1 Democratic Action Party, Can-You- Trust this Chap Any More? 197^* 
Also by the DAP, Goh Hock Guan: Self-Claimed 'Born Leader*
becomes Pathetic Born Follower, (mimeograph) which was distributed 
at Medan Selera, Petaling Jaya, on August 5i 197^-
2 Democratic Action Party, Can You Trust this Chap Any More, '197^ -
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Thus what are the job opportunities for non-bumiputras?
Will he open the doors of both the police and the armed 
forces to reflect the racial composition of the 
country? It Is well known that many jobs in the 
government service and statutory bodies as well have 
been frozen all because there are no bumiputras to 
fill them •
The Pekemas theme for campaigning against the Barisan Nasional 
was, that the Barisan Nasional represented an attempt to form a one- 
party state. Dr Tan Chee Koon again set the pace for his colleagues 
when he declared "If the Front does get the majority, they can do any­
thing with the Constitution ... The National Front has shown that it
2cannot be entrusted with too much power". The Pekemas took partic­
ular exception to Tun Razak1 s statement that "The Barisan was determined 
to see that all Opposition candidates lose their deposits". A strong, 
viable and healthy Opposition was essential for democracy to flourish,
the Pekemas held, failing this, a one-party state leading eventually to
3dictatorial rule would inevitably result. (Plate 6)
With the progress of the campaign the battle for the non-Malay 
vote assumed a greater intensity and political stunts became a distinct 
feature. In'non-Maiay constituencies, the Barisan Nasional candidates 
began harping upon Tun Razak’s visit to China, holding it up as 
convincing proof of his, and the Barisan Nasional’s, genuine interest 
and concern for Chinese welfare. The trip itself had undoubtedly been 
so timed to be advantageous at the election hustings. Now Barisan 
Nasional candidates in non-Malay majority constituencies, began dist­
ributing photographs of Tun Razak shaking hands with Chairman Mao Tse 
Tung. The photograph was in many cases printed on the polling card 
sent out by candidates informing individual electors of their polling
1 Dr Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas President at a public rally in Kepong 
constituency, on August , 197^.
2 The Sunday Times, August 11, 197^-
3 The Malay Mail, August 13, 197^-
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station and registration number. (Plate 7) Other candidates,
included it in the handout alongside their personal bio-data, public
service and the like. So widely was this distributed that it
provoked Fan Yew Teng, the DAP's Organising Secretary and candidate
for Menglembu,to declare "It appears‘that the DAP is contesting
Mao Tse Tung and not the Barisan".
The DAP, for its part, was not to‘be outdone and posters reading
"Vote for a Malaysian Malaysia. Vote for the Rocket" and yet others
reading "The dac-ing^/Scales of justice^ destroys Chinese education;
the Rocket protects Chinese culture - determine to oppose the
dacing" (Plate 8 ) were plastered all over the predominantly Chinese
constituencies. It is to be noted ;that '"the election manifesto and
other earlier publications for the 197^ election had avoided using the
term ’Malaysian Malaysia1 - the term being held by the authorities as
causing communal antagonisms during the 19^9 election. T.he
Government reacted strongly to the posters and ordered them to be
removed. The Acting Inspector General of Police (IGP), Encik Haniff
Omar, held that a ruling had been obtained from the Attorney-General1s
chambers that there was sufficient evidence to warrant investigation
under the Sedition Act,and instructed the DAP,to remove the posters
within two days. The Acting IGP stated that the Police saw the
posters put up by the parties and candidates, and taped their speeches
for evidence of infringement of the Sedition Act as well as for
3blatant racialism and extremism. The DAP ignored the Acting IGP’s 
orders and the police attempted to remove the posters, but throughout 
the campaign period the posters, made their appearance. The incident
1 Fan;Yew Teng at a public rally in Menglembu on August 20, 197^«
2 The Barisan Nasional1s symbol is a golden scales of justice on a 
blue background.
3 The Straits Times, August i6 , 197^*
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Translation: The dacing destroys Chinese education,
the rocket protects Chinese culture ... 
determine to oppose the dacing;
the dacing changes the character of Chinese schools.
The Pacing (scales of justice) is the Barisan Nasional party symbol; 
that of the DAP is the rocket.
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provided the Barisan Nasional1s component parties with the opportunity
for a fresh onslaught on the DAP on grounds of racialism, communalism
and Chinese chauvinism. Prime Minister Tun Razak himself took the
lead accusing the DAP of "irresponsible campaign" which could cause an
eruption of sentiments and affect' national security. The UMNO and
the MCA candidates reminded the public that the "tactics were similar
to those used by elements responsible for arousing communal hatred and
dissension during and after the 1969 election". The Straits Times
editorial of August 20, 197^ stated the Barisan Nasional1s position:
"Do they know what they are doing these abrasive young 
men who seem prepared to .gamble with the nation’s life 
for a handful of seats? ... If the DAP can write on 
their posters the most crass appeals to chauvinist 
emotion, to what lengths are its men on the ground going 
- those who are moving from house to house, whispering 
from mouth to ear?"
Indeed, to what extents were the DAP men going? Why, for that
f
matter to what length were the Barisan Nasional men, the Pekemas men 
and-those from each of the parties going? If anything ,the editorial 
was a sad commentary on the difficulty of supervising a campaign to 
ward off communal appeals. The DAP /however, appeared content 
for the rare publicity it received for one of its many initiatives.
The DAP and Pekemas for their part did not let up in their own 
scathing attacks on each other, both accusing the other of negotiating 
for a place in the Barisan Nasional and each denying that it itself 
had. The DAP took the offensive even at the outset and maintained 
the tempo throughout, never missing any opportunity for a broadside at 
the Pekemas. Pekemas leaders were accused of having connived with the 
Alliance in voting for the- Constitution Amendment Act 1971,and this, it 
was held, made a sham of the Pekemas call on the people to vote for the
1 The Malay Mail, August 15, 197^ •
2 Ibid.
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party’s candidates to deny the-Barisan Nasional its two-thirds 
majority. Pekemas leaders were also accused of being political 
opportunists who fought each election on a different partytticket - 
a reference to the Pekemas leaders first having been in the Labour 
Party, and then helped to form the Gerakan, and again, on expulsion 
from the latter, having formed the Pekemas. The keenness expressed 
by the Pekemas to have a United Opposition Front with the DAP even in 
the eleventh hour,made its objections about the DAP appear rather 
hollow. The DAP leaders for their part,had carefully prepared the 
electorate by having continuously presented the failure of their talks 
with the Pekemas as a consequence of the lack of sincerity on the part 
of Pekemas leaders.
The DAP entered' the campaign distinctly better organized than
the Pekemas. The DAP,as a party in existence for no less than eight
years,had a better and tighter ground level organisation than the
Pekemas which had been formed only two years prior to the election. The
Pekemas had moved fast and in the two years had established numerous 
'I
branches. This in itself may be an impressive feat, but when the
time came for these branches to present the campaign workers they were
found wanting, Pekemas Treasurer,V. Veerapan,explained:
"What’s the difficulty in opening branches, just catch a 
dozen fellows to be office bearers and register the branch.
These fellows must be sufficiently interested to mobilise 
support. Anyway it takes time to gather support in an 
area and our branches were all new."^
The DAP allocated its national level leadership between the 
various states it was contesting, and these leaders each maintained a 
well co-ordinated organization throughout the■campaign period. In 
Penang,the organization was headed by Yeap Ghim Guan,and Ex-Co member,
1 Refer Chapter A, the section on political party branches.
2 Personal interview with Pekemas Treasurer, V. Veerapan,
August 10, 197A.
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Peter Dason; in Perak, by Organising Secretary,Fan Yew Teng,and Deputy 
Secretary,Lim Cho Hock; in the Federal Territory and in Selangor, by 
Publicity Officer, Lee Lam Thye; in Negri Sembilan,by President,Chen 
Man Hin,and Treasurer,Seevaratnam;and in Malacca by Bernard Sta Maria. 
Secretary General ,Lim Kit Siang,maintained a firm supervisory control
'I
over all these state level organizations. Detailed preparations had
been undertaken months earlier. Bernard Sta Maria explained the
type of organisation that had been attempted
"The DAP in Malacca has been extremely well organized.
We have maintained an office functioning for the past 
five years with paid staff. The people actually main­
tained it. Each year we go round collecting funds and 
have no problem collecting at least M>jf 2,000> . It is a 
good psychological ally. It gives them a stake in the 
whole thing and they feel they must see the DAP win.
Previously it used to cost us between M#'100 and M ^ 200 per 
rally. Then, we got our own public address system and our 
own van. We erected our own platform on the van by 
building brackets, etc. Now it only costs us about 
M ^  10 to M$T20 per rally. This gave us a good opportunity 
to train our speakers and-candidates. Even four months 
before nomination day we started having rallies - as many
as four per week. We started in the areas where we were
not fielding candidates. Soon the candidates lost their 
stage fright and became eloquent. Then we moved into the 
areas we were contesting."
The DAP leaders made a systematic effort to present their party as more
militant, distinctly outspoken and fearless, and better organized.
Much of this was conveyed in the campaign speeches and even the manner
in which DAP candidates conducted themselves during the campaign period
For instance ,all DAP candidates dressed in white and had short haircuts
- one senior member of the party who had not done so,is said to have
been given a stern telling-off by the party’s Secretary General,
Lim Kit Siang. Perhaps such uniformity is unimportant in the search
for votes,but it is reflective of the effort and type of image that the
1 Personal interview with DAP Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng, 
August 8, 197^*
2 Personal interview with Bernard Sta Maria, August 20, 197^-
3oA
DAP attempted to convey. The Pekemas by comparison conducted a less 
organized campaign. Its party leaders were confined to the Federal 
Territory and Penang where they were each defending seats, victory in 
which was considered tenuous. Thus excluding those in Penang, the 
Federal Territory and Selangor, the Pekemas candidates were left very 
much to their own resources. Desperate attempts by some of the 
candidates to get national level leaders to speak at their rallies 
failed.
The Partai Rakyat also fielded candidates in non-Malay majority 
constituencies in Penang, Melaka and Pahang. The party's campaign 
was essentially on a non-communal socialist platform,but in view of 
the dominance of the Barisan Nasional-DAP-Pekemas battle, the Partai 
Rakyat received scant attention as a party that could mobilise non- 
Malay support. Pekemas treasurer ,V. Veerapan, summed up the attitude 
of the other parties when he held,"The Partai Rakyat's support is very 
small but hardcore. They can convert few of ours and we can convert 
none of theirs". The statement is a reflection of the gulf that 
exists between the Partai Rakyat and the other parties in terms of 
their approach to Malaysian politics. The Barisan Nasional, however, 
was delighted by the Partai Rakyat's participation in the non-Malay 
areas, reasoning that it would aid in further splitting the opposition 
vote.
The Battle for the Malay Votes
The Malay vote has traditionally been successfully contested by 
■only the UMNO'and" the PAS. 'In some areas,other parties have managed 
to woo the Malay vote with limited success - notably the Partai Rakyat, 
.and in the 19^9 election the Gerakan. The formation of the Barisan
1 At a personal interview on August 10, 197^ -.
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Nasional meant that excepting Partai Rakyat there was no Malay-based
opposition party. Not surprisingly, therefore, thirty of the Barisan
Nasional’s seventy-five Malay candidates (seventy-four of whom were
placed in Malay majority constituencies) were returned unopposed.
■Though in places the Barisan Nasional's Malay candidates were being
contested by the DAP and the Pekemas, serious challenge for the Malay
votes came from only the Partai Rakyat and the Malay Independents, the
latter comprising essentially the UMNO and PAS dissidents who had been
unable to obtain nomination via the UMNO or the PAS. In Kelantan,
the dissidents quickly grouped together Into the Bebas Bersatu (the*'
United Independent Front), issued a ten-point manifesto , utilized a 
2
common symbol , and gave a semblance of organized and co-ordinated 
challenge. For the main part ,the rest of the Independents lacked any 
organization or common policy and their challenge for the Malay votes 
proved nominal.
Many of the Independents cut a pathetic image and their only 
grouse against the Barisan Nasional remained that they had been denied 
nomination. In the event they hoped to stand as Independents and, 
should they prove successful, regain entry into the Barisan Nasional. 
The internal rivalry that occurred in many localities between the UMNO 
and the PAS officials,allowed for claims that the Independents were 
indeed being sponsored by either the UMNO, or the PAS leaders, in an 
attempt to weaken the position of the other, in a newly elected 
Barisan Nasional government. In Johore, Encik Mohammed bin Kassim 
(Batu Pahat) and Haji Abdul Hadi bin Mohammad Yassin (Semerah), both
1 Calun-calun Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 10 Garis Kasar dan Analisa, 
Manifesto Pilihanraya 197^, Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 197^*
2 All eight parliamentary candidates of the Bebas Bersatu utilised 
a white bus on a green background as their symbol.
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PAS members, claimed that they were permitted to stand as Independents
1against Barisan Nasional candidates. In several other instances, 
the rumour was effectively passed around and UMNO and PAS leaders 
found themselves in the embarrassing position of denying that they were 
indeed privately sponsoring independent candidates. In Selangor, the
UMNO Youth President and Chief Minister, Dato Harun Idris, had to issue
2
a press release denying such claims by some Independents. The
Barisan Nasional reacted to this challenge by expelling all party
members who stood as Independents and those who supported them. Thus,
twelve UMNO members were expelled In Sabak Bernam for having nominated
UMNO dissident Datuk Taiban Hassan (Sabak Bernam) and two other
candidates for the state election.. . Similarly,in Malacca, Haji
Maidin bin Haji Manap,.. former Deputy-Chairman of the Bandar Melaka
UMNO Division, who was contesting the Batu Berendam parliamentary
constituency, and two other candidates contesting the state election.
' k
were expelled. In Penang, UMN0Ts Sungei Tiram branch Chairman,
Encik Suhaimi bin Ismail,was similarly expelled for contesting the
5
Bayan Lepas state constituency. In Perils,eight independent
candidates for parliamentary and state seats,and forty of those who
had supported their nomination,were similarly expelled. In
Trengganu,UMN0*s former Speaker of the Trengganu State Assembly, Datuk
Abdul Rahman bin Long, was expelled for contesting the Kuala Nerus
7
parliamentary constituency. The spate of expulsions continued and
1 Star, August 13? 197^-
2 The Straits Times, August 16, 197^-
3 Utusan Malaysia, August 12, 197^»
^ The Straits Times, August 12, 197^*
3 Ibid.
6 Star, August 10, 197^*
7 The Malay Mail, August 9? 197^-
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greatly demoralized the independent candidates. In Kelantan, Tengku 
Razaleigh, who presided over the Barisan Nasional1s election machinery 
made the message clear, MWe will not only expel them, we will take away
'I
whatever privileges they enjoyed as party leaders and members** and a 
party aide explained:
**We know them all - those who have licences as wholesale 
rice dealers, those who have taxi-permits, even those who 
have permits to keep shot guns and pistols. Poor chaps, 
they will not only lose their deposits but they might even 
lose their Mercedes Benzes.**^
Such a move by the Barisan Nasional led to a progressive lowering of 
dissident morale and some even gave up their candidature and returned 
to their own parties.
The Barisan Nasional, however, had to face a tougher challenge 
from the Bebas Bersatu in Kelantan than it had from the dissidents 
elsewhere, though even here,the battle appeared by all counts to be 
low-key - low-key by comparison with the battle for the non-Malay votes, 
and more so, by comparison with the previous engagements between the 
UMNO and the PAS. Lacking was the tension, the ugly bloody incidents 
between rival factions, groups of men,some armed,squatting around party 
arches, fights, kidnappings, stabbing incidents and buffaloes slashed 
in the padi-fields, that long marked Kelantan political campaigns -
b,fthere were no thugs brought from Patani” explained a party aide.
1 The Straits Times, August 20, 197^«
2 Ibid.
3 For example, Ahmad bin Abdullah Manaf,who was earlier nominated 
as an independent candidate for the Mantin parliamentary seat? 
withdrew in favour of the Barisan Nasional candidate.
The Straits Times, August J\97b*
b Patani is a province of Thailand adjoining Kelantan state and is 
principally Malay in ethnic composition.
The Straits Times, August 20, 197^»
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During the 1969 election campaign between 600 and 700 reports were 
made to the police ranging from fist fights to armed attacks and 
assaults. The 197^ campaign saw no such activity, there being by 
August 16 only one report. Even public rallies were few and these 
were virtually all organized by the Barisan Nasional. Kelantan in 
197^ - had by all previous standards a very quiet election campaign.
This was a reflection of the state of the competing groups, their 
respective financial and manpower resources and the inability of the 
Bebas Bersatu to muster sufficient enthusiasm or raise burning issues 
that would excite the Kelantanese Malays1 fervour. The reasons for 
this go back to the very organization and development of the Bebas 
Bersatu itself.
The Bebas Bersatu was a hurriedly formed grouping of individuals, 
led by the dissident PAS Youth Leader,Ehcik Fakhruddin bin Abdullah, 
who had served as the PAS Member of Parliament for Pasir Mas. The 
nucleus of the group was the Golongan Revulisi (Revolutionary Group), 
a group of PAS dissidents who in March 197^ demanded the resignation . 
of the PAS Kelantan State Chief Minister, Datuk Ishak Lutfi. The 
Bebas Bersatu emphasized its Islamic leanings and campaigned for a 
,rclean, honest and efficient government". The writer interviewed 
Encik Fakhruddin at his residence in Pasir Mas. The principal issue, 
he claimed, was the PAS’s un-Islamic conduct by way of corruption, 
nepotism and, generally, the neglect of the poor. His group, he said, 
intended to frcleanse the government of corruption and nepotism of 
Asri and Ishak Lutfi."^
1 The Straits Times, August 17, 197^*
2 Personal interview with Encik Muhammad Fakhruddin, leader of
the Bebas Bersatu, on August 23, 197^» ;
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Pamphlets attacking the Mentri Besar and the State Economic 
Development Corporation, which had been earlier circulated by the 
Ctolongan Revulisi- , were given even wider circulation by the Bebas
Bersatu. Encik Fakhruddin himself gave the writer copies of it.
One of the pamphlets alleged that the State Government had since 1939 
sold a total of 1,186,703 acres of timber land, to principally Chinese 
companies, for a pittance. Included for circulation with the pamphlet 
were photostat copies of a purported agreement made on January 13,
1970 between the Kelantan State Development Corporation and two 
Chinese of Sharikat Kayuan Gunong Tahan of Temerloh, Pahang, and, a 
photostat copy of a Chartered Bank, Kuala Lumpur cheque dated January 
27, 1970 to the value of M#' 1^-0,000 allegedly made out by this Gunong 
Tahan Enterprise to PAS State Ex Co member,.Dato Nik Man bin Nik Mat, 
for arranging the timber concession. The pamphlet minced no words 
and linked the alleged corruption to the PAS President Dato Asri 
himself: - '
"Dato Nik Man who is in the Kelantan EXCO, was at one time 
the Timber Chairman in Asri’s government. In political
terms Asri and Nik Man are Siamese twins. No surgeon
would be able to separate them for they have a common lung, 
moreover if Nik Mqn were to eat,A-sri would also feel 
satiated. Asri ... as Chairman of the SEDC gives away 
the timber entrusted to him by the EXCO and the people of 
Kelantan, amount by'amount, to the timber ’towkays1 who 
are willing to bribe him and his hangers on."^
1 The original text in the Malay language reads:
"Ada pun Dato Nik Man in Exco Kelantan, pernah menjadi 
Pengerusi Balak dalam Kerajaan Asri. Maka dalam bahasa 
politi pula Asri dan Nik Man adalah KEYBAR SIAM.
Ta’ada doctor bedah yang sanggup memisahkannya kerana 
mereka mempunyai Lanya satu jantong, tambahan pula kalan 
Nik Man makan Asri juga merasa kenyang.
Asri ... sebagai Pengerusi SEDC, beliau meyerahkan Balak 
yang di amakah deh EXCO dan Rakyat negeri Kelantan, banyak 
demi banyak kapada taukeh balak yang sanggup member! 
ganjaran kapadanya dan juga kapada kuncu-kuncunya."
Golongan Revulusi, Siri Sastera Revulusi, Bil. 30, dated June 6 , 
197^. (Copy with this writer.)
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Religion has always played a significant role in Kelantan and
indeed Malay politics, and the ulamas (‘theologians), imams (leader of
the congregation), penghulus (headmen) and bilals (persons in charge
of the mosque) who are on the State Government's payroll had in the
past campaigned'for the PAS; but such support for the Bebas Bersatu
- at least overt support - was not forthcoming. Even though the
bulk of these-religious leaders may have felt that' the PAS should not
have gone into the coalition, their own positions as servants of the
State Government did not make them take the risks of going against the
PAS. In any case, such risks appeared unwarranted because the Bebas
Bersatu did not pose as an ideological alternative to the PAS, and its
formation, though causing interest, presented no rallying point or
burning issue for the-cause of■ the religious leaders. Indeed the
Bebas Bersatu leaders left the door open for their own participation
in the coalition Barisan Nasional. Encik Fakhruddin himself conceded
that several of the Bebas -Bersatu candidates would join UMNO should
they win the election and be accepted by UMNO. In the face of such
a lack of commitment -on the part of the ^ebas Bersatu candidates, their
claim to "uplift and defend Islam as the official religion of the 
2
nation" served little to ascertain the support of the religious leaders. 
The PAS and UMNO leaders for their part, made certain that the religious 
leaders would stay in line, and a directive was issued by the Mentri
Besar to these leaders warning them against participation in the
3
political campaign. The Bebas Bersatu, eager to represent the PAS 
as'having betrayed the cause of Islam, retaliated by distributing
1 At the personal interview on August 23, 197^»
2 Calun-calun Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 10 Garis Kasar dan Analisa, 
Manifesto Pilihanraya 197^, -Bebas' Bersatu, Kelantan',. ■197^1
3 The Straits Times, August 20, 197^*
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photographs of the PAS Mentri Besar of Kelantan allegedly performing 
the opening ceremony of a Chinese temple. (Plate 9)
The Bebas Bersatu1s campaign was seriously handicapped by its 
lack of organization and financial resources. The group was not even 
registered as a party, and there existed no branches whose services 
the group could rely on. Encik Fakhruddin's residence itself served 
as'the headquarters for the campaign. Posters were few, there were 
insufficient copies of the manifesto, and campaign workers could not 
be paid. Its campaign was devoid of the drive, consistency, and the 
stamina of a political party for it to be contended as a potent force. 
The difficulties faced, particularly the lack of financial resources, 
were to an extent overcome by holding a large number of majlis 
ceramah'(dialogue sessions). The majlis ceramah, is a particularly 
adept form of campaigning in the essentially Malay rural areas, and 
Kelantanese innovativeness has developed this into an especially 
sophisticated campaign style. The majlis ceramah spearheads the 
penetration of a village. The sponsors are either party stalwarts or 
sympathisers who live in the village, and their role is essentially to 
organize the majlis ceramah and invite their friends,who often turn up 
for reasons of politeness, or a sense of neighbourliness. The numbers 
at such majlis ceramah range from between twenty tot one hundred, or 
even more persons. The organizer introduces the campaigner who then 
begins a speech and then a dialogue with those present. The majlis 
ceramah are normally held at night after 1Isha1 (the evening prayers) 
and can last well nigh into the early hours of the morning. The 
short campaign period, and the absence of resources for mass rallies, 
meant that numerous majlis ceramah had to be arranged for the same day. 
The writer persuaded Encik Fakhruddin to let him attend one of these 
and he agreed. This majlis ceramah was held after the noon prayers 
(Sembahyang Jumaat) on Friday, August 23, 197^, “two miles from
Photographs 
distributed by 
the Bebas Bersatu 
in Kelantan.
- 'PAS Chief 
Minister of 
Kelantan 
performing the 
opening ceremony 
of a Chinese 
temple'.
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Pasir Mas on the way to Lubok Tong,at the home of a Bebas Bersatu 
sympathiser. The room used was approximately twenty feet by twenty 
feet in size ,with split bamboo walls roughly painted over with 
aluminium paint and an attap roof. The floor was merely beaten earth 
and rough wooden benches covered with newspaper sufficed for the 
seating. The audience comprising predominantly of aged males and 
numbering between sixty and seventy, was soon spilling over into the 
adjoining rooms. tye were served tea, and the campaigner, a Malay 
school teacher, was introduced by the host. The campaigner explained 
how the PAS had always been an Islamic party, but now Datuk Asri and 
his cronies had betrayed the cause of Islam. As proof was held out 
the green flag with a crescent on it, which had long been the PAS 
symbol, and the'Barisan Nasional1s blue and gold colours. Photos of 
the Kelantan Mentri Besar inaugurating a Chinese temple were 
distributed. Then an emotional attack on Harami (illegitimate ones) 
and Kaffir (non-believer) followed. The Harami and Kaffirs were 
being allowed to exploit the poor Muslims, said the speaker. Here 
the sale of timber land to non-Malay companies provided a convenient 
example. Nepotism and lack of land for the poor were all master­
fully woven into the theme of the PAS corruption and betrayal of the
Islamic faith. Bebas Bersatu supporters-had mingled with the crowd
and interrupted with approving interjections. Soon the audience was
nodding in approval, and the rapport was established for an effective
majlis ceramah - the strained and formal atmosphere gave way to an
intimate dialogue between' the campaigner and the audience. A marked
characteristic of this majlis ce-ramah, and indeed the Bebas Bersatu
campaign as a whole, was that UMNO and the concept of the Barisan
Nasional underwent little criticism, much of the invective being
directed at the PAS. In Encik Fakhruddin1s own words, the campaign
■ 1
was "one shot at UMNO, three shots at. PAS".
1 At the personal interview on August 23, 197^.
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The PAS and the UMNO, however, did not regard the challenge of the 
Bebas Bersatu lightly. For the PAS leaders, the battle presented the 
opportunity to nip in the bud the opposition to PAS supremacy. Any 
victory by the Bebas Bersatu candidates could mean the thin aid of a 
wedge that could cut right through the PAS organization and support. 
Accordingly, the Barisan Nasional waged a determined and carefully 
planned campaign. Massive amounts of literature, posters and banners 
were distributed - the Barisan Nasional posters for Kelantan (twelve 
constituencies with 311,608 electors) weighed seventeen tons; the 
UMNO candidates in the state alone were allotted A-,000 full time 
election workers. The Barisan Nasional headquarters in Kota Bharu, 
manned round the clock with the PAS and the UMNO officials, bustled 
with activity. Co-ordination Committees for all constituencies, 
polling districts and polling centres right down to the village level 
were effective.
The PAS and the UMNO leaders presented the union of the two
parties as the ultimate unity of the Malay people. Tengku Razaleigh
told a political rally "we were fighting bitterly against each other
2
once, but now we have formed a common front". The PAS leader,
Datuk Asri declared that Malay unity was the political force that
should be galvanised to form the backbone of Malaysian unity - "This
is a great development, a phenomenon that will not possibly occur
3again m  a thousand years". To the Kelantanese, long divided by 
UMNO and PAS conflicts, the appeal was best presented as the time for 
peace and unity:
1 The Straits Times, August 20, 197^-
2 The Straits Times, August 1^, 197^*
3 The Straits Times, August 19, 197^ +®
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"Remember how bitterly we fought each other since 1959?
We not only fought with our 11-idah1 /tonguej/ but some of
us fought with our fists and our 'kapak kecil1 /small
axe_s7• Brother fought against brother; father against
son; families became estranged and disrupted. Husbands
lost their wives. Villages became split into bitter
opposing camps. Our ulamas gave conflicting fatwas /declarations/
because they represented different political factions.
You were either a 'kafir* or you were not.
Now we are united, we have healed our wounds. We can 
have our kenduris /feasts_/togetlier. No man need fear 
being boycotted or ostracised by his neighbour just 
because he is a PAS man or an UMNO man."^
Malay unity, and with it an assurance of political supremacy - the
call was music to the Kelantanese ear.
The Barisan Nasional1s challenge for the Malay vote in Trengganu
and Pahang came essentially from the Partai Rakyat. In Trengganu
the Partai Rakyat was contesting six of the seven parliamentary seats,
and it was- here that the principal party leaders were seeking election
- President, Kassim bin Ahmad, Vice President, Datuk Kampo Radjo and
Secretary-General, Satar bin Haji Dahan. The party was also making
a concerted effort to capture the Trengganu State Government. It
explained the choice of Trengganu "for its emphasis as being because
Trengganu ,was ''the most neglected and the most exploited state in
2
Peninsular Malaysia". In adjoining Pahang, the party contested four 
of the eight parliamentary seats besides attempting to emerge as the 
principal opposition party in the State Assembly.
The challenge- of the Partai Rakyat had always posed an enigma 
to the Alliance, and so it did in the 197^ election to the Barisan 
Nasional. To brand the party as communal, as was conveniently done 
in the case of the DAP and to a lesser degree the Pekemas, was 
impossible - the leadership was essentially Malay, but, unlike the 
other opposition parties, the Partai Rakyat contested in both Malay
1 The Straits Times--,- August 20, 197^-
2 The Sunday Times, August 11, 197^•
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and non-Malay areas. More importantly, the party campaigned on an 
essentially non-communal platform, paying scant regard to the issues 
that have tended to divide Malaysian society along communal lines. 
Lacking in its printed literature, press releases and campaign 
speeches was any exploitation of the communal issue. Even in issuing 
a special manifesto for the Trengganu State Assembly election, the 
party declared, that it aimed- at raising the standard of living of the
'j
people "irrespective of race". An appeal on the grounds that it
was to raise the standard of living of the Malay people would have been
more effective i-n Trengganu, where Malays comprise 9^*11% of the 
electorate. Alternatively, for the Barisan Nasional to brand the 
party as comprising frustrated individuals who had deserted the PAS 
and the UMNO on failing to be nominated as candidates for the election;) . 
as was done in the case of the Independents and the Bebas Bersatu, was 
again impossible. Undoubtedly, the Partai Rakyat leaders have 
formed a band, though small, of individuals who have shown consistent 
loyalty and dedication to their chosen cause. The party*s National
Treasurer claimed that he could have stood on an UMNO ticket in any
p
constituency he chose,if he had agreed to join UMNO. Like many of 
Partai Rakyat's national level leaders,he certainly had all the 
necessary qualifications to recommend him as a candidate.
i
Perhaps what ^rked the Barisan Nasional most was the disdain 
shown its formation by the Partai Rakyat leaders. All other politcal 
parties had allowed the formation of the Barisan Nasional and its 
implications for Malaysian society to- become the main issue in the 
campaign. • The Partai Rakyat, however,treated the formation of the 
Barisan Nasional with relatively little concern,regarding it merely as
1 The Star, August 11, 197^ •
2 Utusan Malaysia, August 13, 197^«
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an enlarged Alliance that had been hurriedly put together, because the
Alliance had lost its credibility by the election reverses in 19&9 and
the pursuant communal violence. The party explained:
"What is the National Front? It is an enlarged Alliance; 
an association of bourgeois parties that are bankrupt but 
still power mad, and a group of opportunists who use the 
nationalist and Islamic slogan to deceive the people. Why 
do we regard it as a large Alliance? Because its basis 
is that of the Alliance. Why do we regard it as bankrupt? 
Because they are trying to sell goods that are no longer 
saleable with the use of new wrappings. Why do we regard 
them as opportunistic? Bbcause they are willing to cheat 
and oppress the people in order' to perpetuate their power.
If the A.lliance was destroyed by the racial riots of the 
13th of May, 'the1, fate of the Barisan Nasiorial ’will, cbrtainly 
be no better than thati"^
The principal issue as far as the Partai Rakyat was concerned was 
the neglect of the masses, the exploitation of the poor by the rich.
In keeping with its socialist programme, the. party called for 'land 
to all farmers1, permanent land grants-to those having temporary ones, 
the sponsoring of co-operative projects for fishermen, the reduction of 
fees for hawker licences 'and-the nationalisation of industries,
p
businesses and banks owned by foreigners. Corruption and nepotism
1 The original text in the Malay language read as follows:
"Apa dia Barisan .Nasional? Barisan Nasional ia lah 
Perikatan yang di-perbesarkan, satu:gabungan partai, borjuis 
yang -sudah bangkerap tetapi yang tamakkan kuasa, satu pakatan 
opporcunis yang mengunakan selogan. nasronalis dan Islam 
untuk mengabus mata rakyat.- Mengapa kita sifatkan dia 
sebagai Perikatan -besar? Kerana dasarnya dasar Perikatan*. 
Mengapa-bankerap? Kerana mereka cu’ba men jual barang,
lama yang sudah ti-dak--laku -de-ngan menggunakan bungkusan 
baru. Itf-engapa oporcunis.? Kerana mepeka sanggup menipu 
dan menekan rakyatJ untuk ■mengekalkan.-kuasa' mereka. Kalau
Perikatan telah dihancurkan . didalam 'kencah rusuhan 
perkauman Mei 13, nasib yang menanti Barisan Nasional tentu 
tidak lebih baik da.fi ithl" ,
Party President, Kassim Ahmad's speech to party cadres of the 
Kedah-Perlis division of the Partai Rakyat on July .12, 197^» 
Mimeographed copy of the text of the speech with this writer.
2 ■ The Star, August 11, 197^ -.
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in government circles was given special emphasis. In Johore, its 
lone parliamentary candidate Encik Abdul Razak (Pulai constituency) 
alleged unfair distribution of land by the State Government and 
demanded the release of a report completed in 1968 by the Raja Azlan
Inquiry Commission into allegations of Maladministration, malpractices
/ • <] 
and breach of law committed by the Johore Baru Town Council. In
Pahang, the party's candidate for the Kuantan parliamentary constit­
uency, Siva Subramaniam, distributed photostat copies of documents to 
prove that relatives of high government' officials received grants of 
land within two months of application1for them - "the rakyat" (people) 
he claimed "have to wait for seventeen years. We want to show to
the Malays that what is being done for them has benefitted only a
2
handful of rich Malays". Only a socialist government with
socialist'policies can cure Malaysia's ills was the message the party 
hoped to drive home in all the campaigns.
The Barisan Nasional's rebuttal to such challenges was essent­
ially to highlight its own achievements in the field of economic 
development, and then, to ridicule Partai'Rakyat's policies. The 
Malaysian Government's interest in foreign investment was to effect a 
transfer of technology and- train the local people, explained the
Barisan'Nasional's Kelantan and Trengganu election chief, Tengku 
3
Razaleigh. 1 He was rebutting'the Partai Rakyat's charges, that
foreign capitalists dominated the, rubber, tin-, palm oil and modern
industries sector, and-that, whilst 100,000 farmers were landless,
h
foreigners owned more than 1.3 million acres. Tengku Razaleigh
1 Utus-an Malaysia, August 13, 197^*
2 The Straits Times, August 12,, 197^.
3 , The Straits Times, August 19,, 1972*.
k The Straits Echo, August 12, 197^.
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held that the Partai Rakyat's method of "robbing the rich to help the
poor" would not benefit anybody as "the rich will become poor and the
poor become poorer". Encik Khir Johari, a former Minister in the
Federal cabinet, who had been returned unopposed, typified the Barisan
Nasional's response to the Partai Rakyat's call for a socialist
programme, when he- declared:
"It means we have- to stop buying tractors and instead 
supply our farmers with changkuls /does/, take back all 
the buffaloes' and-put them into a-'common pool so that 
everyone can use them in turn, stop giving loans to people 
who want to.buy their ownt; land • or houses, withdraw all our 
bank- notes and- issue coupbns for food, clothing and other 
goods."
More damaging to the Partai Rakyat, were the attempts made by the
Barisan Nasional to present the Partai Rakyat1s socialist policies as
being anti-Islamic. To the despair of the Partai Rakyat's
candidates, copies of a poem written by party President Kassim Ahmad
years earlier, entitled 'Sidang Ruh1•(Meeting of the Souls) attained
wide circulation. The last four lines- of the poem were presented as
conclusive evidence of Kassim Ahmad's and the Partai Rakyat's atheist
and anti-Islamic beliefs. The said lines read:
"nanti akan padamlah dengan sendirinya 
lampu-dari menara tinggi 
karena dibawahnya orang kian .mabuR' 
dan Tuhan sudah mati."
-■ /the- torch from the high minaret 
shall die by itself 
because benekth it so many are drunk 
and God is - dead/ 3
The party had in previous elections too been seriously handicapped by
its opponents imposing-1 on it an anti-Islam label, and so, Kassim Ahmad
attempted-to.' dispel such1 an-image at the onset of the election
1 The Straits Times, August 19? 197^>
1 ;
2 The Star, August 18, 197^»
I
3 The original text is in the Malay language.
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campaign:
"Is our party against religion as it is claimed by our 
enemies? No. Our party guarantees the freedom of 
religion for all peoples-. Is our party against Islam 
as the national religion? I feel that in principle, no.
Islam is in my opinion, a religion that advocates good and 
is against evil as well as having the intention of freeing 
mankind from nonsensical beliefs and from placing man in 
the position of Caliph on this earth. This also is the 
troot of the socialist'struggle. As such in our country 
'the socialist struggle is compatible to the teachings 
of Islam.
To the academic this may have been mentally satisfactory, but to the 
lay Malay it. was tantamount to equivocating with his basic belief.
It is difficult to assess the exact extent of the damage that the anti- 
Islam label did, except to note that the Malay is intimately linked 
to Islam for its perceived spiritual and temporal implications.
No aspect of his domestic, economic,, social and political life is con­
ducted outside the framework'of such beliefs. The Malaysian rural 
scene may have changed, but the way of life of its people has barely 
been scratched; traditional values still play an overwhelming role in 
the outlook and'thinking of the peasants. Thus,in the predominantly 
rural and Malay world of Trengganu, where Partai Rakyat's main 
challenge to the Barisan Nasional came, the effect of an anti-Islam
I 1
label could not be anything but damaging.
To emphasize that Partai Rakyat's ideology was indeed anti-Islam 
and alienjthe Barisan Nasional stated that funds from foreign sources
1 The original text in .the Malay language reads as follows:
"Adak-ah Part-ai. kita menentang agama, dapqrti yang ditohmahkan 
oleh musuh kita? Tidak. Partai kita menjaminkan 
Rebebasan berag-ama bagi semua penduduk. Adakah Partai kita 
” men'entang-. IsTamrs'ehagai* “agama ‘negaraT" • Saya,'tfikir'V"p''ad'a •' 
prihsipnya, tidak juga. Islam pada penda^at saya, adalah 
satu agama yang menyeru kepada kebaikandan melarang 
kejahatan serta bertujuan membebadkan manusia dari segala 
kepercayaan karut dan mendaulatkan manusia sebagai 
khalifah di-dunia ini. Ini juga adalah tujuan pokok 
perjuangan sosialis. Dengan demikian, di negeri kita, 
perjuangan sosialis adalah sejar dengan ajaran Islam."
Party President, Kassim bin Ahmad1s speech to party cadres of the 
Kedah-Perlis division of the Partai Rakyat on July 12, 19?^- 
Mimeographed copy of the text of the, speech with this writer.
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were filling Partai Rakyat's coffers. The Partai Rakyat of course
denied these charges, claiming that it was "only spending between
M/ 2 ,000 and M^ 3,000 on each parliamentary candidate, and that
1includes the deposit of each candidate". The party attempted to
overcome its difficulties by a thorough house-to-house campaign,
! .
between 300 and 600 workers, almost all volunteers, were deployed to
each of the parliamentary constituencies it was contesting in
Trengganu. This house to house campaign was backed up by seventy-nine
public rallies- and hundreds of majlis ceramah. A measure of support
came from university students, who had travelled from their campuses
in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, to assist in the campaign. The support
lent the Partai Rakyat by university students provoked the ire of
Barisan Nasi-onal members. UMNO Supreme Council member Mahathir
Mohammad declared:
"Students should be grateful to the government for the 
thousands of dollars Spent oh them each year. They 
should concentrate on their studies' and not get involved 
in politics."^
The DAP and the Pekemas,' boo, fielded candidates in the Malay- 
majority constituencies and would have.welcomed .Malay support. But
their image as principally non-Malay parties handicapped them. Their
search for the non-Malay vote, especially as the campaign progressed, 
was marked by an increasingly communal appeal, thus reinforcing the 
Malay voters1 fears. The DAP and the Pekemas were also greatly 
embarrassed: 'by the withdrawal of some of their Malay candidates from 
the State‘Assembly elections being held at the same time. In Johore, 
the DAP's candidate for the Buloh Kasap State Assembly seat , and in
1 The Sunday Times, August 11, 197^ +-
2 Ibid.
3 The Straits Times, August 19, 197^ +»
^ The Straits1 Times, August 1^ -, 197^>
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1
Negri Sembilan , its candidates for the Jempol State seat,withdrew
from the election and urged the electors to vote for the Barisan
Nasional. In Selangor, the Pekemas candidate for the Panglima Garang
State Assembly seat, similarly withdrew, again urging the electors to
give "full support and co-operation to the National Front for the sake
2of unity, peace and prosperity". The withdrawal of these Malay
candidates, and the publicity afforded them through the mass media, 
served to emphasize still further the BAP and Pekemas non-Malay image. 
The PAS and the UMNO, for their part, ensured this by stressing this 
point during their own campaigns in the Malay areas. The lack of any 
serious campaign by the DAP and the Pekemas in the Malay areas greatly 
aided the Barisan Nasional’s cause.
Conclusion
The campaign ended with the' usual flurry of activity and all 
parties held their last rallies on August 22, 197^, the police refus­
ing permits for public rallies to be held during the twenty-four hours 
preceding polling. Other forms of campaigning, the ban on which are 
less readily supervised, continued, and house-to-house campaigns and 
ma.jlis ceramah were held well into the early hours of polling day.
Then the battle-for the votes was over. The politicians and political 
parties had done their share in a campaign, marked in the main, by an 
appeal for support on communal lines.
1 The Straits Times, August 20, 197^ +.
2 The Straits Times, August 17, 197^-
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C H A P T E R  S I X  
An Analysis of the Election Results
32^
As had been unanimously predicted, even prior to the election, 
the Barisan Nasional romped home to a massive victory. It won 
seventy-two of the eighty-two contested seats and, together with the 
thirty-two it had gained without contest on nomination day, it had a 
total of 10^ - of the 11^ Peninsular Malaysian parliamentary seats. 
(Table ^1) The task of forming a credible Parliamentary Opposition 
fell on the nine DAP and one Pekemas candidates elected. (Figure 21) 
The magnitude of the victory was unprecedented. Never before in an 
election in independent Peninsular Malaysia had the ruling party gain­
ed such a massive majority.
The victory was hailed as indicating overwhelming support for 
Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and the Barisan Nasional. Unity and 
intercommunal government, it was held, had received an unquestioned 
mandate. To an extent, this mass media euphoria was justified. The 
victory, for which the mass media had worked tirelessly and of which 
it saw itself as a part, prevented any immediate sober analysis of the 
election results. In actuality, the Barisan Nasional's overwhelming 
majority in seats masked a number of poignant and important 
considerations.
The Result in Votes
The Barisan Nasional secured the Government the biggest majority 
in percentage votes gained in any election held in independent 
Peninsular Malaysia ~ 61.53% of the votes polled. This represented 
a 12.97% swing to the Government as compared with its worst showing in 
1969 and even a 5 ^ 3 %  swing by comparison with its best-ever perform­
ance in 196^. (Table ^2) The inclusion of the PAS, the Gerakan and 
the PPP achieved for the Alliance-based Government support of a kind 
that it had never before attained.
For the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP, however, the results held
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Table Al
Seats won by Political Parties by State, 197A*
State
Total 
No. of 
Seats
Barisan Nasional 
Without With _ , , 
Contest Contest iotal
DAP Pekemas
Perlis 2 - 2 2
Kedah 13 8 5-
Kelantan 12 A 8 12
Trengganu 7 1 6 7
Penang 9 1 8 9
Perak 21 3 1A 17 A
Pahang 8 3 5 8
Selangor 11 2 8 10 1
Federal Territory 5 - 2 2 2 1
Negri Sembilan 6 2 3 5 1
Malacca A - 3 3 1
Johore 16 8 8 16
Total 11A 52 72 10A 9 1
* The Partai Rakyat, IPPP, KITA and the Independent candidates did not 
win any seats.
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 19?A Election Report, 1975?
Appendix D, p. 132.
Table 42
*52-1
Governmentf Coalition's Performance in Elections to 'Parliament,^ Peninsular 
Malaysia, 1959-'! 974
Year Total Vote
Government Opposition
Swing to 
Government 
from previous 
year
Vote % Vote %
1959 1,364,373 800, 944 31". 19 763,631 48.81
1964 2 ,146,608 1,204,340 36.10 94-2,268 43.89 + 4.91
1969 2 ,111,282 1 ,025,144 4-8.36 1 ,086,138 31.44 - 7.5^
1974 1,841,313 1,133,038 61.33 708,4-77 38.47 + 12.97
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission,.Election Reports for the 1939,
1964-, 1969 .and 19l b  elections.
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out little cheer. A substantial portion of their support had been 
lost by their joining the Barisan Nasional. In the 1969 election 
these parties had between them mustered 36.04% of the valid votes 
cast. (Table 43) Thus in 1969, together with the Alliance 48.56%, 
the component parties of the Barisan Nasional had between them gained 
84.60% of the valid votes. In 1974 the Barisan Nasional gained only 
61.33%. The difference of 23.07% represents principally the votes 
lost by the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP. Expressed as a percentage 
of their support in 1969 this amounts to 64.01%. By leaving their 
previously held positions in the opposition and by having joined the 
Alliance in the larger coalition, Ba-risan Nasional, the PAS, the 
Gerakan and the PPP between them lost close to two-thirds of their 
support.
The disillusioned Gerakan, PPP and PAS voter of 1969 shifted 
his support to the DAP, Pekemas, Partai Rakyat and the independent 
candidates. The DAP increased its support from 13-57% in 1969 to 
21.06% in 197^ and the Partai Rakyat from 1.28% to 4.57%. Tbe newly- 
formed Pekemas gathered 5-68% of the votes polled and, very signifi­
cantly, the votes cast for independent candidates rose from a mere 
0.46% in 1969 to 6.75% in 1974 - a 1974 total for the independent 
candidates higher than even that of the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat.
The distribution of support for the several parties varied 
greatly from state to state. (Table 44) The Barisan Nasional 
performed better than its national average (61*53%) in all states 
except in-Penang (55*9%), Perak (52.1%) and the Federal Territory 
(43.9%). It had an absolute majority in all the state?', and even in 
the Federal Territory it had a relative majority, obtaining here 43-9% 
of the votes as compared to 37-4% polled by the DAP and 18.0% by the 
Pekemas. The DAP emerged as the principal opposition party in the 
Federal Territory and seven of the eight states where it contested.
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Table 43
Votes Polled by Political Parties and Independent Candidates, 1969 
and 1974 Parliamentary Elections
Party
1969
Votes %
1974
Votes %
Alliance 1 ,025,144 48.56
PAS 501,123 23.74
Gerakan 178,971 8.48
PPP 80,756 3.82
Barisan Nasional* (1 ,785,99*0* (84.60)* 1,133,038 61.53
BAP 286,606 13.57 387.863 21.06
Pekemas - - 104,547 5.68
Partai Rakyat 27,110 1.28 84,206 4.57
KITA - - 6,228 0.34
IPPP - - 1,356 0.07
UMNO 1,808 0.09 - -
Independents 9,764 0.46 124,277 6.75
Total 2 , 111,282 100 1,841,515 100
* Barisan Nasional figures for 1969 are the aggregate of those for the 
Alliance, PAS, Gerakan, and PPP.
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975)
Appendices F and F1, pp 134-137*
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Table 44
Votes polled by Political Parties and Independents by State 
(by percentage) in Contested Seats, 1974
Electorate in
, Contested n ca State _ ... B n  Constituency to o
n co Bpq S
P-.<1^
Q Pe
ke
ma
s 
I
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rt
ai
 
Ra
ky
at
 
I
IP
PP
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TA
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nd
­
en
ts
Perlis 43,348 66 = 9 - - 6,5 - - 26.6
Kedah 110,043 74o5 806 _ 3 = 7 - 3=6 9.5
Kelantan 148,068 74o9 - - - - - 25=1
Trengganu 107,233 64=6 - - 30,7 - - 4.8
Penang 209,656 55o9 24,3 13=2 5 = 9 - 0=6 -
Perak 399,655 52 = 1 36 o1 4=2 - 0 .8 6 = 7
Pahang 90,844 68=2 13=1 - 15=7 - - 2 = 9
Selangor 208,441 62 0 9 19=4 11.1 - - - 6=5
Federal
Territory 113,850 43.9 37=4 18,0
- ~ - 0=6
Negri Sembilan 87,791 61=7 31=8 1.1 1=7 1=5 - 2 = 2
Melaka 113,841 62,5 15-5 11.3 9=0 - 1=7
Johore 208 ,725 71=7 20o6 - 2 = 9 - - 4=9
Peninsular R,
Malaysia 1.^1.515 61 =53 21 g06 5=68 4=57 0=07 0=47 6=62
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975,
Appendix F, pp 134“133°
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Only in Pahang did the DAP take third place after the Barisan Nasional 
and the Partai Rakyat . The party performed its best in the Federal 
Territory (37*^ +%) and secured • about a third of the votes polled in 
Perak and Negri Sembilan. The Pekemas fielded candidates in only 
five states and the Federal Territory. In every case the party was 
a poor third after the Barisan Nasional and the DAP. In Negri 
Sembilan the party obtained only 1.1% of the votes, performing worse 
than even the Partai Rakyat and the Independent People’s Progressive 
Party. The Pekemae’ better support was in the Federal Territory 
(18.0%) and in Penang (13*2%). The Partai Rakyat emerged most 
successful in Trengganu where the party obtained 30-7% of the votes 
polled and in Pahang where-it obtained 15*7%* However, in Trengganu 
the'party was the only party contesting the, Barisan Nasional and in 
Pahang it contested the election as the opposition party with the 
largest number of candidates. The party did very poorly in every 
other state it contested, the support afforded the-party. ' - being 
invariably less than that given-to the DAP and the Pekemas. The Bebas
. f
Bersatu, the alliance of independents ■ who!,''eomprised the only challenge 
to the Barisan Nasional in Kelantan, succeeded in gaining a quarter of 
the votes polled.
The same trend is evidenced in each state when the votes gained 
by the parties in the several states is compared with their perform­
ance" in 1969. In each state there is a swing towards the government. 
•In each state too, there is in 197^ & swing away from the aggregate 
support of the Barisan Nasional’s component parties as at the 1969 
election.„ (Table V?)
> . The 1 Government had by the formation of the Barisan 
Nasional gained a majority in all the eleven states - only in the 
Federal Territory did its share of the Votes drop below fifty per cent. 
In 1969 the Alliance Government had managed a majority, vote in only
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Table 45
Votes Gained by the Alliance and Barisan Nasional (by percentage) 
By States, 1969 1974, Parliamentary Elections
State
Alliance
1969
Barisan
Nasional
1974
Swing to Barisan Barisan Swing 
Barisan Nasional Nasional Away 
Nasional Parties 1974 from
Barisan
Nasional
Parties
Perlis 31.1 66.9 15*8 93.2 66 .9 26*3
Kedah 33*5 74o5 21.0 • 94.5 74.5 20.0
Kelantan 47-5 74*9 27.4 99-9 74.9 25-0
Trengganu 50.0 64.6 14.6 100 64.6 35-4
Penang 36.9 55.9 19.0 88.9 55-9 33.0
Perak 43-2 52.1 8*9 83.6 52.1 31-5
Pahang
Selangor
60.8 68.2 7.4 85.2 68.2 17.0
Federal Territory
44.0 55.5 11.5 68.7 55-5 13-2
Negri Sembilan 46.4 61.7 15.3 62.7 61.7 1 .0
Malacca 48.8 62*5 13.7 68.2 62 .5 5-7
Johore 67.6 71*7 4.1 75-8 71-7 4.1.
Total 48.6 61 *5 12.9 84.6 61.5 23.1
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975^
Appendices G2 and G3? pp 140-141.
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five states and in three of these with only the barest margins - 
Perlis (51-1%) i Kedah (53-5% )5 Trengganu (50%), Pahang (60.8%) and 
Johore (67.6%). The swing to the government was most in those states 
where, prior to 1974, the contest had been principally between the 
Alliance and the PAS. Thus in Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu, 
the Government gained increased support. The swing was least in 
Johore and Pahang, the two states in which it had already performed its 
best in 1969- The Barisan Nasional hence proved invaluable to the 
Alliance-based Government in widening its base of support.
When observed in terms of'the votes lost by the Barisan Nasional*s 
component parties, it is Perak, Penang, Trengganu and Perlis that 
emerge as the states where there was a more than average loss. In 
Penang, the DAPy "the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat, had won a 33-0% 
swing away from the Barisan Nasional*s component parties. This swing 
was obviously largely from the Gerakan. An even more marked swing, 
representing more than the PPP's share of the votes in 19&9? had taken 
place in Perak, much of the gain,!as in Penang, accruing to the DAP.
In Kelantan and-Trengganu, where the Alliance and the PAS had almost 
exclusively shared the votes-' before 1974, there was also a very marked 
swing. The 35-43% swing in Trengganu went principally to the Partai 
Rakyat (30-5%) and the independent candidates. In Kelantan the 
25% swing went to the Bebas Bersatu.
Any analysis of rural-urban variations in support for the parties 
raises, special problems. The Constituency Delimitation Report claims 
that constituencies were drawn on the basis of a four-fold classi- 
•fie-ation ranging from Metropolitan Urban, Urban Large,.Urban Small to 
Rural Areas. The Report itself gives no definition -regarding these 
four categories. ■ The 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaya, 
undertaken by the Survey Department Malaysia, wjiich the Commission 
utilised in drawing up the constituencies, does, however, provide a
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definition, as follows:
Metropolitan Urban - Any gazetted area with a population of 
751000 persons or more at the time of the Census 5
Urban Large - Any gazetted area with a population of 
10,000 to 74,999 persons at the time of the Census ;
Urban Small - Any gazetted area with a population of 1,000 
to 9,999 persons at the time of the Census ; and
Rural - All areas gazetted or otherwise, that had a population 
of 999 persons or less at the time of the Census. ^
The weightage for area given to the sparsely populated rural districts 
has already been seen to result in rural constituencies in each state 
having smaller electorates than urban constituencies. However, due 
to the apportionment of seats to the various states not being strictly 
on the basis of their electorate size, the electorate in some 'urban 
constituencies in the states advantaged by the apportionment exercise 
are smaller than some rural constituencies in those states 
disadvantaged by the apportionment exercise. Hence a simple ranking 
of all the Peninsular Malaysian constituencies on the basis of size 
will not suffice for an 'analysis of the urban-rural distribution of 
support for the parties.
Another technique was utilized to attempt a classification of 
the seats into urban and rural. The gazetted areas of the four 
categories - metropolitan urban, urban large, urban small and rural - 
were located on a map of the parliamentary constituencies. Those 
constituencies comprising-entirely of any one of these gazetted areas 
was classified accordingly. However, except for a few in the 
metropolitan urban and urban large categories, the bulk of the 
constituencies included a mix of areas from two or more of the. 
categories. The difficulty arises from the fact that the delimit­
ation was done in such a manner that the constituency boundaries 
hardly ever coincide with an obvious gazetted area. For this reason
1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census 
of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 291*
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any classification of the constituencies into ’rural1 and 'urban' has 
not been possible. Some general observations can, however, be 
ventured. In the urban centres of the states of Perlis, Kelantan 
and Trengganu the Barisan Nasional's performance was not appreciably 
different from that in the rural areas of these states. In the 
remaining states - Kedah, Penang, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca and Johore - the Barisan Nasional's performance was 
markedly better in the rural areas than in the urban centres. This 
pattern is further underlined by the Barisan Nasional performing worst 
in the wholly urbanized Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Conversely, 
it is in the urban centres of Kedah, Penang, Perak, Pahang, Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca and Johore that the DAP did best. The party's 
nine seats were obtained in the urban constituencies. The Pekemas, 
too, did best in the urban centres, winning its only seat in the 
Federal Territory. The Partai Rakyat's performance shows no 
appreciable difference in the urban and rural areas: the party polled
its best in constituencies where it had a straight contest with the 
Barisan Nasional, and worst in constituencies where it had to face the 
challenge of other opposition parties as well.
Communal Composition of Votes
In examining the performance of the Barisan Nasional it was found 
that it fared better in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang and 
Johore than it had in Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca 
and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. It is also suggested that 
the Barisan Nasional showed no appreciable variation in performance in 
the urban centres of Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu; in the other 
states, however, its performance in the urban centres was significantly 
worse than in the rural areas of the respective states. These 
spatial variations in support for the Barisan Nasional and the other
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parties s-eem to be due principally / to variations in the communal 
composition of the electorate.
Table 46 sets out the percentage of Malay electorate in the 
contested constituencies for each state and the percentage of valid 
votes gained by the several parties. The table shows the general 
trend of communal support for the various parties. The Barisan 
Nasional's share of the votes is higher in those states with a higher 
percentage of Malay electors. The DAP and the Pekemas did not field 
candidates in states with high percentages of Malay voters. The 
Pekemas candidates were confined to the Federal Territory and the five 
states with the highest percentage of non-Malay electors. The DAP 
fielded candidates in the Federal Territory and in the eight states 
with the highest percentage of non-Malay electors.
A cursory' glance at Table 46 might suggest that the increase in 
the share of the votes' of each of the DAP and Pekemas is not always 
consistent with an increase in non-Malay electors. However, when the
I
vote's' of both the DAP and the Pekemas are read together, the pattern 
becomes more explicit. The DAP- and Pekemas joint vote increases 
with a rise in the percentage of non-Malay electors. The Partai 
Rakyat did best in the predominantly Malay state of Trengganu and 
again in Pahang. Its share of the votes in all states, except in 
Trengganu, is far too small to indicate that it had greater support 
from any particular community. Its better performance in Trengganu 
can likewise be held to be the outcome of its greater emphasis here 
and, more importantly, to its being the only opposition party challeng­
ing the Barisan Nasional.., .
The support lent by the various communities to the several 
parties becomes even more apparent when the performance of the parties 
in seats of different communal composition is examined. (Table 47)
The Barisan Nasional1s share of the votes averages below fifty per cent
Table A6
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Percentage Malay Electorate in Contested Seats and Percentage Vote 
won by Political Parties by State, 197^ -.
State MalayElectorate
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Kelantan 96 *.20 7^-9 25*1
Trengganu 93-Vf 6A .6 30.7 A. 8
Perlis 83.87 66.9 6.5 26.6
Kedah 67.9^ 7^.5 8 .6 3*7 3-6 9 .5
Pahang 36.72 68.2 13.1 15.7 2 .9
Johore 53.57 71.7 20 .6 C- a 9 ^ .9
Malacca 5^.78 62.5 15*5 11.3 9*0 1 .7
Selangor 9-2.68 62.9 1 9 A 11.1 6 .5
Perak A1.87 52.1 36.1 Ao2 0 .8 6 .7
Negri
Sembilan 39.61 61.7 31.8 1.1 1-7 1.5 2 .2
Penang 30.95 55*9 2Ao3 13.2 5-9 0 .6
Federal
Territory 27.79 ^3*9 3 ? A 18.0 0 .6
Peninsular
Malaysia 61.53 21.06 5*68 ^ .37 0.3^ 0 .07 6.75
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 197^ Election Report, 19755
Appendix G1, pp 138-139*
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Table 47
Average Percentage Vote Gained by Political Parties in Constituencies 
of Varying .Non-Malay Electorate, 1974
Percentage
Non-Malay
Electorate
No. of 
Seats^
Barisan
Nasional^
DAP Pekemas Partai
Rakyat
90.01 - 100 3 35-7 (3) 56.37 (3) 7.07 (2 ) 4.84 (1)
80.01 - 90 6 40.94 (6) 42.39 (6) 15.64 (5) 6.70 (1)
70.01 - 80 7 51 -53 (7) 39-75 (7) 10.73 (3) 5.30 (2)
60.01 - 70 9 54.57 (7) 32.12 (9) 10.28 (8 ) 5.76 (2)
50.01 - 60 10 64.19(10) 26.05(10) 13.11 (6) 7.64 (1)
40.01 - 50 14 70.11(14) 25.45 (7) 11.0 (3) 22.49 (4)
30.01 - 4o 7 69-55 (7) 21.94 (4) 13*1 (5) 28.78 (1)
20.01 - 30 6 73*55 (6) 16.14 (2) 10.58 (1)
10.01 - 20 9 72.12 (9) 27-36 (1) 24.15 (5)
10 and less 11 71.17(11) 28.79 (4)
Source: 1 Compiled from data in Appendix 4.
2 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 
1975, Appendix 4, pp 144-198.,
(Figures within brackets indicate number of seats 
in that category contested by the party,)
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in seats with more than eighty per cent non-Malays, but increases 
steadily to exceed seventy per cent in seats where Malays also comprise 
more than seventy per cent of the electorate. (Also compare Figures 11 
and 22) The DAP, on the other hand, has an average of 56.37% of the 
votes in the constituencies where non-Malays comprise more than ninety 
per cent of the electors. The party's share of the vote is seen to 
decrease consistently as the percentage of non-Malay electors decreases 
till it obtains only 21.94% in the category of seats where non-Malays 
comprise between thirty per cent and forty per cent of the electorate. 
(Also compare Figures 13 and 23) The party did not contest in seats 
where there were less than 30% of non-Malay electors.
The Pekemas' share of the votes is consistently low in all 
constituencies except those where the party's candidates had straight 
contests with the Barisan Nasional. On the basis of Table 47 it is 
not possible to determine the communal basis of the Pekemas support. 
However, the constituencies in which the party's candidates did well, 
even where there were three-cornered and four-cornered contests, are 
all non-Malay majority constituencies. (Compare Figures 15 and 24) 
Pekemas President Tan Chee Koon obtained 41.81% of the votes in a four- 
cornered contest in Kepong where non-Malays comprise 83-68% of the 
electorate. Similarly in Jelutong, with a 79*01% non-Malay electorate, 
V. David obtained 20.05% of the votes. In Mata Kuching, with 65-09% 
non-Malays, Ong Yi How won 33-18% of the votes polled, and this despite 
a three-cornered contest. In Pelabohan Kelang, A.V. Kathiah of Pekemas 
obtained 23-42% of the votes, also in a three-cornered contest.
If it is assumed that the bulk of the Malay vote in these constituen­
cies went to the Barisan Nasional, as it did in all the constituencies, 
then it follows that the Pekemas' relatively better performance in 
these constituencies was due largely to its ability to draw on the 
non-Malay vote. Unlike the DAP, which in no seat was able to win 
more Votes than there are non-Malay electors, the Pekemas was able
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to do so in one constituency. In Hilir Perak, Ahmad Boestaman 
obtained 27.36% of the votes polled even when the non-Malay component 
in the electorate was only 18.^9%• Ahmad Boestaman*s performance,
however, cannot be taken as an indication of the party's performance. 
Ahmad Boestaman*s long history as an active and popular left-wing Malay 
nationalist politician apparently resulted in his ability to draw on a 
portion of the Malay vote in his constituency. But even here the bulk 
of the Malay vote remained with the Barisan Nasional. The Pekemas 
support, small as it was in most of the constituencies it contested, 
seems to have come predominantly from the non-Malay voter.
The Partai Rakyat*s performance was poor in non-Malay majority 
constituencies. Its seven candidates contesting in non-Malay majority 
constituencies all obtained less than eight per cent of the valid votes 
polled and lost their election deposits. The party's performance in 
the Malay majority constituencies was, however, much better. (Compare 
Figures 13 and 25) It did best in' Kuala Trengganu where Party President 
Kassim bin Ahmad obtained 38.20% of the valid votes in a constituency 
with 86.3h% Malays. Also in Trengganu State, Siti Nor binti Abdul 
Hamid Tuah obtained 37*03% of the votes cast in the Ulu Nerus 
constituency which has 98.8^% Malay voters. These successes and the 
party's better performance in the Malay majority constituencies 
indicate the party's greater ability to attract Malay support rather 
than non-Malay support. A note of caution must however be sounded.
The party's better performance in the Malay areas Is at least in part 
due to there being no organized Malay-based party contesting the 
Barisan Nasional. It is conceivable that in the event of a Malay- 
based party contesting, the party's performance in the Malay majority 
constituencies would have been as poor as in the non-Malay majority 
constituencies where there were essentially non-Malay based parties
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to rival its appeal for votesa
The above analysis allows for certain generalizations to be made 
as regards the support' given the parties by the Malay and non-Malay 
communities. The Barisan Nasional obtained 61.53% of the votes in
the eighty-two contested seats in Peninsular Malaysia. Of the Malay 
electorate, who comprised 32,32% of the total in these constituencies, 
the Barisan Nasional had the support of no less than seventy per cent. 
This is borne out by the performance of the Barisan Nasional in the 
predominantly Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. 
This contention is lent further support when the Barisan Nasional's 
performance in constituencies where the Malays comprised more than 
seventy per cent of the electorate is studied. In these constit­
uencies the party obtained on the average more than seventy per cent 
of the votes. In the constituencies where the Barisan Nasional did
not face any competition from the Malay independent candidates, or the 
Partai Rakyat, its support from the Malay voters may be held to be 
virtually unanimous. The Barisan Nasional*s support from the non- 
Malay votes was however wanting. Whenever the DAP and the Pekemas 
posed as alternatives, the Barisan Nasional was able to obtain on the 
average/ only about thirty-five per cent of the vote. However, in
I
constituencies where the choice was essentially between the Barisan 
Nasional and the Malay Independents, the Barisan Nasional may be held 
to have gained the bulk of the non-Malay votes.
Of all the parties, the DAP clearly enjoys the largest support 
amongst the non-Malay community. Whenever it posed as an alternat­
ive to the Barisan Nasional, more than fifty-five per cent of the non- 
Malay voters gave it their support. This contention Is based on 
the performance of the Barisan Nasional and the DAP, in the predomin­
antly non-Malay states of Penang, Perak, Selangor and the Federal 
Territory, and, their performance in constituencies where non-Malays
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comprise more than seventy per cent of the electorate. Indeed the 
party was able to obtain 21,06% of the total votes polled in the 197^ 
p'arliamentary election, even though it had candidates in only forty-six 
of the eighty-two contested seats - the non-Malays comprised only 
^7.68% of the electors in all the eighty-two seats contested. Hence, 
if it is assumed that the DAP obtained the bulk of its votes from the 
non-Malays, then it can with certainty be asserted, that the party has 
greater support amongst the non-Malays than the Barisan Nasional. The 
Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat received too little support for any 
conclusive observations to be made, except to note that the Pekemas 
appears to have a greater appeal amongst the non-Malay voters than the 
Malay, and the converse seems to hold true for the Partai Rakyat.
The 197^ results, though revealing that the government still 
lacks the support of the majority of the non-Malays, represented for 
the government a significant improvement over its performance in 1969* 
In 1969 the Alliance lost the bulk of the seats where non-Malays 
comprised more than fifty per cent of the electorate. It fared worst 
in constituencies where non-Malays comprised more than ninety per cent 
of the electorate. In these constituencies the government was able 
to muster on the average only 22,95% of the votes. (Table A8) The 
Alliance's share of the vote increased with an increase in Malay 
electorate and reached an absolute majority in the constituencies where 
the Malays comprised between fifty per cent and sixty per cent of the 
electorate; it was at its highest in constituencies where there were 
sixty to seventy per cent Malay electorates. Beyond this point, the 
Alliance's share of the vote is seen to decline, and in the constit­
uencies where there were more than ninety per cent Malay electorates 
its share of the vote dropped again to below fifty per cent of the 
votes polled. Table ^8 indicates the Alliance's predicament in the
1969 election. In constituencies where there was a large percentage
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Table 48
Average Percentage Votes Gained by political Parties in Constituencies 
of Varying Non-Malay Electorate, 1969.
Percentage
Non-Malay
Electorate
No. of
Contested
Seats^
Alliance^ DAP
Gerakan 
PPP 2
pas2
90.01 - 100 2 22.95 77.06
80.01 - 90 6 24.99 72.49
70.01 - 80 10 40.41 56.92 6.92
60.01 - 70 13 47.95 48.34 11.62
30.01 - 60 8 48.35 25.30
40.01 - 90 9 56.74 26.81
30.01 - 40 9 64.73 32.54
20.01 - 30 10 57-53 39-20
10.01 - 20 12 54.38 45.62
10 and less 15 49.97 49.98
Total 94 48.6 25.9 23.7
Source: 1 Compiled from data in Appendix 3*
2 Malaysia, Election' Commission, 1969 Election Report, 
1972, Appendix B, pp.52-64.
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of non-Malay electors, non-Malay based opposition parties like the DAP, 
the Gerakan and the PPP were, by an electoral arrangement between them­
selves, able to win sufficient votes to capture the seats. In the 
predominantly Malay constituencies, the PAS was able to poll suffic­
ient votes to gain the seats. The Government in 1974 can thus be 
held to have greatly improved on its support amongst the Malays, and 
marginally increased its support amongst the non-Malays - the majority 
of the non-Malays when they had the opportunity preferred to support 
the DAP, rather than the Barisan Naslonal.
The PAS, Gerakan and PPP elements
The election results were of prime importance for the future of 
the new partners in the government coalition - the PAS, Gerakan and 
the PPP. These parties had campaigned for a mandate from their 
constituents for participation in the Barisan Nasional. The results 
in terms of seats were immediately seized upon as an indication of the 
varying endorsement given each of these party elements. The PAS won 
all its fourteen seats, the Gerakan five of the eight it contested, and 
the PPP only one of the four it contested. The victory in terms of 
seats, however, masked the actual mandate gained by each of these 
parties from their respective constituents.
(i) PAS was allocated fourteen parliamentary constituencies, 
three of which were won without contest on nomination day. An exam­
ination of the party’s performance in the eleven contested seats is 
instructive of the extent of swing away from the PAS in 1974 as com­
pared with its performance in 1969® The computation utilized here 
to assess this assumes that,the increased support for the Government 
in these constituencies came solely from PAS participation. Such an 
assumption is possible because the areas where the eleven candidates 
from the PAS faced opposition are areas where the contest has
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traditionally been between UMNO (the Malay component in the inter- 
communal Alliance) and the PAS itself - the two parties accounted for 
one hundred per cent of the total valid votes polled in 1969® It is 
also assumed that the coalition did not result in any loss in support 
for UMNO in 1974. This latter assumption is possible since in nine 
of the constituencies the candidates who contested the PAS candidates 
were PAS dissidents. In the remaining two the challenge came from 
the Partai Rakyat. There were no UMNO dissidents contesting in the 
eleven seats that PAS was contesting and even in their appeal for the 
votes, the PAS dissidents who grouped together to form the Bebas 
Bersatu, campaigned essentially on the grounds that the PAS had 
surrendered its Islamic traditions.
The change in electoral boundaries occasioned by the 1974 
delineation exercise makes it difficult to compare the Alliance’s 1969 
performance with that of the Barisan Nasional*s in. 1974. To make the 
data comparable some form of standardisation is necessary. The method 
utilized here is first to determine the communal composition of the 
constituency concerned in 1974, and assume as the Alliance 1969 perform­
ance here, the average percentage vote the Alliance actually obtained 
in 1969 in constituencies of a similar communal composition. (Tables 
48 and 49) The calculations made on the basis of these assumptions 
are presented in Table 49®
In each of the eleven contested seats there was a gain in votes 
for the Government compared with, the Government’s performance in 1969? 
the gain averaging 20.70%= In two of the constituencies, however, 
the PAS candidates contested Partai Rakyat candidates. If these two 
constituencies are discounted the Government’s performance in 1974 
indicates a 26.08% average gain over that of 1969® This latter figure 
is a more accurate indication of the gains made by the Government as a 
consequence of the pAS’s participation in the Barisan Nasional. This
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Table ^9
Swing to Government Coalition in Seats Contested by PAS,
Seat Percentage 
Malay ^
Estimated 
Alliance 
1969 voted
Barisan
Nasional
3
Swing
P 5 Padang Terap 9 0 .  kk 49.97 Uncontested -
P 8 Kota Setar 88.28 54.38 86.37 31.99
P 9 Ulu Muda 85-93 54.38 TJncontested -
P 17 Pengkalan Chepa 98.56 49.97 • 73.88 23.91
P 18 Pasir Mas 96.22 49.97 80.95 * 30.98
P 20 Bachok 98.39 49.97 Uncontested -
P 21 Rantau Panjang 96.77 49.97 77-97 28.00
-P 22 Nilam Puri 98.00 49.97 78.11 28.3^
P 23 Pasir Puteh 97.23 49.97 69.95 20.18
P 26 Kuala Kerai 87.50 54.38 79.23 2^.85
P 29 Ulu Nerus 98.8 t^- 49-97 62.97 13.20
P 32 Kuala Trengganu 86.5^ 54.38 58.9^ k .56
p 33 Dungun 93.21 49.97 73.25 2 3 .  k8
P 6k Bagan Datuk 6 k .k Z 64.73 87.73 23.00
Source: 1 Based on data in Appendix f^.
2 Based on Table k& , i.e. Alliance vote in 1969 in
constituency of similar communal composition.
3 ' Malaysia, Election Commission, 197^ + Election Report, 
1975, Appendix H, pp 1^4-158.
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is held to be so since the Partai Rakyat’s appeal, based on non-communal 
socialist policies and branded atheist by its opponents, is at least as 
likely, if not more, to have made headway amongst the Alliance 
supporters of 1969 as it did amongst the PAS’ essentially Islamic and 
Malay-based support. The latter figure of approximately 26.08% is 
given further validity when the performances of the parties in the 
1969 and 1974 elect ions for the state of Kelantan are examined. In 
the 1969 election, the Alliance and the PAS between them secured 
99.9% of the valid votes polled in Kelantan - 47.5% Alliance and 52.4% 
PAS. In the 197^ - election, the Barisan Nasional obtained only 74.9% 
of the votes. The difference of twenty-five per cent represents the 
support that the PAS brought the Barisan Nasional in Kelantan in 1974. 
The votes gained by the Barisan Nasional (25%), expressed as a 
percentage of PAS 1969 support (52.4%), indicates the PAS’ mandate from 
its traditional support for its participation in the Barisan Nasional 
- 47.71%. On the basis of these calculations it may be assumed that 
at least half--of the PAS supporters deserted the party when it joined 
the Barisan Nasional.
(ii) By a similar computation as that utilized for the PAS the
Gerakan1s performance may also be gauged. (Table 50) The Gerakan*s
participation resulted in the Government’s share of the vote increasing 
from an average of 35°06% in 1969 to 44.68% in 1974. The shift of
the Gerakan had witnessed a shift of only 9®62% of the votes instead of
the average of 64.94% the Gerakan gained when it contested the Alliance 
in 1969° On the basis of this it. may be presumed that only 14.81% 
of the Gerakan1s 1969 voters supported its entry into the Barisan 
Nasional. In 19695 however, the Gerakan had contested the election 
having an electoral understanding with the DAP and the PPP. The 
average of 64.94% of the votes the Gerakan polled in 1969 could be held 
to include the DAP and PPP votes. Consequently, the above figures,
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Table 50
Swing to Government Coalition m  Seats Contested by Gerakan, "'969 ~ /1974
Seat
Percentage
Non-Malay^
Estimated 
Alliance. 
1969 vote
Barisan
Nasional
197V
Swing
P 42 Tanjong 95*04 22.95 45.99 23.04
P 39 Nibong Tebal 58.42 45.35 57.63 9.28
p-43 Jelutong 79.01 40.41 46.45 6.04
P 49 Taiping 68.25 47.95 53.18 5.23
P 62 Telok Anson 69*04 47.95 50.91 2.96
P 81 Petaling 80.15' 24.99 36.87 11 =88
P 84 Kepong 83.68 24.99' 38.40 13=41
P 87 Kuala Lumpur 
Bandar 91 < M 22.95 28.04 5.09
Source: 1 Based on data in Appendix 4.
2 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 
1975, Appendix B, pp 44-62=
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though indicating the gain accruing to the Government by the inclusion 
of the Gerakan in the Barisan Nasional, do not provide an indication of 
the mandate the Gerakan obtained from its own share of the vote in 1969* 
For an estimation of this, an examination of voting patterns in Penang 
will have to be considered.
Penang is the state where the Gerakan placed its strongest 
emphasis in the 1969 election. Its greater share of the seats in the 
1969 electoral understanding as compared with the DAP and the PPP was a 
recognition of the Gerakan*s relative strength. Since the 1969 
election the Gerakan has maintained control of the State Government of 
Penang and, especially since the expulsions in the party resulting in 
the formation of the rival Pekemas, the Gerakan*s strength was concen­
trated principally in Penang State. An examination of the Gerakan*s 
voting performance in Penang State will therefore serve as <a reasonable 
indicator of the Gerakan's mandate from the party’s own-supporters for 
its participation in the Barisan Nasional.
In 1969? in Penang, the Alliance polled 36.9% of the votes, the 
PAS seven per cent, the PPP 0.4% and the Gerakan 44.6% - the aggregate 
vote of the Barisan Nasional*s component parties had been 88.9% of 
the total votes. The remaining 11*1% of the votes went to the DAP.
In 1974 the Barisan Nasional*s share of the votes was only 56.0%.
In the absence of any UMNO or PAS dissidents contesting the election 
it seems that the loss of 32.9% of votes in 197^ was almost wholly 
from the ranks of the Gerakan voters of 1969. If this contention 
is accepted, then 73.8% of the Gerakan*s support of 1969 shifted to 
the DAP, the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat in 197^ - close to 
seventy-five per cent of the party's supporters of 1969 rejected 
the party's participation in the Barisan Nasional.
A note of caution must, however, be sounded in accepting the 
above figure. The expulsions from the party and the formation of the
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rival Pekemas would in any event have resulted in a loss of the Gerakan's 
support, and thus, it is difficult to assume that the Gerakan's loss 
of about three-quarters of its support as at 1969 is an ample indicator 
of the rejection of its policies by its supporters after the split in 
the party. For an estimate of this the Pekemas vote has to be 
discounted, though much of this was also gained by suggesting to the 
electors that the Gerakan had betrayed its original platform by its 
entry into the Barisan Nasional. However, discounting Pekemas votes 
would provide the minimum figure of rejection by the party's supporters 
f:or the Gerakan's participation in the Barisan Nasional. Thus, if it 
is assumed that from the 44.6% of votes the Gerakan secured in Penang 
in 1969 it would in 197^ have lost the 13.2% the Pekemas gained even 
without joining the Barisan Nasional, then it may be held that its 
support without joining the Barisan Nasional would have been 31.4% of 
the votes polled. On joining the Alliance in the Barisan Nasional 
the party was able to swing only 19-1% of the votes. The 19.1% 
expressed as a percentage of what the party would have polled without 
participation in the Barisan Nasional - i.e. 31A % - expresses the 
upper limit of the extent of the mandate the party received from its 
supporters after the split in the party and the formation of the 
Pekemas. This amounts to 60.83%.
(iii)' The PPP since its formation in 1952 has remained almost 
exclusively a Perak-based party, drawing its support essentially from 
the non-Malay electorate centred in the Kinta District. In 1969) the 
party gained only four parliamentary seats, which four it was allocated 
again in 1974. The boundaries of these constituencies, however, 
underwent alteration in the 197^ delineation exercise, resulting in a 
change in the communal composition of the electorate. Hence, any 
comparison of the PPP’s performance in 197^ with that of 1969 again 
necessitates adjustments indicating the share of the vote the PPP would
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have won in  1969 had the communal com position o f the co n s titu e n c ie s  
i t  con tested  been id e n t ic a l to  th a t o f 1974° The basis u t i l is e d  fo r  
a d ju s tin g  the PPP"s1969 performance to  make i t  comparable w ith  th a t o f 
197^ is  discussed below.
It is first assumed that'thePPP5s support came exclusively from 
the non-Malay community, and support for the PAS came, exclusively from 
the Malay community. The share of the PPP’s support in the four 
constituencies contested in 1969 is therefore estimated as follows;
, . % 
Constituency Malay
Electorate
%
Non-Malay
Electorate
PMIP Alliance PPP
Ipoh 10.86 89o14 - 17.91 (10.86 Malay,
7.05 non-Malay)
82.09
Menglembu 13.10 860 90 - 34d4 (13.10 Malay, 
21.04 non-Malay)
65°86
Kinta 35.80 64.20 - 41.49 (35.80 Malay,
5.69 non-Malay)
58.51
Beruas 41.02 58o99 19.87
(Malay)
58.91 (21.15 Malay,
17^76 non-Malay)
41.22
The share of the party" s votes on the basis of the above assumptions
would, if the communal composition in 1969 had been identical to that
of 1974, be as follows;
%
Constituency. Malay
Electorate
%
Non-Malay
Electorate
PMIP Alliance PPP
Ipoh 4.96 95.04 - 12.48 (4.96 Malay,
7o52 non-Malay)
87.52
Menglembu 15-16 84.84 - 35.70 (15.16 Malay, 
20.54 non-Malay)
64.30
Kinta 40.05 59.95 - 45.36 (40.05 Malay,
5.31 non-Malay)
54.64
Beruas 35.99 64.01 17.44
(Malay)
37.85 (18o56 Malay,
19.27 non-Malay)
44.73
3 6 0
In the 1974 election the voting in these four constituencies was as 
follows:
Constituency Barisan Nasional Independents DAP Pekemas
Ipoh 33.09 4.80 62.11 -
Menglembu' 32.66 4.81 62.53
Kinta 44.18 (4 .11)(5 .85) 45.86
Beruas 42.95 11.48 37.69 7.88
The Independents who contested in these constituencies in 1974 were 
essentially Alliance dissidents - one from the MCA and one from UMNO.
If on the basis of this it is assumed that the votes gained by these 
independent candidates came exclusively from the Alliance share of the 
votes in 1969? then the 1974 loss in the votes of the PPP in each of 
these four constituencies can be held to be those that accrued to the 
DAP and the Pekemas. The votes gained:by the Barisan Nasional as a 
result of the PPP's participation can thus be assessed as the differ­
ence between the adjusted PPP vote in 1969 and the joint DAP and Pekemas 
share of the vote in 1974. This amounts to +25.41% in Ipoh, +1.77% 
in Menglembu, +8 .78% in Kinta and -0.84% in Beruas; an average 
percentage gain of 8 .78%. When this latter figure is expressed as a 
percentage of the PPP’s 62.80% average vote in the adjusted 1969 result, 
an estimate of the support given by the voters of 1969 for its entry 
into the Barisan . Nasional is obtained. This amounts to 13*98%. This 
suggests that more than 86% of the PPP’s 1969 voters denied the party 
their support on its participation in the Barisan Nasional. In the 
Ipoh area - long the base of the PPP headquarters and where the PPP 
controls the Municipal Council and has done so for fourteen years'-.the 
party obtained greater support for its decision. Here close to 30% 
of its 1969 voters continued to support the party.
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On the basis of the assumptions made above it can be held that 
47.71% of the PAS, 26.2% of the Gerakan and 13*98% of the PPP’s 
supporters who voted for these parties in 1969 supported their party’s 
entry into the Barisan Nasional. In the case of the Gerakan, which 
would in any case have lost a portion of its support by the split in 
its ranks and by the formation of the Pekemas, it may be estimated 
that 60.83% of those who did not desert the party for the Pekemas 
continued to lend their support to the party even after it had entered 
the Barisan Nasional.
United Opposition Front
Commencing in 1973 and even up to the eve of the election, the 
Pekemas sought a United Opposition Front with the DAP in particular, 
and if possible also extending to include the Partai Rakyat. The 
Partai Rakyat showed disinterest from the start to any such negotiation 
the DAP •‘‘went along with the discussions but it eventually decided 
against unity. In 1969, the DAP, the Gerakan and the PPP had 
entered into an electoral understanding that had resulted in tremendous 
mutual gain for each of the parties concerned. The procedure 
suggested for the 1974 United Opposition Front was, as in the case of 
the DAP-Gerakan-PPP electoral understanding, an attempt to share the 
seats between the parties to the agreement so as not to split the 
opposition vote and thereby facilitate a Government victory in the 
marginal seats. This section seeks to assess what effects a United 
Opposition Front would have had on the election results.
Arguably, the lack of co-operation between the opposition parties 
and the campaign conducted by them against each other would have meant 
that a measure of their individual support might have been lost to the 
Barisan Nasional in the 1974 election. It is not possible in this 
analysis, however, to estimate for this loss, if any. Here the
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assumption is made that the share of the votes of a United Opposition 
Front would have been the sum total of the votes polled in the 1974 
election by the parties that would have been participating in it.
Seventy-three of the eighty-two contested seats in Peninsular 
Malaysia were won by the Barisan Nasional by an absolute majority.
Hence the formation of a United Opposition Front would not have affect­
ed the results in these seats. In the nine seats that were won by 
relative majorities, five were won by the Barisan Nasional, three by 
the DAP and- one by the solitary Pekemas candidate who obtained a seat. 
(Table 51) In four of the five seats won by the Barisan Nasional, 
a United Opposition Front comprising the DAP and the Pekemas would have 
resulted in the Barisan Nasional candidates losing their seats. In t1^ 0 
fifth seat there was only a DAP candidate and an independent candidate. 
Here the effects of a United Opposition Front would not have been 
significanto Of the four seats that could have been taken by a DAP- 
Pekemas understanding, two were won by Gerakan candidates, one by the 
PPP and one by the MIC. The implications of a United Opposition 
Front would thus have been to further reduce the size of the non-Malay 
representation on the Government benches in Parliament0
Loss of the four marginal seats to the Barisan Nasional was of 
greater significance to the DAP and Pekemas than, the number implies.
In Tanjong ,it would have meant that the Gerakan President and Penang 
Chief Minister, Lim Chong Eu, would have lost his seat, and in his 
place, the DAP's Deputy Chairman, leap Ghim Guan, would have been 
elected. In Jelutong,a United Opposition Front could have meant
the defeat of Gerakan's R„ Rajasingam and the election of Pekemas 
leader and veteran Trade Unionist, V. David. In Beruas,and in
Sungei Siput, too, a United Opposition Front would have resulted in 
important victories for the DAP. In the former, it would have meant 
the election of the DAP's other Deputy Chairman, Daing Ibrahim bin 
Othman, and the defeat of the sole PPP candidate who won the 1974
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Table 31
Votes won by Political Parties and Independents in Seats won by a 
minority vote (by percentage) , 1974.
Seat
Barisan
Nasional
component
contesting
Barisan
Nasional
DAP Pekemas Partai Indep- Rakyat endents
P 42 Tanjong Gerakan 49-99 41.69 7.48 4.84
P 43 Jelutong Gerakan 46.45 29.27 20.05 4.23
P 49 Sungei Siput MIC 49.09 45.59 4.75 0.57
P 56 Beruas PPP 42.95 37.69 7.88 11.48
p 60 Lumut MCA 43.35 38.37 18.28
P 53 Kinta PPP 44.18 45.86 4.11 5 .85
P 58 Batu Gajah MCA 43.75 48.30 5.91 2.04
P 81 Petaling Gerakan 36.-87 40.41 17.08 5.64
P 88 Kepong Gerakan 38.40 17.57 41.18 2 .85
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975j 
Appendix B, pp 44-62.
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parliamentary election. In the latter it could have resulted in the 
election of a DAP national committee member, P. Patto. Daing Ibrahim 
is a Malay, and P. Patto an Indian, and their election would have gone 
a long way in correcting the DAP's Chinese image - currently all nine 
DAP iMembers of Parliament are Chinese. It would also have altered 
the present picture of a largely Malay-based Government and a wholly 
Chinese-based Opposition in Parliament.
An electoral understanding between the DAP and the Pekemas would 
have meant that the three seats secured by the DAP and the solitary 
seat won by the Pekemas,by a minority vote,would have been retained by 
these parties with an absolute majority. Pekemas President, Tan 
Chee Koon, who scraped home to victory with a mere 41.18% of the votes 
polled and a 666 majority in a constituency where 29,379 voters voted,
could have had a comfortable 58.75% of the votes, and a majority of
4,873 votes - certainly a more respectable and fitting margin for a 
dedicated and tireless opposition parliamentarian. The results 
exemplify that the participation of Partai Rakyat, which had from the 
start showed little interest in the United Opposition Front, would have 
had no effect on the contest for these marginal seats as long as there
was an understanding between the Pekemas and the DAP. In Tanjong,
however, the DAP could have defeated Gerakan’s Lim Chong Eu even with 
an understanding with Partai Rakyat.
An electoral understanding would have resulted in the Barisan 
Nasional gaining only one hundred, instead of the 104, of the 114 seats 
contested - thus obtaining only 87.72% of the seats, instead of the 
91.23% it secured despite having won only 61.53% of the votes.
Turn-Out • ■
The electoral turn-out for Peninsular Malaysia as a whole in the 
1974 parliamentary election j/ra.s 7 5°1% and compares favourably with
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72.9% in the 1969 parliamentary election. The 1974 turn-out was 
however lower than the turn-out of 1964 when 78.9% of the electors 
participated at the polls. A turn-out of 75-1% may seem „ on the face 
of it, an adequate level of citizen participation in the democratic 
process. It must, however, be remembered that the figure of 75-1% 
represents only those who voted amongst those who had their names on 
the electoral register. A more accurate measure of citizen 
indifference must take cognizance of the adult citizens who had not 
registered as electors. So viewed, the turn-out of 75-1% leaves much 
to be desired.
Analysis of voter turn-out that goes beyond mere description is 
always fraught with difficulties. The indifferent elector wh.o fails 
to vote may do so for a number of reasons - for reasons of ignorance, 
disillusionment or cynicism as to who governs. Thus voter turn-out 
may be a symptom of alienation or despair. Alternatively, it may 
reflect widespread acceptance of the way in which disputes are resolved 
or a belief that the political balance is in no danger of being upset. 
Whilst the former may have some validity in the Peninsular Malaysian 
context, it is difficult to think that the latter alternative could be 
applicable, especially for the 1974 election which involved the very 
central issues - the basic philosophy and policy directions of the 
state.
Turn-out may also depend on a number of other more mundane con­
siderations, not least amongst which are the weather, the efficiency of 
the machinery of the several parties to mobilise voters, or even the 
discrimination employed by some parties in attempting to mobilise 
support from particular communities only. An example of the latter
occurred in the Damansara constituency of the Federal Territory, where 
the Barisan Nasional candidate, anticipating almost unanimous support 
from the Malay community, deployed his workers and transport vehicles
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to the predominantly Malay areas of his constituency, thus ensuring the 
maximum possible turn-out of the Malay electors. Similarly, the DAP 
candidates are known to concentrate on ensuring that the Chinese voter 
gets to the polls. Given such discrimination by the candidates, the 
turn-out of any particular community, and consequently the total 
electorate in a constituency, must to an extent rest on the different­
ial strength of the respective candidate's party machinery.
Analyzing turn-out figures in Peninsular Malaysia also raises an 
additional problem; Elections for the State Legislative Assemblies and 
the Federal Parliament are held simultaneously and in the same polling 
stations. the Returning Officer offers the voter two ballot papers, 
each of a different colour, and, after having marked his choice, the 
voter places each ballot paper into the appropriate ballot box. Thus, 
unless a voter specifically refuses the ballot paper for one of the two 
elections held, he is given both ballot papers. Hence the turn-out 
for each •'election is to an extent influenced by the factors
that influence turn-ont In the other. An analysis of the turn-out 
for the state and parliamentary elections however suggests that the 
voters held the parliamentary election to be the more important.
Voting was 75*1% for the parliamentary election and only 73°1% for the 
state election. In forty-three of the sixty-eight comparable seats, 
there was a higher rate of polling for the parliamentary election than 
there was for the state election; in. twenty-four it was higher for the 
state election and in one identical for both the elections.
Voter turn-out being dependent on so many variables, any analysis 
of variations in the different categories of constituencies, especially 
when the difference is marginal, will be highly suspect. What has 
been attempted below is merely to suggest that a pattern may be 
discernible.
Analysis of the turn-out by states (Table 52) indicates that it
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Table 52
Turn-Out by States, Parliamentary Election, 1974.
State Turn-Out
Average Percentage
in % Larger Seats Smaller Seats
Perlis 77-90 77.10 79.60
Kedah 69.8O 69.85 71.20
Kelantan 74.12 73.23 75.93
Trengganu 73.36 72.11 75.56
Penang 82.02 83.50 82.07
Perak 73.30 74.99 74.03
Pahang 73.67 7^.13 76.23
Selangor 74.22 76.62 77.00
Federal Territory 66.33 64.00 .65.85
Negri Sembilan 76.07 75.80 70.85
Malacca 78.04 78.25 77.59
Johore 75.07 73.82 76.75
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1973?
Appendix H, pp 144-158.
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was at its highest in Penang® Penang was where the contest was at 
its keenest® Here the DAP and the Pekemas, and to a lesser extent 
the Partai Rakyat, provided strong competition in almost all the seats 
contested. The turn-out was also higher than the national average 
in Perak, Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Malacca® In Kelantan,
Trengganu, Johore, Selangor and the Federal Territory it was below that 
of the rest of Peninsular Malaysia® The low turn-out in the Federal 
Territory, the lowest by comparison with all the other states, is in 
keeping with the trend of previous years when constituencies in the 
Kuala Lumpur area consistently had a turn-out lower than elsewhere®
Two factors appear to have determined turn-out - size of the 
constituency and intensity of the political contest® The larger 
constituencies in each of the states except Penang, Perak, Negri 
Sembilan and Malacca recorded a lower turn-out than the smaller 
constituencies® (Table 52) Unlike the other states where the 
contest was as keen in the smaller constituencies as in the larger 
constituencies, in the larger constituencies of Penang, Perak, Negri 
Sembilan and Malacca the contest was far more keen than in the smaller 
constituencies - it was in these seats that the opposition managed to 
win the ten seats.it gained®
An examination of the turn-out in constituencies of differing 
intensity of contest, as reflected by the winning margin of the cand­
idates lends further weight to the contention that elector turn-out 
was more in constituencies where the contest was keenest. (Table 53) 
Even though the competition was at its keenest in many of the larger 
constituencies where electoral turn-out was generally lower" than else­
where, the turn-out averaged slightly higher here than in the con­
stituencies where the competition was less keen® The trend becomes 
even more established when the traditionally low turn-out Federal 
Territory constituencies are omitted from the calculation® On doing
369
Table 53
Turn-Out in Constituencies 
(Average Percentage)
of Different Intensity of Contest, 197^
Seat where winning 
candidate polled
Peninsular
Malaysia
Peninsular Malaysia 
excluding 
Federal Territory
Less than 50% 75-12% 77-12%
50% - 55% 73-72% 75-92%
More than 55% 75-0^f% 75.^3*
Source: Based on Malaysia, Election Commission, 197^ Election
Report, 1975) Appendix H, pp 1^ *4-158.
this it was found that constituencies where the candidates won by a 
minority vote record an average turn-out of 77°"12%, as compared with 
75-92% in constituencies where the winning candidate obtained between 
50% and 55% of the votes polled; in constituencies where the winning 
candidate obtained more than 55% of the vote the turn-out averaged 
75-^3%.
In the 1974 election it appears that the turn-out of the non- 
Malay community was higher in comparison with that of the Malay 
community. Table 54 lists the turn-out in the constituencies accord­
ing to the communal composition of the electorate® In constituencies 
where the non-Malay communities predominate there is a generally 
higher polling average than in the Malay majority constituencies.
This difference in the turn-out was probably again due to the keenness 
of the competition for the non-Malay vote® The competition extended 
the Barisan Nasional, and the amount of political campaigning in the 
Malay dominated constituencies, were generally lower than they were in 
non-Malay dominated constituencies®
Rejected Votes
The percentage of rejected votes would normally reflect the 
extent of ignorance regarding voting procedures amongst voters. In 
the first parliamentary election held in independent Malaya on August 
19, 1939 the rejected votes constituted only 1®1%® (Table 55) The 
Election Commission, comparing the voting in that election with that 
for the State Legislative Assemblies held two months earlier stated 
that "the most satisfactory aspect of any comparison 1 .® must be the
' I
fact that the number of spoilt /^ejected/7 votes dropped from 2 .5% to
1.1% - a sure indication of the- capacity of the electorate to learn 
1
quickly11. Subsequent elections have, however, seen an increase in
1 Federation of Malaya, Election Commission, Report on the
Parliamentary and State Elections, 1959) 19^0? p° 7°
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Table
Turn-Out in Constituencies of Differing Communal Composition,197^
Percentage Non-Malay Av e peroent Tura.0ut ,
Community^ o 2
More than 90-01% 78.3^
80.01% - 90% 75-83
70.01% - 80% 77-11
60.01% - 70% 73-97
50o01% - 60% 78.87
to. 01% - 30% 7 ^ 9
30.01% - k0% - 71 o96
20.01% - 30% 75-16
10.01% - 20% 72.87
Less than 10% 7^-93
Source: 1 Based on data included in Appendix k *
2 Based on turn-out figures included in:
Malaysia, Election Commission, 197^ Election Report, 1973? 
Appendix H, pp lt-A~158.
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Table 33
Percentage Rejected Votes by States, State .Election,. 1959? 
Parliamentary Elections 1959 - 1974 and State Election; 1974
State
1959 1964 1969 1974
State Parliament Parliament Parliament State Parliament
Perlis 2.1 0 .8 4.1 3.5 8.1 5.3
Kedah 4.0 1.2 4.3 3.8 4.5 4.8
Kelantan 1-9 0 .8 4.1 3.1 5-5 4.9
Trengganu 3.6 1.3 4.3 5.0 7-1 6 .2
Penang 1.9 1 .0 2 .8 5.9 3.9 3.9
Per ale 2 .2 1 .2 4.2 4.9 4.9 4.1
Pahang 2.4 1 .0 4.9 5.8 5.8 5.3
Selangor
Federal
Territory
2.5 1.1 4.8 5.6
5.8 5.1
1.7
Negri
Sembilan 2.3 1 .0 . 4.6 6 .6 4.7 5.5
Melaka 1.8 0.9 3.0 4.8 4.8 3.8
Johore 2.5 1 .2 4.4 6 .0 5.2 4.5
Peninsular
Malaysia 2.5 1.1 4.2 4.9 5.2 4.4
Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1959» 1964, 1969 and 1974 
Election Reports.
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the percentage of -'rejected votes.
From 1964 the parliamentary and state elections have been held 
simultaneously and it was explained that such a system, which involves 
giving the voter two ballot papers at the same time, caused difficult­
ies and resulted in an increase in the percentage of rejected votes in
✓j
1964. In the 1969 election there was a campaign by the Labour Party
to have the voters cast a blank vote and the Election Commission
reported '‘that there were indications that the majority of the rejected
2
ballots had been spoiled on purpose, presumably as a sign of protest". 
With the 1974 election the voters, had already voted three times in 
simultaneous elections for the parliamentary and state seats. There 
was also no campaign for the casting of blank votes. The percentage 
of rejected votes continued to stay high, amounting to 4.42% of the 
total votes cast. The Election Commission for its part has not in its 
1974 election report ventured to suggest any reasons for the continued 
high percentage of rejected votes.
An examination of the voting for the parliamentary election and
that for-the state election may offer an explanation. The turn-out
itself was noted to be higher for the parliamentary election, this
national trend repeating itself in forty-three of the sixty-eight
3
constituencies where such comparisons could be made. This greater
1 Malaysia, Election Commission,,Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan 
Ra*ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1964 of 
the States of Malaya, 1965, p. 16.
2 Malaysia, Election- Commission, Repo,rt on the Parliamentary (Dewan 
RaTayat) and State Legislative Assembly'General Elections 1969
of the States of Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak ,~~1~972, P° 48.
3 Each parliamentary constituency ,in a state comprises of the whole 
of a number of state constituencies. This allows for comparisons 
to be made. However in 1974 of the eighty-two contested 
parliamentary seats fourteen had at least one component state seat 
where candidates were returned unopposed. These fourteen seats 
thus do not allow for comparisons of the sort attempted here.
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interest in the' parliamentary election may thus account for the larger 
percentage of rejected ballot papers. In only six of the comparable 
sixty-eight parliamentary constituencies was the number of rejected 
ballot papers higher than in the corresponding state constituencies. 
This lends support to the contention that there was greater enthusiasm 
and participation in the parliamentary election and also suggests that 
voters, not desiring to vote for one or the other of the elections are 
likely, on being given both the ballot papers, to spoil the ballot 
paper for the election in which they do not wish to participate.
Such intentional spoiling of the ballot papers will inevitably raise 
the percentage of rejected votes in each of the elections that are held 
simultaneously. This, it is felt, must be a contributory factor, if 
not the sole explanation, for the increased percentage of spoilt votes 
since 1964, when elections for Parliament and the State Assemblies have 
been held simultaneously.
The Significance of the Results to the Parties
For Tun Abdul Razak and the Government the election results were 
justifiable grounds for jubilation. The Government had in Peninsular 
Malaysia obtained more than ninety per cent of the seats - a majority 
that must be the envy of any government in a parliamentary democracy. 
From a Government that lacked the support of more than half the voters 
in 1969 it had emerged in 1974 with the consent of more than sixty per 
cent of the voters. Especially after the nation’s traumatic years 
following the communal riots of May 1969 and the measures adopted to 
overcome them, which included drastic constitutional changes, such show 
of support for the Government was considered important, if not 
essential. It equally vindicated the Government from many of the 
criticisms levelled against it during the years between the 1969 and 
1974 elections.
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What must be of concern to Malaysians, however, is that voting 
continued to be dominated by communal considerations and that despite 
twenty-five non-Malay candidates from the Barisan Nasional being 
elected, the Barisan Nasional obtained less than fifty per cent of 
the non-Malay vote. The problem is compounded by the fact that all 
the opposition candidates elected are Chinese. What emerged was a 
principally Malay-based Government and a wholly non-Malay, indeed 
Chinese, Opposition. The implications of this to national unity 
cannot be underestimated. It is in the light of this that the fail­
ure of Pekemas, which represented a more moderate and multi-racial 
approach to Malaysian politics than the DAP, is to be regretted. The 
Pekemas policies were rejected by the Malays (who found in the UMNO- 
PAS coalition the dream of Malay unity) and by the majority of the 
non-Malays, who were obviously more convinced by the DAP's more 
aggressive style and approach. A measure of comfort for those 
sympathetic to the Pekemas is that the party's loss came perhaps as 
much from tactical error as from a rejection of its policies. As a 
party formed only two years prior to the election,the party had 
undoubtedly overstretched its organizational capacity.and resources in 
fielding thirty-five candidates. The election of the Pekem'as 
President Tan Chee Koon, though certainly a personal vote, is 
nonetheless as much a victory for those in the Malaysian political 
arena who believe that a multi-racial approach, backed by effective 
and dedicated service, is a workable alternative.
For the DAP the election results, though unsatisfactory in terms 
of the number of seats it obtained, were nonetheless grounds for 
satisfaction. The party had managed to retain as many seats as it 
had when Parliament was dissolved, and win more than half of the non- 
Malay votes and a fifth of the total votes polled. With the Pekemas 
and Partai Rakyat unsuccessful in making inroads, the DAP was
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established as the principal opposition party. Not surprisingly, the
DAP called for the formation of a two-party system - Secretary General
Lim Kit Siang told a press conference
"the political battle in Malaysia for the next five years 
would be between the DAP and the National Front.
The leaders and members of other Opposition parties should 
realise that the most sensible political decision was to 
join the DAP to present and enable a clear development of 
a two-party system."^
The chances of such a development are, however, bleak; even if 
the idea would hold some attraction for the trounced Pekemas, it is 
difficult to envisage the Partai Rakyat agreeing. The Partai Rakyat, 
though unsuccessful in gaining a single seat, had, however, proved that 
its policies are at least not repugnant to thirty per cent of the Malay 
voters of Trengganu. For a party presenting a non-communal approach, 
such a measure of support in rural and tradition-based Trengganu gives 
cause for hope. Cynics may point to the lack of an alternative 
opposition party contending for the anti-Barisan Nasional vote as the 
grounds for the Partai Rakyat1s gains. This certainly was an 
important contributory factor; but that a party labelled atheist and 
anti-Islam could pick up thirty per cent of the votes, even if they 
were largely anti-Barisan Nasional votes, must give sufficient grounds 
for optimism.
The results are as significant for the position of each of the 
Barisan Nasional*s component parties vis a vis the other component 
parties. UMNO emerged as the principal party, having sixty-one of 
the *104 seats, and, with the fourteen PAS seats, the Malay-based 
parties had just under two-thirds (63.83%) of the seats in Peninsular 
Malaysia and just under half (48.70%) the seats in the Malaysian 
Parliament. For the MCA the election results were a remarkable
1 The Straits Times, August 31 * 1974.
improvement over its performance of 1969* The party won twenty of
its twenty-three seats, as compared with a mere thirteen out of
thirty-three it contested in ^3 ^ 3 , Thus, by having conceded to share
the non-Malay seats with the Gerakan and PPP,the MCA managed actually
to improve its position in Parliament. The MIC was similarly able
to win all the four seats it contested. The 197^ election results
thus showed^ that the formation of the Barisan Nasional had been of 
/
immediate value to the old Alliance partners - the UMNO, the MCA and 
the MIC. They had between them eighty-five seats, approximately 
three-quarters of the seats in Peninsular Malaysia, and more than 
fifty-five per cent of the seats in the 15^ member Malaysian House of 
Representatives. The Barisan Nasional had served as a vehicle for 
the traditional Alliance partners to improve markedly their own 
positions. In 19&9 the Alliance partners had had between them only 
sixty-seven seats in a member Parliament - a mere ^6.53%- Viewed 
in terms of increasing Malay dominance in Parliament, of establishing 
UMNO in an unassailable position as the premier party, and of improv­
ing the position of UMNO’s traditional non-Malay partners, the form­
ation of the Barisan Nasional, the allocation of seats and the 
consequent election victory represents an unqualified success, and is 
perhaps,- the best testimony to the political acumen of the late 
Tun Abdul Razak.
What did the election results hold for the new partners in the 
Government coalition - the Gerakan, the PPP and the PAS? For the 
Gerakan it meant that it was-able to obtain five seats in Parliament
i
as compared with the four it had- when Parliament was dissolved. The 
party had been seriously handicapped by the split in its ranks and the 
formation of the Pekemas. Its 19&9 performance had been principally 
due to its electoral understanding with the DAP and the PPP.
Especially with the extreme unlikelihood of an electoral understanding
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with the Pekemas and the DAP, the party is likely to have lost its 
seats to the Alliance at least on a minority vote® For a party doubt­
ful of its own strength, the results must have proven satisfactory.,
To the PPP, however, the results proved to be a total, setback from 
which it is unlikely to recover® The party was totally demolished,
losing even the Ipoh and Menglembu seats - long regarded as its 
impregnable fortress® The only seat it retained, it did so by a 
minority vote® The PAS won all the fourteen seats it contested®
In 19895 however, the party contesting on its own platform had won 
twelve seats, and it is conceivable that, with the increase in the 
Maiay-dominated constituencies resulting from the 197^ - constituency 
delimitation exercise, the party would have In 197^ obtained more; 
in 1989 the party had obtained no less than 23-7^% of the votes polled, 
almost all of which were certainly Malay votes® It is difficult to
visualize that a party that rivals UMNO in organization and appeal,will 
remain content with fourteen seats compared with UMNO’s sixty-one®
The newly elected Malaysian Parliament is likely to be dominated by 
developments in the UMNO-PAS relationship®
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Communalism is the all pervading and determining factor in the 
Peninsular Malaysian electoral process and its manifestations are 
everywhere apparent.
Political party evolution, organization and appeal are dictated 
by the- constraints set' by a divided polity,, The statistics of 
Peninsular Malaysian pluralism and the political necessity to achieve 
political victories in order to obtain parliamentary majorities have 
led to the development of several permutations, all designed to elicit 
support from the different communal segments of society. Basically 
these can be reduced to three formulae: the closed party, the
theoretically open party, and the inter-communal coalition.
The success of each of these three variations has depended upon 
their ability t©'convince an ethnocentric electorate of their ability 
to representthe elee tor at es? conflicting demands* This the 
political parties have done by an exercise of"communal discrimination 
in their organisation and appeal; indeed communal discrimination is an. 
integral part of party organization and. appeal in Peninsular Malaysia.
Examination of the discrimination employed by the various parties 
in four major aspects of their organization - party membership require­
ments, party branch establishment, candidate selection and candidate 
placement - provided the framework for identifying the parties as 
having an appeal to and representing the interest of particular 
communities rather than that of others. The closed parties dis­
criminated in all four aspects studied and catered for one community 
exclusively. Even in the cas-.e of. the theoretically open parties 
which granted party membership to all Malaysian citizens regardless of 
race, discrimination in the other three areas examined was invariably 
found to be the case, albeit to a differing degree in each party.
The most significant aspect-of the organization and appeal of political 
parties in Peninsular Malaysia is that closed- parties could achieve a
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"balance of discrimination" by means of an inter-communal coalition.
This in effect involved discrimination-in favour of a particular 
community by one component party being offset by the discrimination in 
favour of other' communities by the other component' parties. At the 
time of -the~'-1'97^ election this branch of politics was termed "consensus 
politics", and the overwhelming stature of the coalition and its 
control of the mass media provided it with the opportunity to present 
this advantageously as the solution to inter-communal strife.
The campaign strategy of the political parties in Peninsular 
Malaysia is primarily a function of their organizational mode. For 
the closed parties not restrained- by a coalition it is a straight­
forward task of attempting to outbid each other as the champions of 
their respective communities by exaggerated demands on their behalf.
For the open parties the alternatives are essentially either to appeal 
along multi-racial lines and risk rejection by all communities, or to 
surrender their avowedly multi-racial approach and for the immediate 
term appear to-re-present the interests of one particular community.
The strategy-df the inter-communal coalitions is based on their 
♦balance of discrimination1. This appeal is two fold: first that
the dictates of Malaysian pluralism demand co-operation and unity, and 
second, that the respective communally discriminating components would 
represent and safeguard the particular interests of each community.
This provides a powerful stimulus for the co-operation of ethnocentric 
leaders and •electorates. At the. parliamentary election of 197^ this 
appeal received overwhelming support.. Just over sixty, per cent of 
those who voted gave their approval to this approach, thereby indicating 
that the inter-communal coalition allows for a successful form of 
political organization in Peninsular Malaysia's plural society.
There are, however, limitations to such a mode of organization.. 
Parties representing, exclusively or principally, the interest of
382
particular communities can pose effective threats by presenting the 
inevitable inter-communal coalition compromises as jeopardizing the 
interest of the communities they represent. Consequently, each erodes 
the support enjoyed ’by the inter-communal coalition* Such was 
evidenced in 19&9 and a repeat of those circumstances, the Sedition Act 
and the constitutional amendments barring discussion of communally 
sensitive issues notwithstanding, are a distinct possibility. Related 
to this is the fact that the coalition must at least appear to carry 
into effect" compromises that are equitable and do not smack of one 
community being advantaged at the expense of any other. If this does 
happen, the component coalition parties representing'the disadvantaged 
communities are likelry to sacrifice an increasing share of their 
support to the communal parties outside the coalition. A vicious 
spiral of decreasing support leading to decreasing political influence 
within the coalition and hence even more disadvantageous compromises 
becomes likely. It would appear from the 197^ election results that the 
non-Malay electorate indeed view the coalition as being weighted in 
favour of the Malay community - more than half the non-Malays who voted 
withheld their support from the inter-communal coalition. The ideal 
of the coalition calls for a correction of this image.
A further limitation, and one which-is'convincingly presented by 
the proponents of the open party is that the inter-communal coalition 
itself institutionalizes and perpetuates the communal'ism that exists.
The continued existence■of a -communally divided society preempts the 
success of the closed parties and:' the inter-communal coalition. It 
"is' thus not' diffibult'vtb'understand'that"'the interests of the closed 
parties and'the inter-communal coalitions are to perpetuate the 
current- state of Peninsular"Malaysian(politics. Any alternative
paradigm-is likely to be considered an anathema. The Partai Rakyat’s 
presentation of Peninsular Malaysia’ s"'woes'as the result of divisions
383
along lines of class rather than of race are thus particularly rejected.
The question as to whether the communalism that exists should be 
officially recognized through the provision of parliamentary represent­
ation is the principal issue confronting those who seriously ponder the 
communal problems of Peninsular Malaysian society. The dilemma may be 
expressed thus: are the communal divisions in Peninsular Malaysian
society to be officially recognized and some form of explicit 
guarantees provided for the representation of the various communities, 
or^ i- are the divisions to be ignored in the hope that they would in time 
be overcome? This had essentially been the dilemma faced by those who 
had the momentous task of choosing an electoral system. They had 
opted to be hopeful rather than realistic. Hence, the electoral 
system chosen and still in use, which is plurality voting in single 
member territorial constituencies with a common electoral register, was 
not intended, and does not provide, for communal representation.
The lack of sensitivity to the need for minority representation 
and the manner in which the system is operated in Peninsular Malaysia, 
has introduced inequities of a kind that seriously question the validity 
of continuing the system. The working of the system, the electoral 
code and the regulations show many ways in which the machinery may fail, 
and in failing, destroy the faith of the public, or at least a 
significant portion of it, in the whole concept of democratic 
government.
The idea of the "consent of the governed" and the principle of 
"one man one vote" are accepted features of the Malaysian democratic 
system. But the dictates of communal fears, bargaining and com­
promise have restricted the concept of universal suffrage to a category 
of Malaysian who met the requirements of and obtained citizenship.
Hence, the question: Whose consent is it that successive governments
have to seek? This may provide ample occasion for parsimonious
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criticism of the system. However, it is well to remember that the 
qualifications for citizenship were adopted as a result of political 
struggle and compromise, and theoretical arguments are only one factor, 
and perhaps not the most important, in decisions about the franchise. 
Other inequities have also arisen which are however not the result of 
specific understanding and consequently are grounds for legitimate 
concern and criticism.
Limitations on the exercise of the vote have also been imposed 
by the requirement to register as an elector, the onus for such 
registration resting not on the state but on the individual. For the 
1974 election administrative mishandling led to the loss of the 
franchise by an estimated 1 1 3 ,0 0 0 persons who had registered as 
electors. The rules governing registration play a role in the number 
registered and thus ultimately the number voting. The effect of the 
formal and legal limitations in the franchise affect the different 
communities differently - the Malay community being advantaged and the 
non-Malay communities being conversely disadvantaged. That 
administrative arrangements in themselves could, and have affected the 
different communities differently is witnessed by the fact that, though 
an increased proportion of the non-Malays in the country have with 
time acquired citizenship and thus eligibility for the franchise,
Malay dominance in the electoral registers have since 1969 shown an 
increase. Clearly a greater percentage' of Malays than non-Malays 
eligible for the franchise have their names included in the electoral 
registers.
Even as the principles of universal suffrage and one man one vote 
are subject to limited interpretation and application, the ideal of one 
vote, one value has been subjected to calculated and systematic 
erosion. Arrangements for translating votes into legislative seats 
almost always work to benefit the party that obtains the greatest share
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of votes. That the politically rich get richer is nowhere more 
marked than in elections utilizing plurality voting in single member 
territorial constituencies. Such is the mechanical effect of the 
system. The principles adopted in the apportionment of seats to the 
various states and the delineation of constituencies in Peninsular 
Malaysia however further severely distort the value of the vote, and 
introduce a rank discrimination based on the elector’s location in 
space - the value of the vote is greatly enhanced with rural residence 
and diminished with urban residence. Rural weighting has been 
progressively amended and each amendment has allowed for an increased 
appreciation in the value of the rural vote vis-k-vis the urban vote. 
The 1974- delineation of constituencies made some rural votes as 
significant as almost three votes in some urban areas.
The implications of such distortions in the value of the votes 
is greatly compounded by the spatial distribution of the various 
communities. The states advantaged in the apportionment of seats 
are predominantly Malay and the states disadvantaged are predominantly 
non-Malay. Rural areas are overwhelmingly Malay and urban areas 
overwhelmingly non-Malay. Such residential segregation also makes 
for easy identification and bias in the delineation of constituencies. 
Gerrymandering was evidenced in the examination of the delineation 
undertaken for Selangor and Johore states. The total effect of the 
franchise rules and procedure, and the delimitation of constituencies 
greatly exaggerates Malay electoral strength and diminishes the non- 
Malay. , From this follows significant corollaries.
Malay based political parties are able to obtain a majority in 
parliament well in excess of what Malay population numbers would 
suggest. At the time of the 1974 election the Malay community had 
an electoral majority in seventy-nine of the 114 parliamentary 
constituencies. Malay representation in Parliament was swollen to
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almost two-thirds the total number of seats, though Malays comprise 
only just over half the total population. This exaggerates the 
political strength of the Malay based parties in the coalition and 
places them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the non-Malay based 
parties in the coalition. In the 1974 election the inter-communal 
coalition, which like the other parties places candidates in the 
constituencies where their community predominates, placed a number of 
candidates from the non-Malay based parties of the coalition in 
constituencies with a Malay majority. This was done for a semblance 
of equitable representation within the coalition. Such a dependence 
by the non-Malay, on the Malay based parties, only serves to diminish 
their bargaining power within the coalition. This once again has the 
effect of increasing the number of disadvantageous compromises they have 
to make and therefore diminishing the support from the communities they 
claim to represent. Even more serious, the exaggeration of political 
strength of one community could lead to a one community government.
The possibility of this was held out by the leaders of the Malay parties 
in extorting the non-Malay communities to lend support to the non-Malay 
based parties of the coalition.
The Chinese are a large minority and, furthermore, are sufficient­
ly spatially concentrated to be able to exercise local domination through 
the electoral process, despite being in an inequitable position in the 
political system as a whole. In the urban constituencies of the west 
coast states of Peninsular Malaysia Chinese domination is complete.
The marked disparity in the size of the electorate of urban and rural 
constituencies and the creation of the Federal Territory has meant that, 
the Chinese community comprisesthe dominant community in the
majority of the constituencies in only one state. The fate of the 
other communities is even more disadvantaged under the present system. 
They are widely dispersed and hence there are no distinct local areas
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in which their collective ethnic identity may be expressed.
The electoral system currently employed therefore places the 
minority groups in a difficult dilemma. If the members of the 
minority want to participate as fully equal members of the state, they 
have to subsume their differences within the larger group and play the 
political game according to the rules laid down by the majority.
Such a strategy necessarily involves sacrificing their identity and 
culture. An alternative strategy would involve their retaining their 
own group identity and solidarity, and acting as a cohesive unit.
This latter approach will none the less accentuate their separateness 
from the larger society and involve their continued isolation and 
political impotence. The manifestations of this dilemma are apparent 
on several scales. The various communities that are broadly classified 
as 'Indians1 have to play down their separate group identities in order 
to achieve a measure of political influence as a corporate group.
Even being so classified the group lacks sufficient spatial concen­
tration to form a majority of the electors in any one constituency.
Hence the conflicting approaches of being an impotent and very junior 
partner in the inter-communal coalition, and in other circumstances 
further subsuming their identity to join the Chinese in the even 
broader classification 'non-Malay1. Both approaches have in the 
Peninsular Malaysian context yielded opportunities for Indians to 
gain election to parliament. Even more significant is the fact that 
Peninsular Malaysian parliamentarians, and all candidates presented for 
election in the 1974 were of the three large racial groups - Malays, 
Chinese and Indians. No member of any community not included in these 
three broad categories has even been a parliamentarian, or was presented 
as a candidate by the parties in the 1974 election. The study then 
indicates that in the political wrangling, competition and consensus 
that is perpetuated in the present system amongst the major
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communities, not only will there arise inequities among these three 
communities but small minorities tend to suffer. This is another 
major flaw of the system. It can be generalised thus; when a 
predominant portion of a democratic society’s population demands 
sectarian welfare rather than general welfare, the less privileged 
strata, particularly the smaller minority groups, will lack the 
political influence to secure their own objectives. Clearly the 
electoral system, indeed the whole political system, may be responsive 
only in the sense that it is alert to the demands of the majority 
group and the larger of the minority groups. The responsiveness 
becomes a function of the population numbers of each community.
The data and discussion presented in this thesis indicate the 
grave possibility that the Peninsular Malaysian system is consistent 
with this contention and that there exists in the Malaysian democracy 
permanently entrenched minorities whose needs are not met or met only 
minimally. If such inequities hold consistently over time, they will 
give rise to what must surely be viewed as a serious or even fatal flaw 
in the Malaysian democratic system.
The dilemma that faces the student of the electoral process in 
Peninsular Malaysia today is still basically the same as that faced 
by those who were responsible for formulating it. Should the system 
be adapted to provide for equitable representation, with the risks of 
institutionalizing and perpetuating the communal cleavages? Or 
should the communal divisions in society be ignored in the hope that 
the divisions will soon be overcome? Those responsible for adopting 
the system felt, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
sufficiently confident to opt to be hopeful. The problem that faces 
the student today is compounded by the fact that he has before him 
sufficient evidence that their hopes have neither been realised nor 
are likely to be met in the foreseeable future. Indeed the failure
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to provide for minority representation has resulted in and will 
perpetuate serious inequities.
In the existing order not only the results, but also the initial 
chances of the different communities and the parties representing 
them are very different; they are affected by regulations of the
electoral system '-’h u m  h^y^nd their control and can be altered only
by government action. The parties in government, however, are the 
principal beneficiaries of the system and it does not take much 
insight to observe that politically frozen systems do not yield to 
ordinary methods of change: beneficiaries of an existing system cannot
be expected to vote themselves out of office. The eventual solution 
would be for the courts to hear cases where equitable principles have 
not been followed.
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Appendix 1
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o n s t i t u e n c i e s  U t i l i s e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 & 9  E l e c t i o n .
T h e  10 *f c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  u t i l i s e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 6 9  p a r l i a m e n t a r y
e l e c t i o n  a r e  i n d i c a t e d i n  t h e  m ap a d j o i n i n g  t h i s  p a g e .  T h e  c o n s t i t -
u e n c y  n u m b e rs  o n  t h i s  m ap a n d  a l l  t h e  1969 c o n s t i t u e n c y  m a p s  u s e d  i n
t3ae f e x i ;  o f  t h e  t h e s i s , c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s :
P e r l i s T r e n g g a n u
1 P e r l i s  U t a r a 2 5 B e s u t
2  P e r l i s  S e la t a n 2 6 K u a la  T r e n g g a n u  U t a r a
2 7 K u la  T r e n g g a n u  S e l a t a n
K e d a h 28 D u n g u n
5  J i t r a  P a d a n g  T e r a p 2 9 K em am an
b K u b a n g  P a s u  B a r a t 3 0 T r e n g g a n u  T e n g h
5. K o t a  S t a r  U t a r a  
6  A l o r  S t a r
P e n a n g
7 K u a la  K e d a h 31 B a g a n
8  K o t a  S t a r  S e l a t a n 3 2 S e b e r a n g  T e n g a h
9  K e d a h  T e n g a h 3 3 S e b e r a n g  S e l a t a n
10  J e r a i 3b P e n a n g  U t a r a
11 B a l i n g 3 5 P e n a n g  S e la t a n
12  S u n g a i  P e t a n ! 3 6 T a n jo n g
1 3  K u l im  U t a r a 3 7 D a to  K ra m a t
1 ^  K u l im  B a n d a r  B a h r u 3 8 S e b e r a n g  U t a r a
K e la n t a n P e r a k
1 5  T u m p a t 3 9 U lu  P e r a k
16  K e la n t a n  H i l i r ^ 0 L a r u t  U t a r a
17  P a s i r  M as. H i l i r 4-1 K r i a n  L a u t
18 K o t a  B h a r u  H i l i r b2 K r i a n  D a r a t
19  B a c h o k b3 L a r u t  S e la t a n
2 0  K o t a  B h a r u  H u lu bb H i l i r  P e r a k
21 P a s i r  M as  H u lu b3 K u a la  K a n g s a r
2 2  P a s i r  P u te h b6 S u n g e i  S i p u t
2 3  T a n a h  M e ra h b? P a r i t
2b U lu  K e la n t a n b8 B r u a s
b9 S i t i a w a n
5 0 I p o h
51 M e n g le m b u M a la c c a
52 U lu  K i n t a
8 5 M a la c c a  T e n g a h
5 3 B a t u  G a ja h 86 B a n d a r  M a la c c a
3b K a m p a r 87 M a la c c a  U t a r a
5 5 T a n jo n g  M a l im 88 M a la c c a  S e la t a n
56 T e lo k  A n s o n
5 7 B a g a n  D a to h J o h o r e
5 8 B a ta n g  P a d a n g 89 M u a r  D a la m
P a h a n g 9 0
S e g a m a t S e la t a n
91 M u a r  P a n t a i
5 9 R a u b 92 M u a r  S e la t a n
60 B e n to n g
9 3 B a t u  P a h a t
61 K u a n ta n 9 ^ B a t u  P a h a t  D a la m
62 P e k a n
9 5 K lu a n g  U t a r a
6 3 T e m e r lo h 96 J o h o r  T e n g a r r a
6b L i p i s
97 P o n t i a n  U t a r a
S e la n g o r
65 K u a la  S e la n g o r
66 Batu
67 K a p a r
68 R a w a n g
69 L a n g a t
7 0  S e t a p a k
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7b K la n g
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78 U lu  S e la n g o r
7 9  K u a la  P i l a h
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81 R em ban  /  T a m p in
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Appendix 2
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o n s t i t u e n c ie s  U t i l i s e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 7 4  E l e c t i o n „
T h e  1 1 4  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  u t i l i s e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 7 4  p a r l i a m e n t a r y
e l e c t i o n  a r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  m ap 
u e n c y  n u m b e rs  o f  t h i s  m ap a n d . a l l  
t h e  t e x t  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  c o r r e s p o n d
P e r l i s
1 K a n g a r
2  A r a u
K e d a h
3  J e r l u n - L a n g k a w i
4 K u b a n g  P a s u
5 P a d a n g  T e r a p
6 K u a la  K e d a h
7 A l o r  S e t a r
8 K o t a  S e t a r
9  U lu  M u d a
1 0  B a l i n g
11 J e r a i
12  K u a la  M ud a
1 3  S u n g a i  P e t a n i
1 4  P a d a n g  S e r a i
1 5  K u l im  -  B a n d a r  B a h r u
K e la n t a n
16  T u m p a t
1 7  P e n g k a la n  C h e p a
1 8  P a s i r  M as
1 9  K o t a  B h a r u
2 0  B a c h o k
21 R a n ta u  P a n ja n g
2 2  N i la m  P u r i
2 3  T a n a h  M e ra h
24 M a c h a n g
25 P a s i r  P u te h
2 6  K u a la  K e r a i
2 7  U lu  K e la n t a n
a d j o i n i n g  t h i s  p a g e *  T h e  c o n s t i t -  
t h e  1 9 7 4  c o n s t i t u e n c y  m a p s  u s e d  i n  
t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s :
T r e n g g a n u
28 Be s u t
2 9 U lu  N e r u s
3 0 U lu  T r e n g g a n u
31 K u a la  N e r u s
3 2 K u a la  T r e n g g a n u
3 3 D u n g u n
3k K em am an
3 5 K e p a la  B a ta s
36 M a ta . K u c h in g
3 7 P e r m a ta n g  P a u h
38 B u k i t  M e r t a ja m
3 9 N ib o n g  T e b a l
ko B a le k  P u la u
4 l B u k i  t  B e n d a r a
k2 T a n jo n g
k3 J e l u t o n g
P e r a k
4 4 G r i k
4 5 L a r u t
4 6 P a r i t  B u n t a r
4 7 B a g a n  S e r a i
4 8 S u n g a i  S i p u t
4 9 T a i p i n g
5 0 M a ta n g
51 P a d .a n g  R e n g a s
5 2 K u a la  K a n g s a r
5 3 K i n t a
5 4 I p o h
5 5  M e n g le m b u 87 K u a la  L u m p u r  B a n d a r
56 B e r u a s 88 S u n g a i  B e s i
5 7  P a r i t
58 B a t u  G a ja h N fe g r i  S e m b i la n
5 9  B a t a n g  P a d a n g 8 9 J e l e b u
60 L u m u t 90 M a n t i n
61 H i l i r  P e r a k 91 S e re m b a n
6 2  T e lo k  A n s o n 92 K u a la  P i l a h
63 T a n jo n g  M a l im 9 3 T e lo k  K em a ng
6 4  B a g a n  D a to k 9 4 T a m p in
P a h a n g M e la k a
65 L i p i s 9 5 A l o r  G a ja h
66 J e r a n t u t 9 6 J a s i n
67 K u a n ta n 97 B a t u  B e ra n d a m
68 R a u b 9 8 K o t a  M e la k a
6 9  M a ra n  _ .
7 0  B e n to n g
Johor
71 .P e k a n 99 L a b i s
7 2  T e m e r lo h
100 S e g a m a t
101 K lu a n g
S e la n g o r 102 T e n g g a r o h
7 3  S a b a k  B e rn a m 1 0 3
L e d a n g
7 4  T a n j  o n g  K a r a n g
1 0 4 P a g  o h
7 5  U lu  S e la n g o r 1 0 5
A y e r  H i ta m
76 K u a la  S e la n g o r 106 M u a r
7 7  S e la y a n g 1 0 7
R engam
78 U lu  L a n g a t 108 P a n t i  .
7 9  P e la b o h a n  K e la n g 1 0 9
S r i  G a d in g
8 0  S h a h  A la m
110 S e m e ra h
81 P e t a l i n g 111 B a t u  P a h a t
8 2  K u a la  L a n g a t
112 P o n t ia n
8 3  S e p a n g 1 1 3
P u l a i
W i la y a h  P e r s e k u t u a n
1 1 4 J o h o r  B a h r u
8 4  Kepong
85 Setapak
86 Damansara
C o m m u n a l C o m p o s i t io n  o f  t h e  E l e c t o r a t e  b y  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
C o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  1969 E l e c t i o n o
T h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  b e lo w  w a s  
i n  J a l a n  I p o h , K u a la  L u m p u r 0
Name o f  C o n s t i t u e n c y  £
-ujj-©ox o r9 .X  0
PERLIS
1 P e r l i s  U t a r a  2 1 ,7 9 7
2 P e r l i s  S e la t a n  2 1 ,2 1 2
KEDAH
3  J i t r a / P a d a n g  T e r a p  3 0 ,7 4 6
4  K u b a n g  P a s u  B a r a t  2 4 ,3 3 6
3  K o t a  S t a r  U t a r a  26 ,630
6 A l o r  S t a r  2 0 ,3 7 1
7 K u a la  K e d a h  3 0 ,7 7 2
8 K o t a  S t a r  S e la t a n  2 6 , 7 6 4
9  K e d a h  T e n g a h  2 7 ,1 6 3
10 J e r a i  26,921
11 B a l i n g  2 9 ,9 8 0
12 S u n g a i P e t a n i  1 3 ,6 1 7
1 3  K u l im  U t a r a  1 5 ,2 1 1
1 4  K u l im / B a n d a r  B a h r u  1 6 ,3 3 9
KELANTAN
1 5  T u m p a t 2 9 , 4 9 0
16 K e la n t a n  H i l i r  3 0 ,7 1 2
17  P a s i r  M as  H i l i r  2 8 ,3 3 0
18 K o t a  B h a r u  H i l i r  3 2 ,5 8 2
1 9  B a c h o k  3 0 , 8 8 4
2 0  K o t a  B h a r u  H u lu  3 4 ,0 1 6
21 P a s i r  M as  H u lu  2 4 ,1 9 4
2 2  P a s i r  P u t  e h  3.2,96.1.
2 3  T a n a h  M e ra h  36 ,866
2 4  U lu  K e la n t a n  3 4 ,4 6 5
TRENGGANU
2 5  B e s u t  3 4 ,9 2 4
2 6  K u a la  T r e n g g a n u  U t a r a  3 0 ,0 9 6
o b t a in e d  f r o m  t h e  UMNO h e a d q u a r t e r s
C h in e s e  I n d i a n s  T o t a l  
E l e c t o r a t e  a n d  o t h e r s  E l e c t o r a t e
5,128 1,030 2 7 ,9 5 5
A , 180 580 2 5 ,9 7 2
3,056 1 ,9 7 2 3 5 ,7 7 4
2 ,5 3 6 4 0 5 27 ,277
2 ',3 6 7 669 29,666
1 9 ,3 7 0 2 , 8 9 9 3 8 ,6 4 0
9 ,6 9 2 4 3 8 36,902
3 ,5 1 0 1 ,7 7 6 32,050
4 ,5 3 2 3 , 5 6 0 3 5 ,2 5 5
A 9 630 2 9 9 31 ,850
3 ,7 2 7 2 , 4 9 2 3 6 ,1 9 9
1 0 ,1 4 -5 4 , 8 3 9 28,601
5 , 9 0 3 4 ,7 3 1 2 5 ,8 4 5
9 ,8 7 1 4 , 0 5 4 3 0 ,2 6 4
1 ,3 6 9 2 7 7 3 1 ,1 3 6
292 5 4 3 1 ,058
1,063 183 2 9 ,5 7 6
6 ,4 -7 7 4 2 3 3 9 ,4 8 2
4 3 3 3 2 3 1 ,3 4 9
588 86 3 4 ,6 9 0
1 ,1 2 5 1 1 3 2 5 ,4 2 2
.6 0 4  ' 4 7 3 3 ,6 1 2
1 ,5 8 9 500 3 8 ,9 5 5
2 ,962 1 ,130 3 8 ,5 5 7
5 6 9 63 3 5 ,5 5 6
9 0 4 3 0 ,1 9 0
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Name of Constituency Malay Chinese Indians TotalElectorate Electorate and others Electorate
27 ^ S l a S r ^  4 2 6  2 9 , 4 3 5
2 8  B u n g u n  2 1 , 4 2 6  1 ,7 4 8  2 3 4  2 3 ,4 0 8
2 9  Kem am an 2 0 , 7 1 5  2 , 9 3 5  3 2 4  2 3 ,9 7 4
3 0  T r e n g g a n u  T e n g a h  3 0 ,3 1 5  9 8 0  2 6  3 1 ,3 2 1
PENANG
31 B a g a n 7,661 1 3 ,1 8 3 3 ,9 5 0 2 4 ,7 9 4
3 2  S e b e r a n g  T e n g a h 1 8 ,5 8 4 19,618 3 ,1 3 8 4 1 ,3 4 0
3 3  S e b e r a n g  S e la t a n 9 ,810 10,870 3 ,8 6 5 2 4 ,5 4 5
3 4  P e n a n g  U t a r a 1 0 ,5 3 2 31,261 5,211 4 7 ,0 0 4
3 5  P e n a n g  S e la t a n 16,187 2 8 ,4 0 1 2 , 8 6 4 4 7 ,4 5 2
36  T a n jo n g 2 , 2 6 3 28,065 3 ,3 4 1 33 ,669
37  B a t  0 K ra m a t 4 ,  697 2 3 ,2 4 7 3 ,1 1 9 3 1 ,0 6 3
38 S e b e r a n g  U t a r a 2 3 , 9 4 9 6 ,9 3 8 1 ,4 6 7 3 2 ,3 7 4
PERAK
3 9  U lu  P e r a k 15 ,803 8 ,1 4 1 1 ,5 1 1 2 5 ,4 5 5
4 0  L a r u t  U t a r a 2 3 ,4 9 6 4 ,6 9 1 3 , 4 8 0 3 1 ,6 6 7
41 K r i a n  L a u t 2 1 ,5 8 7 7 ,3 4 5 1 ,5 5 9 3 0 ,4 9 1
4 2  K r i a n  B a r a t 2 0 ,1 5 4 4 ,7 6 6 4 , 5 9 3 2 9 ,513
4 3  L a r u t  S e la t a n 1 6 ,4 5 1 2 4 ,7 3 5 6 ,0 8 0 4 7 ,2 6 6
4 4  H i l i r  P e r a k 1 6 ,6 5 3 3 5 0 681 1 7 ,6 8 4
4 5  K u a la  K a n g s a r 2 1 ,9 6 4 8 ,825 2 ,286 3 3 ,0 7 5
4 6  S u n g e i  S ip u t 7 , 7 6 6 10,688 3 , 2 6 3 ' 2 1 ,7 1 7
4 7  P a r  i t 2 2 ,7 5 2 1 ,5 8 5 9 0 3 2 5 ,2 4 0
4 8  B r u a s 12,068 1 .3 ,9 0 4 3 , 4 5 0 2 9 ,4 2 2
4 9  S i t i a w a n 7 , 8 8 9 1 6 ,6 3 3 3 , 4 1 3 2 7 ,9 3 5
50 I p o h 4 , 4 2 2 30,092 6 ,206 4 0 ,7 2 0
51 M e g le m b u 6 ,7 .9 2 4 1 ,4 4 3 3 , 5 9 4 5 1 ,8 2 9
5 2  U lu  K i n t a 8 ,766 12,707 3 ,0 1 0 2 4 ,4 8 3
5 3  B a t u  G a ja h 5 ,8 4 -2 17,667 3 , 5 7 4 27 ,083
5 4  K a m p a r 1 0 ,0 4 6 2 6 ,7 4 6 3 , 7 3 9 4 0 ,5 3 1
5 5  T a n jo n g  M a l im 9 ,  8 4 o 11,680 4 , 7 7 6 26 ,296
56 T e lo k  A n s o n 1 0 ,1 6 4 1 9 ,6 7 4 5 , 6 3 9 3 5 ,4 7 7
5 7  B a g a n  B a t o k 1 6 ,0 4 8 3 , 2 2 3 4 , 9 7 0 2 6 ,2 4 1
58 B a ta n g  P a d a n g 8 ,208 9 ,4 2 2 2 , 2 9 4 1 9 ,9 2 4
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Name o f  C o n s t i t u e n c y
M a la y  C h in e s e
E l e c t o r a t e  E l e c t o r a t e
I n d ia n s  T o t a l  
a n d  o t h e r s  E l e c t o r a t e
PAHANG 
3 9  R a u b 1 3 ,2 9 7 1.3 ,386 2 , 6 3 5 2 9 ,3 1 8
60 B e n to n g 9 ,4 1 1 1 6 ,4 2 8 2 , 3 5 2 2 8 ,1 9 1
.61 K u a n ta n 1 6 ,9 1 3 1 1 ,6 4 2 1 ,636 3 0 ,1 9 3
62 P e k a n 2 1 ,7 4 2 1 ,5 6 2 267 2 3 ,5 7 1
6 3 T e m e r lo h 2 3 ,9 4 2 7 ,9 3 7 1 ,1 7 3 3 3 ,0 5 2
6 4 L i p i s 2 1 ,9 3 9 8 ,968 1 ^ 4 9 2 3 2 ,3 9 9
SELANGOR
63 K u a la  S e la n g o r 2 0 , o 4 o 6,898 4 , 0 3 9 3 0 ,9 7 7
66 B a t u 8 ,6 3 4 3 5 ,9 4 7 5 , 5 0 2 50 ,083
67 K a p a r 13,216 9 ,9 8 9 3 , 1 6 5 2 6 ,3 7 0
68 R a w a n g 7 ,112 12,098 5 , 5 5 8 2 4 ,7 6 8
6 9 L a n g a t 1 1 , 9 1 9 9 ,1 6 4 2 ,0 5 8 2 3 ,1 4 1
7 0 S e t a p a k 2 4 ,039 2 6 ,5 7 7 7 , 3 9 3 58 ,009
71 B u n g s a r 1 0 ,9 2 7 5 8 ,2 8 5 11,809 81,021
7 2 B u k i t  B in t a n g 1 5 ,2 1 5 32,616 4 , 5 9 8 52 ,429
7 3 D a m a n s a ra 7 ,1 5 6 2 5 ,6 3 3 8 , 4 9 9 4 1 ,288
7k K la n g 11,911 1 4 ,8 9 7 8 ,388 35,196
7.3 K u a la  L a n g a t 1 4 ,8 4 6 6 ,4 0 5 3 ,7 4 1 2 4 ,9 9 2
7 6 S e p a n g 7 ,212 9,718 3 ,9 0 1 2 0 ,8 3 1 .
77 S a b a k  B e rn a m 2 4 ,5 0 7 3 ,9 9 0 1 ,0 4 9 2 9 ,5 4 6
78 U lu  S e la n g o r 7 , 6 5 3 9 ,4 8 8 3 , 6 9 4 2 0 ,8 3 5
N EG RI S E M B ILA N
7 9  K u a la  P i la h .
8 0  S e re m b a n  T im o r
81 R e m b a n /T a m p in
8 2  P o r t  D ic k s o n
83 J e le b u - J e m p o l
8 4  S e re m b a n  B a r a t
MALACCA
83 M a la c c a  T e n g a h
86 B a n d a r  M a la c c a
87 M a la c c a  U t a r a
88 M a la c c a  S e la t a n
20 ,154 6 ,1 0 4 .869 27 ,127
8 , 2 2 4 18,613 ' 5 , 4 1 8 3 2 ,2 5 5
1 8 ,2 2 3 6 ,2 4 2 2,701 27,166
9 ,8 9 2 1 1 ,7 7 7 4 , 9 6 4 2 6 ,6 3 3
1 4 ,2 7 6 13,112 2 ,3 4 1 2 9 ,7 2 9
7 , 6 0 4 15,816 4 ,5 0 1 1 7 ,9 2 1
2 2 , 7 0 5 1 1 ,9 4 8 966 3 5 ,6 1 9
6 ,688 32,180 3 , 8 3 9 42 ,707
2 3 ,4 2 8 7 ,6 8 3 2,111 3 3 ,2 2 2
21 ,007 11,672 3 ,5 5 1 36 ,230
400
, T „  ~ . . .  M a la y  C h in e s e  I n d i a n  T o t a l
ame o o n s  1 n e n c y  E l e c t o r a t e  E l e c t o r a t e  a n d  o t h e r s  E l e c t o r a t e
J0H 0R E
8 9 M u a r  D a la m 1 7 ,4 4 9 10,026 1 , 0 5 4 28 ,529
9 0 S e g a m a t S e la t a n 1 0 ,7 7 7 1 5 ,1 2 4 3 ,8 4 1 2 9 ,7 4 2
91 M u a r  P a n t a i 13,622 16,110 816 3 0 ,5 4 8
92 M u a r  S e la t a n 2 9 , 2 9 3 5 , 5 8 4 8 7 3 4 ,9 6 4
93 B a t u  P a h a t 10,586 1 5 ,8 5 8 5 5 5 2 6 ,9 9 9
9 4 B a t u  P a h a t  D a la m 22 ,072 1 0 ,0 4 1 5 4 8 32,661
9 5 K lu a n g  U t a r a 7 , 9 8 6 1 5 ,0 4 7 2 , 3 0 7 2 5 ,3 4 0
96 J o h o r  T e n g g a r o h 8 , 2 1 3 4 ,7 1 8 838 1 3 ,7 6 9
97 P o n t i a n  U t a r a 2 3 ,3 9 7 6 ,098 51 2 9 ,5 4 6
98 P o h t i a n  S e la t a n 1 5 ,3 6 3 1 2 ,3 3 5 222 27 ,920
9 9 K lu a n g  S e la t a n 9 ,680 1 8 ,2 2 3 2 ,3 5 1 3 0 , 2 5 4
100 J o h o r  B a h r u  T im o r 1 4 ,6 0 4 11,091 3 , 0 5 9 2 8 ,7 5 4
101 J o h o r  B a h r u  B a r a t 1 3 ,4 4 9 1 1 ,5 4 2 2 ,178 2 7 ,1 6 9
102 J o h o r  T im o r 1 1 ,5 8 3 6 ,3 2 7 .4 0 9 1 8 ,3 1 9
103 S e g a m a t U t a r a 8 ,6 0 9 1 1 ,6 5 4 1 ,6 3 0 2 1 ,8 9 3
1 0 4 M u a r  U t a r a 1 4 ,5 7 2 13,887 1 ,810 3 0 ,2 6 9
401
Appendix 4
C o m m u n a l. C o m p o s i t io n  o f  t h e  E l e c t o r a t e  b y  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  
1 9 7 4  E l e c t i o n .,
T h e  d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  i s  b a s e d  on  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  r e g i s t e r s  
u t i l i z e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 7 4  e l e c t i o n *  T h e  r e g i s t e r s  w e re  f r o m  t h e  E l e c t i o n  
C o m m is s io n  h e a d  o f f i c e  i n  K u a la  L u m p u r *  T h e  e l e c t o r a l  r e g i s t e r s  
t h e m s e lv e s  d o  n o t  i n d i c a t e  t h e  c o m m u n ity  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r .  T h e  
e l e c t o r ' s  c o m m u n ity  w a s  i d e n t i f i e d  b y  t h e  e l e c t o r ’ s  nam e -  M a la y ,  
C h in e s e  a n d  I n d i a n  n a m e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  e a s i l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  A s m a l l  
m a r g in  o f  e r r o r ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  u n a v o id a b le  w h e n  s u c h  a  m e th o d  i s  a d o p te d .  
A n  i n c r e a s i n g  n u m b e r  o f  I n d i a n  M u s l im s  h a v e  n a m e s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  
o f  M a la y s *  H e n c e  w h e n  t h e  nam e p r o v id e d  i s  l i s t e d  a s  A b d u l  H a l im  
s / o  M oh am a d a  f o r m  o f  w r i t i n g  t h e  nam e n o t  a d o p te d  b y  M a la y s ,  t h e n  
i t  w a s  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a n  I n d i a n  n a m e * W hen t h e  nam e w a s  p r o v i d e d  a s  
A b d u l H a l i m . b i n  M oham ad i t  w a s  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a  M a la y  n a m e * T h is  
l a t t e r  f o r m ,  i t  m u s t  b e  n o t e d ,  i s  a l s o  b e in g  i n c r e a s i n g l y  a d o p te d  b y  
I n d i a n  M u s l im s *  W hen t h e  nam e a p p e a r e d  a s  A b d u l  H a l im  M oh am a d  i t  
w as a g a in  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a  M a la y  n a m e .
T h e r e  i s  a l s o  a  p r o b le m  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  b e tw e e n  t h e  n a m e s  o f  
I n d i a n s  a n d  E u r a s ia n s  w ho  a r e  C h r i s t i a n s  -  J o h n  M a th e w , f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
i s  com m on t o  b o t h . c o m m u n i t ie s .  F o r  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  a n d  b e c a u s e  t h o s e  
who a r e  n o t  M a la y ,  C h in e s e  o r  I n d i a n  c o m p r is e  a  v e r y  s m a l l  p e r c e n ta g e  
o f  t h e  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  ( i n  1970 t h e y  c o m p r is e d  o n l y  0 * 78%) t h e y  h a v e  
b e e n  i n c l u d e d  w i t h  t h e  c a t e g o r y  I n d i a n .
Name o f  C o n s t i t u e n c y M a la y
E l e c t o r a t e
G h in e s e
E l e c t o r a t e
I n d ia n s  
a n d  o t h e r s
T o t a l
E l e c t o r a l
P E E L IS
1 K a n g a r 23 ,560 4 , 8 9 4 802 2 9 ,2 5 6
2  A r a u 25 ,692 3 ,4 1 5 3 5 8 2 9 ,4 6 5
KEDAH
3  J e r l u n  L a n g k a w i 28 ,305 2 ,3 2 1 3 2 5 3 0 ,9 5 2
4  K u b a n g  P a s u 2 8 A 75 3 , 6 1 4 1 ,7 1 7 33,806
5  P a d a n g  T e r a p 26 ,269 1 ,4 9 9 1 ,2 7 9 2 9 ,0 4 7
6 K u a la  K e d a h 29 ,597 5 ,4 0 1 290 35 ,288
7 A l o r  S t a r 20 ,956 1 3 ,8 4 2 2 ,3 8 0 37,178
8 K o t a  S e t a r 24 ,970 3 ,1 5 6 1 5 9 2 8 ,2 8 5
t o
Name o f  C o n s t i t u e n c y
M a la y  C h in e s e  I n d i a n s  T o t a l
E l e c t o r a t e  E l e c t o r a t e  a n d  o t h e r s  E l e c t o r a t e
9 U lu  M u d a 21 ,702 1 ,9 4 8 1 ,6 0 4 - 2 5 ,2 5 4
10  B a l i n g 28 ,989 3 ,0 4 9 1 ,2 9 3 3 3 ,3 3 1
11 J e r a i 2k ,820 4 ,1 2 3 322 2 9 ,2 6 5
12 K u a la  M u d a 18,906 5 ,6 5 2 4 ,1 6 1 2 8 ,7 1 9
13  S u n g a i  P e t a n i 21 ,210 11,156 4 , 7 6 0 3 7 ,1 2 6
14 P a d a n g  S e r a i 1 3 ,9 6 3 5 ,688 4 , 5 8 5 2 4 ,2 3 6
15  K u l im  B a n d a r  B a h r u 1 5 ,8 3 0 8 ,208 3 ,7 6 0 2 7 ,7 9 8
KELANTAN
16 T u m p a t 3 2 ,1 6 4 1 ,3 6 7
G
OOO 3 3 ,7 1 9
17 P e n g k a la n  C h e p a 2 6 ,8 4 7 341 51 2 7 ,2 3 9
18 P a s i r  M as 28 ,507 1 ,0 3 9 81 2 9 ,6 2 7
19  K o t a  B h a r u 2 8 ,7 7 .9 6 ,6 9 4 481 3 5 ,9 5 4
2 0  B a c h o k 27 ,768 4 4 7 6 28,221
21 R a n ta u  P a n ja n g 21 ,302 6 8 4 28 2 2 ,0 1 4
2 2  N i la m  P u r i 2 7 ,9 5 3 5 6 5 7 2 8 ,5 2 5
2 3  T a n a h  M e ra h 18,681 889 4 3 2 20,002
2 4  M a c h a n g 2 .2 ,5 4 3 8 5 3 17 2 3 ,4 1 3
2 5  P a s i r  P u te h 2 7 ,5 0 1 5 7 2 11 2 8 ,0 8 4
2 6  K u a la  K r a i 15,166 1,609 5 5 7 1 7 ,3 3 2
2 7  U lu  K e la n t a n 1 6 ,2 8 4 1,126 68 1 7 ,4 7 8
TRENGGANU
2 8  B e s u t 2 7 ,3 4 9 5 3 9 56 2 7 ,9 4 4
2 9  U lu  N e r u s 2 3 ,6 1 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 3 ,8 9 1
3 0  U lu  T r e n g g a n u 2 2 ,1 4 1 3 3 4 22 2 2 ,4 9 7
31 K u a la  N e r u s 2 5 ,3 9 1 213 28 2 5 ,6 3 2
3 2  K u a la  T r e n g g a n u 2 8 ,0 3 1 3 ,9 8 3 3 7 7 3 2 ,3 9 1
33 D u n g u n 2 3 ,4 9 0 1 ,4 5 0 262 25,202
3 4  Kem am an 2 2 ,9 3 5 2 ,9 8 5 292 26,212
PENANG
3 5  K e p a la  B a ta s 1 6 ,4 1 8 5 ,4 3 4 1,066 22,918
36 M a ta  K u c h in g 10,878 16,291 4 , 8 1 9 3 1 ,9 8 8
3 7  P e r m a ta n g  P a u h 18,103 4 ,0 1 1 5 4 9 2 2 ,6 6 3
38 B u k i t  M e r ta ja m 9 ,0 3 5 18,148 2 ,838 30,021
3 9  N ib o n g  T e b a l 1 0 ,5 3 3  • 11,066 3 , 7 3 3 2 5 ,3 3 2
403
„  „  . . .  M a la y  C h in e s e  I n d i a n s  T o t a l
Name o x  C o n s t i t u e n c y  1 n , ,  ™  i. 4.E l e c t o r a t e  E l e c t o r a t e  a n d  o t h e r s  E l e c t o r a t
4 0  B a l i k  P u la u 1 6 ,4 9 9 1 2 ,8 0 4 1 ,807 91 ,110
41 B u k i t  B e n d e r a 6 , 9 0 4 9 0 ,9 9 9 4 , 2 9 8 4 0 ,8 9 9
4 2  T a n jo n g 2 , 0 9 4 9 9 ,2 2 9 4 , 1 2 6 4 1 ,4 0 9
4 3  J e l u t o n g 8 ,9 8 9 28,909 4 , 9 1 2 4 2 , 8 o 4
PERAK
4 4  G e r i k •1 0 ,8 4 4 9 ,6 9 1 7 8 9 17,280
4 3  L a r u t 1 6 ,4 9 9 9,211 1,908 2 1 ,0 1 4
4 6  P a r i t  B u n t a r 2 9 ,9 9 2 7 ,8 1 9 1 ,6 2 9 9 2 ,7 7 6
4 7  B a g a n  S e r a i 22 ,122 4 , 8 0 0 4 , 1 9 9 9 1 ,1 1 7
4 8  S u n g a i  S i p u t 9,061 1 1 ,9 9 6 9 , 9 1 9 2 4 ,3 9 6
4 9  T a ip i n g 1 1 ,9 9 1 1 9 ,6 0 9 9 , 1 8 9 9 6 ,9 1 9
9 0  M a ta n g 1 9 ,7 4 9 8 ,4 4 9 2 , 6 9 9 2 6 ,8 9 9
91 P a d a n g  R e n g a s 1 6 ,7 0 7 4 , 8 7 4 1 ,1 1 4 2 2 ,6 9 9
9 2  K u a la  K a n g s a r 1 9 ,9 0 4 6 ,9 9 4 1 ,9 9 8 2 1 ,4 3 6
9 9  K i n t a 18,692 2 9 ,4 7 8 4 , 4 9 9 4 6 , 6 6 3
9 4  I p o h 9 ,8 0 0 9 7 ,9 9 6 6 ,266 4 8 ,0 6 2
9 9  M e n g le m b u 7 , 4 9 4 98,112 9 ,4 9 2 4 9 ,0 3 8
96 B e r u a s 8 , 2 9 9 1 2 ,1 8 9 2 ,966 2 3 ,0 9 0
9 7  P a r i t 1 9 ,6 9 0 8,891 1 ,0 1 9 29 ,320
98 B a t u  G a ja h 6 , 7 8 9 2 9 ,7 9 7 9 ,8 9 6 36,436
9 9  B a ta n g  P a d a n g 1 0 ,2 0 4 1 0 ,0 4 6 2 ,2 9 1 22,301
6 0  L u m u t 8 ,9 1 6 1 6 ,9 1 4 9 ,2 9 9 2 8 ,1 2 9
61 H i l i r  P e r a k 2 2 , 1 4 9 4 , 0 9 9 991 2 7 ,1 7 3
6 2  T e lo k  A n s o n 8 ,4 1 1 1 4 ,2 2 9 4 , 9 2 9 2 7 ,1 6 3
69 T a n jo n g  M a l im 1 1 ,1 9 1 11,900 4 , 2 2 0 26,671
6 4  B a g a n  D a to k 18,212 M 7 9 9 , 1 8 4 2 8 ,2 7 1
PAHANG
63 L i p i s 13',060 8 ,1 1 3 2 ,782 2 3 ,9 3 7
66 J e r a n t u t 1 9 ,1 9 3 4 , 9 7 7 670 2 4 ,8 4 0
67 K u a n ta n 1 6 ,4 4 4 10,010 1 ,3 4 6 27 ,800
68 R a u b 1 2 ,4 3 0 9,068 • 1 , i 4 o 22,638
69 M a ra n 18,288 ■ 3 , 8 0 3 478 ■ 1 22,369
7 0  B e n to n g 9 ,1 4 2 13,108 1 ,9 7 0 26 ,220
71 P e k a n 20 ,676 1,176 118 2 1 ,9 7 0
7 2  T e m e r lo h 1 3 ,3 6 9 1 0 ,3 9 2 1 ,3 2 3 2 7 , 4 8 4
„ „ , . , Malay Chinese Indians Total
ame o ons 1 uency Electorate Electorate and others Electorate
SELANGOR
7 3  S a b a k  B e rn a m 1 7 ,2 0 5 3 ,688 1 ,9-50 2 2 ,39-3
7 4  T a n jo n g  K a r a n g 20 ,127 9-, 200 3 3 0 29-, 657
7 5  U lu  S e la n g o r 10,928 1 0 ,7 9 -5 5 ,1 9 -9 26,822
7 6  K u a la  S e la n g o r 1 5 ,4 2 9 5 ,9 -6 2 6 , 4 o 6 2 7 ,2 9 7
7 7  S e la y a n g 18,78-9- 17,601 A , 9-78 9 -0 ,8 6 3
78 U lu  L a n g a t 12,281 1 3 ,1 5 9 2 ,9 -8 ? 2 7 ,9 2 7
7 9  P e la b o h a n  K e la n g 16,061 12,182 5 , 2.16 3 3 ,9 -5 9
8 0  S h a h  A la m 1 1 ,8 9 -5 18,900 1 0 ,9 -8 6 9 -1 ,2 3 1
81 P e t a l i n g 9 ,5 1 2 32,686 5 ,7 3 1 9 -7 ,9 2 9
82  K u a la  L a n g a t 1 2 ,7 5 3 6 ,9 -0 1 3 ,2 7 8 2 2 ,9-32
83 S e p a n g 1 1 ,8 9 -5 6 ,128 9-, 9-20 2 2 ,3 9 3
W ILAYAH PERSEKETUAN
89- K e p o n g 5 ,9 -3 0 2 3 ,9 -6 1 4 ,3 9 1 33 ,282
85 S e ta p a k 2 2 ,3 3 1 9 ,3 7 2 3 , 0 8 9 3 4 ,7 9 2
86 D a m a n s a ra 1 0 ,9 5 9 1 5 ,9 -2 3 6 ,680 33 ,062
87 K u a la  L u m p u r  B a n d a r 2 ,7 6 6 2 6 ,7 1 9 - 2 ,8 4 1 3 2 ,3 2 1
88 S u n g a i  B e s i 6 ,856 2 9 ,7 7 6 3 ,8 5 7 4 0 ,4 8 9
NEG RI S E M B ILA N
89 J e l e b u 15,9-9-7 8 ,8 6 4 1,201 2 5 ,5 1 2
9 0  M a n t i n 1 3 ,1 7 7 10,061 4 , 6 3 2 27 ,870
91 S e re m b a n 8 , 6 7 9 2 5 ,9 0 1 6 ,1 5 1 4 0 ,7 3 1
92  K u a la  P i l a h 1 9 ,2 2 9 - 5 ,6 5 7 1 ,1 3 8 26 ,019
9 3  T e lo k  K em a ng 10,668 11,096 5 ,220 26 ,984
99- T a m p in 1 7 ,8 0 5 1 0 ,4 8 4 3 ,3 1 2 31,601
MALACCA
9 5  A l o r  G a ja h 2 5 ,4 6 2 8 ,178 2 , 0 4 8 35 ,688
96 J a s i n 2 1 ,4 2 9 9 ,0 3 7 3,261 3 3 ,7 2 ?
9 7  B a t u  B e r e n d a n g 2 5 ,1 4 7 1 1 ,5 9 1 1,176 3 7 ,9 1 4
98 K o t a  M e la k a ' 11,067 2 9 ,9 6 8 3 , 3 3 5 4 4 ,3 7 0
,T „ » ... Malay Chinese Indians Total
ame o ons 1 uency Electorate Electorate and others Electorate
JOHOR
9 9  ' L a b i s 1 3 ,1 1 3  . 9 ,5 0 9 2 , 8 4 7 2 5 ,4 6 9
1 0 0  S e g a m a t 1 2 ,9 6 3 1 5 ,4 7 8 1 ,7 1 1 3 0 ,1 5 2
101 K e lu a n g 8 ,9 0 8 2 1 ,4 0 2 4 , 4 4 5 3 4 ,7 5 5
10 2  T e n g g a r o h 10,528 6 ,4 2 6 4 2 5 1 7 ,3 7 9
10 3  L e d a n g 1 4 ,5 4 3 10,502 805 2 5 ,8 5 0
1 0 4  P a g o h 1 4 ,3 1 1 8 ,7 7 7 1 ,1 9 2 2 4 , 2 8 0
1 0 5  A y e r  H i ta m 1 5 ,6 4 8 9 ,4 8 8 9 0 4 2 6 ,0 4 0
10 6  M u a r 2 3 ,2 4 0 1 7 ,4 4 5 8 3 7 4 1 ,522
10? R e ng am 10,076 2 2 ,5 5 5 2 ,968 3 5 ,5 9 9
10 8  P a n t i 1 5 ,5 3 2 7 ,1 5 3 876 2 3 ,5 6 1
1 0 9  S r i  G a d in g 20 ,858 5 ,3 9 5 3 9 2 2 6 ,6 4 5
11 0  S e m e ra h 20 ,862 7 ,8 6 5 1 4 4 28,871
111 B a t u  P a h a t 1 9 ,4 5 7 1 3 ,6 9 1 566 3 3 ,7 1 4
11 2  P o n t i a n 2 3 ,1 5 1 1 2 ,1 9 4 320 3 5 ,6 6 5
1 1 3  P u l a i 19,228 1 3 ,7 9 9 1 ,3 1 7 3 4 ,3 4 4
11 4  J o h o r e  B h a r u 2 7 , 9 6 4 18,770 4 , 8 0 0 5 1 ,5 3 4
Ao6
Appendix 5
C o m m u n a l C o m p o s i t io n  o f  t h e  E l e c t o r a t e ,  J o h o r e  C o n s t i t u e n c ie s  
D e l i n e a t e d  b y . t h e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n  a n d  I n c l u d e d  i n  i t s  R e p o r t  
d a t e d  J u l y  2 0 , 1 9 7 ^ *
T h e  t o t a l  e l e c t o r a t e  o f  t h e s e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  a r e  a s  t h e y  w o u ld  
h a v e  b e e n  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  1 9 7 A  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  a n d  S t a t e  E l e c t i o n s ,  
a n d  n o t  a s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n 's  r e p o r t .  T h i s  w as 
c a l c u l a t e d .by t o t a l l i n g  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  p o l l i n g  
d i s t r i c t s  t h a t  c o m p r is e d  t h e s e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  a s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  r e g i s t e r  u t i l i z e d  f o r  t h e  1 9 7A  e l e c t i o n s .  T h e  c o m m u n a l 
c o m p o s i t i o n  w a s  a l s o  s i m i l a r l y  c a l c u l a t e d .
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  S e a ts  -  N u m b e re d  9 9  -  11A 
S t a t e  S e a t s  -  N u m b e re d  1 - 3 2
°  a , , M a la y  % C h in e s e  %' I n d i a n s  a n d  
E l e c t o r a t e  0 , ,
99 S e g a m a t 23,397 AO. 93 51.53 7.52
1 B u io h  K a s a p 11,677 A1.70 A2.23 10.07
2 B a n d a r  S e g a m a t 11,920 3A,33 60.63 5.02
100 L a b i s 32,658 38.90 A8 .A5 12 . 6A
3 A y e r  P a n a s 18,709 50,63 A2.03 7-32
A B e k o k 13,9^9 23=15 57.07 19.78
101 T e n g g a r o h 17,379 60.58 36.98 2 .AA
3 E n d a u 8,399 69-09 29=91 1.00
6 M e r s in g 8,980 52.63 A3.59 3-79
102 L e d a n g 30,362 50.67 AA.06 5.27
7 T a n g k a k 13,980 A2.36 A7.86 9.78
8 S e ro m 14-,382 59.90 39.83 0.26
103 P a g  o h 28,839 63.23 33.08 3.68
9 B u k i t  S e ra m p a n g 13A90 660 01 30.86 3.13
10 J o r a k 13,3A5 60.01 35.66 A. 32
10A Y o n g  P e n g 28,810 66.36 31.67 1.96
11 A y e r  H i ta m 13,602 55. OA A2 .A8 2 .A7
12 S p i  G a d in g 13,208 76 .A9 22.00 • 1.51
103 K lu a n g 32,163 35.37 55.18 9 ^ 5
13 L a m b a k 17,231 23-75 65 . 3A 10.91
1A S r i  L a la n g 1^,932 A8.79 A3 .A5 7.77
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T o t a l  . .  _ n/ rtl . a/ I n d i a n s  a n d
t»-i j_ i M a la y  % C h in e s e  % , ,  o/E l e c t o r a t e  ^  o t h e r s  %
106 M u a r 3 9 , 6 4 4 5 1 .0 9 4 6 . 3 7 2 . 5 4
1 3  B a n d a r  M a h a r a n i 2 3 , 6 ? 4 4 2 .5 2 5 4 . 3 9 3 . 0 9
1 6  P a r i t  B a k a r 1 5 ,9 7 0 6 3 . 7 9 3 4 . 4 8 1 .72
1 0 7 S e m e ra h 23 ,326 89.12 10.78 0 .1 0
1 7  S r i  M ed an 1 2 , 4 0 5 9 1 - 9 4 7 - 9 5 0.11
1 8  S r i  M e n a n t i 12,921 8 6 .4 1 1 3 .5 1 0 .0 9
108 P a n t i 2 3 ,5 6 1 6 5 .9 2 3 0 .3 6 3 .7 2
1 9  K o t a  T i n g g i 12 ,506 6 3 .1 4 3 2 . 3 0 4 .5 6
2 0  J o h o r e  L a m a 1 1 ,0 5 5 69.07 28 .1 6 2 .7 7
1 0 9 B a t u  P a h a t 36 ,218 5 2 . 7 4 4 5 . 8 4 1 . 4 2
21 P e s e r a i 1 5 ,1 5 6 7 5 .3 2 2 4 . 4 9 0 .2 0
2 2  B a n d a r  P e n g g a ra m 21 ,062 3 6 .4 9 61.21 2 .3 0
110 ' K u l a i 3 3 , 8 9 3 3 2 .1 9 5 6 .7 1 11 .10
2 3  S im p a n g  R e n g g a m 18,032 4 o .4 9 4 4 .6 1 1 4 .9 0
2 4  S e n a i 15,861 2 2 . 7 4 70 .47 6 . 7 9
111 B e n u t 3 1 , 8 8 9 78.21 21 .6 8 0.11
2 3  R e n g i t 1 4 ,6 4 0 7 8 .9 3 21 .0 0 0 . 0 7
2 6  A y e r  B a t o r 1 7 , 2 4 9 77 .60 22 .2 6 0 . 1 4
112 P o n t ia n 3 0 , 4 9 6 5 3 - 3 2 4 5 . 6 6 1 .02
2 7  P e k a n  N e n a s 12 ,806 56 .28 4 3 .6 1 0.11
2 8  K u k u p 1 7 ,6 9 0 51 .18 4 7 . 1 4 1 .68
1 1 3 P u l a i 3 1 , 1 5 3 5 1 .9 1 4 1 . 4 2 6 .6 7
2 9  G la n g  P a ta h 1 0 , 9 2 3 4 2 . 8 3 4 9 . 8 5 7 - 3 2
3 0  T a m p o i 20 ,2 3 0 56.81 36 .88 6 .3 1
1 1 4 J o h o r e  B a h r u 4 9 , 3 9 2 5 3 .3 4 3 7 . 1 3 9 . 5 3
31 T i r a m 1 6 ,7 9 0 62 .78 21 .82 1 5 .4 0
3 2  T a n jo n g  P e t r i 32 ,602 4 8 .4 8 4 5 .0 1 6.51
4o8
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Appendix 6
P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  B r a n c h e s  b y  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  C o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,
T h e  d a t a  i n c l u d e d  b e lo w  w a s  c o m p i le d  f r o m  t h e  f i l e s  m a in t a i n e d  b y  
t h e  R e g i s t r a r  o f  S o c i e t i e s ,  M a la y s ia , ,  T h e  b r a n c h e s  l i s t e d  h e r e  a r e  
t h o s e  a l r e a d y  o f f i c i a l l y  r e g i s t e r e d .  T h e  f i l e s  f r o m  w h ic h  t h e  d a t a  
were d e r i v e d  a re s
P o l i t i c a l  P a r t y  F i l e  N u m b e r
M a la y s ia n  I n d i a n  C o n g r e s s  ■ (M IC ) 4 5 6 / 4 9
U n i t e d  M a la y  N a t i o n a l  O r g a n i s a t i o n  (UMNO) 4 5 7 / 4 9
M a la y s ia n  C h in e s e  A s s o c i a t i o n  (M C A ) 1 0 4 7 /5 0
P e r s a t u a n  I s l a m  S a D M a la y a  (P A S ) 2 6 /5 2
P e o p le 's  P r o g r e s s i v e  P a r t y  (P P P ) 2 1 / 5 3
P a r t a i  S o s i a l i s  R a k y a t  M a la y a  ( P a r t a i  R a k y a t ) 3 2 6 / 5 5
D e m o c r a t ic  A c t i o n  P a r t y  (D A P ) 4 3 / 6 6
G e ra k a n  R a k y a t  M a l a y s ia  ( G e r a k a n ) 226/68
P a r t a i  M a rh a e n  ( M a r h a e n ) 5 8 9 / 6 8
P a r t a i  K e a d i l a n  M a s y a r a k a t  (P e k e m a s ) 876/71
K e s a tu a n  I n s a f  T a n a h  A y e r  ( K IT A ) 9 9 / 7 4
B a r i s a n  N a s io n a l 3 2 0 / 7 4
I n d e p e n d e n t  P e o p le 's  P r o g r e s s i v e  P a r t y  ( IP P P ) 3 4 5 / 7 4
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—1 (1) Pi 01 01 (U ffi
■ X D in Pi W P h Q
Eh
1 K a n g a r 6 4 3 9 6 4 1 1 .5
2 A r a u 78 54 5 1 3
3 J e r l u n  L a n g k a w i 8 5 3 7 4 1
4 K u b a n g  P a s u 3 8 26 7 1 1 1 1
5 P a d a n g  T e r a p 28 1 4 4 1
6 K u a la  K e d a h 51 22 2
7 A l o r  S t a r 5 8 4 4 9 5 1 2 1
8 K o t a r  S e t a r 36 3 6 5
9 U lu  M u d a 3 ° 18 2
10 B a l i n g 2 16 5 3 1
11 J e r a i 3 3 82 5 1 1 1
12 K u a la  M ud a 3 2 7 2 1
13 S u n g a i  P e t a n i 22 8 8 2 1 3 1
14 P a d a n g  S e r a i 12 11 7 2
15 K u l im  B a n d a r  B a h r u 4 2 3 5 7 A 2 1
 1
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16 T u m p a t 41 5 7 2 1 1
17 P e n g k a la n  G h e p a 3 3 4 3
18 P a s i r  M as 4 o 1 1 5 3 1 1
19 K o t a  B h a r u 3 6 100 5 2 2 3
20 B a c h o k 31 4 3 1 1
21 R a n ta u  P a n ja n g 4 9 16 2
22 N i la r a  P u r i 3 6 80 3 1
2 3 T a n a h  M e ra h 3 7 4 3 3 1 1
2 4 M a c h a n g 26 5 0 2 1
2 3 P a s i r  P u te h 100 51 1 1
26 K u a la  K e r a i 3 4 2 4 3 1 1
2 7 U lu  K e la n t a n 3 4 2 5 2 1
28 B e s u t 7 9 4 6 3 2
2 9 U lu  N e r u s 21 19 -
3 0 U lu  T r e n g g a n u 4 9 26 2 1
31 K u a la  N e r u s 5 5 5 5 1
3 2 K u a la  T r e n g g a n u 7 0 20 7 1 2 2
3 3 D u n g u n 2 9 3 6 6 1 2
3 4 Kem am an 2 5 12 4 1
3 3 K e p a la  B a ta s 12 1 4 1 5 6 2 7 2 3
3 6 M a ta  K u c h in g 16 4 11 5 2 6 2 2 1
37 P e r m a ta n g  P a u h 2 4 8 6 2 1 4 2 1 1
38 B u k i t  M e r t a ja m 1 9 5 1 3 3 10 5 2
3 9 N ib o n g  T e b a l 1 5 1 7 4 2 3 1 3
4 0 B a l i k  P u la u 4 3 1 4 4 5 2 3 2
41 . B u k i t  B e n d e r  a 8 9 6 1 6 1 2 2
4 2 T a n jo n g 10 7 2 1 6 1 2 2
4 3 J e l u t o n g 9 8 2 2 9 1 2 2
4 4 , G r i k 3 3 5 2 2 1
4 5 L a r u t 5 2 4 4 3 4 1 1 2
4 6 P a r i t  B u n t a r 3 7 5 4 8 5 1 1
4 7 B a g a n  S e r a i 3 6 60 5 5 1
4 8 S u n g a i  S i p u t 21 1 7 5 1 2 3 5
4 9 T a i p i n g 2 5 18 1 5 10 1 5 1 2
5 0 M a ta n g 18 7 3 1 1
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51 P a d a n g  R e n g a s 5 6 25 8 2 1 2 1 1
5 2 K u a la  K a n g s a r 5 0 2 4 8 2 1 4 1 2 1 5 1
5 5 K i n t a 5 5 12 16 15 1 5 4 1 1 7
5 4 I p  oh 6 6 1 5 12 4 4 4 2 2 7
5 5 M e n g le m b u 7 7 1 5 4 1 5
5 6 B e r u a s 19 4 7 5 1 2 1 2
5 7 P a r  i t n?( 2 5 4 4 1 1 5
5 8 Batu Gajah 11 4 1 4 5 2 4 4 6
5 9 B a ta n g  P a d a n g 26 5 10 5 .1 2. 2 1
60 L u m u t 2 1 10 7 1 1 2
61 H i l i r  P e r a k 61 8 2 1 1 5 1
62 T e lo k  A n s o n 9 5 26 9 11 2 i. 1 8 1
6 5 T a n jo n g  M a l im 18 11 9 12 1 5 1 5
6 4 B a g a n  D a to k 4 5 22 11 15 1 2 1
6 5 L i p i s 4 9 9 1 4 6 1
66 J e r a n t u t 12 2 5 10 2
67 K u a n ta n 22 2 7 9 1 1 1 1 1
68 R a u b 5 5 6 9 5 1 2
69 M a r  a n 51 4 4 1 2
7 0 B e n to n g 2 5 1 12 4 1 1 1 1
71 P e k a n 4 9 5 0 4 2 2
72 T e m e r lo h 61 6 10 4 2 6 1 4
7 5 S a b a k  B e rn a m 2 5 11 9 4 1 5
7 4 T a n jo n g  K a r a n g 12 16 5 2 5 2
7 5 U lu  S e la n g o r 18 2 11 7 2 2 1
76 K u a la  S e la n g o r 5 5 11 8 9 1
77 S e la y a n g 2 4 5 11 11 2 4 5 2 6
78 U lu  L a n g a t 56 2 10 4 1 5 5 2 1 1
7 9 P e la b o h a n  K e la n g 4 0 12 1 5 10 1 5 1 2
80 S h a h ' A la m 6 4 21 15 1 4 5 5
81 P e t a l i n g 10 4 15 10 1 7 2 4 6
82 K u a la  L a n g a t 28 16 5 4 1
8 5 S e p a n g 8 1 6 4 1 1
8 4 K e p o n g 17 7 5 5 1 2
85 S e t a p a k 18 4 4 1 1 2 1 1
86 D a m a n s a ra 18 1 6 6 1 1 2 5 1 1
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87 K u a la  L u m p u r  B a n d a r 9 4 2 1 12 3 2 1 2 3 3
88 S u n g a i  B e s i 3 1 3 3 1 2
89 J e le b u 4 8 4 7 10 1 2
9 0 M a n t i n 2 1 3 9 15 1 2 3
91 S e re m b a n 2 6 3 2 3 14 3 6 1 1 1 7
92 K u a la  P i l a h 4 3 16 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
9 3 T e lo k  K em ang 19 7 18 13 1 2 1 1 3
94 T a m p in 2 3 14 1 1 1 4 1 1 2
93 A l o r  G a ja h 4 4 1 9 1 3 8 1 1 3 2
96 J a s i n 4 5 28 1 4 7 1 1 2 3 1
97 B a t u  B e r e n d a n g 3 3 2 6 13 3 1 1 4 3
98 K o t a  M e la k a 7 2 4 16 5 5 7 2 6 7
9 9 L a b i s 19 2 6 6 1 2 1 4
1 0 0  S e g a m a t 4 3 2 1 0 7 1 1 1 6
1 0 1 K lu a n g 26 1 1 1 7 1 1 3 2
0 ro T e n g g a r o h 2 3 2 7 2 1 2 1
1 0 3  L e d a n g 4 3 1 6 3 1
10*+ P a g  o h 17 1 5 4 1 2
1 0 3 A y e r  H i ta m 1 9 3 3 1 1 1
1 0 6  M u a r 6 6 7 3 3 6 1 1 3 2
107 R engam 1 4 3 1
1 0 8  P a n t i 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 1 2
1 0 9  S r i  G a d in g 1 3 1 12 8 1 3
1 1 0 S e m e ra h 1 4 8 2 1 1
1 1 1 B a t u  P a h a t 6 4 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 1 3
1 1 2 P o n t i a n 4 2 4 1 0 3 1 1
1 1 3 P u l a i 2 5 2 4 4 1 1 2
114- J o h o r e  B h a r u 3 4 2 1 3 1 2 3 2 1 1 3
t
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T h e  1 9 7 4  E l e c t o r a l  C o n t e s t  -  P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t s  ( I n d )
C o n t e s t i n g  b y  C o n s t i t u e n c y
1 K a n g a r BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
2 A r a u BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
3 J  e r l u n - L a n g k a w i BN
4 K u b a n g  P a s u BN
3 P a d a n g  T e r a p BN
6 K u a la  K e d a h BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
7 A l o r  S e t a r BN - DAP
8 K o t a  S e t a r BN - I n d  ( M a la y )  -
9 U lu  M u d a •BN
10 B a l i n g BN
11 J e r a i BN
12 K u a la  M uda BN
13 S u n g a i  P e t a n i BN - K IT A
14 P a d a n g  S e r a i BN
15 K u l i r a  -  B a n d a r  B a h r u BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
16 T u m p a t BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
17 P e n g k a la n  C h e p a BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
OO P a s i r  M as BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
19 K o t a  B h a r u BN
20 B a c h o k BN
21 R a n ta u  P a n ja n g BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
22 N i la m  P u r i BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
2 3 T a n a h  M e ra h BN
2 4 M a c h a n g BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
2 5 P a s i r  P u te h BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
26 K u a la  K e r a i BN - B e b a s  B e r s a t u
2 7 U lu  K e la n t a n BN
28 B e s u t BN
2 9 U lu  N e r u s BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
3 0 U lu  T r e n g g a n u BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
31 K u a la  N e r u s BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
32 K u a la  T r e n g g a n u BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
3 3 D u n g u n BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
3 4 Kem am an BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
3 5 K e p a la  B a ta s BN
36 M a ta  K u c h in g BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s
-  I n d  ( M a la y )
-  I n d  ( M a la y )  
I n d  ( M a la y )
~ I n d  ( M a la y )
-  I n d  ( M a la y )
-  I n d  ( M a la y )
37 P e r m a ta n g  P a u h BN - P e k e m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
38 B u k i t  M e r ta ja m BN - DAP -  P eke m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t  ■
3 9 N ib o n g  T e b a l BN _ DAP -  P e ke m a s
4 o B a le k  P u la u BN - DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
41 B u k i t  B e n d e r a BN - DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
4 2 T a n jo n g BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
4 3 J e l u t o n g BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
4 4 G r i k BN
4 5 L a r u t BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
4 6 P a r i t  B u n t a r BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
4 7 B a g a n  S e r a i BN
4 8 S u n g a i  S i p u t BN - DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  I n d  ( I n d i a n )
4 9 T a i p i n g BN - DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  K IT A
5 0 M a ta n g BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  K IT A
51 P a d a n g  R e n g a s BN
52 K u a la  K a n g s a r BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s
5 3 K i n t a BN - DAP ~ I n d  ( M a la y )  -  I n d  ( C h in e i
-54 I p  o h BN - DAP -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
5 5 M e n g le m b u BN - DAP -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
56 B e r u a s BN - DAP ~ P eke m a s  -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
57 P a r  i t BN - DAP -  P eke m as  -  I n d  ( M a la y )
58 B a t u  G a ja h BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  I n d  ( M a la y )
59 B a ta n g  P a d a n g BN - DAP
60 L u m u t BN - DAP -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
61 H i l i r  P e r a k BN - P e k e m a s
62 T e lo k  A n s o n BN - DAP -  P eke m as
6 3 T a n jo n g  M a l im BN - DAP -  P e ke m a s
6 4 B a g a n  D a to k BN - P e k e m a s
6 5 L i p i s BN
66 J  e r a n t u t BN
67 K u a n ta n BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t  -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
68 R a u b BN - DAP
69 M a r a n BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
7 0 B e n to n g BN - DAP -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
71 P e k a n BN
72 T e m e r lo h BN - P a r t a i  R a k y a t
7 3 S a b c ik  B e rn a m BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
7 4 T a n jo n g  K a r a n g BN
7 5 U lu  S e la n g o r BN - DAP
76 K u a la  S e la n g o r BN - I n d  ( M a la y )
7 7 S e la y a n g BN
7 8 U lu  L a n g a t BN
7 9 P e la b o h a n  K e la n g BN
80 S h a h  A la m BN
81 P e t a l i n g BN
82 K u a la  L a n g a t BN
8 3 S e p a n g BN
8 4 K e p o n g BN
8 3 S e t a p a k BN
86 D a m a n s a ra BN
8 7 K u a la  L u m p u r  B a n d a r BN
88 S u n g a i  B e s i BN
89 J e l e b u BN
90 M a n t i n BN
91 S e re m b a n BN
92 K u a la  P i l a h BN
93 T e lo k  K em a ng BN
9 4 T a m p in BN
9 5 A l o r  G a ja h BN
9 6 J a s i n BN
97 B a t u  B e re n d a m BN
98 K o t a  M e la k a BN
9 9 L a b i s BN
100 S e g a m a t BN
101 K lu a n g BN
102 T e n g g a r o h BN
1 0 3 . L e d a n g BN
1 0 4 P a g  o h BN
105 A y e r  H i ta m BN
106 M u a r BN
107 R e ngam BN
108 P a n t i BN
1 0 9 S r i  G a d in g BN
110 S e m e ra h BN
111 B a t u  P a h a t BN
112 P o n t i a n BN
1 1 3 P u l a i BN
1 1 4 J o h o r  B a h r u BN
DAP -  P eke m as  
DAP -  P e ke m a s  
DAP -  P e ke m a s  
DAP -  P eke m a s
DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
-  P e k e m a s
-  DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  I n d  ( C h in e s e )
-  DAP -  P e ke m a s
-  DAP -  P eke m a s
-  DAP -  P e k e m a s
-  DAP -  P eke m a s
-  DAP -  I n d  ( M a la y )
-  DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
I n d  ( M a la y )
-  DAP
DAP -  P e ke m a s  -  IP P P
P e k e m a s  
P e k e m a s
P a r t a i  R a k y a t  -  I n d  ( M a la y )  
DAP -  P e k e m a s  -  P a r t a i  R a k y a t
DAP 
DAP
DAP
DAP
I n d  ( M a la y )
DAP -  I n d  ( M a la y )
P a r t a i  R a k y a t  
DAP
Appendix 8
E l e c t i o n  E x p e n s e s  I n c u r r e d  b y  Tw o B a r i s a n  N a s io n a l  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  
C a n d id a te s
T h e  e l e c t i o n  e x p e n s e s  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  tw o  c a n d id a t e s  i n d i c a t e d  
b e lo w  a r e  n o t  t h e  o n e s  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n  a s  r e q u i r e d  
b y  l a w .  T h e y  w e re  d i v u l g e d  t o  t h i s  w r i t e r  i n  c o n f id e n c e  a n d  f o r  t h a t  
r e a s o n  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e  c a n d id a t e s  c a n n o t  b e  r e v e a l e d .  T h e  e x p e n s e s  
i n d i c a t e d  b e lo w  w e r e  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  a n y  m a t e r i a l  s u p p o r t  ( p o s t e r s  o f  
p a r t y  s y m b o ls ,  p u b l i c  a d d r e s s  s y s t e m s ,  e t c . )  p r o v i d e d  b y  t h e  p a r t y .
A c c o u n t  A
C a n d id a te  -  S o u g h t  e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  i n  1 9 7 ^  a n d  w a s  
s u c c e s s f u l .
C o n s t i t u e n c y  ~ U r b a n  w i t h  n o  c o m m u n ity  c o m p r is in g  a n  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  ( p l u r a l i t y ) .  T h u s  t h e  n o n - M a la y s  a s  a  w h o le  
c o m p r is e  a n  a b s o l u t e  m a j o r i t y .
E x p e n s e s  -  '
1 C a m p a ig n  E x p e n s e s  f o r  P a r t y  M e m b e rs
( a )  T o  UMNO b r a n c h e s  a n d  w o r k e r s
( b )  T o  M IC  b r a n c h e s  a n d  w o r k e r s
( c )  T o  C h in e s e  w o r k e r s
^  P o l l i n g  D a y  E x p e n s e s
( a )  P o l l i n g  a g e n t s ,  g u id e s  a n d
h e l p e r s
( b )  T r a n s p o r t ' e x p e n s e s  -  p e t r o l ,
d r i v e r s ,  a n d  p a y m e n ts  t o  
d r i v e r s  w i t h  c a r s
( c )  P o l l i n g  b o o t h s
3  P r i n t i n g  E x p e n s e s
( a )  H a n d b i l l s  ( 3 0 , 0 0 0  c o p ie s )
( b )  P e r s o n a l  p o s t e r s  -  w i t h
c a n d i d a t e ’ s  p h o t o g r a p h  a n d  
p a r t y  s y m b o l ( 10 ,000  c o p ie s )  /  3 , 000 .00
( c )  E l e c t o r s  C a rd  -  1 p e r  e l e c t o r  g  9 0 9 - 0 0
/  2 0 ,1 3^-00 
g  6 , lA -0 .0 0  
g  8 , 7 3 3 - 0 0
/  3 5 , 0 3 6 . 0 0
g  3 , ¥ f 5 „0 0
g  8 , 968 .00  
g  ^ , 750 .00
/  17,163-00
/  3 , 0 00 .00
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4  G e n e r a l  E x p e n s e s
( a )  T e m p o r a r y  d r i v e r s  a n d  v a n s
r e n t a l 1 , 8 4 2 . 0 0
( b ) T e m p o r a r y  s t a f f / . 213 .00
( c ) T e a  p a r t i e s  t o  m e e t v o t e r s 1 , 300 .00
( d ) P u b l i c  r a l l i e s w 1 , 100 .00
( e ) R e n t a l  o f  H a l l $ 3 3 0 .0 0
( f ) O f f i c e  r e n t a l % .300 .00
( g ) F u r n i t u r e  r e n t a l % 118 .20
( h ) R e f r e s h m e n t s  f o r  v i s i t o r s ,  
• c a m p a ig n  w o r k e r s ,  e t c . % 4 , 6 1 3 . 3 3
( i ) N o m in a t io n  d e p o s i t $ 1 , 000 .0 0
/ 1 1 , 2 1 8 . 7 5
5  M is c e l l a n e o u s  E x p e n s e s  1 6 5 • 5 5
T o t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e  $ 7 .0 ,4 9 2 .3 0
A c c o u n t  B
C a n d id a te  -  S o u g h t  r e - e l e c t i o n  a n d  w a s  u n s u c c e s s f u l .  
C o n s t i t u e n c y  -  U r b a n  w i t h  a n  a b s o l u t e  C h in e s e  m a j o r i t y  a m o n g s t  
e l e c t o r a t e .
E x p e n s e s  -
1 C a m p a ig n  E x p e n s e s  f o r  P a r t y  M e m b e rs
2  P o l l i n g  D a y  E x p e n s e s
( a )  P o l l i n g  A g e n t s ,  g u id e s  a n d
h e l p e r s
( b )  T r a n s p o r t  e x p e n s e s  ( s i x t y  c a r s
f o r  c o n v e y a n c e  o f  v o t e r s  a t  
$  4 0 . 0 0  e a c h )
( c )  P o l l i n g  b o o t h s  c o n s t r u c t i o n
( 4 0  b o o t h s  a t  3 0 .0 0  e a c h )
/  7,800.00
^ 2 ,500.00 
$  2 ,200.00
/  2 , 4 0 0 . 0 0  
/  1 ,200.00
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P r i n t i n g  E x p e n s e s
( a ) H a n d b i l l s $  1,500=00
( b ) P e r s o n a l  p o s t e r s  -  w i t h  
c a n d i d a t e ’ s  p h o t o g r a p h  a n d  
p a r t y  s y m b o l /  2 ,0 0 0 .0 0
( c ) E l e c t i o n  c a r d s  ( 5 0 , 000 ) St 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
G e n e r a l  E x p e n s e s
( a ) S t a f f  f o r  a d d r e s s in g  a n d
d i s t r i b u t i n g  e l e c t i o n  c a r d s ,5 0 0 .0 0
( b ) B a n n e r s / 500=00
( c ) P u b l i c  R a l l i e s  ( f o r t y  r a l l i e s  
a t  . /  7 5 .0 0  e a c h ) $  3,000=00
( d ) H e a d q u a r t e r s  e x p e n d i t u r e $ 150 .00
( e ) B a d g e s  f o r  p a r t y  w o r k e r s St 400.00
( f ) N o m in a t io n  d e p o s i t St 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
/  4 , 500.00
$  6 ,550„00
5  M is c e l l a n e o u s  E x p e n s e s  $  1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
T o t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e /  19,850.00
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Appendix 9
E l e c t o r a l  B e h a v io u r  G od e
A s  h a s  b e e n  c u s t o m a r y  f o r  e a c h  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  E l e c t i o n  C o m m is s io n  
i n  A u g u s t  1 9 ? 4  i n v i t e d  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  t o  a  m e e t in g  t o  f o r m u l a t e  
a n  e l e c t o r a l  c o d e  o f  c o n d u c t .  O n ly  t h e  B a r i s a n  N a s io n a l ,  t h e  
D e m o c r a t ic  A c t i o n  P a r t y  a n d  t h e  P e k e m a s  a t t e n d e d  t h e  m e e t i n g .  T he  
P o l i c e  w e r e  a l s o  i n v i t e d  a n d  w e re  p r e s e n t .  T h e  E l e c t o r a l  B e h a v io u r  
C ode l i s t e d  b e lo w  w a s  a g r e e d  t o  b y  t h e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s .  S u b s e q u e n t ly  
th e .  P a r t a i  R a k y a t  a l s o  p le d g e d  t o  a b id e  b y  t h e  C o d e .
1 E x e m p la r y  b e h a v io u r  s h o u ld  b e  s e t  b y  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  c a n d id a t e s ,  
t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  a g e n t s ,  s u p p o r t e r s ,  h e l p e r s  a n d  w o r k e r s .
2  P e r s o n a l  c r i t i c i s m s  l e v e l l e d  a g a i n s t  a n y  i n d i v i d u a l  s h o u l d  be  
c o n f i n e d  o n l y  t o  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d  v ie w s .
3  P o l i t i c a l  s p e a k e r s  s h o u ld  r e p l y  t o  t h e i r  o p p o n e n ts  f r o m  t h e i r  ow n 
p l a t f o r m s .
4  T h e  w e a r in g  o f  d i s t i n c t i v e  h e a d g e a r  a n d  u n i f o r m  c l o t h i n g  b y  
p e r s o n s  c o l l e c t i v e l y  s h o u ld  b e  a v o id e d . ,
5  T h e  r a c e  o r  r e l i g i o n  o f  a n y  i n d i v i d u a l  s h o u ld  n o t  b e  m e n t io n e d  
w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  r i d i c u l i n g ,  i n s u l t i n g  o r  b r i n g  h im  i n t o  
c o n t e m p t .
6 T h e  c a r r y i n g  o f  w e a p o n s  b y  c a n d i d a t e s , t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  
a g e n t s ,  s u p p o r t e r s ,  h e l p e r s  a n d  w o r k e r s  s h o u ld  b e  c o n s id e r e d  t o  b e  
w h o l l y  u n d e s i r a b l e .
7  P o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  a g e n t s ,  
s u p p o r t e r s ,  h e l p e r s  a n d  w o r k e r s  s h o u ld  r e f r a i n  f r o m  t e a r i n g  do w n  
o r  d e f a c i n g  e l e c t i o n  p o s t e r s  a n d / o r  b a n n e r s  o f  r i v a l  p a r t i e s  o r  
c a n d i d a t e s .
8 P o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  a n d  c a n d id a t e s  s h o u ld  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  p o s t e r s  
a n d / o r  b a n n e r s  p u t  u p  o n  t h e i r  b e h a l f  a r e  r e m o v e d  im m e d ia t e l y  
a f t e r  t h e  e l e c t i o n s .  I t  i s  p r e f e r a b l e  p o s t e r s  s h o u ld  b e  m o u n te d  
o n  w o o d e n  f r a m e s  o r  b o a r d s  a n d  h u n g  o r  s t u c k  t o  t h e  g r o u n d  a s  a  
p l a c a r d .
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9 P o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  a n d  c a n d id a t e s  s h o u ld  a v o id  u s i n g  o r  e m p lo y in g  
m e m b e rs  o f  S e c r e t  S o c i e t i e s  a n d  o t h e r  u n d e s i r a b l e  e le m e n t s  a t  
a s s e m b l ie s / m e e t i n g  o r  i n  h o u s e - t o - h o u s e  c a n v a s s in g .
10  I n  a  c a n d i d a t e ’ s  b o o t h ,  o n l y  s u f f i c i e n t  f o o d  a n d  r e f r e s h m e n t s  
r e q u i r e d  f o r  c o n s u m p t io n  b y  p e r s o n s  m a n n in g  t h e  b o o t h ,  s h o u ld  be  
s t o r e d .
11 P o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  c a n d id a t e s ,  t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  a g e n t s ,  
s u p p o r t e r s ,  h e l p e r s  a n d  w o r k e r s  s h o u ld  n o t  t a k e  p a r t  i n  p r o p a g a t i n g  
t h e i r  p a r t y  p l a t f o r m  a t  a n y  f u n c t i o n  o r g a n is e d  b y  G o v e rn m e n t  
O f f i c e r s .
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